Country Report: South Korea (April 2025)

On April 3, South Korea’s Constitutional Court upheld the impeachment of former President Yoon Suk-yeol over his illegal declaration of martial law. His removal from office has ushered in a period of both institutional uncertainty and political urgency. Following Yoon’s ousting, Prime Minister Han Duck-soo has resumed his role as acting president, and a snap presidential election is now scheduled for June 3. Leading the race is Lee Jae-myung, whose potential victory could herald a significant shift in South Korea’s foreign policy direction. Amid this political vacuum and the short campaign window, South Korea is confronting one of its most fragile moments in recent memory¾forced to navigate complex foreign policy and national security challenges without the stability of an elected head of state.

Ironically, March and April have been months marked by both profound uncertainty and emerging unity. While domestic media coverage was initially dominated by anxiety surrounding the Court’s deliberations and Yoon’s impeachment, a notable transformation has taken place: the more certain the uncertainty becomes, the more the growing sense of bipartisan solidarity. Despite ideological divides, there is a call for national coherence¾on issues ranging from economic security and tariffs to regional diplomacy and technological sovereignty. Many have emphasized the need for “patience,” urging all political actors to avoid rash decisions and instead focus on long-term strategic resilience. The emphasis has not been on political victory, but on safeguarding South Korea’s broader national interests.

As South Korea braces for a political transition, this country report examines the country’s responses to key foreign policy and economic challenges during this turbulent period. It begins by analyzing South Korea’s responses to US tariff pressure, in particular amid fears of economic hollowing-out as a result. It then explores the evolving debate around Korea’s strategic positioning in light of shifting US defense priorities, especially with growing concerns that US commitment to the Korean Peninsula may be downgraded in favor of Taiwan and homeland defense. In China’s maritime assertiveness and South Korea’s response, it assesses escalating tensions in the Yellow Sea and the rare political consensus that China’s unilateral actions demand concrete countermeasures. Furthermore, it analyzes South Korea’s recent designation as a “Sensitive Country,” contrasting interpretations and its implications. Lastly, the report evaluates the implications of DPRK-Russia military cooperation, including North Korea’s official confirmation of its troop deployment. 

South Korea’s Responses to US Tariff Pressure

On April 8, South Korean Acting President and Prime Minister Han Duck-soo held his first phone conversation with US President Donald Trump. During the call, Han proposed continued ministerial-level consultations regarding the 25% “reciprocal tariffs” the US imposed on South Korean exports.¹ Although the call marked an initial diplomatic step, skepticism looms over Han’s ability to deliver results, given his lame-duck status¾his term ends on June 3¾and his traditionally cautious political stance. According to the Prime Minister’s Office, Han conveyed South Korea’s willingness to pursue deeper cooperation in three strategic areas: shipbuilding, liquefied natural gas (LNG), and trade balance.

The US treasury secretary has named Korea, Japan, the UK, Australia, and India as the top priority countries for tariff negotiations. In parallel, defense cost-sharing for US Forces Korea (USFK) has re-entered the agenda, as Trump openly links economic and security issues into a unified bargaining strategy¾what he calls “one-stop shopping.” This concept, which Trump publicly praised as “beautiful and efficient,” underscores a transactional approach that bundles trade, industrial policy, and alliance management into a single negotiation framework.

Trump’s tariffs, which particularly target South Korea’s automotive sector—its largest export to the US—have generated alarm across the political spectrum. Nearly half (49.1%) of Korea’s auto exports are US-bound, and these tariffs effectively erode the gains secured under the ROK-US Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA).² Both conservative and progressive outlets regard the tariffs as an existential threat to South Korea’s export-driven economy, warning of downstream effects on manufacturing, employment, and domestic supply chains.

Despite consensus on the gravity of the moment, conservative and progressive media narratives diverge on cause, principle, and strategy. Progressive outlets frame Trump’s bundling of economic pressure with defense cost-sharing demands as coercive and diplomatically inappropriate. A recent op-ed by the progressive Kyunghyang Shinmum points out that such tactics not only undermine the rules-based trade order but also risk compromising South Korea’s national security posture by forcing false trade-offs.³ It further calls for principled resistance, alliance coordination, and decoupling trade from security¾advocating a piecemeal, sector-specific negotiation strategy backed by international solidarity with other US allies.

