The Persistent, Soaring Ambitions of Xi Jinping’s “New Era” for China, Socialism, and the Globe

The first Trump administration inaugurated a period of open, global strategic rivalry with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and the Biden administration sustained it.¹ As of this writing, it is too early to say how the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)² see the contest’s long-term trajectory in light of the new domestic and international policies of the second Trump administration.³ It is possible, however, to revisit the continuity and expansiveness of the CCP’s ambitions under Xi Jinping, whose tenure as paramount leader since late 2012 has now spanned four US administrations. The foundation of Beijing’s official ideology of “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” (hereafter “Xi Jinping Thought”) is its title concept that the PRC’s successful development over several decades has raised its wealth, power, and status, allowing Chinese socialism to “enter a new era” with implications for the future of: (1) China and the Chinese nation, (2) world socialism, and (3) the development of human society (by which Beijing means global politics). In each of these areas, Xi has announced soaring objectives that he has expressed with even more sweepingly ambitious language over time. While many in Washington have awoken to the ‘hard power’ dimensions of the contest (military, economic, technological, etc.), and some to Beijing’s aim of rewiring the international order, few acknowledge the ideological dimensions or the centrality of the concept of the “new era” as the driver of Xi’s posture in all three areas. This article seeks to fill that gap.

Why pay attention to the CCP’s ideology at all? During the Cold War, an intellectual community complete with English language journals devoted itself to analyzing the Soviet Union’s ideology and examining the evolution of Moscow’s official worldview and its relationship to policy.⁴ Today, there is no parallel community focused on unpacking Beijing’s ideology; yet, in recent years, a growing number of external observers have rediscovered the value of CCP leadership speeches and policy documents as a vehicle for understanding the PRC’s intentions and actions. This is indeed the correct starting place. Owing to the CCP’s Leninist heritage, it uses ideology expressed in these venues as its instrument to depict, modify, and mobilize around its long-term goals, view of the external environment, and the policies designed to navigate toward its objectives. Further, as Timothy Heath, Rush Doshi, and others note, the content of Beijing’s ideology is the result of elaborate, multiyear processes by which its assessments are formulated and coordinated. Ideology thus has bureaucratic force because the PRC’s institutions must frame and justify their work in its terms. Finally, the CCP spends enormous resources explicating its ideology to its own officials, forcing them to study it and identify how they are applying it in their areas of responsibility.⁵ The oceans of ink and forests of books produced for this purpose are available and should facilitate summary by external observers.

Nevertheless, it is traditional in English language academic writing on CCP ideology to bemoan the challenge of interpretation.⁶ Explicating Beijing’s ideology involves summarizing concepts written in what will be, for most readers, two foreign tongues: first, the Chinese language, and second, the party’s conceptual language derived from the Soviet Union’s Marxist-Leninist “newspeak.” To succeed, one must sail narrowly between two challenges. On the one hand is the Scylla of translating the concepts in a way that one’s readers can digest, but which threatens to focus on what the observer cares about rather than what Beijing does and thus utterly distorts the party’s original ideas. On the other is the Charybdis of depicting all of the CCP’s concepts with their original logic and yet drowning the reader who lacks the context the party’s cadres possess to make sense of them.⁷ Unfortunately, most English language scholarship on Xi’s political thought as of this writing has been dismembered by Scylla, and some manages to both be torn apart by Scylla and drowned by Charybdis at the same time. While several recent volumes are useful in their summaries of Xi’s policies in particular areas in specific chapters, their arguments about the overall meaning of Xi Jinping Thought do not reflect summaries of Beijing’s own explanations. Crucially, they bury the central concept that animates Xi Jinping Thought and provides unity to its many parts.⁸ This neglected idea is the ideology’s title notion of “the new era.”⁹ In contrast, while the present essay is not a comprehensive summary of Xi Jinping Thought, or even of the implications of the new era for strategy and policy in all of the major policy areas Xi Jinping Thought addresses, it begins by exploring the overall meaning of the new era.¹⁰ Afterwards, it traces how the ambitions Xi articulated for the new area in each of three major areas have evolved over his tenure in office. Owing to the central role that Party Congresses play in consolidating and promulgating changes to the CCP’s guiding ideology, the article is anchored in the 19th Party Congress held in 2017—the first Xi presided over as incumbent general secretary and at which he announced Xi Jinping Thought—and the 20th Party Congress in 2022. It also addresses how Xi’s first five-year term 2012-2017 set the stage for these ambitions.¹¹

Setting the Stage: The “New Era” as a Change in China’s Power and Status

Below is the passage Xi uses in his 19th Party Congress report to set the context for his proclamation of the “new era” [emphasis added] ¹²:

In the early days of reform and opening up, the Party made a clarion call for us to take a path of our own and build socialism with Chinese characteristics. Since that time, the Party has united and led the country’s people of all nationalities in a tireless struggle, propelling our country into a leading position in terms of economic and technological strength, defense capabilities, and comprehensive national power. Our country’s international standing has risen as never before. The face of our Party, the face of our country, the face of our people, the face of our military forces, and the face of our Chinese nationality have changed in ways without precedent. The Chinese nation, with an entirely new posture, now stands tall and firm in the East. With decades of hard work, socialism with Chinese characteristics has crossed the threshold into a new era. This is a new historic juncture in our country’s development.

This is what socialism with Chinese characteristics entering a new era means: The Chinese nation, which since modern times began had endured so much for so long, has achieved a tremendous transformation: It has stood up, become better off, and grown in strength; it has come to embrace the brilliant prospects of rejuvenation.”¹³ 

This passage sets up the first of the new era’s three interrelated meanings, namely, that the new era reflects a new Chinese “posture” in the world due to the CCP’s progress over several decades making the PRC a leading country in the world by many measures. In official study guides on Xi Jinping Thought, Beijing underlines the breathtaking nature of this change.¹⁴ Put simply, China’s success constitutes a change of conditions for its place in the world. The passage below, from the Central Propaganda Department’s 2021 volume, Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era Study Questions & Answers, is typical language:

We have completed the industrialization process that took developed countries hundreds of years in just a few decades, creating a miracle of rapid economic development and long-term social stability that is rare in the world, making the impossible possible, promoting an unprecedented improvement in our country’s comprehensive national power and international status, and promoting an unprecedented improvement in the living standards of our people. Since the 18th CPC National Congress, nearly 100 million people in our country have been lifted out of poverty, and the problem of absolute poverty that has plagued the Chinese nation for thousands of years come to an historical conclusion, thus writing a great legend in the history of human development, and proving with irrefutable facts that socialism with Chinese characteristics is true socialism.¹⁵

