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Praise for China permeated Russian writings in the winter of 2025, sometimes backed by contrasts with Russia’s foreign policy choices in the late 1980s. Rejection of “universal values” proved to be a more enduring response to the United States. Coverage of Trump’s threatened “trade war” also supports China, comparing the more limited purpose of the Trump policy in his first term with broader objectives now and recognizing China’s preparedness for a fuller response. A review of the evolution of US policy toward Central Asia stresses the aim of minimizing Russian and Chinese influence, while finding serious problems in the way of shifting policies. Since 2022, the US has sought to weaken this influence in economics, politics, cultural-humanitarian, and military-technical cooperation but has faced tougher laws against NGOs and foundations, including foreign financing. Countries in the region resisted cooperation on secondary sanctions, not satisfied to become instruments of US operations to weaken the position of Russia and China. Another theme of interest is US pressure on South Korea and Japan, leaving alliances more troubled in 2025. South Koreans have taken the development of nuclear weapons more seriously, while Japanese found that Ishiba’s quick visit did not suffice given alarm over the spillover from how Trump is treating Ukraine and allies in Europe. On Russia-India relations, the tone is upbeat, mixed with awareness of unbalanced trade ties and intense competition for the Indian market. Looking ahead to a possible new Yalta conference of great powers dividing up parts of the world, one author noted China’s misgivings about the Versailles conference’s results and the lower status of China at Yalta compared to the Cairo summit, implying uncertainty about China’s interest this time. Finally, articles on ASEAN optimistically raised the issue of avoiding hierarchical ties with China and pointed to the mixed results of US military ties in Southeast Asia, while opposing blocs and supporting a balance of powers in the area. It is assumed China will not succeed in forging hierarchical ties and the US must not.
China vs. the United States
In Rossiya v Global’noi Politike of March/April Aleksandr Lomanov contrasted China to the United States. Saying the CCP is proposing a new civilization to the world, he compares it to the 1980s. At the time, the Chinese reevaluated old values, without rejecting socialism under the banner of saving humanity from a nuclear tragedy. Already drawing close to the West at the end of the 1970s, aware of its own backwardness and the need to exit its self-isolation, Chinese prioritized “salvation” over “enlightenment.” They rejected “convergence” after its intellectuals had debated what must be taken from the West, rejecting ideas that would have led to a full dismantling of state authority, denial of party ideology, and radical weakening of the position of national culture. As in the first part of the 20th century, on one side were proponents of complete westernization, including values, as if the alternative was “Chinese feudalism,” and on the other—manifest in the political reversal of 1989—development of the party and state with revival of traditional culture gaining authority in the 1990s. Even in the years after 2005, the debate reignited over “universal values,” as part of China’s mass media was able to support the position of pro-western globalism. After the earthquake in Xinjiang of May 2008, Nanfang Zhoumo praised the authorities for demonstrating China’s “acceptance of universal values.” Dissidents continued this line of thinking in Liu Shaobo’s December 2008 program for dismantling CCP authority, which aroused a backlash in China rejecting any possibility of “universal values” as leading to “full westernization.” Then Chinese recalled Gorbachev’s attempt to make humanism the main attribute of socialism, using this as the basic criterion to evaluate the history of the USSR, ignoring concrete problems it faced. Such an “idealistic view of history” does not correspond to reality, and it led to the defeat of the communist party in the Soviet Union under pressure from hostile forces.
