Washington Insights (November-December 2021)

Washington Insights (November-December 2021)

The  excitement in DC and in webinars with a DC presence was generated by South  Korean appeals for Washington to join in a call to North Korea for an  end-of-war declaration. Fervor of this sort was reminiscent of appeals by past  South Korean administrations for support, whether over North Korean policy,  “culture wars” with Japan, acceptance of East Sea along with Japan Sea, or  endorsement of the Northeast Asian Peace and Security Initiative. Seoul has  repeatedly sought to mobilize opinion in think tanks and Congress for its  diplomatic agenda, invariably encountering bewilderment in the US over how  these moves would achieve policy objectives. 
There  was scant other excitement in the fall months. Kishida Fumio’s rise to prime  minister put a familiar face in charge in Japan with a policy agenda already  coordinated with Biden’s foreign policy team. Few Chinese or Russians engaged  in exchanges over foreign policy, given the sharp lines drawn against the US as  well as pandemic barriers. In any case, divisions were fixed with no prospect  of finding common ground at this time. Yet Sino-Russian relations drew scrutiny  with occasional input from Russians. Given the predominance of Japan and South  Korea in the webinars, their bilateral ties naturally arose. Finally, the reach  of the Quad drew attention, too, as did the potential for US-EU cooperation in  the Indo-Pacific after the AUKUS rift had opened. The common denominator for  this theme and the US-ROK discussions was US alliances groping with challenges  of coordination as the Biden  administration prepared a vision statement and strategy for the Indo-Pacific  region and faced countries more hesitant about confronting China.
Japan-ROK  Relations

One  subject raised in DC was the prospect for Japan-ROK cooperation and  triangularity in the Kishida era, especially as he deals with a new Korean  president from May 2022. Whereas Kishida is experienced in negotiating with  Seoul—in 2015 as foreign minister he delivered the “comfort women”  agreement—his base is conservative and influenced by anti-Korea emotions on the  rise in Japan. A fourth force standing in the way of improved ties has been  added—that is, public opinion in Japan—as well as the usual forces of Japanese  conservative spokespersons, Korean media, and South Korean public opinion.  Recognizing that Tokyo is no longer a passive force unable to move without the US,  but a co-shaper of regional policy in the Indo-Pacific, Seoul faces the  challenge of accepting Japan on new terms. New appointments raise the profile  of human rights and economic security in Japan, also tying it closer to the  priorities of the US. Now more confident, Japan is less inclined to listen to  the US on South Korea. All of these factors raise the stakes for Japan-ROK  talks in the second half of 2022 to turn relations around before another  downturn occurs, making that even more difficult at a cost to the US regional  strategy.
The  Korean Peninsula

