May and June can be characterized as a period marked by efforts to enhance relations with China and proactive engagement across multiple fronts in Asia and Africa, while managing regional security challenges stemming from North Korea’s “alliance” with Russia. The emphasis remains on fostering economic cooperation, maintaining security alliances, and navigating complex international dynamics to safeguard national interests and regional stability. During this time, significant diplomatic initiatives were undertaken, aiming to foster mutual understanding and cooperation. These include the ROK-China ministerial meeting, the Trilateral Summit among the ROK, Japan, and China, and the South Korea-Africa Summit.
Strikingly evident in the progressive coverage of foreign policy during the late spring was the strong rejection of the Yoon administration’s tilt to the United States and Japan, marked by new hope for dialogue with China and insistence on resumption of talks with North Korea. Instead of the deepening regional polarization and Putin’s trip to North Korea leading to affirmation of deterrence, appeals intensified for a fundamental redirection of foreign policy. Riding a wave of confidence after electoral successes in April, progressives focused on policies sharply at odds with those pursued since 2022, as if the Moscow-Pyongyang “alliance” was reversible.
The ROK-China ministerial meeting underscored efforts to enhance economic ties while navigating complexities around North Korea’s nuclear program. The trilateral summit among South Korea, Japan, and China marked a significant milestone, emphasizing regional stability amid global geopolitical shifts. Meanwhile, South Korea’s engagement with African nations signals a strategic pivot toward expanding economic partnerships beyond traditional alliances.
Despite these diplomatic maneuvers, challenges persist regarding North Korea’s evasion of sanctions, aggravated by its declared alliance with Russia. The Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement between Russia and North Korea has raised international concerns, particularly regarding potential threats to regional security. Amidst these developments, South Korea faces the critical task of balancing its alliances and security concerns, particularly regarding nuclear deterrence and economic stability.
Finally, this report concludes with a brief analysis of the current situation on the Korean Peninsula, which has seen heightened tensions due to a series of provocations, including the recent release of trash balloons towards the South.
The ROK-China ministerial meeting
The May 13, 2024, meeting between ROK Minister of Foreign Affairs Cho Tae-yul and Wang Yi, a member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and foreign minister, at Beijing’s Diaoyutai State Guesthouse marked a significant milestone in the ongoing diplomatic dialogue between South Korea and China. This encounter could be viewed as one of the first crucial steps toward revitalizing relations between the two nations this year. Cho and Wang discussed high-level exchanges and economic cooperation, as well as issues related to North Korea’s nuclear program, North Korea, and regional and international situations. The meeting, which included a dinner banquet, lasted four hours.1
The two sides agreed to continue communications to strengthen economic cooperation, including the stable management of supply chains. Cho emphasized the need for creating a favorable investment environment and resolving issues to ensure stable investments by South Korean companies. They also decided to promote exchanges to improve mutual understanding and foster friendly sentiments between their peoples. This includes revitalizing exchanges between local governments and resuming various exchange and cooperation projects led by both countries’ foreign ministries, such as the Committee for the Promotion of Cultural and Human Exchanges. Additionally, the two ministers discussed regional and international issues, including the situations in Ukraine and the Middle East, as well as US-China relations.2
Cho expressed concerns about North Korea’s stance on reunification, characterization of inter-Korean relations as hostile, and actions that escalate tensions on the peninsula, including illegal military cooperation with Russia. He emphasized China’s role as a permanent member of the UN Security Council in promoting peace, stability, and denuclearization on the peninsula. Furthermore, Cho conveyed both domestic and international apprehensions regarding the forced repatriation of North Korean defectors and requested cooperation to ensure defectors can choose their destination without coercion. In response, “Minister Wang affirmed China’s consistent policy on the Korean Peninsula and assured that China will contribute constructively to resolving issues on the Korean Peninsula,” the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs explained.3
An opinion piece in the Korea Economic Daily emphasized that South Korea cannot simply adopt a hostile stance towards China, given the high degree of industrial and economic interdependence between the two nations. It argued that despite aligning with the United States on security interests, South Korea should maintain a pragmatic diplomatic approach. The article highlighted that for the Yoon Suk-yeol administration, managing relations with China is a crucial test of its global diplomatic capabilities. It underscored the importance of a wise approach that fosters exchange and cooperation without compromising on principles.4
An editorial by Hankyoreh emphasized that despite a significant reduction due to the visible US-China power struggle, China remains South Korea’s largest export partner. It noted that China is a major supplier of numerous essential raw materials to South Korea. With the US-China conflict increasingly disrupting global supply chains, the stability of trade relations between South Korea and China is becoming more crucial for both nations.5 The two ministers also agreed to continue to work together to ensure the success of the Trilateral Summit among South Korea, China, and Japan, which would be held in South Korea on May 27, 2024.