As the last sentence of this passage suggests, the CCP insists that this success is due to its navigating according to “socialism with Chinese characteristics” (i.e., the post-Mao reform era policies consolidated at the 13th Party Congress in 1987).¹⁶ The change in China’s position, owing to its achievements, however, presents the CCP with a different set of governance challenges at home and abroad that flow from these new conditions. This is the second major meaning of the “new era,” though it will not be a focus of this essay.¹⁷ Xi Jinping Thought is explicitly not a departure from socialism with Chinese characteristics, but a comprehensive adjustment for the conditions brought about by its success thus far.¹⁸

The changes Xi Jinping Thought makes to socialism with Chinese characteristics are designed and framed in terms of completing the navigation towards long-term goals for China’s development and status identified by the 1980s.¹⁹  In the third meaning of the new era and the major focus of the present essay, the new era is to be a period in which the CCP’s long-held ambitions for China are fulfilled.

In the first chapter of Xi’s 19th Party Congress report quoted from earlier, after discussing the implications of the new era for the status of international socialism (discussed below) and providing a portrait of what the new era will bring in terms of the PRC’s long-term development goals, he heralds a greater role for China in the world, maintaining that: “It will be an era that sees China moving closer to center stage and making greater contributions to humanity.” In Chinese this is literally “center of the world stage.”²⁰ After discussing what the new era means for the PRC’s domestic governance challenges, Xi summarily concludes this section with the following: [numbers and emphasis added]:

Chinese socialism’s entrance into a new era is, [1] in the history of the People’s Republic of China and the history of the Chinese nation, of tremendous importance. [2] In the history of international socialism and [3] the history of human society, it is of tremendous importance. Our entire Party should develop unshakable confidence, work hard and work well to see socialism with Chinese characteristics display even stronger vitality.²¹

Over the course of his tenure as paramount leader, Xi has articulated the CCP’s objectives to be realized in the new era in each of these three areas extensively. In all three areas, the logic of Beijing’s aspirations predated Xi, and they would likely endure his departure from the political stage. At a minimum (though this is not detailed in this essay), they are embedded, through the party’s ideology, in its institutions through resources, strategy, and policy. They are discussed in an avalanche of official study guides on Xi Jinping Thought and in articles in the party’s flagship newspaper, The People’s Daily, in its theoretical journal, Seeking Truth, and in the several volumes of speeches by Xi Jinping titled The Governance of China (four as of this writing).²² The remainder of this essay will examine the implications of the new era asserted at the 19th Party Congress in each of these three areas, beginning with how Xi had foreshadowed those ambitions during his first five-year term from 2012, and concluding with how the 20th Party Congress in 2022, which elevated Xi to a third five-year term, doubled down on and expressed them in even more expansive terms.²³

1) Ambitions for the PRC and the Chinese Nation: Become the Global Leader

“The great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” is the principal theme of the 19th Party Congress. Xi emphasizes it twice on the first page of his address, where he describes it as the CCP’s “original aspiration.”²⁴ A dramatic early passage in Xi’s report further reframes each major period of the party’s history as having been aimed at realizing national rejuvenation.²⁵ While he is not the first PRC leader to use the phrase, Xi has made it familiar to even the most casual observer of Chinese politics. He famously put national rejuvenation in the foreground at the dawn of his tenure as top leader. In a November 29, 2012 speech on the “China Dream” at the PRC’s National Museum, Xi asserts: “In my opinion, achieving the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation has been the greatest dream of the Chinese people since the advent of modern times.”²⁶ Both Xi’s inaugural address delivered two weeks earlier (upon his selection as general secretary) and his speech to the new politburo on the spirit of the 18th Party Congress two days after that, reinforce this prioritization of national rejuvenation. In the latter speech, Xi further frames the party’s commitment to socialism with Chinese characteristics as an instrument for realizing the “main objective” of national rejuvenation:

We pay close attention to the main objective because the Communist Party of China has shouldered the historic mission of rejuvenating the Chinese nation ever since its birth. The very purpose of the Party in leading the Chinese people in revolution, development, and reform is to make the people prosperous and the country strong, and rejuvenate the Chinese nation.²⁷

Crucially, this passage links the goal of rejuvenating the Chinese nation (民族, literally nationality) with the goals of making the country wealthy (“the people prosperous”) and the state powerful (“the country strong”). Xi frames this as a common denominator aspiration of Chinese “since modern times began,” and Beijing’s consistent linking of the status of the Chinese nation with the development and strength of the country is indeed a position diverse Chinese nationalist thinkers prior to the CCP taking power such as Liang Qichao and Sun Yat-sen also endorsed in the face of China’s late 19th and early 20th century weakness.²⁸ Xi makes clear in his inaugural address, however, that the ambition is not merely to overcome China’s 19th and 20th century economic backwardness and weakness, but rather national rejuvenation also means attaining a position of leadership where China can “make contributions” to humankind. In describing taking on responsibility for the nation, he maintains [emphasis added]:

Ours is a great nation. Throughout 5,000 years of development, the Chinese nation has made significant contributions to the progress of human civilization. Since the advent of modern times, our nation has gone through untold tribulations and faced its greatest perils. Countless people with lofty ideals rose up for the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, but each time they failed. After it was founded in 1921, the Communist Party of China rallied and led the Chinese people in making great sacrifices, forging ahead against all odds, and transforming poor and backward China into an increasingly prosperous and strong nation, thus opening completely new horizons for national rejuvenation.

Our responsibility is to rally and lead the entire Party and the people of all China’s ethnic groups in taking on this task and continuing to pursue the goal of the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, so that China can stand firm and strong among the world’s nations and make new and greater contributions to mankind.²⁹

This discussion about standing firm and strong among the world’s nations and about making greater contributions to humankind (both of which are paralleled in Xi’s 19th Party Congress report’s language about the new era noted above) also echoes the language and aspirations of both Mao Zedong and (discussed below) Xi’s post-Mao “reform era” predecessors.³⁰ Indeed, in the 2012 “China Dream” speech Xi directly quotes Mao’s expansive poetry.³¹ In that context too, Xi clearly means to identify national rejuvenation not simply with overcoming China’s 19th and early 20th century economic backwardness and weakness, but also with moving the PRC into a leading position in the world where others look up to and learn from China. This has been a consistent ambition for the PRC’s leaders.