As  elections loomed in Japan and South Korea, listeners heard an update. The  ruling party candidate has been nominated in Korea. Real estate is a primary  concern. The candidate is accused of a scandal in this area. Yet the  conservative opposition is in shambles. Both candidates are likely to stress  the alliance, but the progressive candidate could try something new on North  Korea, which may be disturbing to the US. Job creation is the biggest issue for  the economy. All sectors of society are angry. A high level of vaccination has  taken the pandemic off the table. Some of Moon’s foreign policy could be  reversed, as with North Korea or with the US on tactical nuclear weapons, if  the conservative won. The progressive is eager to lift sanctions and remains silent  on human rights, saying there is no reason to lean to either China or the US.  The conservative would strengthen the alliance into a comprehensive, strategic  alliance, even joining the Quad and leaning further to the US. In this election,  there will be sharp differences on foreign policy as well as on domestic  policy. Neither candidate seeks middle ground. The ruling party has gained a  lot from vaccination, but the bump of late may fade. The US clearly is much  more aligned with the conservative approach to foreign policy. Democrats have  mostly dealt with conservative ROK governments until 2021, which is proving  difficult for Biden. Yet there was good language in May on the supply chain,  emerging technology, health as well as climate change.
In  one webinar, the idea that security and human rights policy toward North Korea  have a zero-sum relationship was refuted. Information is a big theme in this  argument. North Korea is taking new steps to restrict access to outside  information, using advanced digital technology for a new age of censorship and  surveillance. Diverse outside efforts over two decades have tried to breach the  controls. Prolonged border closures have complicated such efforts. When the US is  not talking to North Korea, it raises human rights concerns, as in the US in  2017, but in 2018 as talks proceeded the US grew silent. The results of such  silence show that security was not enhanced. During the Six-Party Talks, the US  side shunted human rights aside to focus on negotiations, although Bush  proceeded on his own, caring a lot about human rights. In the region, including  in the Roh Moo-hyun administration, US envoys were not welcomed on this.
Should  there be an end-of-war declaration? One exchange exploring this issue said the  Moon administration is focusing on this to bring the North Koreans back to  talks. Before, it was seen as a last step. This is short of a peace treaty to  end the war. This is a way to show the North that the US has no hostile policy.  The big push at the end of 2021 is due to the political calendar in Seoul and  to the new concerns about North Korea returning to “normal” behavior. Seoul  wants progress before the Beijing Olympics and the winter military exercises of  2022. It says this will not be legally binding, and there is no need to worry.  The North has long sought a peace treaty. Yet, no moves toward denuclearization  suggest to some that the timing is bad. If there are conditions, the North is  likely to resist. Trump was already willing to discuss this, but Kim Jong-un  only sought big sanctions relief. There has to be peaceful intentions by  Pyongyang for this to be seen as positive. This represents negotiating without  any sign that Pyongyang is interested or willing to move without sanctions  relief. Pyongyang could use it to denounce joint exercises or human rights  criticisms. It could start a slippery slope toward a peace treaty with demands  that US troops leave the peninsula. Some alliance structures could be put in  jeopardy. Defying reality opens a Pandora’s box of follow-on effects. This  issue has little to do with the reasons North Korea has refused prior deals. It  refuses verification and other steps. The US has said on many occasions that it  will not attack North Korea. It could repeat that, but Seoul wants more. To  declare peace now is equivalent to accepting a nuclear North Korea. If this  might be part of a small package deal, some say, first North Korea has to sit  down and explain what it would accept other than major sanctions relief. Also,  the South Korean public is unlikely to be swayed by such a superficial  agreement. The most successful policy in three decades was maximum pressure in  2017, which ended abruptly with maximum engagement. Kim Jung-un had his best  chance under Trump. Now we have maximum impasse. It takes going to the brink,  as in 1994 and 2018, to get some progress. Obama sent credible signals, opening  the best opportunity and persuading China in 2016 to boost some sanctions.    
A  “balanced” perspective on North Korea is sought by South Korea. Seoul has the  highest percentage of military expenses of any US ally with 7 percent increases  per year recently. A framework to keep Pyongyang on track is needed. In 2018  there was hope for this. The ROK-US summit in May laid a foundation to pick up  where we left off in 2018. Moon has proposed an end-of-war declaration to  revive talks with Pyongyang. On China, Seoul’s course was described as a good  working relationship with a huge trade surplus, but overdependence puts supply  chain resilience in doubt. The more US-China tensions, the more tension is felt  in Seoul. China is needed for making peace on the Korean Peninsula. As a  trading nation, Seoul is pragmatic.
As  the Sino-US relationship changes in character with deeper strategic  competition, the ROK faces new challenges. Both sides are tolerating more  confrontation in the relationship, leading to more volatility. Domestic  politics may influence ties more than geopolitics. Pressures on US partners and  allies are more acute, more costly. China is testing the risks countries are  wiling to bear. It is asking states to choose more than the US is, as seen in  Australia. Does Seoul’s unwillingness to speak vocally on Hong Kong damage the  alliance? The US should accept some such cautions. China needs to be  open-minded about bilateral relations. South Korea as the US has a heightened  sense of overdependency, even with thoughts of de-coupling. Weaponized economic  dependence is undermining market-driven interdependence. There is also a sharp  decline in mutual public perceptions. Elite politics and Korean polarization  stand in the way of improving bilateral ties. 
Will  realism serve stability or not? China sees systems in conflict with the US,  leading to moves to neutralize South Korean leanings to the US. South Korean  cultural influence over Chinese is seen as spiritual pollution. Korea’s balance  is not equidistance. It tries to avoid territorial and sovereignty challenges  to China or friction due to high trade volumes and the pursuit of cooperation,  as in the 2022 Winter Games, to renew talks with North Korea. The ROK is  cautious not to irritate China on values. Choosing free and open and other  principles leads to joining the US camp, a coalition that has momentum. The US  seeks a new steady state with common sense guardrails with China, but China is  ready for more coercion, more risk. It is hard to ignore genocide. Mutual  respect means no criticism of China, something hard to avoid. The two big risks  to the alliance are a crisis we are unprepared for, as in the Taiwan Strait;  and divergence on China causing drift and diminishing the alliance. China is  the organizing principle for DOD, and the ROK does not embrace that. The  alliance needs to evolve, discussing the China challenge. With China technology  is where cooperation breaks down first. There will no longer be a normal trade  relationship, including limits on capital flows, which are still going strong,  For the alliance to go forward we must resolve the China challenge. The Chinese  strategy is to neutralize South Korea. Seoul must not overlook that if it seeks  to keep the alliance strong.
