In recent years, the concept of a “new type of great power relations” (xinxing daguo guanxi) has appeared as a prominent theme in Chinese international relations discourse1. The concept was first outlined by State Councillor Dai Bingguo at the US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue in 2010, but achieved particular prominence following Xi Jinping’s visits to the United States as vice-president in 2012 and as president in 2013. At the Sunnylands summit with Barack Obama in June 2013, Xi explained that the “new type of great power relations” was based on the principles of “no confrontation or conflict,” “mutual respect,” and “win-win cooperation.”2 Yet all this positive language about cooperation and mutual benefit cannot hide the fact that the United States and China face a number of political, economic, and security challenges with the potential to drag them into conflict rather than cooperation. One of the most pressing is China’s relationship with Japan.
This article poses a very simple question: Where does Japan fit into Chinese discourse on a “new type of great power relations?” Answering this is an important step in determining whether the United States and China will be able to craft a future relationship that avoids confrontation. Recent scholarship on China’s rise and the power transition taking place in Asia has emphasized the significant role that Japan could play in shaping the future US-China relationship. Some argue that Japan enhances the likelihood of confrontation and conflict between them: the centrality of Japan in the US strategic posture in Asia and Japanese fears of US abandonment threaten the development of a genuine US-China power-sharing “condominium” in Asia.3 Others contend that Japan has and will continue to play a central role in managing China’s peaceful rise within Asia: the US-Japan alliance underpins America’s forward military presence in the region and serves as a balance against Chinese military power, while Japan’s economic engagement of China and active support for regional multilateralism simultaneously helps to socialize and integrate a more peaceful China into the region.4 Regardless of whether one sees Japan as contributing to or detracting from a stable US-China relationship, there is little doubt that Japan, and China’s relationship with Japan, remains central to the future of any “new type of great power relationship” between the United States and China.
To explore how Japan fits into China’s new concept this article examines a range of Chinese scholarly articles and newspapers, most of which have been published since 2012.5 Of the 326 Chinese-language journal articles that refer to the “new type of great power relations,” only eight made any reference to Japan, and only five of these discussed Japan in any detail. In addition, a similar content search of China’s major official newspaper, the People’s Daily, indicated that of the thousands of articles on the first subject only seven discussed Japan in any detail.6 This content analysis demonstrated a first important finding: the overwhelming majority of Chinese academic scholarship and media coverage on the concept pays little or no attention to Japan. The “new type of great power relations” has been developed explicitly in reference to the US-China relationship, and the paucity of articles that refer to Japan suggests that very few Chinese academics, officials, or journalists consider Japan or the Japan-China relationship to have any bearing on the future of this relationship. Only one academic article directly applied the concept to Japan-China relations itself, and the author, Liu Jiangyong, an expert on these relations, mentioned the concept only very briefly by stating:
“Whether or not China and Japan, as the world’s second and third largest economies, are heading towards dire straits or the building of a new type of great power relations and good neighbor relations, crucially depends on whether they can grasp the opportunity and enthusiastically build policies to improve their relations, particularly with regards to the Diaoyu issue.” 7
Despite this general lack of coverage, a handful of scholarly articles, opinion pieces, and media coverage of speeches by Chinese officials do explicitly consider Japan when elaborating on a “new type of great power relations.” Four dominant themes emerge. The first, and perhaps most unsurprising, is a strong argument that any “new type of great power relations” between the United States and China could easily be disrupted by a dispute between China and Japan over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands. Second, Chinese academics and officials measure China’s rising power by reference to Japan’s declining power. Third, they have developed this new concept by explicitly drawing a contrast between China’s future rise and Japan’s historical rise to power. Finally, Chinese academics, journalists, and officials see the “new type of great power relations” as a partial extension of the post-World War II international order in which very specific roles were ascribed to China and Japan. The postwar order thus becomes an important reference point in thinking about the future US-China relationship. Below, I discuss each of these themes before considering the implications of this Chinese discourse for the future of China’s “new type of great power relations.”
