Looking Back on The Asan Forum, 2013-25, as Editor and Author

As my career at Princeton University reached its end, I was fortunate to be asked by the Asan Institute to launch The Asan Forum. As the bi-monthly, on-line journal on international relations in the Indo-Pacific took shape, I made three critical decisions consistent with what I had learned over four decades of teaching, writing, and editing collections of articles at Princeton. The journal brought together my approaches to scholarship and served as the capstone of my career.

First, trained largely by historians and immersed in the histories of East Asia, I remained intent on drawing the past into studies of international relations. Stimulated by the September 3 victory day parade in Beijing, I have appended articles on the evolution of Chinese and Russian thinking over the past 40 years regarding the Cold War. Recognizing that the historical dimension in Northeast Asia plays a critical role in national identity, I made this a focus.

Second, I consider myself a Northeast Asianist, viewing countries’ inter-relationships and then comparing their national identities and mutual perceptions. Having majored in Chinese and Russian studies and compared China and Japan in a Ph.D. dissertation, I came to Korean studies through two stints as a visiting professor. In the new journal, these four countries served as the core coverage.

Finally, inviting authors to contribute, I have organized clusters of interrelated articles and added an introduction to ensure the whole was greater than the parts. This practice was renewed in the Special Forum of The Asan Forum. Simultaneously, the Korean Economic Institute of America (KEI) invited me to organize panels at academic conferences and compile volumes, including introductions to each set of panel papers, including my own article. Over 50 years from my days at Princeton to 2025, more than one hundred joint compilations were published. Unlike many edited collections, these were solicited to coordinate themes and contents, summarized or compared in an introduction.

The Asan Forum reflected these three interests. It has incorporated history and national identities steeped in history as a persistent theme. Coverage has concentrated on the entirety of Northeast Asia, including Russia, ranging to other parts of the Indo-Pacific region as well. Bi-monthly country reports on four language sources—Chinese, Japanese, Korean, and Russian—demonstrate this focus.  Collections of articles every two months on a designated theme, drawn together through an introduction, served the third pursuit.

Through roughly fifty cycles, the journal every two months rotated country reports on Japan, China, Russia, and South Korea. Scouring journals and newspapers in these four countries—always in their languages—research assistants found the latest accounts of how key regional issues were being debated. Except for Korean sources, I read the assembled material, reported the gist of key sections, and tried to explain what was new and interesting. For Japan and South Korea, the contrast of conservative and progressive newspaper coverage became the centerpiece of these reports. For China and Russia, no such sharp division emerged, while think tank journals provided the bulk of the source material, still yielding clear insights into divergent thinking and shifting views. In addition to the solicited articles by authors from these countries, these country reports have showcased the priority on capturing viewpoints in Northeast Asia. I did not translate articles; instead, I dug for their deeper significance and reported that in the brief, English-language findings I prepared.

Whereas social science tends to separate comparative studies and international relations into distinct fields, I was interested in ways to link the two. At times, the comparative side took precedence. My first four books were comparative: two studying urban development in premodern China, Japan, and Russia to identify stages of history and shifting relative levels (7 stages) of development; and two on the stages of modernization in Japan and Russia and on the foundation for the modernization of China, in comparison to Japan and Russia. These volumes pointed to the salience of premodern conditions for later development and to commonalities with socialist countries.
Three subsequent interests led to edited books, where I presented a framework for comparative analysis: comparisons of how Confucian traditions became embedded in China, Japan, and Korea over their premodern history and then de-Confucianization began; comparisons of the dismantling of communist systems as the Cold War was winding down; and a comparative approach to national identities in China, Japan, and South Korea, on the basis of which identity gaps could be studied in a follow-up to uncover the roots of bilateral relationships.

In an international relations journal, comparisons are normally not a central focus. Yet, they figured importantly in The Asan Forum, often juxtaposing the thinking in two countries on a shared regional issue.
Parallel coverage of articles in the Special Forums offered a ready opportunity to draw comparisons in the introductions. At times, articles covered strategic thinking in multiple countries, and the introduction expounded on what was similar and different. In other cases, successive Special Forums covered parallel themes or carried the discussion forward from one period to another. Eyeing such linkages, we compiled seven books from articles in the journal. Critical to these was foresight in steering authors to a shared goal.

