Introduction

Special Forum: Introduction

The China-India-Russia Troika in the Summer of 2025 in the Context of Middle East Turmoil, Trump’s Tariffs, and the Trump-Putin Summit

In August 2025, great power relations stood on the precipice of change unparalleled since the climatic end of the Cold War. Four assertive leaders stood poised to make far-reaching decisions. Presidents Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin met in a high-stakes summit with the potential to rock the global order by reaching a deal after staring at an impasse. Waiting in the wings was Prime Minister Narendra Modi, targeted by Trump for his accommodation of Putin and likely to be either the beneficiary of a Trump-Putin grand bargain or the collateral damage from a failed process. Looming in the shadows was General Secretary Xi Jinping, anticipating China’s turn to take center stage next: hosting a revitalized China-India-Russia triangular meeting at the August 31–September 1 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) gathering with new determination to oppose US unilateralism, or hosting Trump en route to the October 31–November 1 APEC summit in South Korea in pursuit of a grand trade bargain. While most analyses treated Trump as the wild card in this group of leaders, the objective here is to assess ongoing thinking in the other three great powers.

Great power relations have never been in as much flux since the end of the Cold War. While debate persists on which countries qualify as a great power, in a period of maneuvering for advantage in the balance of power in Asia, four stand above the others. The United States remains a superpower, and it has suddenly flexed its might as never before to unilaterally remake the world. China is increasingly recognized as a rising superpower, eyeing a grand bargain with the United States but also intent on forging a Sinocentric sphere in Asia exclusive of the superpower it perceives to be in decline. Russia seeks a parallel arrangement to Yalta, bringing together itself, the United States, and China, while considering India’s presence vital for great power maneuvering in Asia, as the United States did in its Indo-Pacific strategy of 2021–2024. Finally, India has emerged as a vital player in Asian maneuvering with growing expectations of its future impact. In the summer of 2025, relations among these four powers suddenly acquired great immediacy as uncertainty shadows international relations. If some would include the European Union in the great power equation, especially regarding the Russia-Ukraine war, its lack of clear leadership and narrower horizons leave it on the sidelines in recent maneuvering across Asia. In the face of the Trump-Putin summit on August 15, the anniversary of Japan’s surrender eighty years earlier, Europe again appeared marginalized on the global stage.

Bringing matters to a head are Trump’s assault on the world trade system and lurching policies toward the Middle East, Russia’s war in Ukraine, and China’s challenge to US supremacy. These forces took a sharp turn in the summer of 2025 with Trump’s ultimatums for trade deals, the Israel-US attack on Iran over its nuclear weapons program, and Trump’s pressure on Russia through secondary sanctions on India (and China?) over the oil from Russia funding its war economy. In the background was the possibility that Trump’s obsession with deal-making would lead to rapprochement with Putin and/or Xi, causing a tectonic global shift. Viewing this picture through the prism of Russian, Indian, and Chinese thinking, this Special Forum presents a snapshot of how things stood in August 2025 amid a surge in great power tensions.

After the August 15 summit, the spotlight shone on Trump’s interest in dual grand bargains with Putin and Xi Jinping, in effect constructing a three-headed world order. The aura was like seven years earlier when Trump met in Singapore with Kim Jong-un. Trump went to the summit with little preparation, defied strategic thinkers with grandiose hopes for a breakthrough, insisted that the summit was a success despite all evidence to the contrary, enabled the other leader to score a huge victory by escaping international opprobrium and isolation, and laid down a marker that henceforth he would aim for the sky in international deal-making. A few days later, the main European leaders and Ukrainian President Zelenskyi met with Trump in DC to avert a great power deal over their heads. The North Korean gambit failed at Hanoi the following year, but Trump has consolidated power since and may be prepared to offer Putin and Xi much greater rewards than he could promise Kim Jong-un.

The Middle East as a Factor in Great Power Relations

In June, relations among the great powers were tested by the Israeli and American air attacks on Iran, aiming to stop nuclear enrichment seen as leading to nuclear weapons. Given recent Chinese and Russian support for Iran and continued Indian interest in maintaining productive relations with Iran, observers asked how this aerial war would impact great power relations. Would it reinforce US supremacy, as the friends of Iran only remained on the sidelines? Would China, Russia, and India find common cause in resisting US unilateralism? Would India take a softer line toward the United States, causing a new rift in the non-Western great power triangle? Given Russia’s strategic loss earlier in 2025 from the overthrow of the Assad regime in Syria and Israel’s decimation of Hezbollah in Lebanon, would its reputation as a great power suffer the most? Alternatively, given Israel’s sullied image for causing an enormous humanitarian disaster in Gaza, would the United States lose face for abetting this horrific situation? Two of the three articles in this Special Forum concentrate on the responses in Russia and India to developments in the Middle East.

