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With Trump cutting trade deals, Xi Jinping seeking to rally states behind his notion of globalization, the EU and NATO steeling themselves to support Ukraine more fully, and the Middle East no longer a promising venue, Russia appeared to be left on the margins of international politics. Yet, its publications on Eurasia continued to exude optimism. The afterglow of the October 2024 BRICS summit in Kazan obscured the dim lights of the June 2025 Brazil BRICS summit, which Putin and Xi skipped. China’s continued efforts to draw the “Global South” together raised hopes, even if its focus is recognized as the BRI rather than some joint framework with Russia and “South-South” relations more than Eurasia. Expectations of Sino-US contradictions worsening overshadowed wariness of China’s interest in cutting a deal with Trump, and talk of China not being ready to challenge the US global dominance. Sino-US trade talks were not reassuring, even if long-term forces were deemed favorable for Russia. No such positivity could be found in coverage of the Philippines, cozying up militarily to Japan as well as the United States. Commentary on Japan’s “militarization” seemed worrisome, but it was qualified by mention of popular dissatisfaction with US pressure and calls for standing firm on Japan’s own national interests. Some optimism had followed Lee Jae-myung’s election in South Korea and the argument that Trump’s tariffs were now the focus of discontent, as well as Lee’s expressed interest in building relations with Russia oriented to his country’s national interests, even if skepticism prevailed toward his “pragmatic multilateralism.” Since geopolitical turbulence and the linkage to the US will be big influences, there is no point in expecting serious changes in foreign policy, but there may be possible nuances, readers were told. As for Seoul’s ties to Tokyo and Washington, mention is made of a “perfect storm” in the second half of 2024, as Biden, Kishida, and Yoon all were eclipsed. If in mid-2025 this trilateralism somewhat recovered, as Lee softened his earlier rhetoric on the US and Japan and called Ishiba before Xi Jinping—at odds with the order of prior progressive presidents—it was assumed that Lee could not ignore his base or his past views. Reassurance was found in Lee’s reluctance to get involved in the Ukraine crisis, Lee’s mix of advisors, and Trump’s disinterest in Japan-South Korea relations. Another perspective found Seoul gradually relaxing sanctions on Russia and striving to resume dialogue, while some forces in Japan aim to gradually reestablish relations with Russia. Meanwhile, the dangerous military-political triangle forged by the US with Japan and South Korea has forced Russia, the DPRK, and China to answer with a different structure, so far only two de facto alliances with no full alliance between Russia and China, but a de facto one, suggesting the formation of two blocs.
Nervousness about Central Asia, Eurasian integration through Mongolia, and Eurasian identity apart from China seeps through Russian publications. One author warns that Russian policy should be conducted in a manner that makes China understand it must consider the priority of Russian interests in Central Asia. He points to the transport routes, infrastructure, massive money, and a new special organization headquartered in Xi’an, uniting China and these five states. He adds that Russia needs to fight with the West for Central Asian countries, since it is also active there. If it falls back to its policy of the 1990s, assuming these countries are going nowhere, it will be left behind, signaling out the West and Turkey as challenges while only hinting at China’s impact. Of concern, too, is the fact that young people are almost cut off from the Soviet heritage. Another theme is the dawdling progress on the economic corridor connecting China, Mongolia, and Russia, a critical link between the BRI and the EEU in Eurasian architecture. Mitigating factors include fear in Mongolia and Russia of China’s strategic intentions, the need to improve the investment climate, and cultural and legal differences. Slowly developing projects miss the initially established goals. Problems include political instability, long construction times for infrastructure, trade imbalances, and differences in tariffs and standards, despite close diplomatic ties. Initiatives advance mainly at the bilateral level, leaving trilateralism underdeveloped despite the urgency at a time of growing global geopolitical risks to accelerated Eurasian infrastructural ties. The corridor is deemed critical not only for the economic development of the region, but also for firm cooperation in Northeast Asia and Eurasia as a whole. Administrative barriers remain for customs control, investment cooperation, and infrastructure development, as operational issues remain at the borders. There is no inter-government commission with headquarters in Ulan Bator, including representatives of border regions and skirting the center-periphery model. Contemporary geopolitical challenges underscore the strategic necessity of cross-border infrastructure involving transport and energy. For Russia, it is vital to develop infrastructure for its energy sector and regional development.
