Country Report: South Korea (June 2025)

The inauguration of President Lee Jae-myung comes at a precarious moment for South Korea, with tariff disputes and seismic shifts in foreign policy threatening to overshadow any honeymoon period. The Trump administration’s aggressive protectionism—marked by sudden hikes in steel and auto tariffs and a high-stakes “July Package” deadline—has collided with urgent alliance questions, including the specter of USFK troop reductions and an end to the era of “security with the US, economy with China.” The Lee administration is now forced to navigate a diplomatic minefield, and the dominant narrative cutting across party lines and media outlets is that time is running out. As Lee’s government promises pragmatic diplomacy and national unity, the urgency to secure Korea’s interests in this volatile new environment has never been greater.

This May–June country report examines the strategic dilemmas facing the newly inaugurated Lee Jae-myung administration, highlights key domestic and media reactions, and assesses how these intertwined economic and security challenges are shaping Korea’s foreign policy and national debate. It also analyzes South Korea’s response to escalating US trade protectionism under the Trump administration, the high-stakes tariff negotiations culminating in the “July Package” deadline, and the broader shifts in ROK-US alliance dynamics, including debates over USFK troop reductions.

South Korea’s New President

Lee Jae-myung of the Democratic Party won South Korea’s snap presidential election on June 3, 2025, with 49.4% of the vote and a record 79.4% turnout, the highest since 1997. Sworn in the following day, Lee pledged to “heal wounds” and foster national unity. In his first weeks, Lee moved swiftly to distinguish his administration’s approach to North Korea from his predecessor. On June 11, he halted loudspeaker propaganda along the DMZ and urged activists to suspend leaflet balloon launches—measures aimed at reducing tensions and rebuilding trust. Marking the 25th anniversary of the June 15 South-North Joint Declaration, Lee called for restoring inter-Korean communication channels, signaling a rapid rollback of the hardline policies pursued under Yoon Suk-yeol. Despite this shift toward engagement with North Korea, Lee also emphasized a pragmatic, national interest–centered diplomacy. He reaffirmed the importance of a robust ROK-US alliance, committed to enhanced trilateral cooperation with Japan, and promised a pragmatic, interest-based approach toward China and other regional powers.

Foreign Policy Realignment and Diplomatic Calculus

Lee’s early diplomacy reflected this pragmatic stance. On June 9, just six days into his presidency, he held his first phone call with Japanese Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru, agreeing to strengthen trilateral cooperation. Conservative media largely praised this move, pointing out the fact that Lee chose to speak with Japan second, ahead of China, which is said to be a deliberate move of giving Japan strategic priority.¹ Comparing it with former President Moon Jae-in, who had called China’s Xi Jinping before Japan’s Abe in 2017, most commentators from the right welcomed Lee’s pivot away from ideological foreign policy. However, some on the right pointed out Lee’s past criticism of trilateral cooperation. In 2023, he condemned the Camp David summit as “a grave mistake that turns the wheel of history back to the pre-liberation era,” and in 2022, he labeled South Korea’s participation in US-Japan military drills as “an extreme act of pro-Japanese submission.” Despite this, certain conservative voices indicated they would support Lee, provided he maintains this pragmatic course going forward.²

Despite these early diplomatic successes, anxiety lingered among conservatives. Lee’s history of harsh rhetoric toward the US-Japan alliance and perceived leniency toward China and Russia fueled doubts in Washington about his reliability as an ally. Notably, Lee’s first phone call with US President Donald Trump did not take place until June 6, unusually late by tradition. The White House’s statement immediately after the election, warning against “Chinese interference and influence,” was read by many as an implicit expression of concern about Lee’s foreign policy leanings. Conservative critics argued that any deterioration in the ROK-US relationship would harm South Korea’s security, and urged Lee to use upcoming G7 and NATO meetings to reassure allies of his credibility and stability.³