Trilateral Summit among ROK, Japan, and China
Yoon Suk-yeol, Prime Minister Kishida Fumio, and Premier Li Qiang proceeded to convene the 9th Trilateral Summit Meeting, four years and five months since the leaders of the three countries last gathered in Chengdu, China. In commemoration of the 25th anniversary of trilateral cooperation, they concurred that the eight summits held since 2008, along with the establishment of the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat (TCS) in 2011, had provided a robust foundation for the institutionalization of trilateral cooperation, which has significantly deepened across various domains, bringing substantial benefits to the three nations and their citizens. This collaboration has firmly established itself as a pivotal platform for regional cooperation.6
During the summit, the leaders discussed cooperation strategies in six areas including economic and trade cooperation, cultural exchanges, climate change response, healthcare and aging population issues, science and technology digital transformation, disaster and safety cooperation. Additionally, they exchanged views on issues such as the North Korean nuclear problem and violations of UN Security Council resolutions, as well as regional and international security situations. They incorporated discussions on the six areas into a joint declaration, committing to enhance cultural and personnel exchanges and foster a predictable trade and investment environment. Yoon emphasized, “The foundation of trilateral cooperation lies in mutual understanding and trust among the citizens of the three countries. To achieve this, frequent meetings and communication are essential.” He further stated, “We have agreed to actively promote exchanges, particularly among future generations, striving to achieve an annual exchange of 40 million people by 2030.”7
This summit was significant as it marked an agreement to regularize meetings that had been long suspended. In addition, it was positively assessed in Seoul Shinmun that key East Asian stakeholders have agreed to discuss regional issues and build a cooperative future before the US presidential election, amid the rapidly intensifying US-China competition.8
The ROK Institute for National Security Strategy went so far as to say the summit held profound strategic implications beyond the mere resumption of suspended talks: (1) signifying a notable reduction in inter-regional tensions and a broadening of the scope of our diplomatic influence; (2) advancing the government’s Indo-Pacific strategy in a more comprehensive and committed manner; (3) assuming strategic importance as a counterweight to the deepening relations between Russia and North Korea or between China and North Korea; (4) while formally a trilateral summit, suggesting a normalization of bilateral relations between South Korea and China; and (5) serving as a prudent measure to address uncertainties arising from the outcome of the US presidential election.9 However, examination of the joint declaration led to criticism that the three countries only concentrated on normative statements, highlighting efforts to restart free trade agreement (FTA) negotiations, enhance economic cooperation and human exchanges, and investigate collaborative measures in non-traditional security areas.
Particularly regarding North Korea’s denuclearization, a primary concern for South Korea, the latest summit revealed ongoing differences between South Korea and China. The South Korean government emphasized the importance of North Korea’s denuclearization as a prerequisite for stability on the Korean Peninsula. In contrast, China reiterated its longstanding position on the need for peace and stability in the region, without specifically addressing North Korea’s denuclearization. In a recent editorial, Maeil Kyungjae expressed regret that Li had not made more proactive statements, considering that North Korea is the root cause of destabilizing Northeast Asia while war rhetoric persists.10 Despite the diplomatic significance of resuming the summit, this raises questions about how to foster genuine cooperation moving forward.11
Even so, the Chosun Ilbo editorial mentioned that over the past four years, the situation in East Asia has changed significantly, making it essential for South Korea, China, and Japan to cooperate. Following North Korea’s provision of 10,000 containers of weapons and ammunition to Russia, the military closeness between North Korea and Russia now threatens global security beyond the Korean Peninsula. Putin, currently attacking Ukraine, has alleviated his concerns about ammunition shortages, while Kim Jong-un, with Russian assistance, has succeeded in launching a reconnaissance satellite, rapidly completing a nuclear attack system. The editorial assessed that this situation poses a direct threat not only to South Korea and Japan but also to the United States,12 pointing out that the international situation is incomparable to four years ago. The Russian invasion of Ukraine shows no signs of ending, and the Israel-Hamas war seems poised to spread to the entire international community, which could be disastrous for South Korea, China, and Japan, all of whom rely heavily on this region for energy imports. Particularly concerning is the potential for China to invade Taiwan, raising fears of a US-China war in the Pacific.13
The Donga Ilbo, in an editorial, also mentioned that it is significant for the three countries—South Korea, China, and Japan—to initiate “buffer diplomacy” amid the rough currents of a new Cold War confrontation. The resumption of the trilateral talks is significant because it marks a shift in China’s stance, which had previously shown lukewarm responses despite ongoing requests from South Korea and Japan. China’s recent change in attitude can be attributed to its efforts to improve relations with the United States and thereby reduce pressure from Washington. Furthermore, for South Korea and Japan, engaging with China is crucial to avoid being caught in the crossfire of the US-China power struggle, the editorial asserted.14