Separately, the lack of a Eurasian identity is bemoaned for the EEU. Missing is a sense of shared history and values. Without a common identity, economic integration is in jeopardy, readers are told. The younger generation tends to support more progressive social forces, dealing with social and environmental issues. Studies show that the basis of Eurasian values is collectivism, traditionalism, and statism. One study called for a synthesis, combining socialist ideology and traditional morals of the peoples of Eurasia. Respondents had difficulty pointing to shared symbols in the EEU, despite Russian serving as a lingua franca and the actual common history. Respondents had little to say on the symbols of other countries in the EEU. No mention is made of China’s identity as part of Eurasia.
BRICS and the “Global South”
In Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn, No. 6, Oleg Karpovich and Natal’ya Strigunova wrote optimistically about the successes in hosting BRICS in 2024 and expanding the organization. The fact that countless sanctions had been imposed on Russia, mainly since 2022, and non-Western states had not only defied them but attended the BRICS summit and agreed to join the group served as proof that the sanctions had actually been beneficial in accelerating the arrival of a new world order, adding a positive impulse and becoming a catalyst for a multipolar world. Through Russia’s chairmanship, BRICS had been transformed, as advances in innovative technology for Russia, China, India, and others in BRICS were becoming the basis of their technological sovereignty as part of the global majority. While the 2025 BRICS summit drew less interest, hopes raised in October 2024 continued to fuel grandiose expectations.
In RSMD on June 23, Ilya Vinogradov wrote that the “Global South” is coming together, reporting on the May 27 first summit of ASEAN, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and China, held in Malaysia. In conditions of rising global and regional instability and protectionism, the “Global South” is seeking a new, geo-economic model, serving the reality of multipolarity. This three-way summit served that end, readers are told. The introduction of US unilateral sanctions is accelerating the transition to a new order, especially alarming ASEAN countries. They traditionally adhered to a balance between the US and China. One can assume that now they will deepen ties with countries of the Persian Gulf and China, leading to a change in the geopolitical balance. In this, Malaysia has a leading role. In the context of the Palestine-Israel conflict, a key role will be played by their agreement with the position of China on peace and security in the Near East, consistent with Xi Jinping’s 2022 Initiative on Global Security, fundamentally at odds with the security architecture created by the US of alliances and partnerships at the expense of other countries. Only Singapore in ASEAN has a different view of Israel, but it is calling for the observance of international humanitarian law. Thanks to the BRI, China helps the countries of ASEAN with infrastructure, and it is a world leader in green technology and other technologies critical to the Persian Gulf states, moving away from dependence on oil and gas as their source of income. China positions itself as the informal leader of the “Global South,” and it offers a partnership outside of the framework of the West. The April 2025 Central Conference testifies to China’s priority on the “Asian periphery,” where Xi affirmed “Asian values,” peace, cooperation, openness, and inclusivity. The BRI will continue to be the main platform for cooperation. South-South ties show the way to a transition from regionalism and fragmentation of the world economy to open, inclusive, interregional partnerships.
Sino-US Relations
In MEiMO, No. 6, M.A. Potapov analyzed Sino-US economic relations as contradictions between the two countries are now exacerbated. It is said that China is able to withstand reduced exports due to US limits because of increased domestic demand, and Chinese goods also enter the US market through third countries. However, China depends on US technology. Today, China does not practice mercantilism. It has an open foreign economic policy. So far, China and the US are holding back from radical measures. The trade war is an instrument for constraining China’s technological development. No matter the administration, it adheres to the containment of China. As the US share in China’s trade keeps falling (now 11% with just 6% of imports), China is in a stronger position. US support for Taiwan is another instrument of US pressure on China in bilateral economic relations. Trade contradictions exacerbate the competition in the East Asian market, where China seeks an integrated region exclusive of the United States. Economic interdependence does not guarantee the absence of a sharp conflict between China and the US. China is not ready to challenge the global dominance of the US due to its military-technical potential. China will make concessions on reducing the trade deficit and liberalizing its financial markets as long as it gets advanced US technology. Yet contradictions will inevitably worsen in the future.