In contrast, rejection of “universal values” became an irreversible part of the ideological mainstream in China. A turning point occurred with Xi Jinping’s September 2015 General Assembly speech on constructing a “community of common destiny.” Shared values are, in the first place, peace and development, providing for material well-being. Other ones are equality and justice, above all, for international relations. Only after that come aspects of political culture such as democracy and freedom. Xi’s approach calls for respect for diversity of civilizations, leading the Chinese mainstream to separate Xi’s “common values” from “universal values.” Whereas in the Enlightenment “universal values” played a progressive role in the victory of the bourgeoisie over feudal and clerical forces, that era is long gone. “Common values overcome the abstractness of universality and can unite the world based on acceptance of cultural differences. The article credits Marxism as well as Chinese wisdom with this realization. The West propagates “universal values” to strengthen its hegemony and exploitation of non-western countries. Chinese thinking rejects convergence and ideological capitulation before the West. Moreover, it links “common values” to Chinese cultural tradition and global equality of civilizations. With Chinese asserting that China is a “state of a civilizational type,” Xi recognized in 2023 the “continuity” of China’s civilization, its “innovativeness,” “unity,” “exclusivity,” and “peace-loving” character. Russia in 2023 in its foreign policy conception also labelled itself an “autonomous state-civilization.” In 2021 Xi said that the party had created a “new form of human civilization,” combining China’s development and a “community of shared destiny.” This article contrasts the choices made by China and Russia in the late 1980s, suggests what an alternative history for Russia could have meant, and lauds the way China, especially under Xi Jinping, has confronted the West and been proven correct.
In Mezhdunarodnaya Gazeta, No. 2 Vladimir Petrovskii wrote that the US-China “tariff war” had begun. He noted that on March 4 Trump had doubled tariffs on China from 10 to 20%, while acting against Canada and Mexico too, insisting that the PRC is unwilling to take measures to curtail the flow of synthetic opioids into the US. This is understood to be a pretext. From April1 tariffs on cars, semi-conductors, and pharmaceuticals are planned, resulting in retaliatory sanctions on US products as well as increased inflation. In 2018-2019, Trump’s main goal was to reduce the trade imbalance. China was quick to respond this time, including with new limits on rare earth mineral exports as well as tariffs on agricultural products. Against this background, TSMC announced new investments of $100 billion in manufacturing chips in the US, raising fears for the future of Taiwan. Although no more than 5-7% of the company’s total production will be affected, US factories will still depend on Taiwan TSMC for technical support and monitoring. So far, China’s chips fully suffice for its civilian and military sectors (and for Russia’s). China is rapidly advancing, investing more than all other producing countries together. One must agree with China that there is no winner in a trade war. The US from 2016 pulled out of the arbitration organ of the WTO, rendering it useless. Some in the US also are not happy with Trump’s impact on the market.
Central Asia
In Mezhdunarodnaya Gazeta, No. 2 Evgenii Vlasov, Pavel Vorob’ev, and Marina Dmitrieva wrote about the evolution of US policy toward Central Asia, noting a rise of interest after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Initially, the US strategy consisted of deepening political contacts, advancing democratic governance and market liberalization. Then, the US shifted to support for the growth of “national consciousness and national cultures” with the goal of driving the region, culturally, historically, and mentally, away from Russia. The strategic significance of the region for the US is rooted in its significant energy deposits and rare metals, as well as its geographical location in Eurasia, defining its role in the fight against terrorism and support for regional stability. At the same time, the region is a buffer zone for influencing Russia and China on matters such as economic integration, migration flows, and traditional and non-traditional security threats. Minimizing their influence remains the key aim of the US geopolitical strategy, the authors explain.
The article proceeds to identify stages in US policy: 1991-2000, using traditional US instruments to undermine Russia’s economic and ideological influence, through democratic institutes, market relations, and credit cabals to attract states; 2001-2005, countering Russia’s military, political, and economic presence through US bases and a transition in political elites to pro-western ones; 2005-2010, the greater Central Asia strategy to counter Russia’s successful Eurasian economic community initiative to integrate the region, destabilizing with democratic values areas around Afghanistan; 2011-2014, the new silk road strategy, uniting Central and South Asia around Afghanistan with more intensive economic measures; 2015-2018, the C5+1 strategy, separate from Afghanistan, demonstrating that problems could be resolved without Russia and China, posing that Moscow and Beijing were at odds in Central Asia; and 2018-2022, proxy export of democracy, as detailed in a 2020 State Department strategy.