Over the past four years, China has been reluctant to meet with South Korean and Japanese leaders, citing issues such as the trilateral cooperation among South Korea, the US, and Japan, and the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system. The fact that China actively participated in the recent meeting suggests that the variability of the existing security and economic order is more serious than ever. Meanwhile, a Seoul Shinmun editorial mentioned unresolved issues that need to be addressed between South Korea and China, still grappling with the fallout from China’s retaliatory measures against THAAD, resulting in severely strained public sentiment. To achieve their goal of increasing bilateral exchanges to 40 million people by 2030, both tangible and intangible regulatory barriers need to be lifted.15
Unresolved issues like historical disputes and restrictions such as the Hallyu ban (prohibition on Korean cultural exports) persist among South Korea, Japan, and China. Without genuine willingness to address these issues, conflict resolution remains elusive. Practical actions leading to agreements are undeniably paramount, whether between any two of these countries or among all three. Therefore, dialogue and cooperation among their leaders are crucial, not only for regional stability but also for addressing global challenges, the editorial concluded.
The 2024 Korea-Africa Summit
On June 4th and 5th, a summit between ROK and African nations was held in Seoul. Of the 55 countries in Africa, 48 participated, excluding the 7 nations currently under international sanctions. Leaders from 25 countries attended in person, holding bilateral talks with Yoon Suk-yeol. The high level of interest shown by African countries in this event reflects their great expectations for improving relations with the ROK. While Japan and China have long been holding regular summits with Africa, the participation of all eligible countries in this summit is testament to the special affinity and high expectations they have for South Korea. The inaugural Korea-Africa Summit established a foundation for increased capital commitments from South Korea towards infrastructure, investment, and development projects in Africa.16
Cooperation with Africa seems more timely than ever. As the world divides into the free world and authoritarian blocs, Africa’s influence has significantly grown, encompassing a quarter of the UN member states. The scope for cooperation between South Korea and Africa is expected to expand as mutual interests continue to multiply.17 Historically, due to the geopolitical environment of South Korea, the nation had to focus on diplomacy with the four major powers, leaving little room to expand our diplomatic horizons to Africa. However, Africa is now a central continent within the “Global South,” which comprises over 120 developing countries. Africa is not on the periphery of the international community; it represents a quarter of UN member states, demonstrating significant voting power. Particularly in a world where the UN Security Council is virtually paralyzed and global divisions between free and authoritarian regimes are deepening, Africa’s influence and presence cannot be overlooked.
This Korea-Africa summit should serve as a foundation for establishing cooperation and collaboration. In fact, during this summit, several key areas were discussed to ensure the sustainability of Korea-Africa relations. These included leveraging Africa’s demographic advantages and resources, combining them with South Korea’s advanced technology and expertise, and expanding South Korea’s “green ladder” to jointly address the climate change crisis facing African countries. Additionally, South Korea committed to actively participating in efforts to enhance peace and security in Africa and to strengthening cooperation with African nations on the international stage.18
According to Donga Ilbo editorial, even if the government provides support, economic cooperation will be difficult if Korean companies do not voluntarily enter local markets. For most, Africa remains a distant and unfamiliar market. It is crucial to first establish a stable framework where companies can expand investments with confidence and freely import key raw materials. It has been pointed out that the government needs to intensify efforts to pursue Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) with major African countries, which enhance FTAs by incorporating economic development support functions and lowering trade barriers.19
Seoul Kyungjae, in an editorial, emphasized that amid South Korea’s challenges of rapid labor force decline and decreased growth potential, Africa stands as a beacon with abundant resources and labor—a veritable “land of opportunity.” To overcome the crisis of “Peak Korea” (a term indicating growth rates have peaked), which is characterized by declining growth potential, securing stable resources and labor and exploring new export markets through expanded cooperation with Africa is crucial.20 The editorial suggested that by effectively leveraging Korea’s experience of rapid economic growth, advanced technological prowess, and infrastructure capabilities, sustained and mutually beneficial partnerships with Africa can be established.21 It underscored the need for sophisticated diplomatic efforts to ensure that the summit would not be merely a diplomatic event but a cornerstone for expanding economic ties.
