Japan’s Quiet Preparation for War: How to Defend its People

“Implementation” has been the guiding principle for Japanese defense planners since the release of the most recent National Security Strategy (NSS), National Defense Strategy (NDS), and Defense Buildup Plan (DBP) in December 2022.¹ These three documents collectively marked drastic changes to Japan’s longstanding defense policies by committing the country to increase its defense budget toward 2 percent of its GDP and substantially improve both the hardware and software of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF).² Since taking office in October, Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru has promised to continue his predecessors’ efforts to reinforce Japan’s defense capabilities.³

Among the seven key fields the NDS identified for Japan’s defense reinforcement efforts, the procurement of new weaponry and assets, such as stand-off strike capabilities, as well as the modernization of the SDF’s command and control (C2), have rightly drawn considerable scholarly and media attention.⁴ These efforts have profound implications not just for Japan’s defense posture but also for the organization of the US-Japan alliance. Following Tokyo’s decision to reform the SDF’s C2 structure by establishing the new Japan Joint Operations Command (JJOC), US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin announced in July 2024 that the Pentagon would upgrade the U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) into a joint force headquarters, serving as JJOC’s counterpart.⁵ That Japan’s move prompted the United States to better prepare its military structure for a regional contingency in the Indo-Pacific was an unprecedented dynamic in the decades-long history of the alliance. Historically, it was almost always the United States that raised the alarm on military readiness with Japanese counterparts.

Tokyo’s rare initiative in this realm was also indicative of the mounting sense of urgency within Japan. After decades of trying to shape the trajectory of China’s rise, the Japanese government has finally acknowledged in the 2022 NSS that its neighbor has now grown into “an unprecedented and the greatest strategic challenge in ensuring the peace and security of Japan.”⁶ The Chinese military has been ever more active around Japan’s borders in recent months, and the possibility of a contingency in the Taiwan Strait looms large in the minds of Japanese security planners.⁷ 

Japan’s Nascent Civil Defense Build-up

Beyond headline-grabbing new capabilities and grand alliance designs, the need to defend against a Taiwan contingency has also propelled Tokyo to undertake a much less flashy yet tremendously critical national project. Highlighted by the NDS as efforts to enhance “mobile deployment capabilities and civil protection,” the central government in Tokyo has been working closely with various local municipalities to develop Japan’s first-ever comprehensive civil protection schemes for a contingency.

Building robust civil defense is an urgent task for the Japanese government. Due to its favorable geopolitical position during the Cold War, Japanese leaders never had to seriously prepare for a possible armed attack against the homeland. Even after the Cold War, the one crisis situation they seriously prepared for was natural disasters, leading to the empowerment of the prime minister’s office to enhance government capacity for crisis management.⁸ Although momentum to build a civil defense program was first observed in 2004 with the enaction of the Civil Protection Law, its implementation, especially for measures against a full-scale armed attack, had been lacking.⁹ With Japan’s severe security environment today, however, the issue has recently regained political momentum, with many voices at the national and local levels urging the government to address the long-delayed task of protecting civilians against foreign threats.

Establishing reliable civil defense schemes is also critical for effective deterrence, preventing contingencies from occurring in the first place. The ability to shield its citizens—noncombatants, to be more specific—from enemy attacks provides political leaders with more policy options for crisis bargaining, contributing to more effective deterrence. If citizens are vulnerable, leaders—especially in democracies, where accountability to the public is high—may have no choice but to back down in a crisis and yield to aggressors’ demands, fearing an unacceptable level of civilian casualties. This vulnerability can also undermine leaders’ resolve, or the credibility of their threats, potentially emboldening adversaries as a result.

The lives of ordinary citizens should weigh particularly heavily on the minds of Japanese leaders, as the country has not experienced war-related deaths, let alone noncombatant casualties from attacks on its homeland, since the end of World War II. Such considerations will inevitably affect the Japanese government’s calculations over their involvement in a contingency over Taiwan—whether by providing base access, logistical support, and asset protection to allied forces or by engaging in more direct actions against invading forces. Furthermore, any discovery of government neglect or oversight in establishing civil defense could significantly undermine the credibility of leaders in the eyes of the public, increasing the risks of misinformation and disinformation during a crisis. Adversaries might exploit public doubts about the government’s reliability by referencing Japan’s pre-1945 history to reinforce perceptions of its inability to protect ordinary citizens.