Conservative outlets, while also uneasy with Trump’s aggressive transactionalism, adopt a more pragmatic stance. Rather than viewing the moment as a zero-sum threat, they see it as an opportunity for strategic recalibration. A recent Joongang Ilbo editorial argued ⁴ that Korea must not respond with emotion, but instead develop a clear, long-term strategy. If a comprehensive deal encompassing cooperation on advanced technology, manufacturing, and deterrence measures against North Korea is possible, it would be in Korea’s interest to pursue it. In this view, South Korea could reduce the risk of diplomatic marginalization (“Korea passing”) by demonstrating initiative and flexibility.

The Domestic Investment Dilemma

The immediate economic fallout is already materializing. Trump’s 25% tariff on South Korean automobiles and steel, alongside a universal 10% tariff on other imports, has disrupted South Korea’s economic momentum. The first quarter of 2025 saw a 0.2% GDP contraction¾the first decline since Q2 2024¾largely driven by a sharp drop in auto exports.⁵ In response, Hyundai Motor Group announced a $21 billion investment in the US over the next four years. Some estimate that this plan could reduce domestic production by approximately 300,000 vehicles and cut 10,000 jobs. This has triggered intense debate about the hollowing-out of Korean industry and the longer-term consequences of capital outflow.

Progressive media outlets have decried this trend as a failure of strategic governance. A recent Hankyoreh editorial argued that affected companies need immediate financial support and that the government should introduce incentives for domestic production, including requirements for local sourcing of parts and materials.⁶ More broadly, progressives argue that the state should not leave tariff responses to the discretion of private firms but must formulate a national-level package strategy to protect South Korea’s ecosystem.⁷

In contrast, conservative commentary places greater blame on internal dysfunctions. The Joongang Ilbo⁸ frames the economic strain not just as an external shock but as a product of Korea’s deteriorating investment climate¾characterized by high labor costs, rigid employment protections, and burdensome regulations. Reforms such as the 52-hour workweek, revisions to the Commercial Act, and the Yellow Envelope Law are viewed as deterrents to innovation and reinvestment. These “regulatory shackles” must be removed to revive domestic dynamism. Hyundai Motor Group Chairman Chung Eui-sun’s remarks at the opening of the Metaplant America facility in Georgia ¾“We did not come here just to build a factory, we came to put down roots.”¾were cited as evidence of Korea’s failure to offer a competitive business ecosystem.⁹ The editorial further recommends structural reforms, tax incentives, and labor market flexibility as the antidote to industrial hollowing-out.

South Korea’s Strategic Position

Across the political divide, one shared concern emerges: South Korea’s need for a coherent, forward-looking negotiation strategy. While both conservative and progressives agree that Trump’s tariffs reflect a broader realignment of global trade, alliance management, and industrial policy, they offer different pathways forward.

Progressives emphasize international coordination and criticize any narrowing of Seoul’s diplomatic bandwidth. A Hankyoreh op-ed strongly rebuked Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul for his CNN interview¹⁰ where he ruled out trilateral cooperation with China and Japan, arguing that such statements self-sabotage Korea’s bargaining power. The fear is that overdependence on Washington, without hedging via regional diplomacy, leaves Korea strategically vulnerable. Aligning with other US allies such as the EU, Japan, or Australia¾without shutting the door on cooperation with China and Russia¾is seen as essential to preserving leverage.¹¹ 

Amid this evolving debate, a recent report by the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS)¹² interprets Trump’s tariff strategy as a deliberate effort to divide negotiating partners through a prisoner’s dilemma¾forcing them into bilateral competition that weakens collective leverage. IFANS recommends a multi-pronged strategy: first, prepare for sector-specific bargaining, with internal alignment across Korea’s ministries and industries; second, engage in selective coordination with allies such as Japan, Australia, and the EU to counteract US divide-and-conquer tactics; third, reduce economic overreliance on China by diversifying supply chains; and finally, accelerate Korea’s accession to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) to anchor itself within a broader, rules-based economic order.

