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In the early spring of 2025, Russian coverage of East Asia reflected confidence in foreign policy as well as a quest to solidify successes. One article recognized achievements in the “Turn to the East” while arguing that it needed bolstering through a more decisive shift away from Eurocentrism in cultural and civilizational relations, especially with China. A second article took satisfaction in Russia’s closer ties to North Korea, assuming they will lead to positive outcomes, perhaps even the new regional security framework Russia has long sought. Also reported were differences in Chinese and Russian interpretations of the victory in 1945, adding that Russians need to be sensitive to avoid disagreement. Another publication reviewed the Sino-US trade talks in Geneva, finding little progress that would prevent further escalation. Separately, an article focused on Japan’s tougher stance toward Russia under Kishida, but, pointing to tensions with Trump of late, concluded that it now must improve relations with Russia. Other articles showcased problems Japan faces and how to assess the Abe legacy. Japan-India relations also drew attention.
East vs. West
In Rossiya v Global’noi Politike on May 1, Aleksandr Girinskii wrote about Eurocentrism and East-phobia. He noted that for the past few decades, Russia’s orientation has been toward cooperation with countries of Asia, the world majority, and the “Global South,” but things have not been so simple in culture and ideological presumptions. In cultural and civilizational relations, Russia remains Eurocentric. Russia does not consider itself in Europe anymore. The idea of a “different Europe” first appeared in the political philosophy of Slavophilism in the 19th century and remained important in discourse—for instance, by Solzhenitsyn—but this contradicts official proclamations of Russia as a state-civilization, autonomous in culture and ideological relations. Yet, Russia is viewed as lacking the thickness of the development of an autonomous civilization, such as China, India, and Persia have, or the focus of Islam. It is hard to say Russia is no longer Europe. From the 16th century to the present, Russia often shifted its form of state structure, ideology, and basic values. Now contemporary Russia tries to put together a “new old” identity from its diverse past. There is nothing bad in this, but it does not add up to a single-minded ideological construction.
Making it difficult to specify Russia’s civilizational identity are the domination of Eurocentrism in culture; the weak adherence to foreign cultural influences, which often provoked radical transformation of society and state; the capacity to accept diverse cultural forms poorly coincides with the idea of a “civilization,” a closed cultural expanse. Most serious is the muddled understanding of Russia’s civilizational autonomy, complicated in Europeanized culture by the deeply embedded fear of the East, Sinophobia, the “Yellow Peril,” and “pan-Mongolism.” This dates from the rise of nationalism in the second half of the 19th century in the West, including Russia, taking the extreme form of racism. Chinese migrants drew anti-immigrant attitudes and prejudices. The idea spread of Russia as a barrier country called to restrain the hordes of Asian barbarians and defend the great European civilization, appealing to many Russian writers and intellectuals as a civilizational mission of the Russian state. Entrance of Chinese into the Russian Far East was viewed as likely to be followed by a military invasion. Russian literature on this period was part of European “nationalist” culture invoking the “Yellow Peril.” Eurocentrism and Sinophobia are two sides of the same coin. It was not long ago that an image of China as a dangerous state having “territorial pretensions on Russia” and threatening as a rising economy and vast population was exploited by Russian liberals as an argument to cling to the West. In 2014, Boris Nemtsov warned of Russia becoming a colony of China. In the 1990s–2000s, East-phobia was used to call for the need to enter NATO and privatize Russian strategic resources, as if Western companies would defend Russian territory from the “Chinese hordes,” logic similar to Zelenskyy assuming that control by Western companies over Ukraine’s strategic resources will defend Ukraine’s sovereignty, used in Trump’s policy not shying away from colonial rhetoric. There was active opposition to Russia’s initiatives to resolve the territorial dispute with China in the 2000s by the liberal establishment together with nationalist forces, repeating slogans of the Cold War, when the “Chinese threat” was quite realistic.
The reason why the “Chinese threat” arguments worked for so long despite not corresponding to reality was the Eurocentrism of Russian culture, marked by the post-Soviet radical ideological drift toward “Western liberalism.” Russia long had a deficit of experts on China and the East, and the need for the “Turn to the East” was only asserted about 15 years ago and long was little reflected in political and economic behavior. The direct military confrontation with the West is forcing change, which, if it had occurred earlier, could have led to more strategic thinking by the Russian elite, resulting in calmly resolving many questions of economic and military-political cooperation with the Greater East, now being faced in conditions of colossal foreign pressure. Even the military crisis of 2022 might have been averted.