On June 6, Na Kyung-won, a prominent lawmaker from the conservative opposition People Power Party (PPP), took to Facebook to highlight the unusual delay in Lee’s first phone call with the US president. She pointed out, “Former President Moon Jae-in spoke with the US president on his inauguration day, former President Yoon Seok-yeol did so just five hours after his election, and former President Park Geun-hye had the call the day after she was elected. But it’s been three days since President Lee’s inauguration, and he still hasn’t even managed to get Trump on the phone.” Echoing this concern, Ahn Cheol-soo, another conservative-leaning politician and former presidential candidate, also affiliated with the PPP, warned that such a delay could be a “serious sign that ‘Korea passing’ is starting.”⁴

Japan Relations and Public Sentiment

At a reception commemorating the 60th anniversary of Korea-Japan diplomatic normalization, hosted by the Japanese Embassy in Seoul, Lee delivered a video address emphasizing future-oriented cooperation between the two countries. He underscored that “Korea and Japan are important partners who must jointly seek responses amid rapidly changing global circumstances.”⁵

Amid these external pressures, Korean experts highlighted the importance of sustained, pragmatic engagement with Japan. Son Yeol, president of the East Asia Institute (EAI) and a professor at Yonsei University’s Graduate School of International Studies, noted in his recent issue brief that “cooperation with Japan on security, economy, environment, and technology should be regarded no differently than cooperation with any other country, separate from historical issues.” He argued that “future-oriented Korea-Japan cooperation should be framed as an investment in future generations,” adding that “it is inevitable that Korea and Japan will face common challenges down the road, so it’s wise to identify areas of joint cooperation in advance.”⁶

This expert consensus is mirrored in public opinion. According to a joint survey by JoongAng Ilbo and EAI, favorable perceptions of Japan among Koreans have risen sharply, with the proportion of respondents expressing a positive impression increasing from 41.8% last year to 63.3% this year. Kim Gyu-pan, senior research fellow at the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP), argued that economic security cooperation with Japan represents South Korea’s best defense against China’s economic coercion, and is a necessary tool for nurturing advanced industries and safeguarding critical technologies.⁷

Overall, the immediate diplomatic environment, shaped by signals from Washington and Beijing as well as domestic pressure from conservative lawmakers, shows the high expectations and scrutiny facing Lee’s foreign policy. Yet, the positive shift in public sentiment toward Japan and expert calls for future-oriented, practical cooperation suggest that there is a growing consensus around the need for South Korea to look beyond historical grievances and pursue regional partnerships rooted in national interest and shared challenges.

The G7 and NATO Summit: Testing International Leadership

The G7 Summit in Canada (June 16–18) served as an inaugural test of Lee’s international leadership. His summit with Ishiba on June 17 emphasized bridging differences and building a future-oriented partnership. Lee said: “There are small differences, and also differences in opinion, but I hope that Korea and Japan can move beyond those differences and develop a cooperative relationship that is mutually beneficial in many ways,” He added, “I hope that today marks the beginning of a more future-oriented and improved relationship between Korea and Japan.” The next day, South Korea, the US, and Japan conducted their first trilateral joint air exercise under the new administration, reinforcing the commitment to regional security.

A South Korean government official stated that South Korea’s push to join the G7 began in earnest under the Yoon Suk-yeol administration, and the Lee Jae-myung government has decided to continue the effort, viewing G7 membership as a bipartisan issue tied to the national interest. This ambition is often promoted and supported by experts in South Korea, with the example of Kim Hyun-wook, president of the Sejong Institute, who stated, “The Indo-Pacific region is currently the central axis of the global trade order, and South Korea and Australia are key pillars of that region.” And he added, “President Lee should emphasize that South Korea’s accession would strengthen the G7’s influence in the Indo-Pacific.⁸ 

Lee’s participation in the G7 Summit has been positively received by domestic progressive, centrist circles, and parts of the academic community, as a first step toward a “national interest-oriented, future-focused strategic diplomacy.”⁹ It was echoed by Min Jeong-hoon in a contributed column, stating that the Lee administration had “declared that Korea is back.”¹⁰Nonetheless, within the conservative camp, there is strong cautionary sentiment, demanding that the government move beyond symbolic participation and deliver tangible diplomatic and economic outcomes without delay. Maeil Business Newspaper, citing a PPP spokesperson, urged results over symbolism, particularly on North Korea and China.¹¹