The Middle East stands, along with Southeast Asia, as a prime testing ground for reconfiguring the “Global South.” Russia found its leverage in the latter area inadequate and capitalized on Syria’s and Iran’s pariah status. Expansion of BRICS fueled its optimism about the area, but its position in the Middle East has been severely weakened in 2025. For China too, US complicity in Israel’s unbridled humanitarian assault on Gaza boosted expectations of growing influence in the Middle East. Yet reliance on Iran appeared problematic in June 2025, when that state proved defenseless against Israeli and US airstrikes. Russia and China had hedged their bets somewhat through ties to other states in the Middle East, and their bilateral relationship may not have suffered much from joint marginalization in the 2025 upheavals in the region since it rests on other cooperation.

India was not as much impacted, given its lesser involvement in rallying the region against the United States. Its ties to Russia may have been affected, however, by the latter’s loss of clout in the region and its flailing to find a path forward there, as India distanced itself during the regional war from joint statements regarded as too anti-Israel and anti-West. In just two months, the Trump tariffs and the Trump-Putin summit had eclipsed developments in the Middle East as forces impacting the relationships among the great powers.

Donald Trump exerts US power through bilateral relations without the reservations that limited previous occupants of the White House. He proceeds abruptly, with no established policymaking process. Whereas President Joe Biden concentrated on strengthening US alliances and multilateral partnerships, making the EU, Asian allies, and India his priorities, Trump seems obsessed with direct deals or pressure, focusing one by one on Russia and China, with India’s standing left unclear. For Putin, Trump has been a godsend. For Xi and Modi, there have been some worrisome signs, but past hopes for Trump could flicker again, given his desire for big deals.

Restructuring Asian Architecture

Strategies for restructuring the architecture of Asia or the Indo-Pacific have intensified since the 2010s. China has launched the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) while also agreeing with Russia on various multilateral schemes, starting with an expanded and more fulsome SCO. Russia has also proposed the multilateral Greater Eurasian Partnership (GEP) after forging the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) as its own bailiwick. India has shifted from “Look East” to “Act East,” as it partners with both the entities led by China and Russia and those championed by the United States. Finally, US leadership has ranged from the “pivot to Asia” to the Indo-Pacific Initiative, efforts aimed at forestalling an exclusive Sinocentric regionalism. All these frameworks testify to the furious maneuvering at play to reconstruct Asian geopolitics and geo-economics in a manner favorable to one great power or another at a time of tectonic shifts in the regional framework. Trump’s strategy in 2025 remains a work in progress, but he appears to prioritize Russia and China and to be amenable to spheres of influence if personal objectives are adequately realized.

Shifting US policies draw the closest attention, as Washington strives to maintain its dominant position in global affairs and Trump takes things to another level. Three countries matter most for the emergence of a world order not centered on the West: China, India, and Russia. They engage in trilateral exchanges through multilateral organizations, support “democratization” of the international order, and maneuver among themselves for advantage in great power balancing. Trump has made no secret of his obsession with reconstructing global architecture, including US relations with Russia and India, and lately Russo-Indian relations. General Secretary Xi Jinping pays close attention to Russo-Indian relations, seeking to steer them through joint organizations, notably BRICS and the SCO, and as part of his agenda for the “Global South.” In the summer of 2025, three developments shed light on their endeavors: (1) war and regime collapse in the Middle East, the primary focus here; (2) the BRICS summit in Rio de Janeiro, coming just nine months after the Kazan summit that showcased the China-Russia-India troika anew; and (3) Trump’s early August economic threats against India and Russia and their oil trade, followed by Trump’s about-face at his summit with Putin. Would Moscow and Delhi find common ground in responding to the transformation of the Middle East still under way, as both capitals put great stock on ties to this region? Would their distinctive approaches to the “Global South” and the troika with China do serious damage to their bilateral relationship? Would Trump’s overlapping pressure on their economies and relationship impact their relationship? Finally, would Trump’s clear embrace of Putin and eagerness for a deal with Xi overshadow all other matters and lead to a three-headed global order with spheres of influence with India on the margins?

