A Perspective from Japan

On the eve of a critical US presidential election, US allies would be well advised to prepare for any eventualities. Donald Trump’s “America First” thinking leaves all uncertain if they will be adequately consulted or escape one-sided pressure to satisfy Trump’s whims. The legacy of George W. Bush’s Iraq war, when Washington on the basis of faulty intelligence pressed allies to join in a fruitless occupation, stays fixed in many memories too. Even Kamala Harris, were she to follow in the footsteps of Joe Biden in advancing an economic security agenda, would not be free of suspicion that she would be tempted to put US economic interests before those of allies.¹ While fear of US abandonment outweighs that of entrapment, the idea has been spreading that allies which work closely together are more apt to favorably influence US policies. Having been first in late 2016 to take preemptive action for a US presidential transition and having played a leading role in forging minilateral groupings, Japan is better positioned in pursuing minilateralism both to supplement US leadership and to better influence it.

South Korea has been a difficult challenge for Japanese foreign policy for decades. While Tokyo and Seoul cooperated to bring China to international and regional economic liberalization in the late 1990s,² their bilateral relations have been distracted by domestic political sensitivities. A bilateral approach did not work in security cooperation, and the United States, having alliances with both countries, took the leadership through indirect results. Since the breakthrough in Japan-ROK relations in 2022-23, an opportunity exists to cooperate with South Korea within a regional context, still recognizing that close bilateral coordination is vulnerable to domestic sentiments in Seoul and Tokyo. Japanese aspirations for a distinctive Indo-Pacific role, not just under US leadership, may justify a trilateral platform’s emergence with South Korea.

With some exceptions like AUKUS and the Five Eyes, Japan has been a member of multiple minilateral security cooperation partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region.³ To name a few, Japan participates in the Quadrilateral Security Cooperation (Quad) with Australia, India, and the US, the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) with Australia and the US, the Camp David Trilateral with the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the US, and the so-called “Squad” with Australia, the Philippines, and the US. On top of these initiatives, there is a new framework: a trilateral arrangement among Japan, Australia, and South Korea at the 1.5-track⁴ and the defense ministers’ level.⁵  Among the clear benefits of this trilateral is the opportunity to consult on the American policies of the three countries. This is in the interest of Japan’s government as it awaits US elections.

At face value, the commonalities among the three countries include not only the alliances with the United States but also advanced economies, democratic political systems, and stakes in maritime security of the Indo-Pacific region, including peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.⁶ Such common political and economic interests already appeared in the venues where the three countries share membership, such as the Indo-Pacific Four (IP4) operating with NATO as well as broader regional platforms, the East Asia Summit, ASEAN Regional Forum, G20, and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. Australian and South Korean leaders are occasionally invited to the G7 Summit, of which Japan has been a member since the 1970s.⁷ Australia-Japan-ROK trilateral cooperation never stimulates the centophobia of Tokyo. Indeed, it is seen as way of impacting ROK policy, not so amenable to bilateral moves.

Having an additional and separate trilateral forum with Australia and South Korea needs an indisputable rationale for Japan.⁸ The marginal benefit should justify the diplomatic resources needed for managing this new initiative. Why not use the existing platforms? If creating a new one, why not form a quadrilateral with the United States, the common ally of the three countries? Why not include New Zealand, which plays a key role in the Pacific Islands and is a member of the IP4? To answer these questions and to avoid trilateralism becoming an additional diplomatic burden or mere talk-shops, it is important to set a clear agenda in this platform that uniquely excludes the United States. For agenda-setting, distinguishing issues of “three in” and “two in, one out” is essential. The former can include joint coordination and information-sharing of their respective policies toward outsiders, especially the US. One nation’s approach to American policymakers or their coordination with the US military can be a playbook for others. The latter includes levelling up one nation’s interest in certain issues to the level of the other two countries. Commencing by just comparing notes of regional security assessments, capacity-building policies, and connectivity projects, this platform helps the three governments to advance bilateral security partnerships by learning from the other bilateral within this triangle, such as the potential Australia-ROK Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA), not degrading the US alliance system but rather enhancing it, and at the same time, pursuing a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.”

Bilateral Relations with Australia and South Korea

For Japan, Australia is the core component for cooperation among like-minded countries⁹ or the inner core of the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” vision.¹⁰ Based on the trilateral security partnership with the United States since the early 2000s,¹¹ the two countries agreed to strengthen their “Special Strategic Partnership,” updating the Declaration on Security Cooperation in October 2022 and the enactment of the RAA.¹² The most recent 2+2 meeting in September 2024 acknowledged concrete cooperation, such as the evacuation of respective nationals from third countries during crises, reciprocal exchanges of liaison officers between their joint headquarters, and further cooperation between Japan’s counter-strike capability and Australia’s long-range strike capability.¹³ It is no exaggeration to say that Australia is the second most important security partner, following its treaty ally, the United States.