Respecting Core Interests: The Diaoyu/Senkaku Island Dispute as a Threat to the “New Type of Great Power Relations”
Of all the themes considered here, the most frequent reference to Japan is that achieving a “new type” of more cooperative Sino-US relations could be jeopardized by a dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands. China-Japan relations worsened as a result of the Japanese government’s decision to “purchase” three of the islands in September 2012, and because of China’s increasing air and maritime incursions into the contested area surrounding the islands. Tensions between China and Japan over this issue have therefore increased precisely at the same time that Chinese specialists and officials have been developing ideas about a “new type of great power relations.” For many Chinese analysts and officials, discussions of the future US-China relationship cannot be isolated from discussions about the Diaoyu/Senkaku island dispute with Japan.
The relationship between the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands dispute and the US-China “new type of great power relations” was first underscored on September 20, 2012, when People’s Daily published the text of a joint address given by then vice president Xi and US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta during the latter’s visit to China. Xi expounded on the “important consensus” that had been reached on developing the idea of a “new type of great power relations,” then immediately turned to the dispute with Japan, which had flared up with the purchase of three islands in the chain on September 11. Outlining its relationship to the future of US-China ties, Xi stated:
“We hope that the U.S., from the point of view of regional peace and stability, will be cautious, will not get involved in the Diaoyu Islands sovereignty dispute, and will not do anything that might intensify contradictions and make the situation more complicated.” 8
Subsequent Chinese articles elaborated on how the “new type of great power relations” may be affected by the island dispute. Editorials in People’s Daily in late 2012 and early 2013 issued a clear argument that these relations could not be achieved without US respect for China’s “core interests” (hexin liyi). One editorial suggested that “respect for core interests” was the “crux” of the “new type of great power relations” being jointly constructed, and that sovereignty and territorial integrity were fundamental to China’s core interests.9 An editorial in December 2012 put the position even more bluntly:
“The US position regarding “welcoming a strong, prosperous and peaceful China” together with China’s concept of “new type of great power relations” merits affirmation. However, creating a new type of China-US great power relations will not be effective if countries just talk the talk. The US must learn how to respect China’s core interests, and do fewer stupid things….The Diaoyu islands issue is related to China’s sovereignty and the US should fully understand the high sensitivity of this issue; from a regional peace and stability perspective it must be cautious, should not intervene in the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands issue, and [should] not do anything that might intensify contradictions and make the situation more complicated.”10
As Ren Xiao has argued, China’s concept of a “new type of great power relations” recognises that the only way for the United States and China to avoid future confrontation is to find ways to compromise on “sensitive questions” such as territorial disputes.11 Yet when we probe more deeply into the question of where Japan fits into this, we see little evidence that China is willing to compromise on the question of territorial disputes with Japan. In January 2013, an editorial in People’s Daily warned the United States that China simply could not “give in” (tuirang) on issues of territorial sovereignty, and had “no room to maneuver” (meiyou renhe huixuan kongjian) on the Diaoyu/Senkaku issue.12 Thus, it argued that the United States must learn to “speak and act cautiously” (jinyan shenxing) with regard to the Diaoyu/Senkaku island dispute, and that by criticizing China’s behavior in the East China Sea—rather than that of Japan—the United States had failed to do so.