Richard Weitz, “Middle East Crises Highlight Constrained Russia-China-India Cooperation”

The Middle East has experienced waves of conflict since the Hamas terrorist organization attacked Israel. Russia, China, and India had minimal impact on them. With the end of the fighting, though, they could adopt a more assertive stance to elevate their regional influence or recalibrate relations in response to the reassertion of US power. They arguably have more important relations with other countries than with Iran, but wildcards in the volatile Middle East could transform their policies in the region.

When Israel and then the United States attacked Iran, Russian officials declined to pledge concrete military or economic support, choosing instead to continue the Russian-US dialogue regarding Ukraine and other issues. China’s public stance regarding the war resembled that of Russia, with some rhetorical variations. PRC messaging contrasted alleged Israeli and US belligerence with China’s responsible non-interventionist behavior and commitment to international law. In a phone call with Putin, Xi called for a ceasefire, protection of civilians, a political resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue, and for the Security Council and major powers to play the lead role in ending the conflict. At a previously scheduled meeting of the defense ministers of the SCO, China took no concrete steps to achieve a ceasefire, mediate the conflict, or avert further escalation by threatening economic measures like sanctions. The Indian government’s reaction to the June 2025 war, though characterized by more balanced rhetoric, was also restrained. Only on June 23, following the US air strikes, did Modi call for “immediate de-escalation, dialogue and diplomacy as the way forward and for early restoration of regional peace, security and stability.” Unlike Russia and China, India declined to support the June 14 SCO statement censoring Israel for “aggressive actions [that] constitute an infringement on Iran’s sovereignty, cause damage to regional and international security, and pose serious risks to global peace and stability,” asserting it had not participated in the drafting.

During the past decade, Russian leaders have welcomed how the current Iranian government regularly challenges the West, balances Turkey’s influence in the South Caucasus and Middle East, and displays indifference toward how the Russian government treats its Muslim minorities. Yet, ideological differences, historical animosities, and lack of trust have long impeded deep cooperation, even as ties provide leverage for tactical advantages vis-à-vis third parties. Iran’s value for the Kremlin has fallen due to the end of their joint military campaign in Syria, Iran’s debilitated military and proxy network, and Moscow’s extensive commercial and diplomatic ties with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) governments eager to constrain Iranian military power. The Russian and Israeli governments have sustained a mutually acceptable security arrangement regarding Syria, Ukraine, and other issues. Another constraint on Russian support for Iran was Putin’s desire to cultivate personal relations with Trump in the hopes of improving Russian-US ties, reducing Western sanctions, or at least decreasing US military support for Ukraine. China’s quiescence during the June 2025 conflict was equally striking. Chinese investment and trade with other countries in the Middle East are much greater than with Iran. Analysts, therefore, look beyond commercial considerations and see Beijing’s large purchases of Iranian oil as China’s way of helping sustain the Iranian economy, military, and regime without the risks of rendering more direct support. India’s most important investment in Iran remains the Chabahar Port; however, Western sanctions on Iran, Russia, and the Afghan Taliban, along with other challenges, will likely continue to hobble India’s Chabahar-related projects. China’s regional integration efforts regarding Iran have been a source of Indian-Iranian tensions. India’s commerce with the GCC states is now twenty times greater than the volume of India-Iranian trade. Indian diplomats are wary of the China-Pakistan alignment against India, along with Pakistan’s growing ties with Russia, which remains an important defense partner of India. Looking ahead, India will maintain its strategic autonomy, balancing ties between Russia, China, Iran, and other partners. Due to strong Indian-Israeli ties, the Indian government has declined to follow Russia, China, and Iran in routinely attacking Israeli policies. Indian leaders also anticipate that good relations with Israel help strengthen Indian ties with the United States, which has become a preeminent defense partner.

Middle East developments may motivate Moscow, Beijing, and New Delhi to resuscitate the dormant Russia-India-China (RIC) troika. All three are full members of the BRICS and the SCO, and in July, Deputy Foreign Minister Andrey Rudenko confirmed that he had discussed reviving the format with both the PRC and Indian governments. Lin Jian confirmed the PRC’s openness to the proposal, while Lavrov acknowledged Moscow’s concerns that Western governments were trying to pull India into their containment campaigns against Russia and China. PRC leaders have the same anxieties about keeping India from aligning too closely with the West. New Delhi’s persistent tensions with China and India’s reluctance to align closely with any great power bloc, whether led by Washington or Moscow and Beijing, remain an impediment to the troika’s restoration.