In Bishkek, American University positioned itself to foster future leaders for the democratic transformation in Central Asia. The Kazakh American University was similar. Ties to US universities, such as Arizona, Pennsylvania, and Michigan threatened to produce BA degrees not reflecting the real needs of the society. Yet, in the past two years, laws against NGOs and foundations, including foreign financing, have toughened, impacting their work. After the start of the Special Military Operation in Ukraine, the US has tried to weaken the ties of Central Asian states with Russia and China in economics, politics, cultural-humanitarian, and military-technical cooperation. Use of secondary sanctions became the main instrument to manipulate their behavior. The focus has been Kazakhstan, much more than the other countries, including support for logistics bypassing Russia, such as the Trans-Caspian transport corridor through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey. Yet, this and other projects favored by the US face serious problems.
Seeking to undermine plans for a gas sphere of Russia, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan, the US has spread information that Russia aims to control the gas exports of the others. From 2022 the number of personal visits by high-level US officials significantly increased, applying unprecedented pressure, e.g., to reduce economic ties with Russia connected to observance of US sanctions. There was also support for conferences and seminars aimed at reconsidering the negative history of the region under the Russian empire or the USSR. There were calls to revive identities and religious societies, which could be used by extremist groups. The countries of Central Asia were not satisfied to become instruments of US operations to weaken the position of Russia and China in the region. The area is not of critical significance for the US, which was trying to weaken cooperation with others.
South Korea
In Kommersant on March 12, Elena Chernenko reported on the US move to put South Korea, one of its key allies, on a list of sensitive countries, putting special limits on cooperation. This is reportedly due to rising ambitions in Seoul for nuclear weapons against the background of tensions over a lack of clarity in bilateral relations on opposing North Korea. Trump spoke earlier of the unacceptability of new nuclear powers. The US Department of Energy could make this determination on April 15, but the ROK Minister of Foreign Affairs told the National Assembly that the decision has not yet been made, and that the US had not informed South Korea of this prospect earlier, but it found out through unofficial channels. Seoul plans to discuss this in the hope of avoiding this designation. Of the 24 states now on the list, some are called terrorists, some unofficially possess nuclear weapons, and others simply are seen as increased risks to US national security. Being on the list means extra scrutiny and limits on cooperation. This includes access to dual-use items and to research in the US or visits to some US Department of Energy sites.
Drawing US attention is more active talk of developing one’s own nuclear weapons. With this designation, cooperation on peaceful nuclear energy could be impacted, and the country’s international reputation damaged. South Korea should repeat that it is refraining from these weapons to avoid this step, one Korean warned. The discussion of the need for them had been prompted by intensification of the clash with nuclear North Korea and the coming to power in the US of a president with isolationist tendencies. Supporters of this in Seoul hope that it would allow the country to take care of its own security in any geopolitical conditions. Sceptics fear further degradation of the situation on the peninsula with worsening US-ROK ties and unpredictable economic consequences. Some call for a middle position, going to the threshold of building nuclear weapons and not crossing it now. In the fall of 2024, it became clear that South Korea intended to get approval in the US for construction of objects to process extracted nuclear fuel, said to be needed for nuclear reactors and submarines. This would not exclude authorities laying the technological potential for nuclear weapons. In 2016 Trump had declared that the US could support the nuclear ambitions of Seoul and Tokyo if they provided for their own security, but he never repeated that as president, and in his second term, he has rejected any expansion of the nuclear weapons club. If the Department of Energy proceeds, this would send a positive signal to the entire community of non-proliferation, denying even to close US allies and partners this option. At the same time, given growing doubt about US will, such a decision could drive South Koreans to lean further on their own forces, including nuclear ones, regardless of Washington’s opinion.
Japan
Oleg Paramonov in Mezhdunarodnaya Gazeta, No. 2 discussed the aftermath of Ishiba Shigeru’s visit to Washington on February 6-8. The visit was called a “new golden age” in relations between the two powers. In Tokyo, hopes rose that Trump’s sympathy for Japan, reflected in his personal relations with the deceased Abe Shinzo, would persist, as if Ishiba also has “chemistry” with Trump, while Japan is doing all the “homework” from Washington for strengthening its military role within the alliance. Already, under Kishida, plans were put in place for raising the defense budget from 1 to 2 percent by 2027. Yet, it is an illusion in Japan that Americans well understand the “delicacy” of this for Japan’s domestic politics. The Japanese fear reduced civilian control over the armed forces and a rise in corruption from the increase in the Ministry of Defense’s budget. There remains a lot of “homework”: security ties with Australia, Great Britain, South Korea, and Finland; multilateral exercises; official assistance for security for friendly states in the Global South; and infrastructure and other projects in the Indo-Pacific region.