In other words, a well-developed civil defense program is essential for Japanese leaders to maintain public trust in a contingency while expanding their policy options for effective bargaining with adversaries. This is why, when presenting the three defense papers to the public and advocating for reinforcing the defense of Japan’s southwestern region, Prime Minister Kishida Fumio called for not only doubling Ground SDF units but also building up transport planes and vessels for the rapid deployment of units nationwide. He emphasized the importance of these assets “from the viewpoint of protecting the Japanese people if, by some chance, an emergency were to arise.”¹⁰

To implement the NSS, which aims to “seamlessly” defend Japan in “all directions,” the Japanese government has finally begun extensive efforts to enhance the protection of its nationals as part of contingency planning. Three key lines of effort broadly characterize Japan’s nascent civil defense program: 1) evacuation planning for noncombatants, 2) construction of underground shelters, and 3) expansion of peacetime access to airports and seaports across the country.

Devising Evacuation Plans for Noncombatants

The recent political drive for this program has emerged from both bottom-up and top-down efforts. As early as July 2022, the mayors of Ishigaki, Taketomi, and Yonaguni—three islands closest to Taiwan—together visited the Okinawa prefectural government in Naha to request further measures to safeguard their residents in a possible Taiwan contingency.¹¹ More conservative-leaning and politically aligned with the central government in Tokyo than Okinawa Governor Denny Tamaki, these mayors have also been in touch with lawmakers in Tokyo to garner additional support for this matter.¹²

While many Okinawans increasingly perceive the threat of a possible outbreak of war in Taiwan—a recent poll conducted by the Okinawa Times found that 37 out of 41 heads of all municipalities within the Okinawa Prefecture felt such a risk was increasing—the sense of urgency still seems to vary depending on proximity to Taiwan.¹³ As Taketomi Mayor Maedomari Masato has noted to Okinawan business executives, a significant difference in attitudes exists between those living on remote islands and those on Okinawa Main Island, which is farther from Taiwan.¹⁴ Residents of the remote islands frequently witness—quite literally—increasing activities by China’s military and paramilitary forces, including recent live-fire exercises around Taiwan.¹⁵ Consequently, they have also grown more welcoming of the SDF presence established on their islands over the years. The SDF opened new camps in Yonaguni in 2016, Amami Oshima and Miyako in 2019, and Ishigaki in 2023, with plans to establish a new radar unit in Kitadaito during FY2025.¹⁶

While the 2004 Civil Protection Law asks local municipalities to establish evacuation guidelines based on various contingency scenarios, the record from March 2020 shows that only 62 percent of all municipalities had one or more evacuation guidelines in place. The situation was particularly concerning in Okinawa, where only 4 out of 41 municipalities had issued such guidelines.¹⁷ The limited landmass and isolated geography of Okinawa’s remote islands, which comprise 15 municipalities, have made it particularly challenging for these local authorities to devise serious evacuation plans on their own.¹⁸

In fact, the “basic guidelines” to the Civil Protection Law issued in 2005 had long highlighted the need for the central government’s “special consideration” in evacuating Okinawa residents, as  broader coordination with distant prefectures, such as in the Kyushu area, may be necessary.¹⁹ Major contingencies in their vicinity, such as in the Taiwan Strait, would require cross-prefectural coordination for evacuation from one prefecture to another. To facilitate this large-scale evacuation scheme, strong leadership from the central government has been deemed essential.

The Japanese government finally stepped up in 2023. Following the release of the three defense papers, the cabinet secretariat accelerated its outreach efforts to local municipalities to reinforce civil protection measures, particularly in Japan’s southwestern region. In July 2023, Matsuno Hirokazu became Japan’s first chief cabinet secretary to inspect the state of civil protection measures in Okinawa’s remote islands.²⁰ A few months later, he also visited Kumamoto and Kagoshima prefectures to ask the Kyushu region to begin planning for the acceptance of evacuees from Japan’s southwest.²¹ The willingness of Kyushu governors to cooperate, offering destinations for evacuees, has critically paved the way for serious evacuation planning for residents in Okinawa’s remote islands. Involving Kyushu in this endeavor was a long time in the making.²²

With destinations identified, the central government also urged the Okinawa prefectural government to conduct tabletop exercises on evacuating residents from the remote islands. These exercises were first held in March 2023 and again in January 2024, involving 45 entities, and were attended by representatives from various local municipalities, the police, the SDF, the coast guard, and private businesses, such as airline companies.