North Korea’s Strategy for Evading Sanctions
On March 28, the UN Security Council resolution to extend the mandate of the Panel of Experts on North Korea sanctions was vetoed by Russia, resulting in the termination of the panel’s activities on April 30. The cessation is expected to create gaps in the international community’s monitoring system for the implementation of sanctions. The dissolution of the Panel of Experts raises concerns about the enforcement of UN sanctions against North Korea in the short term and, in the long term, the international community’s ability to effectively sanction North Korea. This is because there is no other authoritative body that can regularly provide such comprehensive and in-depth reports as the panel did. According to the Institute for National Security Strategy, the termination of the Panel of Experts’ activities is expected to lead not only to an increase in the frequency and intensity of sanction violations by countries such as China and Russia but also to more active diplomatic efforts by North Korea to undermine the sanctions regime.22 The international sanctions against North Korea related to the development of weapons of mass destruction consist of UN sanctions, independent sanctions by the United States, and independent sanctions by countries other than the United States.23
The UN sanctions, also known as “comprehensive sanctions,” include extensive measures affecting the entire economy, impacting in various ways, including arms embargoes, trade sanctions, economic cooperation sanctions, financial sanctions, cargo sanctions, and sanctions on luxury goods and proliferation networks. Specifically, the export sanctions on North Korean minerals such as anthracite and iron, as well as on seafood, textiles, and clothing finished products, have dealt a severe blow to the North Korean economy. Most notably, the annual limit on crude oil imports to 4 million barrels and refined oil to 500,000 barrels is assessed to have caused significant harm to both the North Korean economy and the livelihood of its people.
The intensification of strategic competition between the United States and China, along with the prolonged Russian invasion of Ukraine, signals a reorganization of the regional international order into a new Cold War. This development is likely to serve as a window of opportunity for North Korea, potentially loosening the sanctions network against it and providing some relief. According to the Institute for National Security Strategy, Russia seems to have determined that disbanding the panel of experts could incentivize North Korea to continue operating its overburdened munitions factories and keep supplying weapons. Furthermore, Russia’s move to disrupt the sanctions regime on North Korea seems to be driven by an intention to pressure South Korea and the United States by leveraging the North Korean issue. By terminating the panel’s activities, Russia appears to be sending a message that if South Korea crosses the line by providing direct military support to Ukraine, it could dismantle the sanctions regime on North Korea at any time. This serves as a warning to South Korea and simultaneously signals to the United States not to encourage South Korea to support Ukraine.24
According to the analysis by the Sejong Institute, the North Korea Sanctions Committee is obligated to report directly to the UN Security Council even without a panel of experts, i.e., to report information related to sanctions violations and related matters received from member states to the UN Security Council. However, the primary role is to collect and distribute information to support member states in enforcing sanctions, which is likely to be challenging under the current system without expert panels. Therefore, it is mentioned that a new mechanism to replace the expert panel is being discussed through the UN General Assembly.
Given that UN General Assembly approval remains uncertain, alternative approaches are being considered. The South Korean government, in collaboration with the United States and other Western countries, could provide financial support to existing think tanks and media organizations conducting research on sanctions violations. Sharing information and resources, they can maximize the real-time dissemination of information regarding these violations.25
According to the Sejong analysis, the South Korean government should consider establishing a North Korea sanctions research organization through multinational cooperation to aid in the enforcement of sanctions among Western nations. Reporting sanctions violations involving specific individuals and entities carries a significant risk of legal complications. Therefore, this proposed international organization would require resources not only for the regular employment of experts but also for a legal team. Securing funding through multinational collaboration and developing a robust system for information collection and reporting could confer a degree of international legitimacy, even outside the United Nations framework. Although cooperation Russia is improbable, it is worth exploring ways to minimize North Korean sanctions violations through proactive collaboration and support from key countries in Southeast Asia, South America, and Africa.26
Some progressive media outlets in South Korea argued that the current South Korean government bears significant responsibility for this situation. According to an editorial in the Kyunghyang Shinmun, the Yoon administration’s role in deteriorating relations with China and Russia is a major contributing factor. The editorial suggested that had these relationships been managed more amicably, China and Russia might have been more considerate of South Korea’s position, potentially preventing the cessation of the Panel of Experts.27 This perspective underscores the need to reflect on the consequences of strained diplomatic relations.