Even in the triumphant atmosphere for Japanese conservatives elicited by Ishiba’s return, the “calm before the storm,” was punctured by news of Washington ignoring the interests of its Western allies in the course of extracting itself from the “Kiev dead-end,” culminating in the Oval Office spat with Zelenskyy. It became clear that Trump was ready, without the slightest hesitation, to redress any allies for the sake of an “advantageous deal.” This raised the question of whether the US could act similarly with its Asian allies or when would it so act. Alarming commentaries followed from Japanese, including former high-ranking diplomats with great authority among conservatives. The lesson one drew from the war in Ukraine is that the era of fully relying on the US has ended. If the threat directly affects the US, it will fully respond; if not, it may retreat. Worst of all, Xi Jinping probably is aware of that. Tokyo does not know what to do if it had to choose sides in a conflict between the US and European powers and Canada. Great efforts were devoted to attracting the British, French, Germans, Canadians, and Baltic people into the Indo-Pacific project, and now they may have to turn to China. Some moves by Tokyo have already troubled Washington, e.g., the steps to “lean to China” after the November 15, 2024, Lima APEC summit between Ishiba and the Chinese leader leading to some improvements in relations, such as weakening visa restrictions, while talk of a free trade zone of China-Japan-South Korea coincided with Trump’s victory.
The March 4 Senate confirmation hearing of Elbridge Colby sent shock waves when he called for Japan as soon as possible to spend at least 3% of its GDP on defense and to accelerate modernization of the SDF. He also insisted that Taiwan boost its defense budget four-fold to 10% of GDP. This is occurring just when Japan is discussing its defense budget without an LDP-Komeito majority as budgets are being cut, as Upper House elections are awaited in July. Ishiba may not survive. He asserted on March 5 that Japan must decide on its own its defense budget. Adding fuel to the fire, Trump on March 6 argued that the 1960 Japan-US security treaty was one-sided, adding comments that Japan is getting rich on the US. Again, Japan had to explain that its laws had changed in 2015 in support of US forces in certain regional scenarios and to allow the US to use military objects on Japanese territory to support peace and security in the Far East. If the US cannot fully recognize Japan’s circumstances, it would be logical to pull away, but over recent decades the alliance has become part of the identity of Japan. Trump’s trade war could put the defense plans in doubt.
Russia-India Relations
In Nezavisimaya Gazeta on January 26 Lidiya Kulik discussed Russia-India relations, looking ahead to a visit by Putin to India. Asserting that 2024 was especially significant, she points to Modi’s visit to Moscow in July and then to Kazan in October for the BRICS summit. Adding that economics now is central, she notes plans in July for the Program-2030, providing political support for a unique chance at economic cooperation, from logistics to payments to migration to labor resources. Work has begun on an FTA between India and the EEU as well a bilateral agreement on free trade in services and investments, advancing also joint projects in the Russian Far East and Arctic. The leaders set a goal of $100 billion in trade in 2030, building on $65 billion in 2023 and a likely 8% rise in 2024. They seek to correct unbalanced trade and to diversify, given the fact that Russia is not in the top 25 countries for India’s exports. BRICS matters for India’s pursuit of a more just global political and economic order, overcoming growing monopolies by the Western powers in digital platforms, foodstuff trade, etc., as global institutions are blocked by them. Russia has proposed a series of initiatives, especially long-term contracts, which await India’s response. India prefers maximum flexibility as market conditions change. It is a leader of the Global South, offering its vast market for sale to the highest bidder with investments, technology, workplaces, quality of life, and respectful relations. One can say confidently that in this relationship there are distinctive components—longstanding trust and spiritual closeness. Russia must understand the intense competition for India’s market.