The governments of Russia, China, and India share important interests regarding Iran. At the global level, all four regimes are, to varying degrees, dissatisfied with the prevailing Western-dominated international system. Moscow and Beijing favor a strong Iran to promote a multipolar world and distract US resources from Europe and Asia, areas they consider more important. Russia and China are Iran’s leading foreign economic partners, while India would like to resume purchasing Iranian oil. Yet, the three largely failed to coordinate their responses during the June 2025 war. Russian-Chinese cooperation comprised only joint statements and backing UNSC resolutions calling for an immediate end to the fighting. Meanwhile, the Indian government operated almost entirely independently of Moscow and Beijing during the war, notably standing aside from Sino-Russian efforts in the UN and SCO to support Iran diplomatically. None of the three issued threats to the parties to end the fighting, deter escalation, or avoid post-truce hostilities. Russian, Chinese, and Indian policymakers considered their economic and security ties with some other countries at least as important as their relations with Iran. Neither Moscow nor Beijing aimed to transform the 12-day Israel-Iran war into a proxy confrontation with the United States. Tehran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons would elevate the prospect of another Middle Eastern war that would threaten China’s and India’s energy supplies and decrease their regional trade and investment opportunities. Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons could also lead additional countries to seek them, including Germany, Poland, Turkey, Japan, South Korea, and other potential military adversaries of Russia or China. Additionally, a nuclear-armed Iran would rely less on Russian and Chinese support and therefore become less pliable to their influence. Since the June war, Iranian officials have set aside any irritation at the three governments’ limited support and striven to deepen ties. The Kremlin has been striving to parry accusations, by Iranians and others, that Russia provided insufficient support to Iran and its partners during its conflicts with Israel and the United States. These complaints strain Russian-Iranian relations and decrease Moscow’s military reputation in the Middle East. Looking ahead, some Russians have called for providing Iran with substantial military assistance to bolster bilateral ties, reinforce Russian military commitments, or accelerate its postwar recovery. China could also help Iran rebuild its military power.

Nivedita Kapoor, “India, Russia and the Evolving Dynamics in the Middle East”

The collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, the Israeli decimation of Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Israel air war in Iran coupled with a US assault on facilities for uranium enrichment furthered regional transformation impacting the great powers. India and Russia, both of whom have become more active in the region in the past decade, are navigating these rapid changes while seeking to preserve their interests. On June 14, the “member states” of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) issued a statement strongly condemning the “military strikes carried out by Israel on the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran” the previous day, calling it a violation of international law and the UN Charter. The statement also called for resolution of issues around the Iranian nuclear program through peaceful, diplomatic means, thus expressing support for Tehran, which had become a full member of the SCO in 2023 after almost two decades as an observer. The same day, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs issued a statement distancing itself from the SCO announcement, despite the fact that the latter was issued on behalf of the member states. The Indian statement noted that it had not participated in the discussions of the SCO statement. While both India and Russia are members of BRICS and the SCO, the statements issued by these multilateral organizations are not a call for collective action, even if they reflect some common concerns. As evident in India’s distancing from the SCO statement, members can also choose to dissent from the organizational line, depending on their national policies. As explained below, the respective reactions of New Delhi and Moscow to the recent Iran-Israel conflict have been a function of their evolving policies toward the Middle East, demonstrating their own unique strengths and weaknesses. They also reflect a dearth of solidarity in these organizations and between these two capitals in dealing with the Middle East transformation. India’s statements have focused on maintaining regional peace and stability, emphasizing the friendly relations it has with both sides. The policy of maintaining a balance between a wide variety of actors in the Middle East is a longstanding one. India’s growing security ties with the United States and arms purchases from both the US and Israel are factors to be considered, too.