On  North Korea, Seoul is dissatisfied with the US only saying is it is open to  dialogue at any time without preconditions. Pyongyang’s restraint may soon end.  Seoul wants to act now, as on an end-of-war declaration. This is not a stable  stalemate, and the US loses over time. Its relative influence decreases as  China’s grows. Options are limited. Moon is making a valiant last-minute  effort. North Korea will refuse it. The US understands that Kim wants  significant sanctions relief.  Kim wants  the progressives to win in 2022, affecting his approach—some testing but not  likely to arouse an overreaction and some signs of seeking more dialogue with  Seoul. Biden is correct in working closely with Seoul. In 2022, there may be  consensus on stabilizing the peninsula, given the Chinese and US domestic  cycles and the agenda of the next South Korean president. The US is not now  seeking a grand bargain or strategic patience. Deterrence is foremost. 
Policies  have been mistaken in assuming China’s cooperation on denuclearization, in  moralizing about the North by pushing it too hard, and by narrowly focusing on  the nuclear dimension. A new, comprehensive approach is needed or China’s  influence will grow. North Korea has been pushed into China’s orbit for two  decades. One means to alter this is declaring the end of war or establishing  liaison offices. North Korea will provoke in 2022 if there is no bold approach.  If sanctions are maintained, what hope is there in this? The US was willing to  do these things in Hanoi, but it collapsed over sanctions. Compared to the  past, there are no assumptions that China will play a positive role. Koreans  want a redo of Hanoi, building on the Singapore deal. Such was the reasoning of  Korean presenters, seeking to persuade their US counterparts.
The  Joint Statement from the May Moon-Biden summit threaded a needle and is likely  to remain the foundation of the relationship no matter which candidate is  elected president. In light of the limited foreign policy experience of the  two, much depends on the foreign policy team the winner chooses. There is no  reason to arouse doubts now in regard to the military alliance, such as  regarding OPCON transfer. Procedures are in place to move forward. As for the  new stress on “Global Korea,” there is much room to flesh that out.  Particularly challenging is the May commitment to bridge military and economic  matters, including diversification of supply chains, joint R&D, export controls  to protect vital industries, development of renewables, and the securitization  of technology. There is not yet an architecture to enable consultations or  mechanisms to reduce market-based decisions without a security input. This  shift in decision-making will be more difficult for South Korea, which depends  more on the Chinese market. In the US and ROK traditional security types have  operated on one plane while building trust, and trade officials on another  plane. How can the two be blended together? The old ways of doing business,  such as just-in-time supplies and blind ignorance of subcontractor sources,  will be difficult to maintain. Already Japan has established a minister of  economic security, offering a new basis of control. The alliance will be tested  by Seoul’s hesitation to act.
Another  test is relations with China. Seoul may not appreciate its great economic  vulnerability to China. In the case of THAAD, it was portrayed as forced on  South Korea, which made the South a victim of China’s response more than a  harbinger of what happens when the risk of overdependency is too great. More  focus is needed on the growing economic coercion by China and Russia and what  is needed preemptively to lessen the danger. More also is needed on how China  tries to weaken the alliance, Seoul also may have counted too much on China  playing a positive role in reunification, as Park Geun-hye did, and may now be  drifting toward an illusion of being able to dislodge North Korea from China’s  orbit. Some suggest that if China draws the North closer it will hurt the  alliance, given China’s multiple advantages over the US across the  peninsula—geographical, cultural, economic. This is a misreading of the  Sino-ROK-DPRK triangle as if Pyongyang could tilt to Seoul rather than Beijing  and Beijing does not have the leverage to deny Seoul its peninsular goals. Indeed,  the consensus in the US is that China has been using North Korea’s “legitimate  security concerns” to pursue its own objectives against South Korea and the US.  The lone exception, when China took sanctions seriously at the end of 2017, had  two unique circumstances: total US focus on North Korea in Sino-US relations,  when they were still in an uncertain state; and unprecedented Chinese anger at  the North’s leader for testing a nuclear weapon near China’s border and  continuously showing disrespect to Xi Jinping. Kim in 2018 stabilized the  relationship, and Sino-US relations entered a downward spiral that reduced any  prospect of further coordination on North Korea of the sort achieved at the end  of 2017. 
Why  pursue talks on a declaration of the end of war? On the one hand, this is the  burning desire of the Moon administration, and out of respect for it the US  must take this prospect seriously. On the other, as in 2015 when Park Geun-hye  was obsessed with her Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative, there is  hardly anyone in DC who sees this as promising. The only comparable idea that  the US had accepted, but only on condition that denuclearization advance first,  was the fifth working group of the Six-Party Talks in 2007. If the purpose is  to garner support from China in dealing with North Korea, China’s lack of  interest is a telling sign. If it is to delink North Korea from China,  encouraged by the negative remarks made by North Korean officials in private  talks, then this misjudges how much more Pyongyang would be discomforted by  Seoul or Washington’s demands than Beijing’s. If the idea is to give Pyongyang  more confidence in its security, this is far-fetched since the real threat to  the regime—South Korea’s presence as an alternative model and cultural  magnet—would not be changed.
Despite  the success of the May Joint Statement and the upbeat mood on the surface,  relations between Washington and Seoul have been troubled by conflicting  approaches to North Korea. The good news is that close consultations continue  with no open, mutual accusations. The bad news is that the gap is wide and not  narrowing, as Seoul feels stifled in its last, best chance for peace by  overreliance on pressure and Washington suspects that engagement without signs  of denuclearization would lead to appeasement. To buy stability in this way would  be an illusion. A peace declaration would not change North Korea’s strategic  calculus but embolden it to push further to drive the US out and coerce South  Korea into reunification on the North’s terms.
In  one seminar where Koreans made the case for an end-of-war declaration, the US  pushback made for a lively set of exchanges. The Korean side stated that  Biden’s policy for North Korea has hit an impasse, which is bad because time is  on the North’s side. The goal must be peaceful coexistence, and it has been  within reach on occasions in the 1990s, 2000ss, and 2020s, but each time  through US mistakes it proved elusive. If North Korea was sincere, as in 2019,  the US proved untrustworthy. The key to building trust now is an end-of-war  declaration. Nuclear weapons are a survival strategy for Pyongyang. By  partially lifting them, with snap-back provisions, trust would be built. Once  an atmosphere of confrontation was fading, the pathway for peaceful coexistence  on the peninsula would evolve, parallel to what happened between the US and the  PRC in 1971-72. Seoul has proven itself over seven decades the ideal US ally  and in 2021 has followed the guidelines set with Biden faithfully. With this  new declaration, it can be trusted to cooperate closely on what would be a  sustainable legacy from the Moon era. The South Korean case for a declaration  appealed also to US national interest versus China. The US must stop alienating  China and losing its support in dealing with North Korea, while it can count on  North Korean alarm about China to boost peaceful coexistence supportive of a US  presence. 