Simultaneous with my time editing The Asan Forum, I edited panels and follow-up books for KEI’s Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies. The first volume in 2012 on Asia at a Tipping Point focused on leadership transitions, and the final book in 2022 covered the Indo-Pacific in the Shadow of the Ukraine War. After the new journal, Korea Policy, replaced the annual book series, I was again fortunate to contribute introductions to some of the new collections of interrelated articles.

One country’s strategic thinking about another, as tracked through its publications, became an abiding interest of my research. It began in 1974 with an article on the Soviet debate about the origins of the “distorted” worldview of Maoism. This led to an edited book on how Soviet authors perceived Chinese history in successive periods. The 1980s saw books and articles on the Soviet debate about China and its implications for Soviet reform, and on the Chinese debate about Soviet socialism and comparative socialism. Eventually, an article explored the concurrent Chinese debate on the Gorbachev period. A related monograph examined the Japanese debate over Gorbachev. Mutual perceptions became a persistent focus of The Asan Forum.

Two series of books detailed strategic thinking in one state toward others in Northeast Asia. The first set, in the 2000s, looked at four countries and added a combined view of thinking about the North Korean nuclear crisis. The second set, in the 2020s, depicted a much-changed region, as viewed through Russia’s “Turn to the East,” the wild ride undertaken by South Korea; Japan’s rise as a regional and global power; and China’s quest for a Sinocentric Asia. Between these two series were books exploring misperceptions of regional development, democratization, and evolving strategic triangles. For the books after 2012, articles originally in The Asan Forum were put together with a new introduction and removed from the journal site.

Explaining how Asia has been misunderstood is a persistent interest later manifest in The Asan Forum. Concentrating on the 17th to 19th centuries, I sought first to show through the development of cities, markets, and Confucianism as a source of social organization that intellectual history and stagnant views of premodern periods failed to capture the dynamism of Asia. In a volume marking retirement from Princeton, I summarized my thinking in Misunderstanding Asia: International Relations Theory and Asian Studies over Half a Century. Articles in the Asan Forum and KEI volumes looked further at Chinese and Russian distortions of history, especially at how they treated the histories of Korea or Japan in service to current policies.

Inspired by Japanese articles of the 1990s on regionalism, Chinese articles of the 1990s on multilateral relations, and Western writings of the 2010s on democratization, I explored these themes in books: Northeast Asia’s Stunted Regionalism revealed the role of bilateral distrust in scuttling regional community agendas; Democratization, National Identities, and Foreign Policy in Asia exposed how efforts to boost democracy stumbled in the face of identities rooted in history; and Strategic Triangles Reshaping International Relations in Asia is a review of nine triangular relationships impacting the region, focusing above all on how Seoul, Tokyo, and Moscow tried to stave off rising bipolarity between Washington and Beijing. Big themes were broken down into strategic thinking in separate states or bilateral relations.

The Asan Forum and KEI volumes chronicle year-by-year changes in regional thinking and international relations in the Indo-Pacific, with emphasis on Northeast Asia. They cover a transitional era prior to the dramatic developments of 2025. Following my projects over the 1980s-2000s, they cover the decisive culmination of an interregnum from the time the Cold War era was winding down to the time a new bipolar environment was taking shape. The challenge remains to generalize about this era, as a whole, utilizing these building blocks.

I conclude this retrospective essay by returning to the three themes that have guided my endeavors: history and identity; the region as a single entity; and collective wisdom as a foundation for scholarship. All three depart from the prevailing training in international relations.

A peak of short-sighted optimism was reached in the 1990s, treating history as something to be relegated to the past and other identities as a distraction from the wave of democratization and universal values sweeping the world. South Koreans could never accept this, given deep grievances toward Japan. Japanese were wrestling with little-resolved historical questions, too. Chinese and Russian leaders took little time to root their quests for national rejuvenation and legitimacy in historical narratives. Starting by widening salient national identity gaps—blaming victimization on another state—one country after another, or political parties in Japan and South Korea found history a convenient instrument for swaying the public and gaining a “card” to use in bilateral diplomacy. Decade by decade, historical memory has drawn greater attention, now as a tool of Beijing and Moscow.

Training in the social sciences is less interdisciplinary than during the 1960s, when area studies were at their peak. The dichotomy of geopolitics and geo-economics overshadows coverage of national identities, including the historical dimension. The result is a growing gap between what analysts cover and the forces cited as driving policy choices. Consider the “comfort women” issue between Seoul and Tokyo, the “Northern Territories” issue in ties between Tokyo and Moscow, “Korean War” memories for Beijing and Seoul, and Moscow and Seoul, Sinocentric memories between Seoul and Beijing, and the “anti-fascist war” as a Chinese obsession versus Japan. No longer are the identity preoccupations of the Sino-Soviet dispute in the forefront, but some linger in the background. Northeast Asia is a breeding ground for identity gaps impacting bilateral relationships.