Russia too follows a multi-vector policy in the Middle East, but unlike India, its relations with Iran have grown closer since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, especially as a result of Tehran supplying thousands of Shahed drones for Moscow’s war effort in 2022–23. Since then, Russian reliance on direct supplies from Iran has declined as the production of these drones has been localized. The two sides signed a strategic partnership agreement in January 2025, and Tehran also concluded a Free Trade Agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union this year. However, in the latest crisis, while expressing support for the Iranian people ¹ and condemning the recent Israeli and US strikes, Moscow has not gone beyond political support. Even for Russia, the advantage accruing from a US embroiled in a Middle East conflict that could take attention away from other hotspots does not necessarily mean an escalation would be to its benefit. Already, the 12-day war highlighted the limited nature of Russian influence in a rapidly evolving military situation in the region. Both India and Russia, while seeking to pursue balanced ties with Middle Eastern actors, are also dealing with their own limitations in power projection while looking at a regional order that is still evolving, especially after October 7. Their disparate reactions to the latest crisis cannot be fully understood without the perspective of the past few years that have seen major developments in the policies of all sides in the Middle East.

Overall, both India and Russia follow a multi-vector policy in building relations with Middle Eastern states, skillfully balancing their varied interests amidst limited influence on major regional issues. While it is the US and China that have mediated cooperative tendencies in the region, both New Delhi and Moscow have used the opportunities offered to strengthen their already existing relations with regional actors, where possible. Yet, there are important differences in how India and Russia approach the region. Moscow has been part of regional diplomatic processes – including the Israel-Palestine conflict and the Iran nuclear deal – and continues to have aspirations to play such a role in the future. It is part of Russian positioning as a vital regional and global actor while highlighting its policies as different from Western actors like the US, whether during its intervention in favor of the Assad government or in its criticism of US support for Israel amidst the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. At the same time, Russia regards the United States as an enemy and seeks opportunities in the Middle East to weaken the US. Thus, its support for Syria and Iran has been widely viewed in this context of fierce great power competition.

India, which is an emerging power, has yet to adopt such a diplomatic or political role in the region and has focused on the economic dimension of its policy in the Middle East. For India, the US remains an important partner to strengthen its engagement with regional actors in the economic domain without building alliance structures. For Russia, in contrast, undermining the US presence in the region remains a goal, if not the central one, in its policy. Given that this posture aligns with that of both Beijing and Tehran in challenging the rules-based order, there has been regular discussion over whether a China-Russia-Iran axis exists. Recent events in the Middle East have given pause to such arguments that have, in the opinion of experts, long been overblown. Even though these three states do have an interest in engaging in efforts to reduce Western influence, it does not always imply a deliberate collective effort in the region. Overall, “trilateral policy coordination” remains “modest,” with the parties focusing on bilateral ties amidst varied national interests and power imbalances.

While the expansion of BRICS is both a sign of a world tending toward multipolarity and of a desire among middle powers to hedge, it has also made decision-making more complicated. India has made it clear that while it is a non-Western power, it is not an anti-Western one. Policy coordination in the SCO has been hindered by its weak institutional structure as well as differences on the Sino-Indian and India-Pakistan fronts, especially in the security domain. Russia has so far failed to position BRICS and the SCO as pillars of a multipolar non-Western world order.

Gilbert Rozman, “The China-Russia-India Troika in 2025: The View from China”

Russia and India are the two biggest challenges apart from the United States to forging a Sinocentric region across most of Asia. Beijing’s approach to these two great powers—one receding from its superpower heritage as the Soviet Union, and the other emerging from its marginality to become the likely third or fourth global power—has been strikingly different. Those differences can be traced through bilateral analysis, while examination of the China-Russia-India triangle promises additional insights. Chinese publications closely explore the triangular dimension as well as the three bilateral legs, notably Russia-India relations.

As the asymmetry between Beijing and Moscow widened, Beijing felt emboldened to set aside its caution in deferring to Moscow, once the priority for strengthening it to balance Washington in the triangle that mattered most. Sufficiently powerful relative to the perceived declining sole superpower and quite reassured that Putin, for the foreseeable future, was irrevocably on a collision course with the US, China under Xi Jinping could defy Russian concerns in intensifying a little-disguised Sinocentric agenda. Xi kept the façade of coordination with Putin as he tested a succession of unilateral moves, to some of which Putin acquiesced.

The 2020 border clash between China and India, the 2021 Biden administration Indo-Pacific framework, the 2022 start of full Russian aggression in Ukraine, and the 2025 “Trump shock wave” (as Chinese call it) all tested the China-Russia-India triangle beyond anything seen in previous decades. From the Chinese perspective, India’s position in the triangle was strengthening as Russia’s was weakening. No immediate, major reconfiguration of the triangle was occurring, but significant changes were underway. The Sino-Russian leg was strengthening, the Sino-Indian leg was still troubled after weakening in 2020–21, and the Indo-Russian leg proved to need careful watching.