Mao, on the threshold of the 8th Party Congress in 1956, at which Beijing would claim to have established a socialist system and to be now embarking on a modernization drive designed to win the race with capitalism (and intended to echo Stalin’s similar claim in 1936), had framed the PRC’s ambition to catch up with and pass in the United States as an imperative owing to China’s superior endowments of people and other resources and to (he alleged) the superiority of its socialist system.³² Further, Mao had maintained that if the PRC failed to do so in fifty years it “should be read off the face of the earth” (literally, “your membership should be expelled from the globe,” 从地球上开除你的球籍).³³

Mao’s economic policies that followed produced famine and disaster instead and the 1956 speech tends to be remembered in English language histories of the PRC as hubristic. Nevertheless, as William Callahan notes in a 2015 essay, in recent decades the speech has remained popular among PRC intellectuals for its aspiration of catching and passing the United States.³⁴ Surely, Xi’s invocation of this language both at the opening of his tenure and in his description of the meaning of the “new era” is no accident. Indeed, perhaps the most prominent study guide on Xi Jinping Thought published by the Central Propaganda Department in February 2021 and serialized in The People’s Daily that same summer, quotes (without attribution, but known to its readership) a speech by Xi in July 2016 on the party’s 95th anniversary, where he foreshadowed the 19th Party Congress’ claims about China’s transformed status and directly identified the change as overcoming the danger of being “removed from the globe” (被开除球籍, echoing Mao’s language). Below is the study guide’s text [emphasis added]:

Over the past century, the great victory achieved by the Chinese people under the leadership of the Communist Party of China on the road to national rejuvenation has enabled the Chinese nation with a civilizational history of more than 5,000 years to move towards modernization in an all-round way, and has given new vitality to Chinese civilization in the process of modernization; it has enabled the socialist proposition with a history of more than 500 years³⁵ to successfully open up a correct path with high realism and feasibility in the world’s most populous country, and has given new vitality to scientific socialism in the 21st century; it has enabled the construction of New China with a history of more than 70 years to achieve world-renowned achievements. China, the world’s largest developing country, has escaped poverty and leapt into the world’s second largest economy in just over 30 years, completely getting rid of the danger of being “removed from the globe,” creating a shocking development miracle in the history of human society, and giving new vitality to the Chinese nation.³⁶

Indeed, if triumph over Mao’s fear of extinction should the PRC fail to become the leading country is one of the contexts Xi invokes here, so is the consistent ambition of Mao and his reform era successors to catch and pass the most advanced capitalist country (the United States). Since 1992, the CCP’s constitution has maintained that [emphasis added]: “The general starting point and criteria for judging each item of the Party’s work are that it must benefit the development of the socialist productive forces, be conducive to increasing socialist China’s comprehensive national power, and help to improve the people’s living standards.”³⁷ A key underpinning of the assessment that “socialism with Chinese characteristics has entered a new era” is Beijing’s view of the change in its relative status vs. other great powers in terms of the CCP’s evaluation of comprehensive national power (综合国力), a term that has appeared in several of the passages quoted thus far.

Comprehensive national power is a PRC measure that includes not only military and economic strength, but also what Western scholars would likely regard as more difficult to measure elements such as diplomatic strength. While the concept of comprehensive national power dates to the 1980s, and continuous, high-level references to it down to this day indicate its importance, Beijing obscures the term in foreign language versions of its official documents by translating it in several ways. (Neither the party nor government disclose how official calculations are conducted).³⁸ Nevertheless, the imperative to build comprehensive national power provides a link between the baldly expressed ambitions of the Mao and Xi eras and the more outwardly modest reform era between them. Xi’s invocation of the change in China’s comprehensive national power as a driver of the judgment that socialism with Chinese characteristics had entered a new era underscores that prudence about the PRC’s relative strength, not a dip in its ambitions, underpinned the more modest stance between Mao and Xi.³⁹ Further, when, at the 19th Party Congress, Xi returned to openly expressing the PRC’s ambitions in terms of relative great power status, he did so by accelerating the timeline for China’s mid-century modernization targets and expressing the new targets in terms of comprehensive national power. Comprehensive national power, then, is both an end and a means to achieving the PRC’s overall goal of national rejuvenation.⁴⁰

Xi’s 19th Party Congress report pins objectives previously associated with “mid-century” to 2035 and advances new, more expansive goals for the PRC’s 100th anniversary in 2049.⁴¹ He explicitly called for the PRC to become “a country with leading comprehensive national power and international influence” (综合国力和国际影响力领先的国家: this is a rare case where the official English translation is more aggressive, rendering the phrase: “a global leader in terms of composite national strength and international influence”).⁴² In other words, the goal is not just to become a developed, modern strong country in absolute terms, but also a leading country in comparison with others. Indeed, while some external observers have rushed to point out that the official translation says a global leader not the global leader, it strains credibility that, already seeing itself as the number two power in the world as measured in computations of comprehensive national power, Beijing’s goal could be to work hard for several decades only to remain number two.⁴³ In specific areas of international competition including economics, science and technology, innovation, and military capabilities, Xi repeatedly talks about “seizing the initiative,” and the need for China not to miss another historical opportunity to assume leadership.⁴⁴ Indeed, a 2021 People’s Daily editorial under the pseudonym “Manifesto” (宣言), which Beijing has used several times to express the ambitions of the new era, maintains that “Gaining the upper hand in the competition of comprehensive national power is the key to national rejuvenation.”⁴⁵

The breadth with which Beijing’s expresses its expansive ambitions for global leadership, however, has only widened since the 19th Party Congress. This is extremely clear from the party’s official documents; yet it is not widely discussed among external observers. Many instead focus on language in Xi’s report to the 20th Party Congress outlining a darker external environment and highlighting the need for technological self-reliance and food security. Crucially, the 20th Party Congress was the first in the wake of both COVID-19 and the advent of more open rivalry with Washington, and it would have been surprising if these developments did not elicit more discussion of threats to the PRC’s security.⁴⁶ Yet this impression of a turn towards security has likely contributed to the idea, prevalent for at least a year prior to the United States’ November 2024 presidential election, that Beijing was on its heels owing to domestic economic problems, would likely never pass the United States economically, and that the PRC’s leaders ought to be scaling back their ambitions.⁴⁷ The overall tone of Xi’s address to the 20th Party Congress, however, is not that of a besieged party leader climbing into a bunker. On the contrary, Xi’s language indicates he is doubling down on, not decelerating, the CCP’s pursuit of its goals.