NATO Summit: Division and Debate

Debate over whether Lee Jae-myung should attend the upcoming NATO Summit has revealed a clear division in opinion, both within political circles and across media outlets. On one side, conservative media and foreign policy hawks argue that he should attend the summit as a follow-up to the G7, framing it as a symbolic step toward reviving presidential diplomacy.¹² High-level diplomatic engagement had been effectively stalled for six months following the December 3 martial law crisis. Attendance, they argue, would reinforce South Korea’s commitment to the liberal international order. Skipping the summit, in their view, could send the wrong signal and raise doubts among democratic partners about the direction of Lee’s foreign policy.¹³

On the other side, a more cautious camp including some progressive voices argues that South Korea should refrain from attending, citing the potential need to rebalance relations with China and Russia. Attending NATO, a military alliance often seen as adversarial by Beijing and Moscow, could complicate Seoul’s efforts to keep diplomatic channels open with those powers. Lee’s schedule has already been packed, and back-to-back overseas trips within two weeks of each other pose a significant logistical and political burden, especially for a newly inaugurated administration facing mounting domestic challenges.

Lee ultimately did not attend the NATO Summit in The Hague. On the 22nd, National Security Office Director Wi Seong-rak announced in a written briefing, “Despite the many pressing state affairs following the president’s inauguration, the government had been actively considering the president’s attendance at the upcoming NATO summit.” He continued, “However, after comprehensively considering various domestic issues and the uncertainties arising from the situation in the Middle East, it has been decided that the president will not attend in person this time.”

Response was deeply divided. Progressive and centrist outlets framed the decision as a sensible, national-interest-first choice. Hankyoreh, via Moon Jung-in’s op-ed, called it a “highly rational decision based on common sense.”¹⁴ He continued to argue that the benefits of attending are minimal compared to the diplomatic and economic risks, especially under pressure to increase defense spending, and that sending a senior delegate instead was a pragmatic, sufficient diplomatic response. In a similar vein, progressive OhmyNews also defended it, highlighting that Japan and Australia similarly opted out.¹⁵ The op-ed argued that it was highly likely that this summit would be staged as a moment for NATO leaders in Europe to join Trump in celebrating their agreement to increase defense spending. If Trump is dissatisfied with the outcome, he could abruptly leave the summit early, just as he did at the recent G7 meeting. Understanding that this NATO summit may become a spectacle aimed at appeasing Trump over defense contributions, the article argued, it becomes clear why the leaders of Japan and Australia were hesitant to attend, and why it was a good idea for South Korea not to attend.

In contrast, conservative media and opposition figures issued harsh criticism. South Korean conservative lawmakers such as Na Kyung-won and Ahn Cheol-soo labeled it an “disastrous diplomatic blunder” that risked weakening alliances, and the international community may come to see South Korea not as “a strategic partner,” but as “a country on diplomatic probation.”¹⁶ Editorials in Chosun, JoongAng, and DongA raised alarm about potential economic fallout and strategic distrust from allies. Chosun Ilbo, in an editorial, expressed concern that “Not attending the NATO summit could harm the national interest.” The editorial stated, “It is true that international uncertainty has greatly increased as the US has mobilized B-2 strategic bombers to strike Iranian nuclear facilities, and Iran has hinted at retaliation against US bases in the Middle East. For Korea, which relies on the Middle East for 72% of its crude oil imports, it is difficult to simply side with the US.” The piece continued, “The Trump administration reportedly plans to demand at the NATO meeting that allies increase their defense spending to 5% of GDP. Since Korea’s defense budget this year is about 2.3% of GDP, Lee may have felt burdened by this,” it concluded, “Avoiding the NATO meeting will not make these problems disappear.”