Conceptions of the cultural-civilizational gap between Russia and China remain an important factor in the way of firming up relations. Despite talk of a partnership “not knowing limits,” consciousness of China remains that of an “exotic” country with an enormous population, which is seen to be culturally “different”—that is, dangerous. Closeness is seen as “geopolitical,” above all in opposition to the West, not as friendship of values of close peoples. For the average Russian, residents of European cities are closer, reinforced by classical literature and the humanitarian tradition. Cultural contacts with Asian countries must be cultivated, linked to gradual “erasing” of Eurocentrism, especially in the study of history and literature by schoolchildren, while retaining studies of the historical and geopolitical context of the authors and using a comparative approach. Student exchanges, “revised” media and expert content on Chinese and “Eastern themes,” and wider funding on the history of relations between Russia and China are needed.
North Korea-US Relations
In Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn, No. 4, Roman Kalinin focused on the nuclear problem on the Korean Peninsula under Trump in his second term. He noted two aspects of the problem: North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons in response to the nuclear threat from the US and its allies; and policies of states whose security is under threat due to the presence of nuclear weapons on the peninsula. He also explained that the unfolding structural changes in the world order are manifest in the intensifying crisis of Northeast Asia and are reflected in the dynamics of the nuclear problem on the peninsula. Often the current state of the international system is characterized as a new cold war, which can be understood as a bipolar US-PRC confrontation or more widely as a battle between the US-centric and multipolar worlds. In this paradigm, the nuclear problem on the peninsula is part of the geopolitical opposition between the Western and non-Western worlds, suggesting that the latter is also a bloc. What makes the peninsula, which was the epicenter of the Cold War conflict between the US and USSR, so threatening are the alliances between the US and Japan and South Korea in a bloc system for containment of the PRC and the liquidation of the North Korean regime, as was written in 2023 at Camp David, while testing new formats of nuclear cooperation, which undermine the basis of the non-proliferation treaty. These moves are a natural outgrowth of US global strategy for national security, which will further develop under Trump. For various reasons, North Korea has a lower threshold than other nuclear powers for using these weapons: conditions of isolation that could lead to incorrectly interpreting nuclear signals; probability of using nukes to achieve political aims; and limited nuclear strikes could be used to destroy competitors or to unite the peninsula. In the fall of 2017, Trump was on the verge of war with North Korea, leading to a level of tension comparable to the 1962 crisis in the Caribbean, but he could not force capitulation to get a “big deal” for denuclearization.
After the end of the Cold War, we discern the following stages in US policy: in the 1990s, unresponsive to North Korea’s demands for national security, leading it to withdraw from the non-proliferation treaty; under George W. Bush, complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantling of nuclear weapons (CVID) with no US guarantee of security (the most extreme approach to date), along with Six-Party Talks, in which Bush made some concessions in 2005, but insufficient ones before he refused to do what was agreed to, causing North Korea to conduct its first nuclear test in 2006; under Barack Obama, reliance on sanctions and political pressure without diplomatic results; under Donald Trump, edging toward nuclear war in 2017; failure to find a shared understanding of denuclearization, facing serious opposition from US hawks despite Trump’s personal intentions in 2018–21. AUKUS, the Quad, and Camp David trilateralism all came to reflect tight adherence to containment. US cooperation with the Kiev regime and support for Taiwan impact management of the nuclear problem on the peninsula, where Russia and China have spheres of influence. As a result of its confrontation with China, the US is now losing the possibility of China’s support over North Korea, as Russia finds the new cold war on the peninsula convenient for tightening ties to North Korea. In response to US strategic bloc formation, potential opponents of the US are forging their own axis of Russia–China–North Korea. Russia’s treaty with North Korea serves as a mechanism for stopping a conflict on the peninsula while laying a basis for a new Eurasian system of security. The downturn in relations between North and South Korea is largely explained by the foreign policy agenda of the Yoon administration, aimed at a “global alliance” with the US. The idea of unification in Seoul is transformation with the goal of “democratization” of North Korea through all possible means. Having tried in the 1970s to go nuclear, South Korea is a threshold nuclear state, whose public now mostly favors an independent nuclear potential, meaning that Trump must face two nuclear challenges on the peninsula.