China’s Maritime Assertiveness and South Korea’s Response

In March and April 2025, South Korea faced heightened maritime tensions with China following Beijing’s unilateral installation of large offshore structures within the Yellow Sea’s Provisional Measures Zone (PMZ). Originally established under the 2000 Korea-China Fisheries Agreement as a temporary mechanism to manage disputes while formal maritime boundaries were negotiated, the PMZ has increasingly become a flashpoint. China’s installation of Shunlan 1 (2018) and Shunlan 2 (2024) aquaculture facilities¾alongside a 2022 structure resembling an offshore oil rig¾is widely interpreted in South Korea as a de facto assertion of Chinese sovereignty. Tensions peaked in February 2025 when a South Korean inspection attempt was blocked by Chinese maritime authorities, resulting in a direct confrontation between the countries’ coast guards. This confrontation exposed the structural fragility of the PMZ framework and triggered a cross-partisan outcry within South Korea. This incident was perceived not merely as a regulatory infraction but as a deliberate erosion of South Korea’s maritime rights.

The Democratic Party (DP) issued a formal statement expressing “deep regret” and called upon China to immediately halt its activities within the PMZ. The DP’s firm stance was welcomed by conservative figures, who praised the government’s reaffirmation of national sovereignty.¹³ Against this backdrop, the Third Korea-China Maritime Cooperation Dialogue was held in Seoul on April 23. South Korea formally demanded that China relocate its structures outside the PMZ.¹⁴ China, however, downplayed the issue, insisting the installations served purely aquacultural purposes. Instead of addressing relocation, it floated the idea of a state visit to improve bilateral ties, and both governments agreed on the importance of managing the dispute carefully.¹⁵ Despite the lack of substantive progress, China’s dispatch of a 20-member delegation suggested a calibrated interest in maintaining diplomatic engagement, likely with the upcoming APEC Summit in mind.¹⁶

On April 24, the National Assembly’s Agriculture, Food, Rural Affairs, Oceans and Fisheries Committee convened and approved a 60.5 billion won supplementary budget to respond to the escalating situation.¹⁷ Following this, Cho Tae-yul, during a parliamentary budget session on April 28, confirmed that the government is “comprehensively reviewing measures such as establishing a maritime science base” as a countermeasure. This remark came in response to a question from DP lawmaker Yoon Joon-byung, who pressed the minister for concrete retaliation against China’s action.¹⁸

Nevertheless, editorial voices within South Korea remained sharply critical. A recent conservative Chosun Ilbo editorial¹⁹ denounced the installations as part of China’s broader campaign of “maritime expansionism,” arguing that the moves were not isolated but part of a calculated strategy to incrementally undermine South Korean maritime sovereignty. The editorial accused the government of responding too cautiously and urged a more resolute and unified domestic posture, calling on both the government and opposition parties to present a cohesive and firm response to China’s provocations. It further warns that failure to address these challenges decisively could embolden further encroachments, not only from China but potentially from other neighboring countries as well. Echoing these concerns, the People Power Party held an “Emergency Forum on Responding to China’s Maritime Project in the West Sea” on March 25. Nam Sung-wook warned that the line of Chinese structures could reach key South Korean cities like Mokpo, Muan, and even Pyeongtaek, home to USFK.²⁰ Professor Nam argued that the likely objective was to contain the operational range of USFK in the event of a Taiwan contingency. He called upon the South Korean government to respond in kind by installing similar maritime structures of its own. Members of the National Assembly’s National Defense Committee also held a press conference on the same day, urging the government to take all necessary measures, including proportional countermeasures.

While progressive outlets traditionally emphasize diplomatic resolution and multilateral cooperation in resolving such disputes, this time even E-daily aligned with conservative critiques and cited growing expert skepticism about the viability of relying on international legal frameworks alone to resolve the dispute. ²¹ There was consensus across the media landscape that China’s actions represented a direct challenge to South Korea’s maritime sovereignty and required more than symbolic protest, such as concrete countermeasures.

South Korea’s Designation as a “Sensitive Country”

On March 10, Hankyoreh, a progressive South Korean newspaper, reported that the US Department of Energy (DOE) had begun procedures to designate South Korea as a “Sensitive Country.” The report attributed this development primarily to growing domestic calls for nuclear armament, notably from conservative political circles.²² It particularly pointed at South Korea’s escalating nuclear armament rhetoric under the Yoon Suk-yeol administration in 2023, which may have triggered Washington’s concern over South Korea’s future nuclear trajectory.  This news sparked polarized interpretations from South Korean media, with conservative and progressive outlets offering sharply contrasting narratives on its causes, implications, and necessary policy responses.