In the meantime, JoongAng Ilbo’s editorial emphasized that the current crisis could deliver “a shock to the entire Korean economy,” highlighting the threat of surging oil prices and inflation if Middle East oil supplies are disrupted. It also warned of potential negative security impacts on the Korean Peninsula, such as North Korea’s nuclear advancements and the possible redeployment of US troops. It concluded that Lee’s absence from the NATO summit was regrettable, as it was “an opportunity to explore international cooperation to resolve the uncertainties threatening our security and economy.”¹⁷

US Troop Redeployment Rumors: Shockwaves and Strategic Debate in Seoul

On May 22, The Wall Street Journal reported that the Trump administration was considering redeploying approximately 4,500 US troops, a full brigade, from South Korea to other Indo-Pacific locations such as Guam. The Pentagon quickly denied the story, with both US and South Korean defense officials insisting there had been no discussions about withdrawal. Yet, the report immediately raised alarms across South Korean media, fueling questions about Washington’s intentions and the future of the alliance.

The presence of US Forces Korea (USFK) has traditionally served as a deterrent against North Korean provocations. The Trump administration, however, reportedly views troop redeployment not as a retreat but as a means to increase “strategic flexibility”—the ability to respond rapidly to crises elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific, such as Guam or Okinawa, without sacrificing readiness. In other words, South Korea is increasingly viewed as a counterweight to China’s growing assertiveness, especially in the South China Sea and around Taiwan.

Despite official denials, the mere suggestion of withdrawal generated front-page headlines and emergency commentary in every major Korean newspaper. Notably, Korean media did not fundamentally question the US strategic logic: in the event of a US-China conflict (for example, over a possible Chinese invasion of Taiwan in 2026–27), the only US ground combat presence in the region would otherwise be the lightly armed Marines in Okinawa. Redeploying the Stryker Brigade—the only US heavy combat unit in East Asia—to Guam or Okinawa thus had some rationale as a contingency measure. Korean media, instead, pivoted to the critical question: How should South Korea adapt to this emerging reality?

Many warn that this could undermine regional security commitments.¹⁸ Specifically, media and expert reactions fell along familiar ideological lines. Conservative outlets such as Munhwa Ilbo warned of a “perfect storm” if a future, alliance-skeptical South Korean administration dovetailed with Trump’s own doubts about alliances. It then recommended that Seoul may need to accommodate US strategic flexibility through burden-sharing, financial or operational contributions.¹⁹

Yet, there are skeptical voices of timing and purpose. Both conservative Chosun and progressive Hankyoreh set aside doubts about the US strategic rationale itself, instead scrutinizing the motives and potential uses of the troop withdrawal narrative. One op-ed from conservative Chosun Ilbo expressed suspicion about the motives behind the leak, suggesting that Trump might be using the threat of troop withdrawal as a diplomatic bargaining chip, particularly in negotiations with North Korea or as part of wider alliance renegotiations.²⁰ Progressives like Hankyoreh went further, interpreting the report as a strategic move by Washington to extract concessions from Seoul on trade or defense cost sharing, rather than an actual policy shift.²¹ Across the spectrum, skepticism focused less on the military logic and more on the political utility of the withdrawal narrative, warning that Washington could use it for economic or diplomatic leverage. Both sides called for transparency, strategic patience, and a carefully calibrated response from Seoul.

US Demands a Strategic Choice from South Korea

The controversy over troop redeployment came as Washington was already demanding greater strategic alignment from its allies. On May 15, General Xavier Brunson, commander of USFK, publicly reaffirmed the necessity of US ground troops in Korea¾not just to deter North Korea but also as part of the wider Indo-Pacific strategy to counter threats from both China and Russia. He described South Korea as a “fixed aircraft carrier” between Japan and the Chinese mainland.²² He added, “USFK is not focused solely on deterring North Korea. As a small part of the broader Indo-Pacific strategy, we are also focused on regional operations, activities, and investments,” emphasizing the continued necessity of stationing US ground forces in South Korea to counter threats from China and Russia.²³