The key message of the 20th Party Congress is the “new journey” to build “a modern socialist country in all respects and advance the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation on all fronts.”⁴⁸ In addition to reaffirming the 19th Party Congress’ acceleration of the PRC’s long-term development targets, the 20th refines the 2035 targets and adds targets for 2027.⁴⁹ The “new journey” is specifically the effort to navigate towards the party’s “second centenary goal” modernization and development targets and targets for relative comprehensive national power (pinned to the 100th anniversary of the PRC’s founding in 2049) after achieving its “first centenary goal” (pinned to the party’s 100th anniversary in 2021). Indeed, while Beijing clearly regards the security environment it faces as having darkened, this reflects, as mentioned, the advent of open US-PRC global strategic rivalry. CCP leaders had long predicted this would arrive as the PRC’s comprehensive national power grew.⁵⁰ In this sense, what Beijing perceives as US efforts to contain the PRC do not indicate failure but instead herald the CCP’s success. This, in turn, is reflected in the even more expansive expressions of Beijing’s ambitions at the 20th Party Congress compared to the 19th, not only for China’s status, but also for its role in vindicating socialism and for its role as a global leader. Here is how Xi frame’s his 20th Party Congress objectives for China’s status and for its leading humanity: “Since its founding a century ago, the Communist Party of China has taken a remarkable journey. Our Party has dedicated itself to achieving lasting greatness for the Chinese nation and committed itself to the noble cause of peace and development for humanity. Our responsibility is unmatched in importance, and our mission is glorious beyond compare.”⁵¹

This latter theme of the PRC’s global role is examined later in this essay, however, at least as significant for understanding the nature of U.S.-PRC strategic rivalry is the CCP’s goal of vindicating “scientific socialism” (Marxism-Leninism) and its international status.

2) Ambitions for Socialism: Reversing its World Status vs. Capitalism

Of the three areas of ambition associated with the new era, Beijing’s objectives for socialism remain the most obscure for most observers writing in English. If many now acknowledge the PRC’s goal of becoming the leading power in the world and its aim to rewire the international order so that it functions on values aligned with the CCP, few wrestle with Xi’s insistence that he is a Marxist, and there is plenty of disagreement about whether he deserves that title.⁵² The present essay is not the space to unpack the ways in which Xi Jinping Thought contains orthodox Marxist-Leninist political ideas; yet from Washington’s standpoint it ought to matter that Xi has been relentlessly consistent in framing the PRC as engaged in a systems contest with capitalism, where the CCP’s ability to navigate China to the status of the leading country in the world has implications for the rivalry between socialism and capitalism. A key plank of socialism with Chinese characteristics has been the party’s consistent claim that “only socialism can save China” and party leaders have consistently vowed to demonstrate socialism’s superiority to vindicate the PRC’s “choice” of socialism.⁵³ Yet, Beijing has consistently nursed broader ambitions than this.

In his 19th Party Congress speech, Xi famously declared of the new era that [emphasis added]:

It means that scientific socialism is full of vitality in 21st century China, and that the banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics is now flying high and proud for all to see. It means the path, the theory, the system, and the culture of socialism with Chinese characteristics have kept developing, blazing a new trail for other developing countries to achieve modernization. It offers a new option for other countries and nations who want to speed up their development while preserving their independence: and it offers Chinese wisdom and a Chinese approach to solving the problems facing humanity.⁵⁴

Here, “scientific socialism” is a traditional reference to Marxism, owing to Marx and Engel’s claim that their version of socialism was based on scientific theory as opposed to utopian vision. Since the 19th Party Congress, however, the CCP has begun to assert that Xi Jinping Thought constitutes “21st century Marxism,” and that the PRC’s success offers other developing countries the prospect of an alternative path to modernity and development over and against that of the developed capitalist democracies.

Like Beijing’s ambitions for global leadership discussed above, Xi’s discussion of the new era status of the PRC’s “choice” of “socialism” is a dramatic departure from the language of his post-Mao predecessors. Prior to 2016, the weight of Beijing’s post-Mao arguments domestically and internationally justifying its commitment to socialism were defensive, claiming that socialism was the solution to China’s specific conditions and problems.⁵⁵ The socialist system (including the party’s dictatorship), Beijing also insisted, was the only system capable of realizing the ambitions of the Chinese nation to transform its status in the world. Other systems had been tried and failed in the 20th century. By contrast, the CCP argued, it had restored China’s sovereignty and dignity and navigated for decades towards modernization, development, and improvements in the Chinese people’s material lives and the country’s international status.⁵⁶ Xi Jinping, from his first days in office, has continued to underline these arguments for remaining committed to socialism; yet he also returned to the arguments about socialism’s inevitable international triumph that had not been emphasized since the Mao era. Further, for Xi, not only is socialism the only reliable path to improving China’s status in the world, but—in the aftermath of the Soviet collapse—the PRC making socialism a success also amounts to a specifically Chinese achievement that constitutes evidence of national rejuvenation.⁵⁷

In what would become a famous speech to party cadres at the provincial and ministerial level in early January 2013, underscoring the party’s commitment to the socialist project, Xi frames the contest as one of systems rivalry with capitalism, a contest in which China is behind but will catch-up [emphasis added]:

Reality has proved again and again that Karl Marx and Frederick Engels’ analysis of the fundamental contradiction in capitalist society is not obsolete, nor is the viewpoint of historical materialism that capitalism is doomed to failure and socialism will prevail. It is an irreversible trend of social development, but the process will be tortuous. It will be a long process that leads to the demise of capitalism and the victory of socialism. We must understand in depth the self-regulating capacity of capitalist society and fully recognize the objective reality that developed Western countries will dominate the economic, scientific, technological and military fields for a long time. We must prepare ourselves for long-term cooperation and rivalry between the two social systems.