On January 20 in Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Iury Paniev discussed the January 21 foreign ministers meeting of the Quad, considered one of the main components of the US strategy against the rising influence of China in the Indo-Pacific region. As Kyodo News explained, this meeting has an unprecedented character, designed to demonstrate the active participation of the US under Trump in the affairs of the Indo-Pacific region. India takes a less strident position on China, readers are told. Despite Trump’s skepticism about alliances, including NATO and the partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region, he launched the Quad in his first term and is intensifying opposition to China. Yet, he is expected to invite Xi Jinping to visit, as Japan also wants warmer relations with China, having recently sent a high-level delegation from the ruling parties. The situation is paradoxical. On the one hand, the US and Japan are trying to improve ties to China; on the other, they are insuring against what they consider to be security challenges from China. Experts sometimes call the Quad, the “Asian NATO.” Its dynamics depend on India, which seeks balance in its relationship with China, freeing the relationship from the complications that arose due to the border situation after 2020, looking to long-term ties. As Sino-US ties worsen, the US will turn to the Quad for support, while the other three countries, in turn, will strive to receive maximum benefits from cooperation with minimal costs.
A Second Yalta Conference
Iury Tavrovsky on February 24 in Nezavisimaya Gazeta asked if WWII has ended for China, explaining that the Versailles and Yalta treaties were deemed unfortunate. The idea of transforming the world order gained a “second breath” with Trump’s return to the White House. His pretenses for territory put at risk UN principles worked out at Yalta that have kept the peace since WWII. There is talk of a “second Yalta,” which now would define the fate of the entire planet. Bilateral meetings of powerful leaders—the heads of Russia, China, the US, and India—will take place in the near future. But is it possible for them to gather together and conduct a “second Yalta”? This is being discussed in the various capitals. At Versailles in 1919, the Chinese delegation was not allowed into the discussion. The May decision to transfer to Japan the German colony at Qingdao led to mass demonstrations, giving rise to the “May 4 movement” and the first communists, including Mao.
If the Versailles conference is a pure minus in the collective memory of Chinese, the Cairo conference, where leaders of the US, Great Britain, and the Republic of China met in November 1943, is described as a plus. It meant recognition after years of marginalization of a new status. The focus was on Japan, for which China remained the only military force able to oppose its army despite having lost control over many of its biggest cities and not receiving military or even diplomatic support from the US, Great Britain, and other states in the West, but only from the Soviet Union. Strong support from Moscow strengthened the position of Chiang Kai-shek and other patriots in the Kuomintang, who opposed the supporters of capitulation. In contrast to the sacrifices of the Kuomintang and Chinese Communist Party, soldiers of the West, such as British troops in Hong Kong and Singapore quickly surrendered after Pearl Harbor. China from 1941 forestalled the planned August invasion of Siberia and the Russian Far East, despite a promise in Berlin, fearing it would weaken the Chinese front. China also served as a “second front” in the war in the Pacific, distracting over a million Japanese, allowing the British and Americans to fight in Burma and conserve forces for the battles in the Pacific Ocean, at tremendous cost to the Chinese. In WWII China again was on the “right side of history,” giving its elite great hope. Chiang received a proposal to include Vietnam in China after the war and, of course, to regain all lands seized by Japan, including Manchuria and Taiwan. China was not invited to the Teheran and Yalta conferences, in the former case it is usually explained by Moscow’s desire not to provoke Japan, as was the case in it not joining in Cairo just days earlier. The participants in Teheran understood China’s limited military potential. Only the Soviet Union could oust Japan, a theme in Teheran and an important part of the agenda at Yalta.
For China, great power conferences smacked of Versailles, and those after Cairo were a step back, not treating China as equal. By 1945, Russia had promised to enter the war against Japan, the US was tightening its vice around Japan, and it was time to establish a new structure of world management. Yet, at Yalta, China was included in the “Big Five” of victors and China was given the legal right to all lands seized by Japan from the end of the 19th century, including Taiwan. Chiang still hoped to get control of Outer Mongolia, but the status quo was preserved. Chiang was not pleased with the disposition of ports and the railway in Manchuria, but the three powers restored Soviet pretentions. With the San Francisco Treaty of 1951, Taiwan was not treated as belonging to China and borders in the South China Sea were not clearly fixed. In the view of Beijing academics, China remained a divided nation, and WWII had not ended. China has a negative view of Versailles and Yalta. Invitations to a “second Yalta” could complicate discussions of global problems with other great powers.