Some Korean headlines sensationalized the development, provocatively asking whether South Korea was now being treated on a par with North Korea, China, and Russia¾countries already designated as “Sensitive Countries” by the US.²³ The situation gained further clarity in mid-April, when it was confirmed that the Biden administration had quietly designated South Korea as “sensitive” as early as January, during its final weeks in office. The designation raises significant concerns, particularly about potential restrictions on bilateral cooperation in advanced technology sectors such as nuclear energy and artificial intelligence.

In the absence of a clear explanation from the US, speculation proliferated. Some theories pointed to the political fallout of the December 3 martial law crisis. Others linked the designation to the rise of public and political discourse around indigenous nuclear armament, or a part of the broader US technological containment strategies. Progressive Hankyoreh cited Jeon Bong-geun, president of the Korean Association of Nuclear Policy, who argued that the designation stemmed directly from South Korea’s excessive domestic debate over nuclear armament.²⁴ He urged Korea to take a more practical approach focused on securing enrichment and reprocessing capabilities that are essential for its economy and energy security. This narrative portrays the United States as reacting, perhaps overly harshly, to Korean domestic political signals but ultimately sees the root problem as self-inflicted. It was echoed by ensuing articles warning that if Korea’s domestic nuclear armament debates are left unchecked, they could be used against Korea as a pretext for further restrictions in sensitive technological fields.²⁵

However, this interpretation faced immediate pushbacks. A rebuttal from the Sejong Institute challenged the causal link between domestic nuclear rhetoric and the DOE’s decision.²⁶ The report made two critical points: first, if pro-nuclear armament rhetoric were the core issue, the Biden administration would likely have acted at the height of those debates in 2023¾not during its final days in early 2025. Second, as a Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) signatory under IAEA safeguards, South Korea lacks a viable path to develop nuclear weapons secretly. The report further called this “overreacting” and an incident that shows that South Korea has yet to overcome its “small-country complex.”

This position was further reinforced by Acting US Ambassador Joseph Yun, who downplayed the incident, calling it “not a big deal.”²⁷ According to Yun, the issue stemmed from a limited case involving a South Korean affiliated with DOE labs who mishandled export-controlled information¾not from any systemic concerns about South Korea’s national intentions or capabilities. He also pointed to the broader context of cooperation, noting that South Korea was simultaneously being considered for Tier-1 partnership status in artificial intelligence¾an indication that bilateral trust in advanced tech collaboration remained largely intact. emphasized positive countermeasures, such as designating South Korea as a Tier-1 partner in AI.

Soon after, DP lawmakers demanded an investigation into how deeply the South Korean government, including the National Intelligence Service, was involved in the issue of “mishandling of sensitive information” raised by the US side, and called for the findings to be made public. In response, conservative South Korean media accused the DP of politicizing the issue for partisan gain. The Chosun Ilbo editorialized that the “Sensitive Country” designation was a routine US bureaucratic measure aimed at strengthening internal safeguards, not a diplomatic indictment of South Korea’s integrity or intelligence practices.²⁸ The piece harshly criticized the DP’s demand for a full investigation into the NIS and its role in the mishandling of sensitive information. It argued that such internal probes would only weaken South Korea’s national security posture at a time when global tech espionage and strategic competition were intensifying. Instead of “poking out its own eyes,” the editorial urged the government to modernize counterintelligence frameworks and overhaul espionage laws to better address emerging foreign threats in a rapidly evolving geopolitical environment.

Recalibrating Korean Security Strategy amid Shifting US Priorities

The recent release of the US “Interim National Defense Strategy” memorandum, signed by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, has triggered mounting concerns in South Korea regarding the reliability and trajectory of US security commitments. The memo considers China as the only threat and prioritizes the defense of its homeland and Taiwan even at the risk of dangers elsewhere. This profound shift in American defense posture signals a downsizing of the US’s forward defense commitments elsewhere¾including the Korean Peninsula¾and suggests a growing expectation that regional allies, particularly South Korea and Japan, are expected to “handle it themselves.” Given that Hegseth expressed this position while visiting Japan, it is likely that the US will soon make a similar demand to South Korea.