This bilateral nexus could not escape the shadow of three far more consequential bilateral relationships: Sino-US ties, Indo-US ties, and Sino-Russian ties—all drawing more attentive scrutiny. Chinese analysis puts the China-India-Russia triangle in historical context, paying close attention to the India-Russia relationship as critical to triangular dynamics. Apart from the triangle, most relevant is coverage of US ties to India, since Sino-US ties and Sino-Russian ties are intensely examined in different frameworks. Modi’s upsurge in Indian nationalism, Biden’s Indo-Pacific strategy, and lately Trump’s “shock wave” figure importantly in the Chinese outlook on the forces impacting the China-India-Russia triangle. The context had appeared strikingly different prior to Modi’s “Act East Policy,” Xi’s BRI, and Putin’s “Turn to the East.”

India poses different challenges than Russia under Vladimir Putin, who has prioritized rebuilding Moscow’s hold over parts of Europe that grasped for support in the West for their full-fledged sovereignty. Under Narendra Modi, India is assessed as having unrelenting ambitions to assert itself as a top-tier power, aspiring to influence across Asia’s southern tier, one area where China intends to carve out a Sinocentric sphere. India is viewed as a much bigger problem than Russia for Sinocentrism.

The collapse of the Soviet Union impacted India as well as the Grand Strategic Triangle. The US-Russian contradiction was now a secondary matter; the Sino-US contradiction was primary, and the Sino-Russian one lost its salience in Chinese thinking. As Indo-Russian ties abruptly attenuated, China had little need to take the triangle with them into account. Its priority was to help Russia revive its power to breathe new life into the China-US-Russia strategic triangle, best facilitated by China’s rapid rise in comprehensive national power. China welcomed sustained Indo-Russian strategic ties as a counter to advancing Indo-US cooperation. The priority in the China-Russia-India troika was to solidify Sino-Russian ties, while Indo-Russian relations gradually weakened as the third leg of this triangle. The state of the China-Russia-India triangle by 2020 gave China an opening to be more aggressive toward India. If Moscow still considered bilateral ties to India quite strong and desired Beijing to pursue closer ties to New Delhi, Beijing had no interest in that. The China-Russia leg was recognized as strong, the Russia-India leg was treated as weakening, and the China-India leg appeared mixed, with room for China to press harder. There was little reason for concern about the Russia-India connection.

During the Cold War, there were three bases of India-USSR relations: security, mainly through arms exports; economics, seen in Soviet support for heavy industry; and the geopolitical impact of US-Pakistan ties and later China too, vs. the Soviet Union. All of these have attenuated. As Russia’s battlefield advances in Ukraine have not gone as expected, India’s trust in Russian weapons has declined, and Russian industry has had trouble satisfying Russia’s needs, impacting exports to India. In geopolitics, the importance of Russia has also fallen, as US-Pakistan ties deteriorated, especially during Trump’s first term. Although India has not followed the Western lead on sanctions and has bolstered energy relations, ties to Russia have been marked by discord and instability. Sino-Indian relations, due to the border question and India’s welcome to the “Indo-Pacific strategy,” have faced obstacles, while Sino-Russian ties have drawn closer. All this impacted India-Russia relations. Worsening Sino-Indian relations impact Indo-Russian ties too, but the Chinese are hesitant to cover this. Modi seeks to be the leader of the third world while joining with Japan and others in the Indo-Pacific for great power status. The Chinese assert as an explanation, adding that at present, Russia still has important strategic value for India.