The comprehensive and strategic partnership between North Korea and Russia
On June 20, Russia and North Korea signed a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement, which will serve as the foundation for future bilateral cooperation, according to the Kremlin. The agreement was signed by President Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un, chairman of State Affairs, following several rounds of discussions, as announced in a statement by the Kremlin.28 The new document supersedes several prior agreements, including the 1961 Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance, the 2000 Treaty on Friendship and Good Neighborliness in Cooperation, and the Moscow and Pyongyang declarations from 2000 and 2001.
The international community has closely watched the meeting due to North Korea’s provision of weapons to Russia and Russia’s efforts to dismantle sanctions against North Korea. Concerns have been heightened as the two nations not only strengthen their ties but also openly declare their intent to collaborate on military technology. There are growing concerns that North Korea may increase its weapon support to Russia, and Russia may play a more active role in North Korea’s military endeavors, such as the launch of reconnaissance satellites. Moreover, the two leaders have openly displayed their alliance by pledging cooperation in areas prohibited by the UN Security Council, including military, economic, space, and railway sectors. They are blatantly undermining sanctions against North Korea and increasing their covert dealings, forming what Joongang Ilbo describes as an exclusive “league of their own.”29
In an editorial, the conservative Joongang Ilbo urged Russia and North Korea to recognize that their actions might reflect their isolation in the international community. The editorial emphasizes that in today’s interconnected world, it is difficult for any nation to survive alone. It warns that if their close cooperation leads to actions such as arms deals and other “rogue behavior,” it will only deepen their isolation.30
Meanwhile, the presidential office announced that it will “reconsider the issue of providing weapons to Ukraine.” According to the conservative Chosun Ilbo, until now, the South Korean government has condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and participated in international sanctions against Russia, but has refrained from directly supplying lethal weapons to Ukraine. The support provided has mainly consisted of non-lethal military supplies such as medical supplies, combat rations, and bulletproof helmets. Chosun Ilbo, in an editorial, stated that while this was a carefully considered decision in light of post-war South Korea-Russia relations, given that Russia has now signed a new treaty with North Korea promising automatic intervention in emergencies and has announced plans to support North Korea with military technology, a corresponding response is inevitable.31
According to an editorial in the conservative newspaper Joongang Ilbo, the government should strategically and confidently respond to Russia’s deviations by leveraging its status as one of the world’s top 10 economic powers and its military power, which has risen to 5th in the world this year. It asserts that a clear “red line” should be established, and if Russia crosses this line, it must face corresponding consequences.32 An editorial in the Chosun Ilbo also mentions that before his visit to North Korea, Putin praised South Korea’s decision not to directly supply weapons to Ukraine. However, the editorial criticizes Putin for not only forming a military alliance with North Korea, South Korea’s greatest adversary, but also potentially transferring military technology to them. The Chosun Ilbo strongly condemns Russia, stating that openly ignoring the UN Security Council’s sanctions on North Korea’s nuclear program is a betrayal of South Korea’s goodwill and a direct threat to the South Korean people.33
The conservative Kukmin Ilbo, in an editorial, called on the government to urgently reassess its national security strategy in light of the North Korea-Russia military alliance, which undermines UN sanctions. The editorial suggested accepting the reality that North Korea’s denuclearization is an unattainable goal and emphasizes the need for South Korea to develop countermeasures, especially as North Korea, with Russia’s assistance, is likely to accelerate the development of strategic assets like military reconnaissance satellites and nuclear submarines. South Korea must abandon any complacency regarding Russia’s potential transfer of critical technology to North Korea and issue a strong warning to Russia. If Russia does not commit to refraining from such transfers or aiding North Korea’s nuclear advancement, South Korea should consider measures to impact Russia’s war efforts in Ukraine. Additionally, diplomatic efforts are necessary to prevent the expansion of support for the North Korea-Russia alliance within the international community. The editorial also highlights the importance of engaging in close dialogue with China, encouraging it to act as a restraining force, given China’s unease with the North Korea-Russia military alliance.34