In Izvestiya on June 30, Ekaterina Zakliaz’minskaya wrote about the EU and China drawing closer against the background of US trade wars, noting Wang Yi’s ongoing visit to Europe. On June 26, European leaders met without reaching an agreement on trade talks with the US despite Trump’s July 9 deadline to raise tariffs to 50%, with no intention to allow time for discussions. Wang’s visit will be devoted to resolving trade questions despite the official program. The EU attaches special significance to the PRC in the context of the trade war. Trade between the two is $786 billion, greater than $688 billion with the US. Next to ASEAN states, the EU is China’s largest market, and China attaches to it a mission to reanimate its exports during the trade war. Brussels faces a complicated task: to maneuver between the need to cooperate with Beijing, given heavy dependence on it, and an inclination not to damage ties to Washington. China aims to use the situation to keep states on a course of globalization. The Ukraine crisis is also a focus. The injury of a Chinese journalist in Kursk underscores China’s interest in speedily resolving the conflict. Yet, this will be secondary.
Southeast Asia
Oleg Paramonov in Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn’ wrote about the Philippines caught in “networks” of regional military exercises. A two-week, multilateral military exercise in late April and early May in the northern Philippines was the largest Balikistan exercise in history. Vance explained that the increased funding in Europe by NATO allies allowed for the sums needed in East Asia for contingencies in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. Of the 140,000 troops participating in the maneuvers, only 150 were Japanese, a reflection of a delay in ratification in the Diet for authorization on its way. Soon, Japan will contribute much more in defiance of constitutional restrictions. Cooperation between Japan and the Philippines in security is no longer limited, boosted by Ishiba’s visit at the end of April. The Philippines is turning into the logistical hub of the Washington-Tokyo-Manila strategic triangle. Ishiba said that Japan and the Philippines are almost allies. It will be difficult for a future leader in Manila to separate the country from this quasi-alliance, strategic triangle.
Japan
In Nezavisimaya Gazeta on June 26, Nadezhda Mednikova explained that Tokyo does not want to boost defense expenses under pressure from the United States, postponing the annual 2+2 meeting just two weeks before its planned occurrence, perhaps due to dissatisfaction with Trump’s pressure, demanding that 3% of GDP be spent. This posed a problem for the Japanese public, especially just before the July 20 Upper House elections. After the NATO summit, that figure may actually be 5%. Clearly, under US influence and in the face of the increased military potential of China and the DPRK, national defense policy in Japan has undergone significant change in recent years despite constitutional limits. Although the militarization of Japan is advancing at full speed, Elbridge Colby complained that its expenses for security are increasing extremely slowly, drawing a rebuke from Ishiba at the Diet. He can hardly ignore challenges at home, including rising dissatisfaction over price increases. Valery Kistanov explained that the postponement is due to Trump’s pressure on military expenses and also the absence of a tariff agreement and taxes on automobiles, steel, and aluminum, striking a severe blow to the Japanese economy and well-being. The call to insist on Japan’s own interests is spreading, as government money is scarce, given the high indebtedness, and people are complaining.