Adding to these anxieties are Japanese media reports from April 14, which indicate that during the US-Japan defense ministers’ meeting, Tokyo proposed conceptualizing the Korean Peninsula, East China Sea, and South China Sea as a threater of operations.²⁹ This proposition is alarming for South Korea, as it implies that USFK could be mobilized in contingencies related to Taiwan or the East China Sea¾conflicts that Seoul has traditionally sought to keep at arm’s length. Even without Japan’s suggestion Washington’s evolving posture already reflects a strategic reframing of USFK as a regional counterbalance to China rather than merely a deterrent against North Korea.

What’s striking is the bipartisan unease that has emerged in South Korea, including among traditionally pro-US conservative voices. Conservative media outlets are increasingly framing the ROK-US alliance as a potential liability rather than an unbreakable asset. One conservative Joongang Ilbo op-ed described Trump’s Northeast Asia policy as a “second Acheson Line” that could trigger North Korea’s invasion of the South.³⁰

Think tanks like the Institute for National Security Strategy (INSS) and IFANS have provided more nuanced policy roadmaps for navigating the Taiwan dilemma. INSS³¹ acknowledges that Seoul may eventually be pressured to play a role in a Taiwan contingency. However, it stresses the importance of establishing non-negotiable principles: firm opposition to any attempt to unilaterally alter the status quo by force on the Korean Peninsula and in the broader region. INSS recommends that South Korea publicly root its policy stance in universal values such as sovereignty and non-aggression, thus insulating itself from accusations of aligning with US containment strategies vis-à-vis China.

IFANS similarly outlines contingency planning parameters.³² Crucially, it proposes that South Korea’s primary role in such a scenario should be to deter North Korea; as the US shifts its focus to Taiwan, North Korea may exploit the situation to stage provocations, potentially leading to two simultaneous conflicts. To manage this dual-threat scenario, IFANS advocates the preemptive relocation of US fighter jet operations from Korea to Japan to avoid escalating tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Moreover, it cautions that trilateral coordination mechanisms involving Japan may dilute South Korea’s strategic influence and recommends that high-level Taiwan contingency planning be confined to bilateral Seoul-Washington channels.

While conservatives align with prioritizing military modernization and domestic industry support (shipbuilding, tech), a recent Joongang Ilbo op-ed framed the US-China geopolitical competition as a business opportunity that South Korea must seize aggressively and proposed massive state-backed expansion of shipbuilding capacity.³³ Another conservative Chosun Ilbo op-ed urged the government to engage in frank negotiations with Washington to safeguard Korean interests in case of future US strategic redeployment, suggesting that alliance terms may need to be adjusted to preserve flexibility.³⁴

Progressive voices, by contrast, are focused on the erosion of South Korea’s strategic autonomy. For them, the US shift toward Taiwan and China is not merely a pivot; it reflects a downgrading of South Korea’s strategic centrality. ³⁵ Their preferred response is multidirectional diplomacy. While continuing alliance management with Washington and Tokyo, progressives advocate deeper engagement with ASEAN, the EU and Australia¾along with more controversial outreach to China and Russia.

A recent Hankyoreh editorial, for instance, suggested that South Korea should leverage Putin as a “diplomatic card” given Russia’s unique relationship with Trump, Xi Jinping, and Kim Jong-un. It argued that Russia is essential for Seoul to navigate US-China competition, advance rare earth development, foster Arctic space collaboration, and rebuild relations with Kim Jong-un.³⁶ Kim Jung-sup similarly recommended pursuing wartime operation control (OPCON) transfer and augmenting South Korea’s self-defense capabilities as part of a broader push for strategic autonomy.³⁷

Despite their ideological differences, both conservatives and progressives are converging on one essential point: South Korea must no longer take unshakable US support for granted. Conservatives and progressives alike advocate for bolstering national defense, securing independent deterrent capacities, and future-proofing diplomacy. They share the view that North Korea is likely to test the alliance’s cohesion during moments of perceived US distraction or retreat. The ChosunIlbo recently published an op-ed³⁸ calling for an unprecedented national consultative body that includes the government, opposition parties, and private sector experts¾emphasizing the need for bipartisan unity and long-term strategic clarity.