For a long time to come, China as a developing country in the primary stage of socialism must cooperate and contend with capitalist countries that possess more developed productive forces, and learn thoroughly and draw inspiration from the achievements of their civilizations.⁵⁸ We must even face criticisms of the weaknesses in our socialist development in comparison with the strengths of developed Western countries. We must have full confidence in our strategies, resolutely resist all demands to abandon socialism, and actively correct erroneous ideas that go beyond our current stage. The most important thing is that we focus on our development to increase our comprehensive national power, improve our people’s lives, and develop socialism that has more strengths than capitalism, so as to lay a solid foundation for us to seize the initiative, win the competitive edge, and secure our future.⁵⁹

This sense of the PRC as significantly behind the United States and its allies that characterizes this passage from early in Xi’s tenure, however, was already changing. Even earlier in the same January 2013 address, Xi notes the international attention Beijing has begun to receive owing to its growing power and he indicates that this will ultimately lead to international influence on the part of its governing model [emphasis added]:

In recent years, with our growing comprehensive national power and international status, more discussions and studies have appeared on the Beijing Consensus, the Chinese model, and the Chinese path. Among them, we hear approval and appreciation. Some foreign scholars believe that China’s rapid development has challenged certain Western theories, and that a new Marxist theory is overturning the traditional Western theory. We always maintain that it is up to the people to choose the development path of their country. The Chinese model represents that path of Chinese socialism created by the Chinese people through their own endeavors. We are confident that as Chinese socialism progresses, our institutions will undoubtedly mature, the strengths of our system will become self-evident, and our development path will assuredly become wider and have greater impact on the world. We must have confidence in our path, our theory and our system.⁶⁰

This description of Chinese socialism’s path “becoming wider and wider” is a reference to the party’s long-held ambition that its version of socialism should become more influential internationally once the PRC had demonstrated its success through its development and modernization drive.⁶¹ Here, the “new era” proclaimed at the 19th Party Congress heralds a watershed change in status for international socialism, which, Xi argued in his report to the Congress, had begun. Adding to this in 2021, less than five years after the 19th Party Congress, the Central Committee resolution on the party’s 100th anniversary, Beijing began to assert that the relative status of socialism and capitalism had already flipped:

Our continued success in adapting Marxism to the Chinese context and the needs of our times has enabled Marxism to take on a fresh face in the eyes of the world, and significantly shifted the worldwide historical evolution of the contest between the two different ideologies and social systems of socialism and capitalism in a way that favors socialism.⁶²

At the same time, the resolution deepened the CCP’s claims about the contribution of Xi Jinping Thought to Marxism in general (and hence to international socialism in general).  The party had traditionally credited Mao Zedong with adapting Marxism to the Chinese context, but Xi Jinping had now integrated “fine traditional Chinese culture” with Marxism. Further, Beijing maintained, owing to the PRC’s success, Xi Jinping Thought is: “the Marxism of contemporary China and of the 21st century.”⁶³ This is an expansive claim. Many European and American Marxist scholars would not agree even that Xi Jinping Thought is Marxism, still less, the Marxist orthodoxy.⁶⁴ Yet, the resolution goes further. Building on Xi’s consistent theme that China’s rejuvenation is a vindication of both the Chinese nation and of international socialism, the resolution argues that what the PRC had accomplished constitutes “a new model for human advancement” that is both uniquely Chinese (hence bathing the Chinese nation in glory) and of potential value to others:

The Party has led the people in pioneering a uniquely Chinese path to modernization (中国式现代化道路), creating a new model for human advancement, and expanding the channels for developing countries to achieve modernization. This has offered a new option for countries and nations who want to accelerate development while preserving their independence.⁶⁵

Just over a year after this soaring contention, the 20th Party Congress report then continued to advance the former claim about Xi’s developing Marxism by asserting that: “To uphold and develop Marxism, we must integrate it with China’s fine traditional culture.”⁶⁶ It further reiterates the claim of the resolution on party history that “Chinese modernization” (中国式现代化, sometimes translated “Chinese-style modernization”) is something uniquely pioneered by the PRC.⁶⁷ Xi describes this integration of Chinese culture into Marxism as the “second combination.” (Mao’s adapting Marxism to the Chinese context is the first combination).⁶⁸ For Beijing, the result is to tightly lash together the nationalist project of making the PRC a global leader with the socialist project of providing an alternative to capitalism as a road to modernity. Beijing credits Chinese culture as underpinning the viability of “socialism with Chinese characteristics” as an alternative path to modernization. The PRC’s successful path should, Xi maintains, boost the prestige of both the PRC and socialism. The below passage is from Xi’s February 2023 speech to provincial and ministerial level cadres on the spirit of the 20th Party Congress. Portions of the speech were published piecemeal near the time of its delivery, but a more complete version was published in late December 2024. The passage is lengthy but worth quoting in full [Bill Bishop’s translation]:

Chinese modernization is deeply rooted in China’s fine traditional culture, reflects the advanced essence of scientific socialism, draws on and assimilates all outstanding achievements of human civilization, represents the progressive direction of human civilization, and displays a new vision of modernization different from the Western model. It is, in fact, a completely new form of human civilization. As the latest major achievement of scientific socialism, Chinese modernization has attracted broad international attention.

Chinese modernization provides a brand-new model of modernization to the world. Since the global modernization process began in Western capitalist countries, and most of today’s developed countries are in Europe and North America or are capitalist nations heavily influenced by Western civilization, people often develop a misconception that modernization equals Westernization, and Western civilization equals modern civilization. In reality, human civilization is diverse, and there is neither a one-size-fits-all model of modernization nor any universal standard for it. Chinese modernization breaks the myth that “modernization = Westernization,” presents another perspective on modernization, and expands the range of options available to developing countries in their pursuit of modernization. It thus offers a Chinese solution for humanity’s quest for a better social system.

Chinese modernization represents a major transcendence of the theories and practices of Western modernization. Capitalist civilization is founded on a system of capitalist exploitation and cannot overcome or eradicate the brutality inherent within it. Fundamentally, there is an inherent contradiction within capitalism between the private ownership of the means of production and large-scale socialized production—one that the capitalist system is unable to resolve. Although capitalism and the Western model of modernization continue to evolve, their underlying nature—capital supremacy, the law of the jungle, severe polarization, and hegemonic dominance—remains unchanged, and their problems are becoming increasingly evident. The unique worldview, values, historical perspective, civilizational outlook, conception of democracy, ecological viewpoint, and other elements embodied in Chinese modernization, as well as its great practical achievements, constitute a significant innovation in global modernization theory and practice.