Trump has considerable space to maneuver: escalation or peaceful regulation. The former, including large-scale exercises with allies, could lead to uncontrolled conflict, risking a global catastrophe. Russian and foreign experts are not optimistic about a peaceful process. It is assumed in the US that talks with Kim Jong-un are unnecessary since his alliance with Russia can give him the necessary support to bypass sanctions or, as some US specialists warn, to allow Kim to use the talks to prepare for war with the South. The fact that Alex Wong, who helped organize the Trump–Kim summits, is at the NSC bodes well for diplomacy. A “megadeal” with Russia could see Trump demand that Russia reconsider its relations with North Korea as part of negotiations on the Ukraine question, experts suggest. Moreover, if the opposition takes power in South Korea, it might attempt closer ties with China and North Korea. The result of forging an axis of opposition on the peninsula would be the start of dialogue for a new architecture of security in Northeast Asia. The goal set in the Six-Party Talks has not lost its relevance in the circumstances of the new cold war.
The above article makes the following points: North Korea’s nuclear program is a response to threats; North Korea must be seen in the context of the new cold war and the struggle between the US-centric and multipolar world orders; danger results from US alliances, which in recent years have grown more threatening; US refusal to guarantee the security of North Korea and failure to stick to agreements has driven North Korea’s nuclear behavior; Trump’s own instincts are frustrated by US hawks; US policy on Ukraine and Taiwan damages management of North Korean nukes; Russia and China have spheres of influence on the Korean Peninsula; an axis of Russia–China–North Korea is forming; Russia’s treaty with North Korea is a basis for a new system of security in Northeast Asia; Yoon’s foreign policy and “global alliance” with the US have caused North–South relations to collapse; Trump has room to maneuver between uncontrolled conflict and, less likely, a peaceful process; certain Trump advisers, a megadeal with Russia, or opposition victory in South Korea could serve as a positive influence; the goal since the Six-Party Talks of a new regional security architecture is advanced by the Russia–China–North Korea axis of opposition.
Sino-Russian Relations
On May 6 in Profil’ Ivan Zuenko explained how China’s interpretation of victory in 1945 differs from Russia’s. Making September 3 a national holiday, as May 9 is for Russia, came only a decade ago. Now China regards the victory over Japan to be part of the global victory over fascism. Whereas Russia considers the Second World War to have begun on September 1, 1939, China puts the date earlier, when Japan on July 7, 1937, launched full-scale military activities through the battle at Marco Polo Bridge, casting doubt on the very existence of a sovereign Chinese state. The Japanese committed many war crimes, dealing extremely cruelly with resistance. For the Chinese, this war is the cornerstone of all contemporary history, labeling it the “eight-year war of resistance,” accentuating its duration. Lately, some historians have recognized September 18, 1931, the “Mukden incident,” after which Manchuria was occupied, as the start of aggression by Japan, beginning a single process of a fourteen-year “war of resistance.” The war with Japan is seen as an inseparable part of the Second World War along with the European and Pacific Ocean fronts, and China’s containment of Japanese militarism an important factor in the overall defeat of Japan and world fascism as a whole. Without China’s resistance, Japan earlier would have seized Southeast Asia, been better prepared for war with the US, and struck a blow at the back of the Soviet Union during the winter of 1941, when the Germans were attacking Moscow. The war could have ended very differently. China considers its contribution in Europe and America to be unstudied and not appreciated. Incorporating the transition from the 1930s–1940s into the resolution of the fate of the world, Chinese officials increasingly use the label “world antifascist war.” Whereas Russians refer to Italian fascists, German Nazis, and Japanese militarists, China unites them all as “world fascism” and says China’s contribution cannot be separated from those of the USSR, US, and Great Britain. It is important that during the war Western powers at last began to treat China as equal, as at the Cairo Conference of 1943, which Stalin did not attend in order not to unnerve Japan, with which there was a non-aggression pact. At that time, the US rescinded discrimination laws for Chinese migrants, and settlements of Europeans and Americans on Chinese territory ended extraterritoriality, restoring China’s authority. As a victor, China became a founding member of the UN and a permanent member of the Security Council. It was the war with Japan that led to the strengthening of the CCP and PLA, which could prevail in the civil war. Thus, for today’s political elite, the history of the war has special patriotic significance for CCP legitimacy. The Chinese think that they paid a great price for the overall victory, losing 20–35 million killed or wounded soldiers and 33 million civilians, more than others and on a level with Soviet losses. Memory of enormous losses plays a big role in attitudes toward Japan and others in the world who undervalue Chinese heroic contributions. Chinese bloggers criticize American historical films, such as Midway, for ignoring the Chinese front, as well as the battle for Stalingrad just beginning. The Chinese do not overlook the assistance of allies in the war with Japan, not giving preference to either the USSR or the US earlier or in August 1945, but saying that the third factor of China’s own forces was no less important. This principled position can be a source of serious disagreements, if not understood. Unlike Warsaw Pact allies and former Soviet republics, which are torn about memorials and graves of fallen Soviet soldiers, the Chinese preserve them, if sometimes moving them, but one must not demand recognition of any exclusive merit of the Soviet Union. China considers itself a fully empowered victor in the war, which fought longer and lost more than others. Russians have their own view and cannot rewrite history, while it needs to show understanding to its Chinese partners.