DPRK-Russia Military Cooperation

While changes in US-DPRK relations were widely anticipated with the start of Trump’s second term, actual progress has proven elusive. Despite rhetorical signals from Washington¾including references to North Korea as a nuclear-armed state¾Pyongyang remains conspicuously unresponsive. Its strong opposition to ROK-US joint military exercises has only hardened, further reducing the likelihood of resuming diplomatic dialogue. This diplomatic inertia, however, stands in stark contrast to the intensification of North Korea’s military cooperation with Russia. 

On April 28, North Korea officially confirmed for the first time that it had deployed troops to Russia to support its war against Ukraine, stating that the deployment was meant to help Russia regain its Kursk region that Ukrainian forces seized in a surprise incursion last year.³⁹ It cited Article 4 of the New Russia-DPRK treaty as the legal basis. Pyongyang’s announcement comes just days after Russian Chief of Staff Valery Gerasimov praised the “heroism” of North Korean troops, the first time Moscow has publicly acknowledged their involvement. In response, South Korea’s Ministry of Unification and the Ministry of National Defense swiftly condemned the deployment, framing it as a dangerous escalation and a breach of international norms.⁴⁰

A recent report by INSS⁴¹ warns that the growing alignment between Moscow and Pyongyang may culminate informal Russian recognition of North Korea’s nuclear status. This would represent a direct challenge to the global non-proliferation regime and significantly weaken the international sanctions architecture. The report also speculates that Russia might transfer critical military technologies, which could transform North Korea’s conventional and strategic capabilities. Domestically, while the inflow of Russian resources may temporarily bolster Kim Jong-un’s image through construction projects, the regime risks backlash if North Korean soldiers desert, are captured, or defect to South Korea. The report concludes that the regime’s attempt to contain domestic dissatisfaction through ideological indoctrination will not be sufficient to manage the internal fallout of increased military engagement abroad.

Meanwhile, a report by the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA)⁴² takes a more structural and capability-focused lens, exploring how Russia’s war in Ukraine is accelerating North Korea’s military-industrial modernization. The report emphasizes the material benefits North Korea may gain from arms trade and technology transfers, projecting enhancements in areas such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVS), air defense systems, and even space-related capabilities. These upgrades are seen as serving dual purposes: enabling more sophisticated tactical provocations and expanding the country’s broader strategic deterrent against the US and its allies. KIDA urges a comprehensive, whole-of-government response¾drawing on diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) tools¾to pressure Russia into halting technology transfers and containing North Korean advances through international sanctions.

While think tanks such as INSS and KIDA approach the issue from analytical perspectives, conservative media have taken a more alarmist tone. A recent Chosun Ilbo op-ed focuses heavily on the confirmed arms transaction between North Korea and Russia, quoting sources from the US Indo-Pacific Command and the Pentagon. The piece suggests that North Korea’s recent display of drones and reconnaissance aircraft likely benefited from Russian assistance and raises concerns that future transfers could include advanced systems like the S-300 air defense platform or even nuclear submarine technology¾altering the regional military balance in ways that would severely undermine South Korea’s security. The editorial also takes aim at South Korea’s DP, accusing it of minimizing the significance of these developments and failing to uphold national security interests. The op-ed calls for a bipartisan consensus on a more hawkish and proactive deterrence strategy.⁴³

Despite diverging in tone and policy prescription, many converge on a core conclusion: the military deepening of DPRK-Russia ties is strategically consequential. It elevates the risk of regional escalation, undermines longstanding non-proliferation efforts, and signals a growing axis of authoritarian coordination in direct opposition to the US-led liberal order. Furthermore, there is broad agreement that Kim Jong-un’s domestic calculus is central to this alignment. Russian backing, whether through material aid or symbolic recognition, offers North Korea a means to bolster its regime legitimacy at home. Yet this strategy is fraught with hazards, particularly if the cost of this alignment is paid in North Korean blood on Ukrainian soil.

Conclusion

In the months of March and April 2025, South Korea experienced an extraordinary convergence of domestic upheaval and international challenge. The impeachment of Yoon created a political vacuum that coincided with a wave of critical foreign policy developments, ranging from renewed US tariff pressures and shifting American defense priorities to China’s assertive moves in the Yellow Sea. This report has examined how these events were interpreted and debated across South Korea’s political spectrum, drawing on conservative and progressive media, as well as expert analyses from leading think tanks.