Chinese sources recognize that the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands dispute is just one of a number of sovereignty disputes, along with the Taiwan issue and the South China Sea issue, that have the potential to derail the US-China relationship.13 Yet, it is the territorial dispute with Japan that has received the greatest attention in Chinese discourse on the “new type of great power relations” over the past eighteen months. An article by Ruan Zongze, vice-president of the China Institute for International Studies (CIIS) highlighted its importance by suggesting that Chinese saw “US statements and actions on issues involving Japan as a litmus test of Washington’s sincerity toward China.”14 Similarly, Yuan Peng, assistant president of the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), has argued that the island dispute has already affected the “chess game” (boyi) between the United States, China, and Japan, and that US “interference” (ganyu) in the dispute has increased the risk of a military clash between it and China.15
Power Transition: Measuring China’s Rise by Reference to Japan
A second way in which Japan features in Chinese discussions of the “new type of great power relations” is as a reference point against which to measure China’s rising power. While this concept was developed to apply to the future US-China relationship, some see China’s surpassing of Japan as a key measure of China’s great power status. In an important article Yuan Peng charts China’s rise by measuring the changing balance of power between China and Japan, focusing on the transition that took place in 2010 when China replaced Japan as the world’s second largest economy. For Yuan Peng, this economic transition between Japan and China is “the most significant event in Asia’s history since [Japan’s defeat of China in] the First Sino-Japanese War,” and an event that symbolized the reality of China’s rise. He links this moment with the 2000 years to the war in 1894-1895 when China held the “indisputable leading position” in East Asia via its tribute system. By overtaking the Japanese economy, China righted a “major contradiction” in Asia’s structural order, which saw China as the weaker power relative to Japan, argues Yuan.16
Yuan also points to China’s successful hosting of the Beijing Olympics in 2008, the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the People’s Republic of China in 2009, and the World Expo in 2010 as symbols of China’s newfound power and status. By contrast, he suggests that Japan’s decline is symbolized by the “constant series of misfortunes” it has suffered since 2011; notably, the earthquake, tsunami, and Fukushima nuclear leak. Yuan concludes that, given this power transition between China and Japan, “in the 10-20 years after 2010, the two competitors will be the US and China.”17
Historical Lessons: China’s Future Will Not Be Japan’s Past
A third prominent feature in Chinese discourse about the “new type of great power relations” is that Japan’s past serves as a point of contrast for discussions of China’s future. A number of academics have developed this concept precisely by drawing a contrast between China’s future rise and Japan’s historical rise to power. For Sun Zhe, the “new type of great power relations” between the United States and China is designed to avoid going down the “old road” taken by rising powers such as Japan (and Germany) in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.18 This idea closely resembles language put forward by Zheng Bijian, the author of the concept of “China’s peaceful rise,” who in 2005 wrote:
“China will not follow the path of Germany leading up to World War I or those of Germany and Japan leading up to World War II, when these countries violently plundered resources and pursued hegemony. Neither will China follow the path of the great powers vying for global domination during the Cold War.” 19
Similar themes are also echoed by Xue Litai and Feng Zheng, who caution that because of drastic changes in the nature of economic relations, military power, diplomacy, technology, and domestic politics, it would be foolish to “mechanically” draw on old historical examples and concepts to interpret the future US-China relationship.20 They suggest that aspects of China’s “national character” (minzu xinge) mean that its rise will be very different than that of Japan, noting that China does not share the “wild ambitions” (juda yexin) for territorial expansion that Japan exhibited during the 1930s and 1940s. These authors suggest that a combination of “extreme nationalism,” military control of the Japanese government, and Japan’s scarce territory and natural resources, led Japan to pursue colonial expansion in North and Southeast Asia and “regional hegemony” (diqu baquan).21 Furthermore, they acknowledge the economic drivers that led Japan and Germany to pursue aggressive policies in the 1920 and 1930s. For both, access to urgently needed raw materials such as oil, rubber, iron ore, and foodstuffs—and their inability to access those materials on the world market—catalysed their decisions to invade and colonize countries. They suggest that unlike Japan, China has no tradition of overseas expansion, and that it is a “domestically-oriented Chinese civilization” (neixiangxing de Zhonghua wenming). They add that because the contemporary US-China economic relationship is a complementary and mutually dependent one, the two are unlikely to experience the same economic competition that propelled Germany and Japan to war.22 Yet significantly, neither these nor any other Chinese academics acknowledge that the complementary and mutually dependent economic relationship between China and Japan might also provide the basis for a “new type of great power relations” between those two countries. Instead, academics such as Liu Jiangyong simply emphasize that the China-Japan economic relationship has suffered because of political and security tensions in the bilateral relationship.23
For Yang Lu-hui, it is Japan’s post-Cold War relationship with the United States that serves as the “negative” model, which must be avoided in future US-China relations. The “new type of great power relations” cannot be modelled on that relationship, which he describes as a “military alliance between two great powers” that is “asymmetrical” (buduichen), “unbalanced” (feijunhengxing), and one in which the two countries do not enjoy equal status (buduideng). Given this unequal relationship, Yang concludes that the “US-Japan great power relationship is definitely not a strategic option for the China-US new type of great power relations.”24
Post-WWII Order: We Must Not Let Japan Overturn the Postwar International Order
In their discussions of the “new type of great power relations,” Chinese make frequent reference to the post-World War II international order (zhanhou guoji zhixu) and the place of China, the United States, and Japan within it. These references serve two purposes. First, they allow Chinese leaders to condemn Japan for behavior that they see as attempting to overthrow that order: Abe Shinzo’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, plans to revise the postwar Constitution, and unwillingness to formally acknowledge the existence of a sovereignty dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands. For example, in one of his early speeches about the “new type of great power relations,” Xi Jinping argued that Japan was threatening to overturn the postwar international order that had been established at the end of the Second World War.