This message was amplified at the May 31 Asia Security Summit (Shangri-La Dialogue) in Singapore, where US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth remarked, “We know that many countries are tempted by the idea of seeking both economic cooperation with China and defense cooperation with the United States. […] But beware the leverage that the CCP seeks with that entanglement.  Economic dependence on China only deepens their malign influence and complicates our defense decision space during times of tension.”²⁴ This was essentially a warning against South Korea’s long-standing strategy of “security with the US, economy with China” (안미경중), signaling that the Trump administration will no longer tolerate this two-track approach and demanding a clear choice. Japanese Defense Minister Gen Nakatani, also at the event, proposed the OCEAN concept (One Cooperative Effort Among Nations), a vision in which all nations in the Indo-Pacific that share common values enhance cooperation as a single bloc. This reflects Japan’s intention to move beyond the traditional ROK-US-Japan framework of deterring North Korea, further aligning itself with US efforts to contain China. Hegseth also defined the US’s geopolitical identity as that of an “Indo-Pacific nation.” By doing this, the US made clear its intention to concentrate its efforts on this region.²⁵

During an interview with Time magazine, Lee Jae-myung, then the Democratic Party’s presidential candidate, was asked whether South Korea would intervene if China invaded Taiwan. He responded jokingly: “I’ll think about it when aliens invaded Earth.”²⁶ The opposition PPP immediately condemned his remark, asserting that national security is no laughing matter and that such comments could undermine confidence and trust among South Korea’s allies and the international community.²⁷ Conservative media outlets swiftly amplified these criticisms, accusing Lee and other progressive leaders of trivializing or ignoring the very real and growing Chinese military threat to Taiwan, and by extension, to the wider region including South Korea. Chosun Ilbo, for example, ran editorials arguing that South Korean political leaders cannot afford complacency or ambiguity in matters of national security, especially given rising regional tensions.²⁸

On the other hand, progressives take a more nuanced position on this issue. A Hankyoreh editorial recently posed three central questions for South Korea: (1) What are the implications of a Taiwan crisis for Korean national interests? (2) How can Korea minimize the risk of entanglement? (3) How should Seoul respond to potential US requests for military support? The article criticizes alarmist arguments suggesting that the fall of Taiwan would collapse the US position in East Asia and inevitably draw Korea into conflict. Instead, it advocates for strategic restraint and flexibility, emphasizing that North Korean deterrence should remain Seoul’s top priority.²⁹ In the event of a Taiwan contingency, the editorial calls for Korea to limit its involvement to non-combat roles such as logistics and diplomacy and to avoid the use of Korean bases (e.g., Osan or Gunsan) for operations related to Taiwan unless these activities are relocated outside the peninsula, such as to Okinawa.

This position directly challenges the increasingly prevalent US and Japanese narrative that “Taiwan’s fate is Korea’s fate,” revealing a deep skepticism among South Koreans toward being subsumed into what they tend to regard as Japan’s regional security agenda. Supporting this view, another progressive outlet, Kyunghyang, stresses in its editorial that any overseas deployment of US Forces Korea (USFK) requires the explicit consent of the Korean government and National Assembly. This op-ed strongly rejects the conservative media’s “fate-driven” approach—arguing that following US decisions unconditionally, regardless of risks to Korean citizens, is both irresponsible and dangerous. Instead, the editorial urges policymakers to build a “logical firewall” to prevent the China-Taiwan dispute from spilling over onto the Korean Peninsula. In an era marked by growing uncertainty and the unpredictability of US foreign policy, this op-ed concludes that South Korea’s diplomacy and security policy must always place the safety of its own citizens above all else.³⁰

South Korea–US Tariff Negotiations: Challenges and Strategic Responses

South Korea now finds itself in a tightening vice of US trade pressure. Seoul faces a standard 10% tariff applied to most US trading partners, but additional, sector-specific levies—25% on automobiles and auto parts, and a punishing 50% on steel and aluminum—have become routine hazards. On top of this, a 25% reciprocal tariff (10% standard plus a 15% country-specific hike) aimed at South Korea was temporarily suspended, but only until July 8. The clock is ticking, with only the differential 15% postponed for now. Since April, the Trump administration has been locked in tough trade negotiations with South Korea. These included working-level talks with the interim government ahead of Lee Jae-myung’s inauguration, and a high-stakes ministerial “2+2” in late April, where the contours of a so-called “July Package” were hammered out. The outline was simple: South Korea wants tariff relief, while Washington demands a reduced Korean trade surplus, lower non-tariff barriers, and broader industrial cooperation in fields like shipbuilding.³¹
The latest bilateral round took place in Washington from May 20–22. With the Lee administration just installed after the June 3 election, Seoul’s new leadership is only now moving to organize its strategy and build a negotiating team. While technical talks can limp along, meaningful high-level negotiations require ministerial appointments and National Assembly vetting—a process that inevitably buys Washington leverage through the pressure of looming deadlines. Given this, the prudent option for Seoul is to push for another extension of the reciprocal tariff suspension. If Washington refuses to extend the suspension, Lee’s government will be negotiating with a gun to its head, with higher tariffs hammering Korean exports in real time.