Meanwhile, compared to Japan-Australia relations, Japan-South Korea relations have muddled through political turbulence. However, driven by President Yoon’s courageous decision regarding the forced labor issue,¹⁴ bilateral relations have improved, enabling Japanese leaders to maneuver to make some concessions.¹⁵ In August 2023, the three leaders agreed on the regularization of trilateral summit meetings in pursuit of advancing a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” and underscoring the trilateral alliance’s role in maintaining the rules-based order.¹⁶ While an in-person meeting was not held this year, the three governments aimed at keeping the momentum of cooperation.¹⁷ Prime Minister Kishida chose South Korea as his final destination for a bilateral visit and agreed on the memorandum on cooperation of protecting respective nationals in third countries.¹⁸  Kishida reassured his counterpart about the continuation of the bilateral and trilateral partnership despite his impending resignation in early October.

While domestic politics still matters more in Tokyo-Seoul relations given the sensitivity of the remaining issues and the big policy swing in South Korea, trilateral relations are compelled by the severe security environment.¹⁹ China will never be out of the agenda of their meetings. At the same time, relations are centering on the United States, the common ally for the three countries, given the significance of China’s political and military challenges. Thus, ironically, as Corben points out in a companion commentary, the utility of engaging in military affairs without the United States is limited.

Reviewing Minilateralism

To make trilateralism as effective as it can be, it should avoid duplication with other minilateralism. The Quad has six working groups covering Climate, Critical and Emerging Technology, Cyber, Health Security, Infrastructure, and Space as well as Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness.²⁰ While balancing between deterrence and provision of public goods, the Quad addresses a broad spectrum of security cooperation relevant to the Indo-Pacific region. The IP4 is becoming a venue for the four countries to exchange their strategic assessments alongside NATO meetings. While the recent meeting showed grave concern over the Russia-North Korea partnership as undermining both Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific security,²¹ the main target was enhancing NATO’s partnership with the Indo-Pacific democracies against Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

The TSD and Camp David Trilateral, due to their alliance-based nature, focus on deterrence. The AUS-JPN-USA trilateral aims at conducting a joint integrated air and missile defense exercise in 2027.²² The TSD framework also addresses regional infrastructure via the Australia-Japan-US Trilateral Infrastructure Consultations. The developmental financing institutions of Australia, Japan, and the United States agreed on a memorandum of understanding for joint infrastructure development in 2018 and 2022²³ and already initiated cooperation for submarine cables in Palau and East Micronesia Cable.²⁴ JPN-ROK-USA defense ministers signed the Trilateral Security Cooperation Framework consisting of senior-level policy consultations, information sharing, trilateral exercises, and defense exchange cooperation.²⁵ Adding Taiwan to this trilateral, the Chip-4 framework sets regulations and standards for the supply chain of semiconductors.²⁶

The Logic of Trilateralism for Japan

Minilaterals must have clear goals, relevant members, and an appropriate modus operandi.²⁷ An embryonic trilateral among Australia, Japan, and South Korea is no exception. While the bilateral relations have advanced as explained above, the trilateral should have a unique agenda and goals based on this membership.

Three-in: Managing Relations with the United States

While the three countries have shared interests in a wide range of issues, such as “Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” maritime security, connectivity, human rights, climate, and free trade, most of these issues are already addressed in the existing global and regional platforms. The duplication of similar agendas easily degrades the legitimacy of the format. The key potential benefit of this trilateral for Japan is having opportunities for either providing or receiving “consultations” regarding its relations with Washington.

Back in November 2016, Prime Minister Abe Shinzo made a surprise visit to the Trump Tower in New York just ten days after the presidential election.²⁸ Ambassador Sasae Kenichiro recalled that the idea of Abe’s solo visit came from the notion of preemptive action.²⁹ When Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull had an intensive and unpleasant phone call with President Trump in January 2017, Abe was already mentioned by Trump by name. Also, Sugiyama Shinsuke, Japanese ambassador to the US from 2018-20, testified that he was sometimes asked by US officials to persuade Trump, who said, “if Shinzo says it, the president would listen to him.”³⁰ Abe’s successful management of relations with the Trump presidency granted Tokyo not only a bullet-proof-jacket against American unilateral actions, but also a hotline to deliver its thinking to Washington as a reliable ally.

Understanding the policies of US administrations and reading the election every four years dominates the time and energy of diplomats in Washington. While all allies may position their best and brightest there, it would be in everyone’s interest that all succeed in stabilizing their relations with the United States based on a common understanding. Outwitting or selling out other allies only destabilizes the US alliance system in the Indo-Pacific region.³¹  Overcoming their territoriality, they can start by holding a regular lunch meeting of the three countries’ ambassadors to the United States or by regular Track 1.5 dialogue in each country to this end. Preparing for any unpleasant surprises from Washington cannot be ruled out as a driving force as well.