“81 years ago, Japan shocked the world with the “Mukden Incident.” Japanese militarism not only caused untold sufferings to the Chinese people, but also caused great trauma to the Asia-Pacific countries including the United States. Some political forces in Japan have not deeply reflected on the wounds of war caused to neighboring countries and Asia-Pacific countries, but have further intensified, and are repeating the same mistake, performing the farce of “purchasing the islands,” openly questioning the international legitimacy of the “Cairo Declaration” and “Potsdam Declaration,” intensifying territorial disputes with neighbors, and so on. The international community must not allow Japan to attempt to negate the results of the World Anti-Fascist War, or challenge the postwar international order. Japan should stop before it is too late, and stop damaging China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity with its completely erroneous words and deeds.” 25
This statement by Xi, as well as other recent official Chinese statements and writings, make extensive reference to symbols of the postwar order, such as the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations.26 These international legal instruments were used by the “Three Great Allies”—the United States, Great Britain, and the Republic of China—to draft the terms of Japan’s surrender, and enshrined a very particular postwar role for Japan as a constrained and “abnormal” non-military power. Statements such as Xi’s depict Chinese alarm at what they see as the potential unravelling of a postwar order that has served as the “foundation of international relations.”27 The international order envisaged by China is one that keeps Japan from breaking free of its special postwar status, and held back from taking military steps to counter China’s rapid rise.
Second, Chinese see the postwar order as significant not only because of the way in which it disarmed Japan, but also because it ascribed a special status to China (albeit the Republic of China) as one of the leading powers in the international system. By invoking images and symbols of the postwar international order, such as the Cairo and Potsdam declarations, leaders subtly remind the United States that China should be recognised as an equal great power and “of a time past, but not long past, when China stood alongside the other progressive powers against fascism.”28 Rather than emphasizing differences with the United States, Chinese writings instead focus on this shared history and values, as in this September 2012 praise for US efforts:
“During World War II, US power was a major contribution to the defeat of Japan. The United States’ historic contribution to the people of Asia, including China, is highly praised and fully respected. After the war, the United States then bore responsibility for the “destruction of Japanese militarism.” 29
These ideas of equality, great power status, and shared contribution to international order—stemming from the experience and aftermath of the Second World War—underpin Chinese calls for a “new type of great power relations” with the United States.