South Korea
On June 10, Oleg Paramonov in Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn’ focused on South Korea, whose new leader is facing old challenges. In the June 3 election, Lee Jae-myung won. In the tradition of Confucian etiquette, China sent a congratulatory telegram, indicating a desire to work together, while Ishiba called for the earliest possible bilateral summit. The conservatives and progressives have sparred on foreign policy, e.g., toward Japan. Instead of the Japan issue and trilateralism with the US and Japan, the focus now is on Trump’s tariff policy and the new strategic position of North Korea, capable of challenging Washington, too. No matter the South Korean president, significant progress on these issues seems unlikely. At first glance, voters’ attention centered on the worsening economic situation in a period of internal political turbulence, but it is the US that has become the main source of bad news with its tariffs, leading to sell-offs in stocks. In his telephone call with Trump, Lee stressed the importance of China as the main trade partner and showed his unwillingness to “take sides” on the Taiwan Strait question. Affirming the US alliance in the face of the nuclear threat from North Korea, Lee also said he would open channels of communication with the North and establish peace on the peninsula through dialogue and cooperation, despite the DPRK avoiding talks since 2019. Lee intends to strengthen cooperation with Japan, reversing his earlier position. Earlier, Lee declared he would build relations with Russia oriented to his country’s national interests, which may mean he will keep his eye on what Trump does. Lee also spoke of planning to assist the “reconstruction” of Ukraine. What will result from “pragmatic multilateralism” is still difficult to say. Since the contemporary geopolitical turbulence and the linkage to the US will be big influences, there is no point in expecting serious changes in foreign policy, but there may be possible nuances.
On June 25, Oleg Paramonov in Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn’ wrote of Lee Jae-myung’s “Japanese somersault,” asking if it is a strategy or a tactic. Pointing to the June 22 meeting of Lee and Ishiba, marking the sixtieth anniversary of normalization, which produced a lingering “headache” for Washington over the agreement to resolve all issues tied to Japan’s occupation, Paramonov argues that the 2022 warming of relations caused one of the main “sensations” on the regional agenda of the decade. In spite of the realization of the strategic triangle, an idea existing already during the Cold War, a perfect storm ensued in the second half of 2024. In July, Biden turned into a “lame duck,” in August, Kishida declared that he would leave office early, and at the end of the year, Yoon was stripped of his power, bringing about the start of political convulsions. However, the situation somehow improved in 2025. At the June celebration, Ishiba was joined by Kishida and Suga, the latter as chair of the parliamentary union with South Korea. At mid-month, the two leaders met at the G7 summit in Canada. Adding intrigue was Lee’s longstanding opposition to moderation with Japan and support for better relations with China and dialogue with the North. His softening rhetoric toward the US and Japan should come as no surprise, given his record of political flexibility and populism. He is now positioned as a centrist, preferring “pragmatic diplomacy” in place of Yoon’s “diplomacy based on values.” The order of phone calls for Lee sent an important signal, first with Trump and then with Ishiba, breaking from his party’s traditional order of calling China’s leader second. In the personal meeting with Ishiba, Lee stressed that bilateral cooperation would have decisive importance for South Korea’s national interests in today’s complex global and regional situation, while the two leaders reaffirmed the consensus reached at the trilateral meeting. In 2023, Lee had called that summit a serious mistake. Lee has a parliamentary majority and, in power, is freer to act. The Japanese recognize that the problem of the “historical past” remains one of the main narratives of South Korean progressives, the core of Lee’s political support, but they also see external and internal conditions pushing Lee to continue bilateral cooperation, especially the uncertain ties with Trump and the military-political and economic cooperation of Russia and the DPRK. Trump’s demands could put a serious burden on a weakening economy. One official explained that Seoul wants to resolve historical problems but not to risk today’s and future ones. Lee wants to separate them onto a different track, but unlike Yoon, he cannot simply ignore his own past. Shuttle diplomacy has resumed. Lee has expressed doubt about getting entangled in questions of European security, unlike Yoon, especially the crisis around Ukraine. Still, Europe is a growing market for South Korea’s military industry, cooperation with NATO is the window for US allies to get involved in the Ukraine crisis, and Seoul intends to fully supply the support to which it earlier agreed. Lee and then Ishiba decided not to go to the NATO summit, pointing to the risks associated with the Near East crisis, but the real reason is that there would not have been a chance to use the summit for meetings with Trump. In one view, Lee may revert to his party’s focus on North Korean talks and cooperation with China. His two key advisors represent opposing positions on foreign policy. As for Japan-South Korea relations, Trump is not interested, and Seoul knows it. Three-way military exercises may have proceeded through inertia. Time will tell.