  

  The US pushback took many forms. First, the case rests on accepting a North  Korean paradigm of US hostile policy. This turns history on its head since it  is North Korean hostile policy since the end of the Korean War that has  disrupted the peace and prevented successful talks. Also, the case treats the  US as having broken faith with the Singapore Declaration, when the North was  the one who did so. Second, the case misjudges the purposes of sanctions—many  of which were partially successful—while assuming that diplomacy alone works,  when diplomacy has mostly failed. Third, the assumption is made that North  Korea would agree to making such a declaration, when it is repeatedly asserted  that it has preconditions for talks, unlike the US side. Fourth, there is an  inconsistency on the part of the Moon administration, claiming both that this  is a cost-free, symbolic step with few consequences and that this is  transformative by changing the calculus of Pyongyang. Indeed, the message to  Pyongyang—but not the US—is that this is proof of a fundamental change in the  US position, ensuring that once again hope would be raised only to be dashed by  charges of broken promises. Fifth, part of the case for the declaration is to  strengthen the alliance since the Moon administration adamantly seeks this. Yet  the impact in the US is predictable: Biden would be ruthlessly attacked as soft  on North Korea without anything to show for his concession to Seoul, and the  contrasting words in Seoul and DC would fuel this barrage. Sixth, coming just  before South Korea’s presidential elections, the US would be seen as  interfering with a possible conservative president’s agenda by trying to lock  in Moon’s legacy. Seventh, to proceed without any indication of Pyongyang’s  intentions and next steps is to walk into a trap. In this regard, the US remains  unclear about the wording of the declaration, which may reaffirm or replace the  armistice with widely different implications. Eighth, the multi-stage scenario  outlined from peace declaration to peace treaty to normalization of US-North  Korean relations to lasting peaceful coexistence has so many leaps of faith and  doubtful assumptions about North Korean behavior that many saw it as desperate,  wishful thinking. Finally, the absence of China in the discussion was viewed as  geopolitically uniformed since its response to the 2018-19 diplomacy was  largely negative and possibly significant for the poor outcome and it has made  clear that it has cards to play with both Koreas to shape new talks.