Arms trade is the centerpiece of the relationship. India’s external geopolitical environment improved after the Cold War, becoming a pivot in great power competition, while Russia’s need for India rose. India was increasingly defining the terms of the relationship. On the Russia-Ukraine clash, there was implicit criticism of Russia. India ignored Russian views of the “Indo-Pacific strategy” as containing China and Russia and as a sign of “Cold War thinking,” which divides the region. The balance in the Russia-India relationship has kept shifting in India’s favor, readers are repeatedly informed. The turnabout in relative power with Russia impacted dependency ties, as did India’s unprecedented position in great power competition. With the US relatively weakened, China in the short run still behind the US, and Russia’s decline, India is sought by all and has less need of Russia. India is in the driver’s seat. The rise in India’s comprehensive national power leads it to assume an unprecedented international position, but it is also caught in an extreme nationalist trap due to its strategic culture. Relations are heading toward alienation, but due to India’s insistence on multilateral autonomy, it needs Russia too. Impacting the balance between Russia and India has been the US’s sharp tilt toward India. Two conflicts in 2025 left India and China further apart: the military tit-for-tat between India and Pakistan after a terrorist attack in India’s Kashmir, and the Israel-US war in Iran, which China and Russia strongly condemned. China’s relationship with India is tested by the fact that India is seen as pursuing leadership of the “Global South” too, and its partnership with Russia is also tested since organizations established to corral parts of the “Global South” are regarded in Moscow as co-launched with it or even with India as a decisive member. Nevertheless, Russian euphoria over BRICS as the driving force for the “Global South” and a new, multilateral world order is not echoed in China’s more Sinocentric thinking about how it will overtake the US in the “Global South.” As a natural member of the “Global South,” China is its top economy and market, seeks shared identity, advances the BRI concept vs. the Indo-Pacific one, and calls for solidarity of existing supply chains with economic growth foremost. India is treated as an obstacle in an arena still lacking cohesion. As changes unseen in the world for 100 years accelerate, the collective significance of the “Global South” keeps growing, Chinese insist. Clearly, India is critical to all efforts to deny China’s plans for this arena.

What had happened in the interval between the 2024 and 2025 BRICS summits? Trump had returned with a vengeance and with haste to overturn the existing international order. In response to the Brazil summit, he declared, “BRICS was set up to hurt us, BRICS was set up to degenerate our dollar and take our dollar, take it off as the standard.” He warned, “Any country aligning themselves with the anti-American policies of BRICS will face those duties with no exceptions. If they’re a member of BRICS, they are going to have to pay a 10% tariff, just for that one thing – and they won’t be a member long.” Trump also threatened secondary sanctions on purchasers of Russian exports. Modi doubled down on his warning at the previous BRICS summit to “be careful to ensure that this organization does not acquire the image of one that is trying to replace global institutions.” The fact that Modi would be welcomed to Brazil with a state visit may have been a reason why Xi Jinping decided to skip the gathering, which would not reinforce Chinese centrality. He had skipped the APEC summit in India the previous fall, too.

After the June “12-day war” between Iran and Israel, with the US entering at the end, the NATO summit, followed by the BRICS summit, tested the temperature of the global order. The absence of Japan and South Korea from the Hague NATO summit set back the Biden strategy of linking the European and Asian theaters, complementing the Indo-Pacific framework. Likewise, the absence of Xi Jinping from the BRICS summit pointed to the lack of solidarity in this grouping. Russia’s marginality, as Iran was under attack, exposed its weakness as a partner to China as well as India. US allies could defer to Trump over Iran without losing geopolitically, but the emptiness of Russia’s claim to be a power in the Middle East damaged its partners, China above all. The China-Russia-India triangle appeared less robust, but so too did US-led multilateralism to counter China and Russia. Chinese recognized that the “Trump shock wave” was having global effects, accelerating global change, with China-US-Russia the eye of the storm. The upshot of recent Chinese analysis of the triangle with Russia and India is, implicitly, that it is in a sweet spot, but it is fragile. Relations between Moscow and New Delhi, such as after the July 2024 Putin-Modi summit, are enduring, with Modi not forsaking strategic autonomy and balancing, but also limited, with no prospect of narrowing the strategic gap between the two. That could put pressure on China, impacting Russia’s agenda. Russia will adhere to its anti-US approach, while India will support and participate in groups Russia leads, while not supporting its anti-West direction. This works nicely for China, one can surmise, given its reasoning that there is no prospect of Sino-Indian geopolitical agreement and no benefit in Russia alienating India to drive it into the US camp.

After the Trump-Putin August 15 summit, a new dynamic was gathering force. It raised Russia’s profile as one of the leading powers while offering China hope that it would be next on Trump’s list to transform the world. As in the run-up to the Alaska summit, Trump could threaten China before switching to deal-making. There would be no conventional strategic planning nor allied consultations for his words and actions. The world would be on edge as Trump followed his own instincts and thirst for grand bargains to suit his fancy to remake the world and the United States with scant regard for the principles that had long driven US policy. The follow-up summit in the White House with Ukraine’s leader and the major European leaders did not change the impression of great power deal-making with little regard for other countries.