The progressive Kyunghyang Shinmun expressed concern in an editorial that the inclusion of a clause stipulating “immediate military assistance if either faces armed aggression” signals a return to Cold War dynamics. The editorial advises the government to take the current situation seriously but to respond with caution. It suggests that since the causes of the current situation are complex, the response should not be simplistic. While maintaining the South Korea-US alliance as the central axis of its response, the government should adopt a multifaceted approach by strategically communicating with China, which is somewhat distanced from the North Korea-Russia alignment.35
The progressive Hankyoreh wrote in an editorial that supplying lethal weapons to Ukraine could provoke Russia into transferring critical military technology to North Korea. It is suspected that Russia has already provided North Korea with technology for a “new satellite launch vehicle.” If North Korea, which already possesses considerable military technology, acquires Russia’s latest advancements, the security environment on the Korean Peninsula will deteriorate further. Hankyoreh also highlighted that Yoon Suk-yeol, over the past two years, has consistently disregarded warning signals from North Korea and Russia, concentrating exclusively on bolstering the South Korea-US-Japan trilateral alliance. This approach has resulted in the deterioration of relations with both North Korea and Russia, leading to the present situation. The editorial emphasized that Yoon must critically reassess his reckless “values diplomacy” from the past two years and develop a long-term strategy. South Korea cannot afford to be positioned on the front lines of a new Cold War, vulnerable to crossfire.36
The centrist newspaper Seoul Shinmun pointed out in an editorial that Russia’s close ties with North Korea pose a global threat. According to the editorial, should Russia, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council (P5), diverge from the international community’s efforts on North Korean denuclearization, it would present a significant challenge. In a commentary for Rodong Shinmun, Putin hinted at tolerating North Korea’s nuclear and missile development. Putin has also threatened to use tactical nuclear weapons in response to Western intervention in Ukraine. Following this agreement, there is a heightened possibility of North Korea openly threatening the South with tactical nuclear weapons. Depending on the outcome of the US presidential election in November, there may be significant shifts in US-North Korea relations. While US Secretary of State Tony Blinken has vowed to prevent North Korean support for Russia, the effectiveness of such measures remains uncertain.37
Seoul Shinmun also emphasized that amid the realistic threats posed by North Korea and Russia, a nuanced approach is imperative. The government must leverage South Korea’s potential nuclear capabilities as a deterrent, especially given Russia’s facilitation of North Korea’s nuclear status and circumvention of North Korean sanctions. Progress in nuclear cooperation between South Korea and the United States is urgently needed. While the US and South Korea activate the Nuclear Cooperation Group (NCG) to bolster the US nuclear umbrella, public confidence in US-South Korea relations remains weak. Ensuring nuclear parity stands as Korea’s last line of defense against these challenges, particularly in response to Russia’s blatant disregard for warnings like “do not cross the line.” Accommodating Kim Jong-un’s demands, whether through military technology transfers or treaty upgrades, would profoundly impact South Korea-Russia relations, warns the Seoul Shinmun. After the Ukraine war concludes, the country Russia will need is South Korea, not North Korea. Hence, as Putin visits Pyongyang, Russia should keenly observe why China is engaging in security talks with South Korea in Seoul.38
Meanwhile, on June 23, 2024, Jang Ho-jin, director of the National Security Office, stated, “If Russia provides advanced precision weapons to North Korea, our constraints will no longer apply. ROK’s response, including the mix of weapons we support, will depend on Russia’s actions.” This emphasizes that should Russia, following its recent summit strengthening military cooperation with North Korea, deliver advanced weaponry to North Korea, the South Korean government may consider supplying a wide array of weapons, including lethal ones, to Ukraine.39
North Korea’s trash balloons
Despite the volatile geopolitical landscape, North Korea persists in its provocations. On the night of June 8, North Korea launched balloons filled with waste towards the South. Approximately 330 waste balloons were identified, with about 80 of them landing in South Korean territory. Previously, on the 28th and 29th of May and the 1st and 2nd of June, North Korea had sent waste balloons on two separate occasions, threatening to retaliate with “a hundred times the amount of waste” if anti-North Korean leaflets were sent again. Kyunghyang Shinmun noted the government announcement on June 9 that it would resume loudspeaker broadcasts towards North Korea in response to the anti-South propaganda balloons, marking the first time in six years since such broadcasts were last used. This escalation follows North Korea’s decision to release balloons filled with waste after defector groups floated leaflets across the border.40 With both sides engaging in escalating provocations, there is a heightened risk of military conflict, creating a deeply concerning situation, the paper warned.