  

  Sino-Russian  Relations

On  Sino-Russian relations, it was explained that Russia is a key part of China’s  strategy versus the US. It shares complaints about interference in sovereignty  issues. The US opportunity to impact Sino-Russian relations begins by not  exaggerating the extent to which they are working together. Russia will not  mobilize to join China in Asian fighting and China also will not do so for  Russia. Thus, there is no alliance. The US confronts them where they are not  partners. Russia’s economic power is not joined with China In technology. They  are opposed on Central Asia and elsewhere on the Eurasian landmass. The BRI is  a challenge to Russia, encroaching on Russia’s interests. The Taliban is likely  to play off the two against each other. Russia needs China more than China  needs Russia, which makes Russia uncomfortable. China is a less revisionist  power internationally. Yet, the US has little chance to take advantage of such fault  lines without risking a counterproductive response. This was a US assessment of  how little leverage it actually has.
A  Russian response was that Russia is not a revisionist power since it sees the  liberal world order as dead, including US partners of old. China is much more  revisionist now, seeing that the positive environment since the 1980s is gone.  The domestic and external systems are changing, both incompatible with the  international system. Russia is now seen in the US as no longer the major  opponent, arousing a sudden adjustment. It is beginning to see how it can  benefit from this. The Sino-Russian relationship is dynamic—experience multiple  stages over the past seven years. From bitter disappointment in the West and  euphoria over China to realism that interactions with Chinese show it is hard  to find common ground with both politicians and businessmen, ties still  improved on a sober basis. It is reckless not to have excellent relations with  China, given its power and proximity. US ideas are baseless to drive a wedge.  There is a growing internal debate about how to deal with clashing interests,  affected by the style of Chinese diplomacy applied to Russia as well. Russia is  the only neighbor of China not afraid of China. All other neighbors are  terrified. Russia is confident it can deter China, which is taken in China as a  positive factor. Clashes in Eurasia are inevitable, but that is not now  happening. Those states are more afraid of China than Russia, giving Russia an  advantage. The big advantage of Russia is China’s offensive threat, but that  does not mean a clash ahead. Of late, Putin has said an alliance is not needed  by either side. Biden’s stress on “free world” versus the rest pushes China and  Russia together, while serving his goal of consolidating the West.
This  is a limited partnership, and there are limited options for the US. In some  areas, there is little cooperation. China does not offer so much to Russia in  many areas. This is only a loose partnership with both sides wary. In defense  areas this is quite consequential for the US. The threat from the US has been  understated here. The US-led order still threatens exclusion to both. In  Beijing there is some concern that US overtures could turn Moscow somewhat  away. Some in the US also seek to give Russia more options; so ties to China  might not strengthen. US allies show more flexibility to Russia. But these  steps would require more stability in US-Russia ties, but this is difficult.  Yet there is also the possibility the US will provoke these countries to draw  closer together. The advice was to not encourage greater collaboration against  the US. It is necessary to anticipate a different world order, recognizing the  end of the old order. Realism calls for balance between the centers of power  without Russia and China working together. No hope for Russia to be equidistant  is in sight, but Russia could have a healthier relationship with Europe and the  US. This avoids trying to create hostility between Russia and China. All three  states would not be incentivized to become revisionist powers. The US needs to  get buy-in from Russia and China. Without specifying the implications, this was  seen as a call to satisfy Russia on Ukraine and China on Taiwan. If the US is  caught in an impasse with China in the Pacific, Russia could be inclined to  move in Ukraine. The US is concerned about avoiding this scenario, as the US  tries to proceed with China without Russia taking such action. Russia is making  the mistake in the 2020s that the US made in the 1990s: assuming a great power  is fading away. Viewing the US as rapidly declining power with its order  collapsing leads to shortsighted responses. For either state to assume that  China is poised for decline, this would be a comparable mistake. 
The  Quad