Andrei Kirillov on April 16 wrote in TASS on the decline in trade between China and Russia by 6.6% in the first quarter of 2025, when Chinese trade with countries unfriendly to Russia—the US and EU—rose. Both imports to Russia ($22.7 billion) and exports from Russia ($30.5 billion) declined by similar degrees, still leaving Russia with a healthy surplus of $7.8 billion. Car purchases fell with the saturation of the market of purchasers of Chinese automobiles, and some now waiting for the return of Western suppliers. Russian exports were hit by the fall in international oil prices, as well as the impact on bank services hit by US sanctions. Although some bloggers expressed concern, experts saw no sharp decline, citing the steadiness of the business partnership and the benefits that could follow normalization of relations with the US and the accompanying softening of sanctions pressure, despite the fact it is much harder to remove sanctions than to impose them. Driving China from the Panama Canal would force it to seek new trade routes, say through the Northern Sea Route, if the states unfriendly to Russia of Northern Europe did not try to block it. Sino-ASEAN trade rose, but in many fields, they are more competitors than reliable partners, especially Vietnam, as business is moving from China even as China, through Hong Kong and Singapore, is investing heavily. China has ways to counter Trump’s tariffs, using gray networks and sending goods through third countries.
Sino-US Relations
On May 13 in Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn, Andrei Kadomtsev wrote about the de-escalation in Geneva of the US-China tariff war with a mechanism in place for further talks between He Lifeng and both Scott Bessent and Jamieson Greer. The unexpectedly high tariffs had backfired on the US, strengthening China’s position before the talks and demonstrating that China’s recent broadening of trade ties with other countries allowed it to redirect trade flows to the Indo-Pacific region and Europe. If the trade confrontation were to grow, it would increase the risk for natural resource markets, the article warns. BCA Research has calculated that the probability of reaching a Sino-US agreement during Trump’s term is just 50%, but many economists and investors in the West think that Trump’s position on protectionism can quickly change under pressure, as seen at the end of April and early May. Realists rationally observe that in a tariff war there is no winner, and tariffs remain high, combining to reach 40% for US imports from China and 25% for China’s imports, with a possible 1.5% drop in the US GDP. Neither side is prepared to give the other what it most wants. At present, for both it is more important to prepare for constructive dialogue to keep the trust of markets and, for the US, political support at home. China did not cause this problem. The chances are high for renewed escalation.
China
In MEiMO No. 5, O.N. Borokh and A.V. Lomanov wrote on the strategy of making China a great financial power in China’s ideology, drawing on excerpts from a 2024 Chinese book. Strengthening of party leadership over the economy, they note, has been accompanied by the growing influence of official ideology on economic processes. A March 2024 compilation of more than 120 of Xi Jinping’s statements on financial (jinrong) work since 2012 clarifies this conclusion. As part of its modernization strategy, China seeks to become a financial power after never experiencing a financial crisis over more than forty years and while facing a clash between great powers. No longer can the financial sector count on rapid economic growth. Centralization serves as the main instrument of control over financial risks, implemented in part through a March 2023 decree, as it was grounded in claims drawn from Chinese history and culture amid demands that businesspeople act within this moralistic spirit and adhere to ideological unity. The third plenum of the Central Committee in 2024 specified ways to proceed. Supporting Xi’s insights are negative conclusions about financial management in the West: narrowing of material production, frequency of financial crises, and monopolization giving rise to social contradictions. Xi aims for financial security. The question remains: will China become the global financial leader after the United States?