Yet the problem is that Chinese officials only wish to maintain certain aspects of the postwar international order: China’s great power status and the comprehensive disarmament of Japan. There are other aspects of the postwar order—notably the US-Japan alliance—that are far more problematic for Beijing. Chinese writings and official rhetoric on the “new type of great power relations” betray a sense of unease about the way in which the US-Japan alliance allowed the United States to “illicitly transfer” sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands to Japan during the 1970s, about Japan’s remilitarization within the US-Japan alliance, and about the way in which the alliance now serves as a key plank in the US military “rebalance” to Asia.30 This is China’s dilemma: The postwar mechanism that enabled the comprehensive disarmament of Japan—the US-Japan alliance—now facilitates Japan’s remilitarization and can be used to counter China’s rise. Despite their desire to maintain the postwar international order, Chinese discourse about that order does not allow for any movement in the US-Japan alliance. Chinese want the US-Japan alliance to remain a static one, serving only to lock Japan into its “abnormal” postwar status. This is a big demand, made even bigger by the fact that China’s own rise is changing Asia’s strategic order, inevitably prompting powers such as Japan and the United States to respond.
Three lessons can be drawn from these Chinese discussions of Japan and the “new type of great power relations.” First, the overwhelming majority of Chinese official rhetoric and academic and media discourse does not refer to Japan when considering the future US-China relationship. This demonstrates that the Chinese concept affords little room to leading Asian states such as Japan, and considers the US-China relationship distinct from relations with other powers in the region. The United States ought to take note of this fact and consider whether its own vision of the Asia-Pacific order is consistent with the Chinese concept.
Second, where Chinese sources do discuss Japan within the context of the “new type of great power relations,” their ideas about Japan are very narrowly conceived. Japan is alternately depicted as a declining power and reference point against which to measure China’s rising power; as a country whose own aggressive rise to power serves as a negative point of comparison for China’s future rise; as a country whose bilateral relationship with the United States is unequal and therefore a poor model for the future US-China relationship; and as an increasingly right-wing and militaristic country which is attempting to provoke regional instability over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute. There is very little positive in these depictions of Japan. Moreover, these views stand in sharp contrast to how Chinese have conceived of Japan at earlier moments in their history. New Chinese archival evidence indicates that in the 1950s-1960s, Chinese officials depicted Japan not only as a wartime aggressor, but also as a model of a modern, industrialised and powerful state and an important economic partner to China. Although the two countries did not enjoy diplomatic relations, leading Chinese officials such as Premier Zhou Enlai and Governor of the People’s Bank of China Nan Hanchen welcomed scores of Japanese industrialists and business groups to China in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s to provide advice on developing China’s postwar economy. 31 In the late 1980s, Japan’s role as an economic partner grew more important, but so too did Chinese fear of Japan’s rising power, a concern that soon would no longer be diminished by the broader strategic context in which China and Japan were aligned against the Soviet threat. The narrowing of Chinese views about Japan intensified in the post-Cold War era as China’s communist leaders embarked on a process of “re-remembering” Japanese atrocities during the Second World War. By the mid-90s, official discourse placed great emphasis on Japan’s historical misdeeds, and was highly critical of the strengthening US-Japan security alliance and Japan’s relations with Taiwan. This discourse spilled over into strong anti-Japanese sentiment at the public level, leading in the early 2000s to widespread protests over issues such as Japan’s bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Nevertheless, even in the midst of these tensions, Chinese discourse on Japan in the early 2000s still contained a plurality of views.32 This was most notably demonstrated by the “new thinkers”—such as Shi Yinhong and Ma Licheng—who put forward the controversial view that China could not expect Japan to forever remain an “abnormal” country without military power.
What appears to be different in Chinese contemporary discourse about Japan is the absence of a plurality of views. Instead, we see a dangerous narrowing of Chinese ideas about Japan. There are still occasional references to the major economic ties that bind China and Japan together, such as in September 2012 when People’s Daily reminded its readers in the midst of widespread anti-Japanese protests and boycotts in China that “[a]ny major disruption to bilateral trade [between China and Japan] would hurt both countries.”33 Yet such references are increasingly rare. Today, the labels that are most prominent in Chinese official and academic discourse about Japan are terms such as “declining power,” “historical aggression,” “right-wing,” and “nationalism,” and symbols of Japan’s disarmament at the end of the Second World War such as the Tokyo Trials and Cairo and Potsdam declarations. These labels portray a very one-dimensional image of Japan. Whether instrumental or otherwise, they depict a view that Japan is inferior to China, that historical aggression disqualifies Japan from playing a “normal” great power role, and that Japan’s “illegitimate” and “nationalistic” behavior—rather than any actions on the part of China—is challenging the status quo in Asia. Just as importantly, these labels also provide a way for Chinese officials and academics to juxtapose China’s future with Japan’s past; because China is not militaristic and nationalistic like Japan, they argue, the world has no need to fear and contain China’s rise.