On July 3 in Komsomol’skaya Pravda, Kirill Babaev gave his views on two blocs taking shape in the East. His institute, the Institute of China and Contemporary Asia and formerly the Institute of the Far East, has widened its coverage beyond China, Korea, and Japan to the countries of ASEAN, Central and South Asia, and the Caucasus, making it the main state think tank on the study of contemporary Asia. Asked if China’s activism in Central Asia, which his institute is the first to study holistically, poses a problem for Russia, he warns that Russian policy should be conducted in a manner that makes China understand it must consider the priority of Russian interests there. He also points to the transport routes, infrastructure, massive money, and a new special organization headquartered in Xi’an, uniting China and these five states. Russia needs to fight with the West for Central Asian countries, since it is also stretching there. If it falls back to its policy of the 1990s, assuming these countries are going nowhere, it will be left behind. Over 30 years, a generation has changed, and the population has grown, doubling in Uzbekistan. Young people are almost cut off from the Soviet heritage, not speaking Russian as they assume posts in authority and consider the views of others—the growing, unlimited presence of Chinese, and the need to struggle with the West and Turkey. Within five years, China will overtake the US economically, as US pressure forces it to respond with no compromise in sight, despite Trump’s inclination for a big deal. Even as the two try to avoid conflict over the Taiwan Strait, tensions will grow. The US will not give up its world dominance voluntarily.
On Korea, Babaev argued it will be a long time until unification, and there is no awareness of how that could occur. Generations have no conception of how to live with their brothers on the other side. It is beneficial for elites to be divided. The US forges a dangerous military-political triangle with Japan and South Korea, forcing Russia, the DPRK, and China to answer with a different structure—so far, only two de facto alliances with no full alliance between Russia and China, but a de facto one. Two new blocs can form. Some forces in Japan do not want to confront Russia. If it had an independent foreign policy, long ago an agreement would have been reached. Our institute keeps in contact with Japanese experts and diplomats, seeing that Japan would like to gradually reestablish relations. South Koreans are already gradually removing sanctions. While Trump is preoccupied with Iran, Seoul is trying to resume dialogue with Russia. Trump’s tariffs antagonize everybody, but he is not eternal. His policies are chaotic and quickly changing, but our interests are unchanging.
А.Ю. Фадеева in Evraziiskie Issledovaniia, No. 2, wrote about prospects for the economic corridor connecting China, Mongolia, and Russia in the context of Eurasian integration. Noting that an agreement was reached on it in 2016 and that it is a key initiative of the BRI, she traces the stages in its implementation as well as political, economic, and cultural challenges. This ECMR corridor is strategically important for integration, taking shape in September 2014, when Xi Jinping proposed uniting the SREB, EEU, and Mongolia’s “Steppe Road.” In June 2015, the three states signed an agreement viewed as the launch of the project within the BRI, strategically special among six corridors mentioned, linking East Asia and Europe and forging a secure, transformative Eurasian economic space able to integrate national economies into one system. This could be a critical link between the BRI and the EEU in Eurasian architecture, benefiting China’s northern provinces and Siberia and the Russian Far East and extending to Europe through Moscow. Three routes were planned: the eastern one from Beijing through Ulan Bator to Ulan Ude; the central one from Beijing to Choibalsan to Chita; and the western one from Dalian, Shenyang, and Harbin to Manzhouli and Zabaikalsk. On November 19, 2021, Xi gave directions for the development of infrastructure, harmonious standards and rules, and friendly relations. Much was written in China and Russia on this corridor. However, mitigating factors existed, including fear in Mongolia and Russia of China’s strategic intentions, the need to improve the investment climate, and cultural and legal differences. Studies of concrete action on projects point to insufficiencies, slowly developing projects that are missing the initially established goals. Problems include political instability, long construction times for infrastructure, trade imbalances, and differences in tariffs and standards, despite close