Japan
On April 16 in Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn, Oleg Paramonov covered Japan’s “Kuril dreams,” pointing to the newly published “blue diplomatic book,” which refers to an “illegal occupation,” while calling for “peaceful negotiations” on the “biggest unresolved question” in the bilateral relationship. In 2022, Kishida restored this wording, at a time when Japan actively joined the sanctions pressure of the West on Russia, synchronizing with the G7 partners. In Asia, only Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan followed. Russia answered by putting Japan on the list of unfriendly countries, exiting talks on a peace treaty, and stopping visa-free visits to the islands by Japanese citizens. Japan very actively provided economic support to Kiev, including hosting a conference on “rebuilding Ukraine.” Until the fall of 2023, military aid was limited to non-lethal items, but in December 2023, it expressed willingness to supply a Patriot missile to the US, reexamining its rules on weapons exports, and compensating the US for its depleted arsenal. NATO’s Mark Rutte just went to Japan, where Tokyo joined the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine, formed to provide production of military-use items, repair, and training of troops. Medvedev declared that the “territorial question” is closed forever, in accord with Russia’s constitution. Japan’s anti-Russian line did not change after Kishida. On February 7, “Northern Territories Day,” Ishiba Shigeru pledged to carry on the policy to resolve the issue of the four islands and conclude a peace treaty, while appealing to Moscow to resume island visits of former residents, calling this the priority in relations and telling pupils victorious in a contest on the “occupation” to show great interest in this theme while promising maximum efforts to “return” the territory. The document underscored that Japan would continue gradually to refuse Russian energy resources, apparently shifting to US LNG from Alaska despite serious doubts in Japan on its prospects. Yet, it expressed the intent to maintain participation in projects with the Russian Far East, Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin-2, important for stable supplies over the mid- and long-term. Russia responded negatively on talks, adding that today there are no contacts between the two sides. The article ended by citing splits in the West, Trump’s turbulent foreign policy, and the contrast between scandal-plagued Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth calling Japan the main US ally in containing China and “rising star” Elbridge Colby demanding that Japan increase its military expenses to 3% of GDP, casting doubt on the alliance in terms of economic costs as tariff wars undercut regional economic ties on which Japan depends. The US is shifting from defending allies to determining their military expenses, obliging Japan to seek better relations with neighbors, including Russia, even more so when Japanese big business does not hide its desire to return to Russia.
In Nezavisimaya Gazeta on April 7, Valerii Kistanov wrote about the world’s fair in Osaka as a barometer of Russian-Japanese relations, noting Russia’s absence despite a tradition of participation in such forums. The third world exhibition to take place in Japan opened on April 13, competing for international prestige with the Olympics in Tokyo, Japan’s other leading city, reminding Russians of the competition between Moscow and St. Petersburg and repeating for Japanese the sequence of the 1964 Tokyo Olympics and the 1970 Osaka world’s fair, both instruments of soft power. When Trump met Ishiba on February 7, he promised to visit the 2025 expo this year while in Japan, but commentaries feared that would sully its image. As a student working at the 1970 USSR pavilion (so popular that people waited 2–3 hours in line) and a member of the Russian pavilion’s directorate at Japan’s 2005 Aichi expo, Kistanov takes pride in his past involvement and in 2005 served as interpreter for Naruhito’s visit there. Many troubles beset EXPO-2025: cost overruns due to the pandemic, inflation, and rising prices for raw materials, nearly doubling the budget; and lack of enthusiasm in Japan. Unlike the 64 million visitors to EXPO-70, organizers count on 28 million, of whom 3 million are foreigners—doubtful given serious socio-economic problems and some severe political ones. Negative phenomena in Osaka include prohibition of smoking in nearby public places, restrictions on illegal taxis, increased hotel prices, and risks to guests from possible earthquakes, typhoons, and other natural phenomena. A Russian pavilion would again be of great interest to Japanese and serve as a humanitarian bridge between peoples for future normalization of relations. As a barometer, 1970 peaked with the prime minister and future emperor visiting the pavilion, in 2005 only the future emperor, and 2025 nothing at all.