According to an editorial in the Kyunghyang Shinmun, the current situation in inter-Korean relations is precarious: the safety pin has been pulled out, communication channels between North and South Korea are severed, and with the suspension of the 9/19 Comprehensive Military Agreement, there is no military buffer zone either. The military had announced artillery exercises near the Northern Limit Line in the West Sea and along the Military Demarcation Line later in June, leading the paper to warn of the potential for military conflict escalating as a result of consistent brinkmanship between North and South Korea. The conservative Kukmin Ilbo pointed out that from the perspective of South Korea, minimizing tensions between North and South Korea is the best course of action. While maintaining readiness to respond promptly to provocations from the North, consistent efforts should be made to initiate dialogue aimed at easing tensions.41
The greater issue, as noted by Kyunghyang Shinmun, is that both sides are shifting responsibility and show no signs of willingness to engage in dialogue. The editorial evaluated that both parties need to regain composure, emphasizing that alongside maintaining a robust posture towards North Korea, the Yoon administration must recognize that “peace through strength” is not a viable strategy to protect the lives of its citizens. The editorial concludes by stressing the urgent need for inter-Korean dialogue to alleviate tensions,42 highlighting that the essence of safeguarding national security lies in reducing tensions. Rising tensions and provocations between North and South Korea point to the urgent need for both sides to prioritize dialogue and de-escalation. With military maneuvers and rhetoric amplifying the risk of conflict, fostering stability through diplomatic channels is paramount for regional peace and security. The international community has a pivotal role in promoting constructive engagement and mitigating the potential for further escalation on the Korean Peninsula, readers were told.
1. “South Korean, Chinese foreign ministers discuss North, trilateral summit, supply chains,” Joongang Daily, May 14, 2024, https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2024-05-14/national/diplomacy/South-Korean-Chinese-foreign-ministers-discuss-North-trilateral-summit-supply-chains/2046362
2. “한중 외교장관 4시간 회담…얽힌 실타래 풀어가자,” Seoul Shinmun, May 14, 2024, https://www.seoul.co.kr/news/international/2024/05/14/20240514500002
3. “한중 외교장관 :한중일 정상회의 성공 협력…한국 ‘강제북송 우려 전달,’” VOA Korea, May 14, 2024, https://www.voakorea.com/a/7609568.html
4. “한중 외교장관 회담, 원칙 지키며 협력도 확대하는 지혜 절실,” Hankyung (Korea Economic Daily), May 13, 2024, https://www.hankyung.com/article/2024051365601
5. “미-중 패권경쟁 속, 한-중 관계 불확실성 빨리 해소해야,” Hankyoreh, May 16, 2024, https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/opinion/editorial/1140856.html
6. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Joint Declaration of the Ninth ROK-Japan-China Trilateral Summit,” May 27, 2024.
7. “4년 반 만의 한중일 정상회의서 채택한 ‘3국 공동선언’ 내용은,” BBC Korea, May 27, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/korean/articles/cz44vq9zqdlo
8. “한일중 정상회의 추동의 힘,” Seoul Shinmun, June 10, 2024, https://www.seoul.co.kr/news/editOpinion/opinion/innout/2024/06/10/20240610026002
9. “제9차 한일중 정상회담의 의미와 전략적 고려사항,” INSS, May 23, 2024, https://www.inss.re.kr/research/area/kp_view.do?nttId=41037173&bbsId=ib&page=1&searchCnd=0&searchWrd=
10. “한일중 정상회의에서 끝내 북 위협 거론 안한 중,” Maeil Kyungjae, May 27, 2024, https://www.mk.co.kr/news/editorial/11026011
11. Ibid.
12. “4년여 만의 한중일 정상회의, 글로벌 정세 안정에도 긴요,” Chosun Ilbo, April 8, 2024, https://www.chosun.com/opinion/editorial/2024/04/08/W7CIQ3IUARCMPMNDATIEGUTBR4/
13. Ibid.
14. “4년 만의 한중일 회의 재개… 신냉전 ‘완충 외교’ 출발점 되길,” Donga Ilbo, May 27, 2024, https://www.donga.com/news/Opinion/article/all/20240526/125121708/1
15. “협력 복원한 한일중 정상회의, 정례화 실천 따라야,” Seoul Shinmun, May 28, 2024, https://www.seoul.co.kr/news/editOpinion/editorial/2024/05/28/20240528027004
16. “한아프리카는 서로에게 어떤 도움을 줄 수 있나?” Asia Today, June 9, 2024, https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/view.php?key=20240609010003849
17. “4년여 만의 한중일 정상회의, 글로벌 정세 안정에도 긴요,” April 8, 2024, https://www.chosun.com/opinion/editorial/2024/04/08/W7CIQ3IUARCMPMNDATIEGUTBR4/