Southeast Asia
In RSMD on March 5, Andrei Gubin examined whether Southeast Asia is succeeding in avoiding a hierarchy, noting that the regional order ahead remains in doubt. He finds no clear leader in ASEAN, opening the door to an external power to shape that order with its own values and interests. For ASEAN the main interest is to pursue an equidistance approach, made easier of late through multilateral institutions that boost the role of small and middle powers. ASEAN states see China pragmatically, not recognizing its superiority or any hierarchical order. Citing foreign experts, who view China as considering Southeast Asia its own sphere of interest and aiming to organize its internal order, using the BRI and other efforts to forge a civilizational community, Gubin points to local elites opposed to expansionist moves and intent on not falling into a “debt trap.” Concern about US leadership aims is stronger. The plan is to retain ASEAN centrality. If “wolf warrior” diplomacy mixed with coercion was an obstacle for China, it now prefers a softer approach. Meanwhile, Anwar Ibrahim in Malaysia rejects full cooperation with the US due to its support for Israeli actions in Gaza, while as the ASEAN chair in 2025 plans to develop South-South ties through BRICS. Southeast Asia is being squeezed between Trump’s tariffs and a “tsunami of imports” from China, to which the US market will not make up for the imbalance. Growing social instability awaits due to business losses, job cuts, and rising inflation. The US may try to win over these states, while it “demonizes” China and accuses its “undemocratic” system of causing all global problems. Chinese propose “li” (礼) as a model of governance, propriety for a “code of conduct” based on mutual respect but also China-centric. A political system for Southeast Asia and possibly Greater East Asia would combine China’s model of centralized governance with technocracy, while ASEAN’s collective identity ensuring equal rights would prove extremely useful in preventing any hierarchy or exploitation in the region.
On January 10 in RSMD, Igor Shkrobtak and Aleksandra Tersi wrote about the US factor in the establishment of a new security architecture in the Indo-Pacific region, remarking thar a variety of countries while maintaining economic ties with China are, to a significant degree, deepening military and political cooperation with the US, as one of the key tendencies in the Indo-Pacific region. This article considers the impact of the US regional military policy on the region’s security architecture. Under Biden’s strategy, the Philippines and Thailand were seen as allies through military treaty, and Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore as leading regional partners. The regional strategy was seen through the prism of defending democracy and US and regional security, stressing the need for unquestioned US supremacy in the region and creating a counterweight to China as well as denuclearization of the DPRK. Equally important was the Russian-Ukraine crisis, which catalyzed strengthening military activity of some political actors, e.g., Japan. Despite paralysis in Congress on assistance, in the final passage $8.2 billion was allotted to the Indo-Pacific region, indicative of its priority. Unlike China’s approach, each US minilateral group or alliance has an ideological component, touching on technology and economic ties and including Euro-Atlantic actors. Notice is taken of “Talisman Saber” involving 15 states in comprehensive exercises, and other military exercises. The economic component plays a special role. Inclusion of NATO is a new phenomenon, as the China factor becomes more important with talk of today’s Europe can become tomorrow’s East Asia. Beijing counters with reliable economic partnerships and assistance without demands for internal political change. It develops military ties with the Solomon Islands and East Timor. India adheres to multi-vector policies, succeeding in 2021 in transforming the Quad from containing China to a foundation for a new regional security architecture. It participates in BRICS and the SCO and works out agreements with China on maintaining a peaceful border, as it strengthens strategic ties with Japan and Australia and cooperates with the US on defense industries. US moves could result in a slow-ticking bomb with serious consequences for regional security; however, other actors stick to balancing, not forming exclusive partnerships with the US, guided by the principle of indivisible security. Division of the Indo-Pacific region into blocs will not serve regional stability or productive relations with China. The most pragmatic approach is to forge a regional balance.
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