Dmitrii Strel’tsov, in East Asia Vostochnaya Aziia: Fakty i Analitika, Vol. 7, No. 1, examines the political legacy of Abe Shinzo, noting that under him the process of departing from the Yoshida Doctrine was finally completed, and Japan became a fully armed power no longer limited by the legacy of fascism. Strel’tsov explains why Abe enjoyed a long tenure as prime minister, although his conservative political views were not shared by a significant part of Japanese society, and various statements by him and his cabinet associates drew criticism. Japanese were weary of revolving cabinets, changing almost every year, but this reason is insufficient, since Abe’s popularity remained high. Key was the strong feeling of an unprecedented security threat. People mobilized around the leader due to concern about China’s behavior in the East China Sea and the North Korean rocket and nuclear programs. Also, under Abe, qualitative improvement occurred in relations with China, Russia, and South Korea due to personal diplomacy, following setbacks to ties under the DPJ from 2009 to 2012. Important too was the contrast with the U.S. and many European countries after a flood of immigrants from countries of the Global South exacerbated problems of inter-cultural relations, terrorism, and international crime. Abe was credited with restraint in liberalizing immigration laws and with rhetoric supportive of traditional values, “saving” Japan. Japanese society sought to preserve national identity while romanticizing its historical record. Abe actively used the media to spread an image of personal charisma, having learned at the side of Koizumi. He also positioned himself as a reformer through use of slogans such as Abenomics. Yet, he had a problem with scandals, at least five of which plagued his term from 2012 to 2020, but these were not catastrophic for his political image, especially in light of the divided opposition and its inability to present an alternative program, as well as memories of failed rule. Many consider Abe’s strong suit to be foreign policy and security, doing everything possible to fulfill U.S. expectations. The Quad grew out of his thinking, and he proposed the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” Yet, there was no real success in overtures to China and South Korea. Although Abe did not achieve his goal in nearly thirty meetings with Putin, bilateral relations were at their peak for the entire postwar period. As for Abe’s thinking on Japan’s militarist past, he spoke differently to different audiences. Abe will occupy a special place in the political history of Japan, carrying out the strategy of turning Japan into a “normal” country—called by some the “Abe Doctrine”—which had a significant psychotherapeutic effect on national confidence.
Ol’ga Dobrinskaya, in Vostochnaya Aziia, Vol. 7, No. 1, wrote about Japan-India relations in Kishida’s “new realism” foreign policy. Despite differences on the Ukraine position, bilateral relations remain secure. Japan considers India a like-minded partner and a regional counterweight to China. Over the three years of Kishida’s tenure, relations strengthened: in 2022, the two sides celebrated 70 years of diplomatic relations, and in 2023, Japan chaired the G7 and India the G20, reinforcing cooperation on the global arena. Kishida inherited relations at a peak achieved by Abe, without notable initiatives by Suga in the shadow of the pandemic. Kishida’s tenure corresponded with a radical transformation of the system of international relations. Russia pays special attention to its strategic partnership with India, and to that end, it naturally focuses attention on the newest tendencies in the development of Japan-India relations. Kishida often warned that what is taking place in Ukraine could, in the near future, occur in East Asia. The impact of the crisis ended the pro-Russian course of Abe and led to an intensification of the policy of balancing against China. Japan has joined the West in seeking to turn the Global Swing States (India, Turkey, Brazil, and Indonesia) to their side in the global confrontation associated with the Ukraine crisis.
As foreign minister in 2015, Kishida spoke in India and argued that the partnership should become a moving force for a new era, identifying three bridges: shared values, economic development, and an open and stable sea. In 2021, as Japan’s leader, he carried these views forward, now with the Quad to realize the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” and with regional security in the forefront. In the 2022 “Kishida Vision for Peace,” he advanced new initiatives for the FOIP, and in December 2022, in the new strategy for national security, he promised to widen defense cooperation with like-minded states such as India. In speaking of a “new form of capitalism,” Kishida showcased India as the optimal partner. In the crisis in Ukraine, the Japanese government made maximal efforts to draw India into condemnation of Russia’s behavior. In a U.S. speech in January 2023, Kishida distanced Japan from “universal values” to appeal to the “Global South.” Modi was invited to the May G7 summit, where the “Global South” was a major theme. In March 2022, India was the first country Kishida visited as prime minister. India’s refusal to permit Japanese military aircraft carrying assistance for Ukraine was unnerving and cast doubt on India as like-minded, as did its domestic human rights policy. The relationship is not based on shared values, but on a shared political task to contain China. The initial disagreement quieted, and India’s relationship with Russia did not prove to be a serious barrier to the partnership.