Chinese modernization offers an entirely new choice for a wide range of developing countries. Attaining modernization is both a right and an inevitable choice for all peoples of the world, and the key is to identify a path of development that aligns with a country’s own conditions and the laws governing human societal progress. From the end of World War II to the early 1990s, some developing countries, disregarding their specific national circumstances and historical contexts, transplanted Western models wholesale, only to find those models ill-suited to their conditions. As a result, most fell into long-term economic stagnation and social and political upheaval. The issue of “which path to take” continues to trouble many developing countries. Thanks to the initial success of Chinese modernization and its notable achievements—along with the marked contrast in the new era often described as “the East is rising while the West is in decline” and “order in China versus chaos in the West”—numerous developing countries now see new hope and new possibilities. Chinese modernization is the answer we have provided to the momentous historical question of how to “awaken the sleeping lion” and realize national rejuvenation. It is about choosing one’s own path and focusing on one’s own affairs. We have never intended, nor do we intend, to export Chinese modernization or the so-called “Chinese model.” However, by setting an example of how developing countries can achieve modernization independently, Chinese modernization will inevitably serve as a reference for some of them.⁶⁹

The last of the above paragraphs expresses Beijing’s vision for the mechanism by which its system (and socialism in general) will become more prevalent: not via Stalin’s approach of replicating a complete model of a Communist dictatorship but through piecemeal adoption owing to the prestige of the PRC’s economic success. Yet the preceding paragraphs also make clear that Beijing sees its system as both an alternative in competition with the model of the West and as deserving to boost the prestige of both the Chinese nation and Marxist socialism. This linking of the nationalist project of making China a leader based on specifically Chinese achievements and the Marxist project of demonstrating the superiority of socialism to capitalism further constitutes a sharpening of the pitch Beijing has been making throughout Xi’s tenure in the third major area of ambition outlined in “the new era.” This third area, that of “the development of human society” involves reforming global governance and reshaping the international order.

3) Ambitions for Human Society: Building a China-Centric Global Order

Beijing has maintained for decades that a multipolar world is in the process of emerging and frequently emphasizes its preference for such a world over one dominated by the United States and its allies.⁷⁰ A multipolar world in which the PRC is one of several poles, however, should not be mistaken for the world the CCP is ultimately seeking to build in Xi’s new era. The thumbnail depiction common among US based China specialists that describes Beijing’s goals as ‘regional dominance and global influence’ undersells and does not comport with either Xi Jinping Thought or the PRC’s actions.⁷¹ On the contrary, Beijing has made it clear under Xi Jinping that it seeks a place of global leadership where the PRC’s proposed solutions to global problems and vision for the global order prevail.

This aspiration is connected to the third area of ambitions Xi articulated at the 19th Party Congress, which focuses on the new era’s significance for “the history of the development of human society.” It is associated with the claim that the PRC now “offers Chinese wisdom and a Chinese approach to solving the problems facing humanity.”⁷² Specifically, Xi proposes an alternative global order called “A Community with a Shared Future for Humankind” (人类命运共同体; originally translated as “A Community of Common Destiny for Mankind” and hereafter “A Community of Common Destiny”). Xi articulated “A Community of Common Destiny” over the course of his first term, made it a key pillar of Xi Jinping Thought at the 19th Party Congress, identified it as a “requirement” for realizing Chinese modernization at the 20th Party Congress, and now claims that it is “pointing the right direction for the development of human society” (指明了人类社会共同发展). 

Many scholars have noted Beijing’s changing evaluation of its relative comprehensive national power compared with the United States in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis; yet Xi’s predecessor as general secretary of the CCP, Hu Jintao, judging China still remained too weak, went out of his way in 2010 to reaffirm former paramount leader Deng Xiaoping’s foreign policy guideline of quietly building comprehensive national power while not seeking international leadership. This is the policy frequently summarized as “hide our capabilities and bide our time.”⁷³ Few policy changes under Xi reflecting the party’s growing confidence in China’s strength and status have been more dramatic than his move during his first five-year term from “hide and bide” to that of “major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics” (“major country” 大国 may be translated “great power”).⁷⁴

At a 2014 Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference (CFAWC), Xi argued China required a diplomacy reflecting its major country status. He maintained that “Our biggest opportunity lies in China’s steady development and the growth in its strength.”⁷⁵ To realize the vision of great power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics, he advocated, among other things, that the PRC build a global network of partnerships and “actively implement the Belt and Road Initiative” (discussed further below).⁷⁶ It was only after internally establishing among PRC diplomats the need for major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics at the 2014 CFAWC, however, that Xi then moved to formally detail his vision for “A Community of Common Destiny” at the United Nations in New York in September 2015 and Geneva in January  2017.⁷⁷ As others have noted, while the phrase “A Community of Common Destiny” predated Xi, and Xi himself had begun to frequently use it in his foreign policy speeches, it was in these two speeches to the UN that Xi began to identify it with an alternative blueprint for the global order.⁷⁸ Indeed, the UN is the traditional venue for PRC leaders to articulate an alternative global vision.⁷⁹

At a surface level, “A Community of Common Destiny” promotes a vision for global order in the areas of politics, security, development, culture, and the natural environment designed to contrast with Beijing’s depiction of the incumbent, Western or United States-centric order. Originally, this contrast was primarily implicit; over the course of Xi’s tenure, it has become more explicit. Other observers have unpacked at length the details of the contrast the CCP draws in each of the above areas. For example, Beijing decries US security alliances as exclusive and destabilizing and advocates instead for its vision of global partnerships aligned to common interests.⁸⁰ More striking than the depiction in “A Community of Common Destiny” of Beijing’s opposition to features of the current international order, the substance of which mostly predates its articulation by decades, however, is its portrait of a deeply integrated world, where “all under Heaven are of one family,” in which it is the PRC’s leadership that underpins global connectivity, development, and international politics.⁸¹ I concentrate this discussion of “A Community of Common Destiny,” therefore, on the increasing confidence and openness with which Xi has promoted “A Community of Common Destiny” as an alternative China-centric order on a global scale.

As others have noted, there is an apparent contradiction between the PRC’s efforts to promote “A Community of Common Destiny” to the developing world and to others Beijing believes are dissatisfied with the existing order by advocating international equality and sovereignty over and against the imposition of Western values, on the one hand, and on the other, painting a vision of China as the global leader.⁸²  Here, Xi Jinping’s answer (at least to a domestic Chinese audience) is to invoke the traditional Chinese concept of tianxia (天下, “all under heaven”), which Xi has linked to “A Community of Common Destiny” by quoting a famous passage on tianxiafrom the Chinese classic Book of Rites in his speeches on “A Community of Common Destiny.”⁸³

Tianxia is a vision where China, as the center of human flourishing (both in material terms [wealth] and political terms [good governance] and in terms of values), attracts others to learn from, connect themselves to, and ultimately move into conformity with it.⁸⁴ For Xi, the “A Community of Common Destiny” will thus advance the causes of both the Chinese nation and of international socialism: not by fomenting violent revolution, but rather through other countries’ free choices as they “hitch themselves to China’s development vehicle.”⁸⁵ Indeed, by injecting ideas associated with tianxiainto his blueprint for global order, Xi offers a signature case of the “second combination” Xi Jinping Thought purports to achieve by mixing “fine traditional Chinese culture” and Marxism.⁸⁶ Indeed, there is a symmetry between the concept of how tianxia is supposed to build global order and the concrete approaches Beijing is using to operationalize “A Community of Common Destiny.”