Graduate training remains fixated on single-country expertise. Few become experts on a particular bilateral relationship, and almost nobody is trained as a Northeast Asianist. The Asan Forum has tried to cultivate regional thinking. Country reports have detailed views of bilateral relationships and the regional environment. Special Forum topics have highlighted region-wide issues. The Six-Party Talks were an ideal opportunity for recognizing Northeast Asia as a single unit of study, and I approached them that way in Strategic Thinking about the Korean Nuclear Crisis: Four Parties Caught between North Korea and the United States. Even without such a diplomatic setting, there is compelling reason to treat Northeast Asia as an entity, not leaving aside East Asia with Southeast Asia and the Indo-Pacific as entities. In addition, Australia and India’s regional role drew our attention.

Rarely, over these more than five decades of research and writing, was I not organizing a group of authors to shed light jointly on what I considered to be a timely and understudied issue in Northeast Asia. For the cooperation I received from hundreds of regional experts, I am immensely grateful. The Asan Forum and KEI made possible the continuation of a format vital to cumulative, comparative analysis.
Edited projects—where paper topics are chosen in coordination, the editing proceeds with an eye to complementary coverage, and the introduction is prepared to draw out the overall message and often comparisons between papers—accomplish what one author cannot.

A new era has, arguably, begun in 2025. The record of 2013-2024, as well as the record of the prior three decades, remains to be mined for longer-lasting insights. Not only do individual clusters of articles serve that purpose, but sustained awareness of overlapping themes leaves a chronological record capable of showing patterns over time. As we look back to the interregnum between the peak of the Cold War and the yet unnamed era from 2025, we should find a valuable resource in these writings. Whether one’s interest is the evolution of strategic thinking and national identities, the evolution of bilateral relations and geopolitics, or the evolution of regionalism as an unrealizable ideal or a divisive, bipolar objective, the materials at hand can help us to reinterpret a transitional era for a vital region. 

Recognizing that extensive coverage could be found for US relations with Northeast Asian states, the Taiwan issue, and the North Korean nuclear issue, the Asan Forum filled holes in the coverage of other issues. Below, I summarize its relatively unique regional coverage with emphasis on perceptions inside Northeast Asia, not on the US role or Western theoretical or methodological approaches to this region. For each of the four core countries, six points are stressed.

Unique Features of The Asan Forum, 2013-2025

• • Comparing Conservative and Progressive Viewpoints
• • Uncovering Shifting ROK Efforts to Find “Balance” with China
• • Pointing to ROK-Japan Differences over US Regional Policy
• • Following the Ups and Downs in Korea-Japan Relations
• • Recognizing the Search for an Autonomous Russia Policy
• • Reflecting on Korean Interest in India and Southeast Asia

In-Depth Coverage of Russia in Asia

• • Tracking Putin’s “Turn to the East” and the Russian Far East
• • Following the Putin-Abe Relationship Closely
• • Prioritizing Sino-Russian Relations
• • Anticipating Moscow’s Shift on the Korean Peninsula
• • Assessing the RIC (Russia-India-China) Triangle
• • Recognizing Russia’s Focus on the BRICS and SCO

Concentration on China’s Views of East Asia, Russia, and India

• • Looking for Differing Views of Russia over Time
• • Tracking Chinese Warnings to South Korea
• • Explaining China’s Priorities in Dealing with North Korea
• • Following Chinese Views of History in Northeast Asia
• • Tracing shifts in Thinking toward India and Southeast Asia
• • Searching for Manifestations of a Sinocentric Agenda

Close Attention to Japanese Debates on Northeast Asia Issues

• • Comparing Conservative and Progressive Coverage
• • Uncovering Shifting Debates over South Korea
• • Explaining the Response to Abe’s Wooing of Putin
• • Assessing the Idea of the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific”
• • Recognizing the Quest to Be a Regional or Global Great Power
• • Following the Struggle between Identity and Realist Policy

The Asan Forum continues with a new direction. Its archives endure as a resource for a transformative period. For those of us interested in the record of the period, these archives may leave a useful legacy.