Military-technical cooperation so far has been a weak link in burgeoning defense ties. Efforts to export to India Japan’s military technology have not been successful, although a memorandum was signed in late 2024 on the UNICORN system. A Shinkansen rapid train line is the flagship of economic cooperation. Green energy projects and semiconductor production have been prioritized, as well as assistance for India’s northeast region. India’s significance for Japan’s national interests in foreign policy and economics will continue to grow, the article concludes.
On April 23 in Izvestiya, Anastasiia Kostina asked if Japan could soften its sanctions policies against the background of Russo-U.S. dialogue, noting a shift already with the beginning of Russo-U.S. negotiations. It now intends to renew negotiations with Russia on a peace treaty as “only the situation allows,” language not heard earlier, indicating its intention to return to talks—perhaps linked to expectations of the end of the Ukraine conflict leading to the removal of sanctions. Russia often has said it is ready for dialogue only when Tokyo turns away from its antagonistic course. So far, Japan’s foreign policy is not that way, given that it has decided for the first time to transmit satellite data to Ukraine. Despite the absence of talks on the Kuril question, the theme of a peace treaty between Russia and Japan has periodically been floated in the media. Given the care taken by representatives of Asian countries, formulas by diplomats rarely change, but the language from Japan’s embassy in Russia in answer to a question by Izvestiya was that.
In an interview, Nikolai Nozdrev, Russian ambassador in Tokyo, said about 100 Japanese firms are continuing to operate in Russia, which provides necessary support. Official Tokyo deliberately is destroying economic ties, and local business has faced direct threats from authorities. Despite pressure on Russia from countries of the West, Japan clearly intends to maintain economic cooperation, and trade rose for three consecutive months last year. Japan has been in full solidarity with the sanction policy of the G7 and has taken an anti-Russian course aimed at harming the national security and economy of Russia. It has applied 25 packets of illegal measures, most recently on January 10, consciously destroying the foundation of bilateral economic relations forged over decades. Trade fell 22% last year and is $7.9 billion versus $19.9 billion in 2021. Japanese media tirelessly convey anti-Russian narratives, damaging Russian business in Japan. Cross-border accounts and logistics add another barrier, and a Russian businessman last year was sentenced and fined for supplying Russia a “dual-use” item through a third country. In 2024, Japan grew notably more popular for Russian tourists, but talks on restoring direct flights await Japan recognizing the futility of its anti-Russian course. Russia sees talks on a peace treaty leading only to conflict, and it seeks a wide-ranging agreement on peace, friendship, and good neighborliness as a foundation for cooperation in the long term, but such a document cannot be discussed with a threatening state. At present, on Japan’s blacklist are 1,000 physical and 800 juridical persons, plus 2,000 items prohibited from export to Russia, as Russia is responding. Asked if Japan is considering Russia’s role in case of a confrontation between mainland China and Taiwan, the writer left the response vague.
Valerii Kistanov, on April 6 in Nezavisimaya Gazeta, wrote about Japan’s demographics, a population decline of 0.7% despite an inflow of foreign citizens of 330,000. Population has fallen for 15 years straight, now 121,561,801, while foreigners number 3,323,374. This rise, due to a labor shortage, inevitably will undermine the psychology embedded since the Middle Ages of self-isolation. The moral and material burden of the small working-age population is rising in the face of a large elderly population, 20 million of whom are 75 or older, in contrast to only 14,173,000 children up to age 15. Meanwhile, Tokyo is growing again, now over 14 million, after an outflow during the pandemic, despite rising housing and commercial real estate costs, as prices for tourists rose too. Rural regions face decline, as the capital serves as a black hole, swallowing everything. Japan faces not only a demographic crisis, but also a failure of leadership with no simple solution, caught up in outdated notions of work, family, and social structure. This is not just a matter of money. Culture, economic pressure, and harsh working conditions are involved, as many young people see unappealing prospects. Political leaders should face the moment of truth. No steps to boost births will work without fundamental restructuring. The demographic crisis poses for the country in the long run no fewer problems than challenges and threats in the international arena, in the economic and security spheres.
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