Between the 2015 and 2017 “A Community of Common Destiny” speeches, in a pivotal address to a politburo group study session on global governance, Xi maintained that the “pattern of global governance depends upon the balance of power, and the transformation of the global governance system originates from changes in the balance of power” and that China must seek to build consensus for changing the system “by following the principles of extensive consultation, joint development, and shared benefits.”⁸⁷ The primary instrument for this is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Over roughly the same period in Xi’s first term, BRI grew in scale to match the global ambitions of “A Community of Common Destiny.” Xi had originally identified it as a regional effort connecting China to Europe via Africa and Asia through the “five major goals” of “policy coordination, facilities connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration and people-to-people bonds” when he announced it in two speeches in 2013 and consolidated the party’s depiction of it in a March 2015 “action plan” paper.⁸⁸ Yet Beijing extended BRI to the digital domain also in March 2015, and by the end of 2017 had widened BRI to include Latin America, the Arctic, and outer space. Today, BRI is explicitly a “platform” for realizing “A Community of Common Destiny.”⁸⁹ While the PRC began to make BRI investments more carefully after 2016 (to date the year of the largest number of new projects, with the value of new projects peaking in 2019)⁹⁰, Beijing remains committed both to BRI and to the mechanism of using the PRC’s size and economic strength to seek global leadership in both emerging industries and technology and the positional power that comes from installing the infrastructure and setting the standards that undergird the future of global connectivity.⁹¹ Indeed, over the course of Xi’s second five-year term and into his third, despite the setback BRI endured with the advent of COVID, he has doubled-down on his ambitions for “A Community of Common Destiny” and become more open in framing it as a challenge to the US-led order.⁹²

“A Community of Common Destiny” is not merely an aspiration or a sketch of the kind of world Beijing hopes for. On the contrary, Xi has made clear that its realization is crucial for the attainment of the CCP’s long-term goals including national rejuvenation. The 19th Party Congress enshrined “A Community of Common Destiny” both in Xi Jinping Thought and in the party’s constitution, with the seventh of eight items that Xi Jinping Thought “makes clear” reading: “It makes clear that major-country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics aims to foster a new type of international relations and build a global community of shared future.”⁹³ The report also discusses “A Community of Common Destiny” as the 13th of Xi Jinping Thought’s 14 points of basic policy, and mentions “A Community of Common Destiny” in both the title and twice in the body of the chapter of the report devoted to foreign affairs. In both instances in the body of the text, the report talks about working with the people of all countries to build a “A Community of Common Destiny.”⁹⁴

Beijing’s sense of the trajectory of its new era horizons in international order building became even more optimistic between the 19th and 20th Party Congresses. A significant feature of this confidence is the party’s widely-noted formal judgment that the world is undergoing “great changes not seen in a century” (历百年未有之大变局). This phrase emerged between the two Congresses, is quoted in the 2021 Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era Study Questions & Answers volume, affirmed in the 20th Party Congress report, and Xi continues to invoke it as of this writing.⁹⁵ A chapter of the study questions volumespecifically addressing “The World is Undergoing Great Changes Not Seen in a Century; What are these Changes?” maintains that:

In brief, the great changes not seen in a century are that the current international structure and international system are undergoing profound adjustments, and the global governance system is undergoing profound changes. The international balance of power is undergoing the most revolutionary change in modern times, and the world presents us with important trends that affect the process and direction of human history.⁹⁶

The chapter then unpacks the origins of these changes in several, unnumbered drivers. First, the PRC’s leaders perceive that the weight of the global economy is shifting away from Washington and the developed capitalist democracies and towards Asia, the developing world, and the PRC. Second, the world is on the threshold of incredibly dynamic changes (Beijing calls these the “new round of scientific and technological revolution and industrial transformation, 新一轮科技革命和产业变革) which some international scholars call the 4th industrial revolution. Beijing sees these changes as having the potential to reshape not only social and political life around the globe, but also “the international pattern and international system.” The PRC further sees these technological frontiers as both an opportunity to seize the leading global position and shape how emerging norms and standards are set.⁹⁷ Third, Beijing sees what it describes as the US or Western-led international political and economic order as “unsustainable” in the wake of the relative decline in strength of the developed countries. The current (Western-led) global governance system, Beijing maintains, is failing to adapt and is unable to solve global problems. Fourth, Beijing maintains that the world is becoming more integrated and interdependent. Finally, the CCP maintains that China’s national rejuvenation is both accelerating these trends and further driven by them.⁹⁸ Indeed, the growing confidence embodied in the assessment of “changes not seen in a century” has coincided with the PRC’s more assertive proclamation of its role in reforming global governance and of “A Community of Common Destiny” as the solution it is proffering.

Since the 19th Party Congress, Xi has moved from calling for participating in the reform of the global governance system to calling for actively leading that reform.⁹⁹ The 2021 Central Committee resolution on the party’s 100th anniversary further maintains: “The concept of a human community with a shared future has become a banner leading trends of the times and human progress.”¹⁰⁰ In a chapter of the resolution on “The Historical Significance of the Party’s Endeavors Over the Past Century,” the resolution’s fourth of five points is that these endeavors have “produced a profound influence on the course of world history.” The discussion then combines Beijing’s claim about the PRC pioneering a new form of civilization discussed in an earlier section of this essay with a claim about order building via “A Community of Common Destiny.” It avers [emphasis added]:

The Party has led the people in pioneering a uniquely Chinese path to modernization, creating a new model for human advancement, and expanding the channels for developing countries to achieve modernization. This has offered a new option for countries and nations who want to accelerate development while preserving their independence. The Party has promoted the development of a human community with a shared future, and offered Chinese wisdom, Chinese solutions, and Chinese strength for addressing major issues facing humanity and for building an open, inclusive, clean, and beautiful world that enjoys enduring peace, universal security, and common prosperity. It has thus become an important force driving human development and progress.¹⁰¹