18. Ibid.
19. “한-아프리카 경협 첫발…기업이 뛰어야 ‘신시장’ 열린다,” Donga Ilbo, June 6, 2024, https://www.donga.com/news/Opinion/article/all/20240605/125298162/2
20. “한·아프리카 정상회의, ‘피크 코리아’ 극복 위한 교두보로 삼아야,” Seoul Kyungjae, June 4, 2024, https://www.sedaily.com/NewsView/2DABYWEOBR
21. Ibid.
22. “유엔 대북제재 전문가 패널 임기 연장안 부결의 의미와 파급영향,” INSS, March 29, 2024, https://www.inss.re.kr/publication/bbs/ib_view.do?nttId=41037116&bbsId=ib&page=1&searchCnd=0&searchWrd=
23. “대북제재 회피를 위한 북한의 복합전략,” Korea Research Institute for National Strategy, 2023
24. “유엔 대북제재 전문가 패널 임기 연장안 부결의 의미와 파급영향,” INSS, March 29, 2024, https://www.inss.re.kr/publication/bbs/ib_view.do?nttId=41037116&bbsId=ib&page=1&searchCnd=0&searchWrd=
25. Ibid.
26. “유엔 대북제재위원회 전문가 패널 종료의 배경과 평가,” Sejong Focus, May 22, 2024, https://www.sejong.org/web/boad/1/egoread.php?bd=1&itm=&txt=&pg=1&seq=7720
27. “무력화되는 대북제재, 윤석열 정부 책임도 크다,” Kyunghyang Shinmun, March 31, 2024, https://www.khan.co.kr/opinion/editorial/article/202403311821001
28. “북러 정상의 ‘위험한 거래’, 국제적 고립을 자초할 뿐이다,” Joongang Ilbo, June 20, 2024, https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25257639#home
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. “정부 “우크라이나에 살상 무기 지원 검토” 러시아가 자초한 일,” Chosun Ilbo, June 21, 2024, https://www.chosun.com/opinion/editorial/2024/06/21/U7USPV3YVZCLDGJKOK3BQ7GN3Q/
32. “러시아 형태 당당히 대응하고, 전략적 우방 외교 강화해야,” Joongang Ilbo, June 24, 2024, https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25258405#home
33. “北 포탄 얻자고 對韓적대 러시아, 대가 치르게 해야,” Chosun Ilbo, June 20, 2024, https://www.chosun.com/opinion/editorial/2024/06/20/JASJKEKY5JH43IKZ6BOHEC4YEY/
34. “북러 군사동맹 부활… 우리도 대응 수단 가져야,” Kukmin Ilbo, June 21, 2024, https://www.kmib.co.kr/article/view.asp?arcid=1718870229
35. “예상 뛰어넘는 북러 밀착, 고차원 접근 필요한 한국 외교,” Kyunghyang Shinmun, June 19, 2024, https://m.khan.co.kr/opinion/editorial/article/202406192057001#c2b
36. “우크라에 무기 공급한다는 정부 위험한 구상 접어야,” Hankyoreh, June 20, 2024, https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/opinion/editorial/1145780.html
37. “북러 ‘동맹 복원’, 동북아를 화약고 만들 셈인가,” Seoul Shinmun, June 20, 2024, https://www.seoul.co.kr/news/editOpinion/editorial/2024/06/20/20240620027005
38. “푸틴 방북, 불량국가 의기투합 좌시 못해,” Seoul Shinmun, June 19, 2024, https://www.seoul.co.kr/news/editOpinion/editorial/2024/06/19/20240619027005
39. “대통령실 “우크라에 제공하는 무기 종류, 러시아 하기 나름,” Hankyoreh, June 23. 2024, https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/politics_general/1146007.html
40. “오물풍선에 대북 확성기 대응, 무력 충돌로 번질 우려 크다,” Kyunghyang Shinmun, June 9, 2024, https://www.khan.co.kr/opinion/editorial/article/202406091837001
41. “오물풍선이 초래한 확성기 재개…긴장 격화는 피해야,” Kukmin Ilbo, June 10, 2024, https://www.kmib.co.kr/article/view.asp?arcid=1717918497
42. “오물풍선에 대북 확성기 대응, 무력 충돌로 번질 우려 크다,” Kyunghyang Shinmun, June 9, 2024, https://www.khan.co.kr/opinion/editorial/article/202406091837001
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