A  webinar on the Quad indicated that it avoids the subjects of China and Taiwan.  The focus is to provide public goods. The unstated message is the provision of  military security. China’s use of coercion has driven this thinking. In the  early days of the Quad, Taiwan was not a factor. Now, it likely is discussed  behind closed doors. Coercion against anyone in the first island chain would  send a signal about China’s intentions. India would be involved. In Japan there  is a good image of the Quad, fed by Chinese grey zone activities around the  Senkakus and by the rapid build-up of the Chinese navy. Japan lacks resources  to do all it may desire in maritime affairs. There is no appetite for a treaty  or standing secretariat. The Quad does not need to expand, but the Quad Plus  can mee some purposes. No alliance is anticipated. Australia wants to use the  Quad to shape a more favorable region, especially in Southeast Asia to China.  All call this a positive partnership delivering public goods. It is still at  the proof-of-concept stage. Deterrence is mainly done through other entities.  Taiwan arises in both the Australia-US bilateral and the trilateral with Japan.  Australia would be involved in some way in a Taiwan contingency occurs, but  public opinion has not caught up or become supportive. Most want to remain  neutral in a conflict, but that is not realistic. The main uncertainty is  political change in India after the next election. The Indian Ocean is not an  active theater of military operations now; the Quad is meeting current needs.  The Quad shows willpower to stand up to China. Great Britain, France, and South  Korea are debating signaling strategically where they are, too. The Quad Plus  is an a la carte approach to that. AUKUS is a defense technology sharing  arrangement, and the Quad is a loose diplomatic effort, not focused on defense.  Both signal Australia’s concerns about China.
EU-US  Cooperation on the Indo-Pacific

In  one seminar both sides recognized a great reshuffling of strategic interests in  the world’s new center of geoeconomics and geopolitical gravity and searched  for shared understanding that could boost EU-US cooperation. This was seen as  critical for not allowing divisions among allies to be exploited. On the  European side, there is fear that Trump’s “America First” and anti-EU approach  could return, commodifying security interests. Yet, it was recognized that the  Indo-Pacific strategy of the US bridges the Trump and Biden administrations and  is expected to last. At this time the US and EU are consulting on Indo-Pacific  strategy, and the Biden administration is preparing an Indo-Pacific vision  report buttressed by a strategy to realize the vision. While the case for the  vision is not overly China-centered, the motivation certainly is. 
Important  here is convergence of the US and EU in assessing the China challenge and  finding considerable common ground in their responses. As seen in China’s  resort to economic coercion, there is a need for coordinated pushback and  preventive steps to avoid unwanted dependency that can be exploited. Some  concerns were expressed about divergence between the US and EU. While in the  Obama era economics and security operated in separate silos for the most part,  they are now being integrated into one comprehensive approach. In the EU this  is slow to take place. In regard to how strategic issues are communicated, the  US is more direct, seen as necessary to shape the narrative in support of the  rules-based order, but the EU has been more indirect and some have seen US  rhetoric as unnecessarily provocative, worrying the US as not up to the  challenge. Finally, the US side seeks to slow China’s rise in areas of  technology with military applications or the potential to be used for economic  leverage, e.g., through export controls and investment screening. This is not  called containment or support for a cold war, but it is aimed at China’s malign  influence. In the 1970s-80s, it was difficult to get the US and European powers  on the same wavelength on the Soviet Union. It will be much harder now on  China.
Discussion  treated AUKUS as a continuing problem for US-EU coordination in the  Indo-Pacific, with a silver lining since it has stimulated much livelier  exchanges, including France especially. As the danger of a clash over Taiwan  grows, the US has security commitments in the region and has a sense of  urgency. European rhetoric appears to stick to the idea of balancing  competition, cooperation, and systemic rivalry without shifting the way the US  has to systemic rivalry stands in the forefront. Not only is there no prospect  of equidistance between the US and China or a European third way, which  Europeans have lately acknowledged, but in light of growing signs of a Taiwan  crisis, delay in assisting Taiwan to resist coercion raises problems in EU-US  relations. If Xi Jinping earlier spoke of participating in global governance  and switched to guiding it, his push to lead it is a gamechanger, given his  plans and tactics. The exchanges pointed to recent shifts within the EU  bringing it closer to the US position and to a new level of consultations, but  they also suggested the importance of accelerating efforts to narrow  differences in the near future.