Table 1. Schedule of ROK-US Tariff Negotiations
The pressure ramped up further after June 4, when Trump doubled tariffs on steel and aluminum from 25% to 50%. The move landed like a bombshell in Seoul, especially as it coincided with Japan’s Nippon Steel being green-lit to acquire US Steel. Across the political spectrum, there are warming signs from the Korean press and academia. For example, one centrist outlet Yonhap reports that the US–Japan “steel alliance” can now produce domestically and upgrade its products with Japanese technology, while Korean exporters are squeezed between tariffs and a new competitive disadvantage.³²
On June 6, Lee and Trump held a phone call and agreed to work toward an early “win-win agreement” on the tariff issue.³³ According to the South Korean government, the two leaders agreed to make efforts to quickly reach a mutually satisfactory agreement on tariffs and to encourage tangible progress at the working-level negotiations.

Korean conservatives, in both politics and media, are laser-focused on Korea’s remaining points of leverage: shipbuilding, nuclear energy, and what is left of its advanced steel sector. The conservative outlets such as JoongAng-Ilbo and Chosun-Ilbo are urgently calling for “total mobilization,”³⁴ emergency envoys, and a hard-nosed diplomatic campaign to win at least a temporary reprieve.³⁵ Yet, there is a sense of anxiety that South Korea is “running out of time.” The steel industry’s hard lesson is that Korea’s supposed “bargaining chips” can evaporate overnight if the US finds a workaround.³⁶ The recent US embrace of nuclear deregulation is another example—Korean nuclear tech may soon face stiffer competition as Washington accelerates its own sector and draws in other partners.³⁷ One conservative op-ed further argues for a more creative approach: bundling Korea’s strengths in semiconductors, biotech, and AI into a single, irresistible package for Washington.³⁸ But there’s a sense of playing defense, not offense.

On the other hand, progressive and academic experts stress the need for a long-term, integrated approach. One op-ed from Hankyoreh, for instance, argues that South Korea’s most effective response to Trump’s tariff is not to adopt defensive or restrictive measures. Instead, it is to adopt a pragmatic and systematic approach by increasing US imports while aligning more closely with the US to counter China’s indirect exports.³⁹ Moreover, Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) suggested that South Korea could strategically leverage the US regulatory easing measures to its own advantage.⁴⁰

There is one area of consensus: across the political and media spectrum, there is universal recognition that a failure to extend the tariff suspension or reach agreement would deal a serious blow to Korean industry. Both sides call for pragmatic, interest-driven diplomacy, but conservatives want shock therapy and urgent action, while progressives prefer careful, systemic adjustment. A recent report from Korean Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) echoes this consensus and further argues that any sign that the US fails to honor its commitments or pushes South Korea into unilateral concessions will inevitably force Seoul to hedge by leveraging its relationship with China.⁴¹ In this context, it becomes even more important for the new administration to demonstrate South Korea’s independent diplomatic capabilities.

Conclusion

This report examined South Korea’s response to intensifying US trade protectionism, high-stakes tariff negotiations, and new alliance challenges under Lee Jae-myung. Lee’s administration faces mounting pressure from Washington on tariffs and security, growing uncertainty over USFK troop levels, and sharp debate at home about how to balance alliances with pragmatic national interests. While early steps have focused on diplomatic pragmatism and improved ties with Japan, time is short for Seoul to secure concrete gains. The coming months will be critical as South Korea seeks to protect its economy, reassure allies, and assert its position in a rapidly changing regional order.