For its part, the 20th Party Congress, which, as noted above, occurred after the advent of more open global strategic rivalry with Washington, doubles down on Beijing’s goals for the development of humanity in two significant ways. First, it frames the realization of Xi’s global order building project as a requirement for achieving Chinese modernization. The report’s chapter on the new journey, in discussing “Chinese modernization,” maintains [emphasis added]:

The essential requirements of Chinese modernization are as follows: upholding the leadership of the Communist Party of China and socialism with Chinese characteristics, pursuing high-quality development, developing whole-process people’s democracy, enriching the people’s cultural lives, achieving common prosperity for all, promoting harmony between humanity and nature, building a global community of shared future, and creating a new model for human progress.¹⁰²

In other words, Beijing makes clear that attaining the CCP’s objectives for the Chinese nation requires the construction of the global order along the lines the CCP favors.¹⁰³ Here, beginning just before the resolution on the party’s 100th birthday, and extending after the 20th Party Congress, the PRC rolled out several “global initiatives” that are designed to offer an explicit counterpoint to the current global governance system. Thus far, Beijing has a Global Development Initiative (announced September 2021), Global Security Initiative (announced April 2022) and Global Civilization Initiative (announced March 2023). As of this writing, these initiatives remain weakly institutionalized, more concepts than institutions, but, as the record of BRI shows, the PRC at times begins with concepts and then builds the institutions to embody and realize them overtime.¹⁰⁴ The 20th Party Congress links the two initiatives then extant to “A Community of Common Destiny”:

Building a global community of shared future is the way forward for all the world’s peoples. An ancient Chinese philosopher observed that “all living things may grow side by side without harming one another, and different roads may run parallel without interfering with one another.”¹⁰⁵ Only when all countries pursue the cause of common good, live in harmony, and engage in cooperation for mutual benefit will there be sustained prosperity and guaranteed security. It is in this spirit that China has put forward the Global Development Initiative and the Global Security Initiative, and it stands ready to work with the international community to put these two initiatives into action.¹⁰⁶

While the principles associated with these global initiatives are not new, their significance lies in their balder framing of Beijing offering an alternative to the current order. Xi’s February 2023 speech on the spirit of the 20th Party Congress further underscores that Beijing is offering these alternatives over and against what the CCP portrays as the values and actions of the West. In what is ostensibly an address on Chinese modernization, he identifies an explicit contrast between the PRC and the West in terms of size of their respective populations, people-centered modernization vs. capital-centered modernization, coordinated material and spiritual civilization vs. greed and “spiritual poverty,” harmony with nature vs. plundering the ecological environment, and peaceful development vs. war, the slave trade, colonization. and plunder. Near the conclusion of the address, he talks about the “great struggle” (a CCP euphemism for the systems contest with Western capitalist democracy), and trumpets [emphasis added]:

We must maintain strategic confidence and strengthen our fighting spirit. Where does this confidence come from? It comes from our country’s increasingly solid foundation, but also from our firm ideals and beliefs, our persistent pursuit of truth, and our unswerving adherence to the Party’s original aspiration and mission. In the face of encirclement, containment, and suppression, we should fight with confidence, because we always stand on the right side of history, on the side of the progress of human civilization, and promote the building of a world of lasting peace, universal security, common prosperity, openness, inclusiveness, cleanliness, and beauty. We play a constructive role in maintaining world peace and regional stability, and we are on the right path and doing a just cause. Hegemonism, power politics, unilateralism, and protectionism go against the trend of the times, are unpopular, and have few supporters.¹⁰⁷

This depiction of Beijing’s goal of a world of “lasting peace, universal security, common prosperity, openness, inclusiveness, cleanliness, and beauty” (持久和平、普遍安全、共同繁荣、开放包容、清洁美丽的世界) is a phrase associated with “A Community of Common Destiny” and its five areas of politics, security, development, culture, and the environment.¹⁰⁸ Finally, in December 2023 at the third Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference held during his tenure, Xi became even more expansive in his claims about momentum for “A Community of Common Destiny.” The following is from the official translation of the Xinhua news summary [emphasis added:

It was pointed out at the conference that building a community with a shared future for mankind is the core tenet of Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy.¹⁰⁹ It is how China proposes to solve the questions of what kind of world to build and how to build it based on our deepening understanding of the laws governing the development of human society. It reflects the Chinese Communists’ worldview, perception of order, and values, accords with the common aspiration of people in all countries, and points the direction for the progress of world civilizations. It is also the noble goal pursued by China in conducting major-country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics for the new era. Since the dawn of this new era, building a community with a shared future for mankind has developed from a Chinese initiative to an international consensus, from a promising vision to substantive actions, and from a conceptual proposition to a scientific system. It has served as a glorious banner leading the progress of the times.¹¹⁰

In such a context, we ought to be able to put to bed suggestions that Beijing’s ambitions for its place in the world are regional (with merely “global influence” as the goal). Rather, the CCP’s vision is that its ideas and solutions become the foundation for the future global order and underpin the future of a deeply interconnected world and the future development of humanity as a whole. If there remained any doubts about the scope of US-PRC strategic rivalry, the 20th Party Congress and its aftermath should have answered them.

Conclusion

In sum, regardless of any particular U.S. administration’s official view of the international order or of the United States’ global role, Xi Jinping is likely to continue to seek to navigate towards his party’s long-term objectives that he has both accelerated and expressed with increasing confidence over his more than a dozen years as paramount leader. These reflect the central vision of his claim that, with China’s emergence as the number two power in the world (in his view, on the way to number one by mid-century), “socialism with Chinese characteristics has entered a new era.” The new era is to be one in which the PRC assumes global leadership, in which the relative balance of global prestige shifts from capitalism to socialism, and in which Beijing builds consensus for a new model of global governance. “We must realize that this era is one for socialism with Chinese characteristics, not for some other models,” Xi said in a January 2018 speech for members and alternates of the 19th Central Committee and provincial and ministerial level cadres at a study session on the principles of the 19th Party Congress.¹¹¹ All statements of fact and opinion are the author’s alone and do not represent the views of the National Intelligence University, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, or the US government.

* I wish to thank Peter Mattis, Erik Quam, and Liza Tobin for helpful comments on a draft of this essay. All statements of fact and opinion are the author’s alone and do not represent the views of the National Intelligence University, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, or the US government.