Reportedly, the current plan envisions transporting as many as 20,000 people per day to evacuate a total of 120,000 individuals from the remote islands—including both residents and tourists at any given moment—over six days to seven prefectures in the Kyushu region, as well as Yamaguchi Prefecture in the Chugoku region.²³ These host prefectures are expected to devise plans by the end of the current fiscal year, and some have already begun to publicize their capacity numbers.²⁴

Construction of Underground Shelters

Another line of effort to establish civil defense has been the construction of underground shelters. The current Civil Protection Law mandates that each prefectural governor designate evacuation sites for emergencies, yet it has come to the public’s attention that most evacuation sites are either located in open fields, such as public parks, or above ground, such as schools, making them unsuitable for protecting people against armed attacks. As of August 2024, only 3,926 of the 58,589 designated “emergency temporary evacuation facilities” (kinkyu ichiji hinan shisetsu) are underground, accounting for just 6.7 percent of all sites.²⁵ It is noteworthy that this number has still improved in recent years, with various municipalities responding to the push by Tokyo to designate more underground facilities.²⁶

Nevertheless, the situation in Okinawa remains concerning, with only five underground evacuation facilities on Okinawa Main Island and one on Ishigaki.²⁷ This shortage naturally led the mayors of Okinawa’s remote islands to petition for funding to construct more underground shelters.²⁸ Their efforts gained momentum with the support of lawmakers in Tokyo, particularly those in the Parliamentary League within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which advocates specifically for this issue.

In response to these calls, the cabinet secretariat began budgeting for research and construction costs related to shelters starting in FY2023. Funding has increased exponentially: from 70 million yen in FY23 to 120 million yen in FY24 and projected to reach 240 million in FY25.²⁹ Members of the LDP’s Parliamentary League continue to play a role, urging the government for additional funds and the establishment of a related legal framework.³⁰ 

In March 2024, the cabinet secretariat released its first comprehensive policy on securing shelters in anticipation of armed attacks, explaining the need to build “specified provisional evacuation facilities (tokutei rinji hinan shisetsu)” in Miyako, Tarama, Yonaguni, Ishigaki, and Taketomi.³¹

This new category of evacuation facilities must be considered in tandem with ongoing efforts to devise evacuation plans. The “specified provisional evacuation facilities,” which will be constructed in Okinawa’s remote islands with funding support from the central government, are designed not only to protect people from armed attacks for several hours but also to accommodate them for up to two weeks while civilian evacuations are completed. Even after successful evacuations, these facilities will continue to serve those who remain for occupational, medical, and personal reasons. 

The five municipalities in Okinawa’s remote islands are moving forward with construction projects in accordance with the technical guidelines released by the cabinet secretariat in March.³² Ongoing projects include remodeling an existing gymnasium in Miyako and a municipality complex in Yonaguni by adding new underground parking lots to serve as underground shelters.³³

Expanding Peacetime Access to Airports and Seaports

The final line of government efforts for civil defense involves designating airports and seaports across the country for “specified use,” allowing the coast guard and the SDF easier access during peacetime, and eventually, wartime. While the central government will have legal access to these facilities once a contingency starts or is officially declared imminent, peacetime access is crucial for establishing a “seamless” defense to deal with all phases of crises. For instance, such designations enable the central government to communicate directly with local staff in charge of these facilities, improving coordination from peacetime to wartime.

Once designated, the government can also provide financial support to reinforce these facilities by repairs and upgrades to runways, docks, and channels, making them accessible for larger coast guard and SDF assets. This reinforcement is essential not only for transporting weapons and ammunition in transport vessels and aircraft but also for evacuating individuals from the southwestern region during a crisis. Consequently, similar to shelters, designated specified use of airports and seaports could also present opportunities for local businesses in each municipality, especially in the construction sector.