Finally, this discourse about Japan poses grave problems for the peaceful management of future US-China relations. As Evelyn Goh has recently argued, Asia’s “ongoing order transition requires a mutual reckoning between China and Japan about the terms of Japan’s reintegration into contemporary regional society.”34 Yet as is clear from this analysis, Chinese conceptions remain narrowly conceived visions of Japan as an aggressive, militaristic, and illegitimate power. Any mutual reckoning appears unlikely. This means that the United States will continue to serve as the “ring-holder” between a rivalrous China and Japan, thereby eroding China’s efforts to build a new order in Asia in which power and authority are more equally shared between the US and China.35 In October 2013, China’s Politburo Standing Committee held a major work conference on regional diplomacy, a conference that was likely intended to find ways to reset and repair China’s regional relations after a difficult 3-4 years. President Xi called on China to consolidate “friendly relations” with neighboring countries, argued that “the Asia and Pacific region is big enough for all countries to develop,” and urged China to take proactive steps to strengthen regional security.36 Whether this new Chinese discourse applies to Japan is not yet clear. So far, we have seen little evidence from China of creative thinking about the role a powerful Japan might play alongside a powerful China. While some, such as Yuan Peng, have acknowledged the importance of strengthening the trilateral US-China-Japan relationship as a “precondition” for achieving the “new type of great power relations,” this kind of thinking remains scarce.37 Unless China rethinks Japan’s role in Asia, and how the power transition can be managed in ways that are acceptable to both China and Japan, we are unlikely to see much success for China’s “new type of great power relations.”
1. The phrase is also translated into English as a “new model of big country relations,” but for the sake of consistency it will be referred to here as a “new type of great power relations.”
2. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Xi Jinping and US President Obama Hold Joint Press Conference,” June 8, 2013, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/xjpttcrmux/t1049545.shtml. For recent analysis of the concept see Ren Xiao, “Modeling a ‘New Type of Great Power Relations,’ A Chinese Viewpoint,” The Asan Forum, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Oct. 2013).
3. Hugh White, The China Choice: Why America Should Share Power (Collingwood: Black Inc., 2012); Taylor, Brendan, “Asia’s Century and the Problem of Japan’s Centrality,” International Affairs 87, no. 4 (2011): 871-885.
4. Evelyn Goh, “How Japan Matters in the Evolving East Asian Security Order,” International Affairs 87, no. 4 (2011): 887-902.
5. I found them through a content search of Chinese academic journals for articles that referred to both “new type of great power relations” and “Japan,” using the Chinese Academic Journals Database CNKI.
6. Several of the People’s Daily articles cited below were published using the byline “Zhong Sheng” (钟声), which, as Michael Swaine has noted, refers to the editorial staff of the People’s Daily International Department, and thus can be considered a “quasi-authoritative” source in representing official Party views. See Michael D. Swaine, “Chinese Views and Commentary on the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 43 (2014):31 (note 14).
7. Liu Jiangyong, “Chuzai shizilukou de Zhongri guanxi,” Shiqi baogao, no. 2 (2013): 44.
8. “Xi Jinping huijian Meiguo guofangbuzhang Paneita,” Renmin ribao, September 20, 2012.
9. “Diaoyudao wenti kaoyan Meiguo zhengzhi zhihui (guoji luntan),” Renmin ribao, September 20, 2012.
10. “Bien na Diaoyudao wenti wanrhuo (guoji luntan),” Renmin ribao, December 3, 2012.