diplomatic ties. Initiatives advance mainly at the bilateral level, leaving trilateralism underdeveloped despite the urgency at a time of growing global geopolitical risks to accelerated Eurasian infrastructural ties. The corridor is deemed critical not only for the economic development of the region, but also for firm cooperation in Northeast Asia and Eurasia as a whole. Three-way political ties have progressed through six summits since 2014, as bilateral partnerships have tightened in parallel. Yet administrative barriers remain for customs control, investment cooperation, and infrastructure development, as operational issues remain at the borders. There is no inter-government commission with headquarters in Ulan Bator, including representatives of border regions and skirting the center-periphery model. Contemporary geopolitical challenges, as between the US and China and the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, underscore the strategic necessity of cross-border infrastructure involving transport and energy. For Russia, it is vital to develop energy infrastructure for its energy sector and regional development in response to Western sanctions. The speed of trade liberalization remains slow. While China accounts for nearly two-thirds of Mongolian trade, its exports to Mongolia slowed in 2019 compared to prior years. China and Mongolia have not reached a free trade agreement, slowing development. Trade between China and Russia has shown a stable rise since 2014, especially after 2016, but it has encountered political and economic risks tied to international sanctions and the uncertain global economy. Trade between Russia and Mongolia rose from 2017 to 2022, but it remains at a low level, and it was hit by foreign economic factors and the pandemic. Sanctions pose a challenge to financial flows between Russia and China, complicating the use of currencies in Western countries, raising interest costs in yuan and other currencies, and slowing economic integration. The corridor offers a chance to utilize mutual debts, lowering risk. China and Russia, and China and Mongolia, recognize each other’s diplomas. Now there are more than 12,000 Russian students in China and more than 44,000 Chinese students in Russia. Tourism has grown with a tourist alliance, but China still has not removed the requirement of tourist visas for Russians, as it has done for Europeans and individuals from other countries. This is an indicator of how countries proceed in a changing geopolitical environment.
In Evraziiskie Issledovaniia, No. 2, V.V. Antonovskaya and E.A. Kozlova wrote about studies of Central Asia amid global turbulence, noting an upsurge in seminars and research. Noted was the strategic significance of the area for energy security, competition with China to realize projects, and prospects for the development of infrastructure that will strengthen ties between Russia and the countries of Central Asia. Attention focused on three partnerships—with China, with the West, and with Russia—and integration through the EEU. One theme was the expanding study of China and the Chinese language in Uzbekistan. Unlike the Western educational model, the accent is on technical and IT education. On US policy, there was talk of serious mistakes, ending USAID, and deporting Central Asians.
In Evraziiskie Issledovaniia, No. 2, O.A. Shegirbaev examined factors affecting integration, bemoaning the lack of a Eurasian identity despite progress in freer movement of goods, capital, services, and labor, and appreciation of that. Missing is a sense of shared history and values. Without a common identity, economic integration is in jeopardy, readers are told. The younger generation tends to support more progressive social forces, dealing with social and environmental issues, not the traditional economic priorities of older respondents. Studies show that the basis of Eurasian values is collectivism, traditionalism, and statism. One study called for a synthesis, combining socialist ideology and traditional morals of the peoples of Eurasia. Just 30% of experts found that some sort of Eurasian identity exists. One found that cultural traits are significantly diverging, and another that the formation of a Eurasian identity has only just begun. A shared history needs to be present. Yet, respondents had difficulty pointing to shared symbols in the EEU, despite Russian serving as a lingua franca and the actual common history. Respondents had little to say on the symbols of other countries in the EEU. Thus, the conceptualization of Eurasian identity is still at the stage of formation. Shared memorials from the Soviet era were mentioned.
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