So far, Tokyo has successfully designated eight airports and 20 seaports for specified use, securing approval from a total of 12 municipalities: first for 16 locations in April 2024 and an additional 12 locations in August 2024.³⁴ Tables A and B list the airports and seaports so designated to date. However, the central government has faced challenges accessing ten candidate facilities in Okinawa, which are mostly controlled by the prefectural government. While Governor Tamaki has not ruled out the possibility, he has expressed reservations, citing a lack of clarity regarding the projects.³⁵

Table A. List of Airports Designated for Specified Use (as of January 1, 2024)³⁶

The full scope of these efforts, including their eventual scale and impact on local economies, remains to be seen.⁴¹ Nevertheless, the central government continues to pursue the expansion of peacetime access by designating new locations across the country, including in Tottori, Shimane, and Hokkaido prefectures.⁴² Additionally, in December, the cabinet secretariat introduced public roads as a new designation category for specified use.⁴³

A Road Ahead: Thinking Beyond Remote Islands

The efforts to establish Japan’s first comprehensive civil defense program are long overdue and are a welcome trend. But these initial steps taken by Tokyo also face numerous challenges and questions that the Japanese government and public must address in the coming months and years.

First, while the government’s current focus on protecting residents in Okinawa’s remote islands is sensible given their geographical remoteness and proximity to Taiwan, it is insufficient. The obvious next question is “who else?” If a severe contingency erupts in the Taiwan Strait, there are not only 21,102 Japanese nationals living in Taiwan, for whom the Japanese government is directly responsible, but also citizens of Japan’s allies and partners, as well as Taiwanese people who may require rescue using Japanese assets.⁴⁴ Failing to consider these realistic scenarios will hinder the central government’s ability to convince skeptics who doubt the seriousness of its initiatives and, consequently, the severity of Japan’s security environment.

Moreover, Tokyo must prepare for the risks of a more severe conflict that would inevitably affect a broader area of Japanese territory, including Okinawa Main Island, Kyushu, and Honshu. Considering these escalation risks, evacuating residents from Okinawa’s remote islands directly to Kyushu and Yamaguchi should not mark the end of efforts. Looking ahead, Tokyo must expand its civil protection measures to encompass other regions of Japan. Citizens nationwide should begin to view civil defense as a shared responsibility rather than an issue isolated to Okinawa’s remote islands.

The question of resources and the division of labor must also be considered. The SDF is enhancing its transport capacity by establishing a new unit focused on transport operations. While the SDF’s assets could support civilian evacuations as needed, the SDF’s primary responsibility during contingencies should be to repel enemy attacks. Consequently, those transport assets must also be used to transport SDF units, equipment, and ammunition across the country. While providing expertise and know-how as needed, the SDF must remain in a supporting role on civilian evacuations while local municipalities take the lead and work closely with the coast guard and private companies.

Raising public awareness of this reality is crucial to ensure the SDF’s ability to focus on combatting adversarial forces during a contingency. Historically, the SDF has gained broader acceptance in Japanese society by contributing to a series of Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response (HA/DR) operations, establishing itself as one of the most trusted public institutions since the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake.⁴⁵ A recent 2023 cabinet office poll reveals that over 90 percent of respondents continue to view HA/DR as one of the SDF’s primary missions, alongside civilian evacuation during an armed attack.⁴⁶ Planning a serious civil defense program necessitates a shift in the Japanese public’s perception of the SDF’s role.

Finally, the timing of civilian evacuations will likely present one of many thorny choices that Japanese political leaders will face during a crisis. There will be pressure to initiate evacuations well in advance of an armed attack to ensure the safety of evacuees and those conducting the operations, including private sector personnel. A timely declaration of the “Anticipated Armed Attack Situation” by the central government is critical for mobilizing various bureaucracies and securing the involvement of key public sector companies, as mandated by the Civil Protection Law.

Nevertheless, taking any action of that scale during a crisis carries significant risks, as it will inevitably send signals to adversaries, potentially provoking them and inadvertently escalating the situation. For instance, adversaries might interpret the start of evacuations as a cue to initiate live-fire exchanges, even when peace remains a possibility. To minimize such misperceptions, synchronizing steps with the United States will be necessary, at the very least.

Preparing for civil defense is a daunting task, as it is akin to preparing for war. Yet as Japan’s security environment deteriorates and the potential for conflict in the Taiwan Strait looms large, serious efforts are already underway in Japan—quietly, rapidly, and ubiquitously.