11. Ren Xiao, “Modeling a ‘New Type of Great Power Relations.’”
12. “Meiguo buyao zai bei xin baofu,” Renmin ribao, January 21, 2013.
13. “Zhongmei nuli goujian xinxing junshi guanxi (quanwei luntan),” Renmin ribao, September 26, 2013.
14. Ruan Zongze, “A New Model of Major-Country Relations: The New Driving Force Behind China-US Relations,” China-US Focus, January 9, 2014, http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/a-new-model-of-major-country-relations-the-new-driving-force-behind-china-us-relations.
15. Yuan Peng, “Xunqiu Zhongmei Yatai liangxing hudong,” Guoji anquan yanjiu, no. 1 (2013): 65.
16. Yuan Peng, “Xunqiu Zhongmei Yatai liangxing hudong,” 56-64.
17. Yuan Peng, “Xunqiu Zhongmei Yatai liangxing hudong,” 56, 59.
18. Sun Zhe is interviewed in Jiang Wei, “Xinxing daguo guanxi jiushi yao bimian zou laolü,” 21 shiji jingji baodao (2013): 14-15.
19. Zheng Bijian, “China’s “Peaceful Rise” to Great-Power Status,” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 5 (2005): 22.
20. Xue Litai and Feng Zheng, “Lishi guaiquan de dapo weishenme shi zai jintian?” Xueshu qianyan, no. 6 (2013): 49.
21. Xue Litai and Feng Zheng, “Lishi guaiquan de dapo weishenme shi zai jintian?” 51.
22. Xue Litai and Feng Zheng, “Lishi guaiquan de dapo weishenme shi zai jintian?” 49-52.
23. Liu Jiangyong, “Chuzai shizilukou de Zhongri guanxi,” 45.
24. Yang Lu-hui, “Zhongguo jueqi beijing xia de Zhongmei xinxing daguo guanxi,” Shandong daxue xuebao (Zhexue shehuikexueban), no. 6 (2013): 6.
25. “Xi Jinping huijian Meiguo guofangbuzhang Paneita.”
26. See for example “China dismisses Abe’s call for talks,” Xinhua, January 23, 2014; Xinhua, “Chinese FM: Abe’s shrine defense exposes erroneous view of history,” Xinhua, January 23, 2014; “Japan worships war criminals while Europe says no to Nazi: Chinese ambassador,” Xinhua, January 8, 2014.
27. “Daguo guanxi yu diqu redian (guandian),” Renmin ribao, January 9, 2014.
28. Rana Mitter, China’s War with Japan, 1937-1945: The Struggle for Survival (London: Allen Lane, 2013), 14.
29. “Diaoyudao wenti kaoyan Meiguo zhengzhi zhihui (guoji luntan).”
30. Yuan Peng, “Xunqiu Zhongmei Yatai liangxing hudong,” 58; Jiang Wei, “Xinxing daguo guanxi jiushi yao bimian zou laolü,” 15.
31. Amy King, “Imperialism, Industrialisation and War: The Role of Ideas in China’s Japan Policy, 1949-1965” (PhD thesis, University of Oxford, 2013).
32. Gilbert Rozman, “China’s Changing Images of Japan, 1989-2001: The Struggle to Balance Partnership and Rivalry,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 2, no. 1 (2002): 95-129; Hung-Jen Wang, The Rise of China and Chinese International Relations Scholarship (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2013): 71-84.
33. People’s Daily editorial, September 28, 2012, cited in Michael Yahuda, Sino-Japanese Relations after the Cold War: Two Tigers Sharing a Mountain (Abingdon: Oxford, 2014): 135.
34. Evelyn Goh, The Struggle for Order: Hegemony, Hierarchy, and Transition in Post-Cold War East Asia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013): 26-27.
35. Evelyn Goh, The Struggle for Order, 201.
36. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Xi Jinping: Let the Sense of Community of Common Destiny Take Deep Root in Neighbouring Countries,” October 25, 2013, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t1093870.shtml.
37. Yuan Peng, “Xunqiu Zhongmei Yatai liangxing hudong,” 65.