The report has also highlighted how, despite ideological divides, there are areas of growing consensus within South Korea’s public discourse. These include a recognition of the diminishing reliability of unqualified US support, the urgent need to bolster national economic resilience, and the rising importance of diversifying diplomatic and strategic partnerships. While responses to specific threats—such as China’s maritime encroachments or North Korea’s alignment with Russia—vary in tone and prescription, the overarching theme is one of recalibration. South Korea stands at a pivotal moment where short-term decisions may carry long-term strategic weight, and where internal political cohesion may prove as vital as external deterrence.

2. “美, 수입차 25% ‘관세 톡판’… 국내외 자동차업계 초비상,” Hankyung, April 14, 2025, https://www.hankyung.com/article/2025041489861.

3. “트럼프 말한 ‘원스톱 쇼핑’과 방위비 분담금 연계 말라,” Kyunghyang Shinmun, April 9, 2025, https://www.khan.co.kr/article/202504091936001.

4. “미국발 관세 충격과 한국의 대응,” JoongAng Ilbo, April 23, 2025. https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25330606

5. “한국 경제 세 분기만에 또 뒷걸음…1분기 성장률 -02% ‘충격’(종합),” Yonhap News, April 24, 2025, https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20250424020951002.

6. “[사설] 결국 닥친 트럼프 ‘복합 관세’, 장기전 준비해야,” Hankyoreh, April 3, 2025, https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/opinion/editorial/1190341.html.

7. “‘쇳물에서 자동차까지’ 미국서 생산, 산업공동화 막아야,” Hankyoreh, March 26, 2025, https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/opinion/editorial/1189079.html

8. “’미국에 31조 투자’ 현대차… 국내 일자리 지키기는 과제로,” The JoongAng Ilbo, March 26, 2025, https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25323505.

9. “대기업 규제·역차별 확 풀어 제조업 생태계 이끌게 하자,” The Joongang Ilbo, April 24, 2025, https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25330898.

10. “”CNN Exclusive: This Asian leader is taking a very different approach from China over Trump’s tariff war,” CNN, April 8, 2025, https://edition.cnn.com/2025/04/08/asia/south-korea-acting-president-han-interview-intl-hnk/index.html.

11. “[사설] ‘트럼프 관세’, 조급한 타결·성과 서두를 때 아니다,” Hankyoreh, April 9, 2025, https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/opinion/editorial/1191633.html.

12. Kang Seonjou, “트럼프 2기의 관세전략: 미국 단독주의(American Alone)와 경제안보적 함의,” IFANS FOCUS, April 4, 2025.

13. “’中 서해 구조물’ 오랜만에 여야 한목소리 대응,” Chosun Ilbo, March 27, 2025, https://www.chosun.com/opinion/editorial/2025/03/27/IYH22JZPUNBJVC73ZSZ73GWR2I/.

14. “中 ‘현장방문’제안… 韓 ‘비례적 대응 방안’ 압박,” Tongil News, April 24, 2025, https://www.tongilnews.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=213306

15. “제3차 한중 해양협력대화 개최(4.23.) 결과, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in South Korea, April 24, https://www.korea.kr/briefing/pressReleaseView.do?newsId=156685975&pWise=sub&pWiseSub=C1.

16. “정부, 중국의 서해 어업 구조물에 대응 시설 설치 검토,” Hankyoreh, April 23, 2025, https://www.khan.co.kr/article/202504232128005

17. “‘中 서해구조물 대응’ 국회 1100억 요청, 정부 절반만 편성,” Donga Ilbo, April 28, 2024, https://www.donga.com/news/Politics/article/all/20250427/131503261/2

18. “조태열, ‘中 서해 구조물’에 "해양과학조사기지 등 대응 검토중,” Yonhap News, April 28, 2025, https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20250428083300001

19. “이어도까지 시비 걸고 나오는 중국의 서해 공정,” Chosun Ilbo, April 28, 2025, https://www.chosun.com/opinion/editorial/2025/04/28/XFNKIKONJVHV5BGBYBYCVIGRJA/.