Two-in, One-out

Another potential raison d’être of the trilateral would be levelling up one nation’s interest or situational awareness in certain issues to the levels of the other two countries. From the Japanese perspective, bringing South Korea into the maritime security discussions of the South and East China seas would be a common interest shared with Australia. In July 2016, Australia, Japan, and the United States issued a joint statement on the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea arbitration on the South China Sea, calling it “final and legally binding on both parties.”³² Meanwhile, the ROK government, though making its statement, only took note of the arbitration award.³³ As of 2024, the ROK government has declared an Indo-Pacific strategy³⁴ and also agreed on the Spirit of Camp David, which articulates that the arbitration award is “setting out the legal basis for the peaceful resolution of maritime conflicts between the parties to that proceeding.”³⁵ As stakeholders of the open and safe trade route in the South China Sea, the three countries can assert a joint stance on the arbitration. If they do so on their own, it can invalidate China’s narrative that US allies are only manipulated and pressured to say so.

Australia shows its solidarity on the Korean Peninsula as expressed in Penny Wong’s speech in July 2024.³⁶ Historically, Australians put their boots on the ground during the Korean War and still keep their presence through the UN Command Rear in Japan.³⁷ In a potential contingency, Australia may play a key role both in operational fights and humanitarian measures.³⁸ That said, according to the Lowy Poll 2024, only five percent of respondents chose South Korea as a nation with which Australia should establish closer security relations.³⁹ Australia still puts priority on “managing relations with great powers and on providing assistance to emerging economies, neither Australia nor Korea can be said to fully prioritize or fully resource their relationships with each other as a peer.”⁴⁰ It would be in Japan’s interest if Australia and South Korea forge a stronger defense partnership on the same level as Japan’s joint declarations with a promise on the Australia-ROK security partnership of committing “to consult each other on contingencies that may affect their sovereignty and regional security interests, and consider measures in response.”⁴¹

Finally, Japan and South Korea can urge Australia to invite not only economic investment and aid but also security cooperation from others for the Pacific Islands. Australia has, as John Howard articulated, a sense of holding a “substantial and special responsibility” in the region,⁴² and it officially welcomes Japan and South Korea taking initiatives with the Pacific Islands.⁴³ Nonetheless, the former Australian leadership was cautious of Japan’s initiatives for the maritime security of the Western Pacific.⁴⁴ There are still some voices wary of Japan’s defense partnership with the Pacific Islands because of the preponderant presence of the US and Australia there.⁴⁵ Recently, the Albanese government has described the Pacific Islands as Australia’s “family,”⁴⁶ as Joanne Wallis points out, entailing a nuance of enclosure.⁴⁷ Even if it targets China, the family narrative may engender a sense of exclusion in Japan and South Korea. While actual infrastructure building or security partnership for police and coast guards should involve the United States and New Zealand, trilateralism can be a convenient channel for Japan and South Korea to affirm their interests and, ideally, their joint proposal for digital connectivity projects or smart city proposals based on an MOU between the Japanese and Korean financial institutions.⁴⁸

To some degree, Japan and South Korea have been competitors in Asia’s southern tier. When bilateral relations were most troubled, they sometimes conveyed the image of rivals for influence, seeking advantage over the other. Now, they are largely on the same wavelength, but South Korea is more cautious in taking positions seen as likely to antagonize China. When South Korea has shifted ground, it has been viewed as a response to US encouragement, not due to coordination with Japan. Encouragement from Australia in a trilateral with Japan on matters such as the Pacific Islands, would also enable South Korea to escape from too close association with Japan. Given the lingering criticism of Japan by the Korean political opposition and the public, this is useful.

Conclusion

Enhanced trilateral cooperation with Australia and South Korea serves Japan’s appetite for coordinating allies’ approaches to the United States as well as drawing closer on the level of understanding and concerns with regard to the key regional security and economic issues in the Indo-Pacific region. it can be helpful in preparing for unsettling developments in US policy and in steering South Korea toward actions it would be wary of taking if received at home as coordinating too closely with Japan.

Policy coordination through trilateralism can help improve each state’s understanding and analyses of American policies, making them more trustful allies for the United States, which is past a hub and spokes approach.⁴⁹ Despite the potential increase of their bargaining power through the alignment of the three Asian allies, it could be a benefit for the US to have a necessary stopper for both isolationist and overly expansionist policy under any future president. Under the multilateral approach of the Biden administration, the new framework is welcome as a desired supplement to the US Indo-Pacific framework, and future administrations would be wise to agree.