20. “與 "중국의 서해 불법 구조물은 ‘해양 알박기’…정부는 단호히 대처하라," Chosun Ilbo, March 25, 2025, https://www.chosun.com/politics/politics_general/2025/03/25/GCRBIWPSFZES3JUVE73MADRAZI/.

21. “중국의 서해 불법 구조물… 단호한 대응, 여야 따로 없다,” E-daily, April 28, 2025, https://www.edaily.co.kr/News/Read?newsId=01361206642107584&mediaCodeNo=257

22. “[단독] ‘핵무장론’ 확산에 미, 한국 ‘민감국가’분류…AI 등 첨단기술 협력 길 막힐라,” Hankyoreh, March 10, 2024.

23. “북한,중국,이란과 동급? 미, 한국도 ‘민감국가’ 분류 움직임,” JTBC News, March 11, 2025, https://news.jtbc.co.kr/article/NB12238414.

24. “’실현성 없는 핵무장 논의보다 농축·재처리 역량 확보에 집중해야,” Hankyoreh, April 1, 2025.

25. “’실현성 없는 핵무장 논의보다 농축·재처리 역량 확보에 집중해야,” Hankyoreh, April 1, 2025.

26. Cheong Seong-Chang, Peter Ward, “[세종포커스] 미국이 핵무장론 확산을 이유로 한국을 ‘민감국가’에 지명했을까?” Sejong Institute, April 3, 2025.

27. “美대사대리 ‘민감국가, 큰 일 아냐… 민감정보 취급 부주의때문,” Yonhap News, March 18, 2025, https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20250318096051504

28. “[태평로] 美 민감 국가 지정, 국정원 조사하자고?” Chosun Ilbo, March 27, 2025, https://www.chosun.com/opinion/taepyeongro/2025/03/27/6DSY4IN2VBCHZG4GKANSZI4CD4/

29. “주한 미군 역할 변경, 막을 수 있는 상황 아니다,” Chosun Ilbo, April 17, 2025, https://nk.chosun.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=202482

30. “’애치슨 라인’ 연상시키는 트럼프발 안보 파고,” Joongang Ilbo, April 1, 2025, https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25325100

31. Jung HyunWook, “트럼프 2기 행정부의 ‘대만문제’ 접근과 전략적 함의,” INSS Issue Brief, March 21, 2025.

32. Choi Wooseon, “미중 경쟁과 미국의 대만에 대한 전략적 이익,” IFANS FOCUS, March 5, 2025.

33. “’미·중 다툼, 한국엔 조선 강국 지위 되찾을 호기,” Joongang Ilbo, 24 March, 2025, https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25322791

34. “주한 미군 역할 변경, 막을 수 있는 상황 아니다,” Chosun Ilbo, April 17, 2025, https://nk.chosun.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=202482.

35. “주한미군의 존재론적 위기 [세상읽기],” Hankyoreh, April 4, 2025, https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/opinion/column/1190602.html

36. “트럼프 2기를 상대할 차기 정부, 푸틴을 잡아라,” Hankyoreh, April 14, 2025, https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/opinion/because/1192365.html

37. “커지는 동맹 비용…정교한 위험 관리 모색해야 [세상읽기],” Hankyoreh, April 14, 2025, https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/opinion/column/1192364.html

38. “[사설] 관세·방위비 협상 위한 거국 협의체 설치를,” Chosun Ilbo, April 10, 2025, https://www.chosun.com/opinion/editorial/2025/04/10/EUKPIB4DPZHGFP5NEVISIY6WR4/.

39. “북한 러시아 파병 첫 공식화…정부 ‘범죄 자인’,” Yonhap News, April 28, 2025, https://www.yna.co.kr/view/MYH20250428021100038.

40. “정부, 북한의 러 파병 인정에 ‘범죄행위 자인…’ 강력 규탄,” Yonhap News, April 28, 2025, https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20250428072351504

41. Lee Sang-geun, “북한군 러시아 추가 파병의 의미와 파급영향,” INSS Issue Brief, March 4, 2025.

42. Lee Jung-gu, “북러 군사협력에 의한 북한 군수산업 영향과 군사능력 변화,” KIDA Focus, March 11, 2025.

43. “러 결국 北에 미사일 제공, 그래도 ‘남의 나라’ 일인가,” Chosun Ilbo, April 16, 2025, https://nk.chosun.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=202480.