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In mid-2024, Chinese analysts assessed the strength and efficacy of ASEAN in the context of intensifying China–US competition. They explored the impact of this major power competition on ASEAN cohesion and evaluated potential threats to ASEAN centrality. One article argued that China–US competition is undermining the “ASEAN Way,” decreasing the relevance of ASEAN as a regional institution. Another perspective, while acknowledging threats to ASEAN centrality, argued that ASEAN effectively uses the agenda-setting process to maintain significant influence over maritime affairs. A third article found significant evidence of ASEAN unity, neutrality regarding great power competition, and commitment to the principle of non-interference (with an exception for the persecution of Rohingya Muslims), but nevertheless argued that the “ASEAN Way” faces significant threats due to heterogeneous social conditions among the ASEAN member states and relatively weak state capacity. Another author focused instead on the internal factors that determine whether ASEAN states can achieve political and security cooperation, pointing to the number of states who benefit from a proposal and the availability of alternatives to ASEAN as the key factors, rather than external variables such as China–US competition. A final article assessed the varied views of AUKUS among ASEAN member states and ASEAN itself, arguing that these views depend on the extent to which China is seen as a threat and the consistency of these actors’ self-identities—including their view of ASEAN centrality as a crucial aspect of their global identity—over time.
ASEAN in the Context of China–US Competition
In Dongnanya Yanjiu, 2024, no. 2, Tan Shujun argues that China–US competition is undermining ASEAN’s internal cohesion and that ASEAN’s longstanding effort to balance between great powers is no longer sustainable. As China–US competition intensifies, Southeast Asia has become the key “battlefield.” Tan asserts that China–US competition is putting increased pressure on countries in Southeast Asia to pick sides and blames this intensified competition on shifts in US policy under Trump, which continued under Biden. While China has sought to reassure Southeast Asian countries of its benevolent intentions through the BRI and other cooperative measures, Tan contends, the United States has strengthened its strategic position in Southeast Asia, invested in its alliance relations, and developed its Indo-Pacific strategy in an effort to counter Chinese influence. Faced with heightened major power competition, ASEAN’s ability to influence the regional order has decreased significantly.
Southeast Asian leaders have adopted varied responses to the pressure to choose sides. Tan asserts that countries with greater comprehensive national strength are more likely to balance between China and the United States, while weaker countries tend to follow China. Moreover, countries that have alliance or quasi-alliance relations with the United States are more likely to follow US policy. Meanwhile, territorial conflicts in the South China Sea and historical memory impact the intensity with which countries pursue a balancing or following approach. Countries that have worsening territorial conflicts with China in the South China Sea experience a greater sense of threat from China. Similarly, countries that have a history of war with China are more likely to pursue balancing behavior than those that have historically seen China as a source of support for national independence or domestic revolutionary movements.
Ultimately, Tan argues, ASEAN decision-making practices and the “ASEAN Way” are insufficient to overcome these challenges. Reflecting national differences, leaders of ASEAN countries hold varying positions on how to respond to the United States and China, hindering collective agreement within ASEAN. Furthermore, Tan asserts, ASEAN’s consultation process is designed to “avoid risks” rather than “resolve crises.” To this end, ASEAN consultation practices emphasize informal diplomacy and non-interference in the domestic affairs of member states, limiting ASEAN’s ability to move leaders toward agreement. Finally, ASEAN decision-making is premised upon unanimous consensus, meaning that even a single outlier prevents ASEAN from taking a position.
Tan contends that the weakening of ASEAN’s internal cohesion in the context of intensified China–US competition is evident in two key examples. First, the “ASEAN Way” has been unable to overcome national-level differences that have emerged regarding the South China Sea. Tan criticizes US interference in the South China Sea dispute after the China–Philippine conflict in Mischief Reef for “internationalizing” a bilateral disagreement and frames intensified Chinese activities in the South China Sea as a “response” to US pressure and a “defensive” measure. Tan argues that this heightened China–US competition in the South China Sea has impacted the context for ASEAN decision-making by marginalizing ASEAN countries and complicating their options. Nevertheless, Tan recognizes how Chinese behavior has created alarm in some countries. Faced with this increasingly complex situation, ASEAN countries’ leaders have come to varied conclusions about how to respond to Chinese claims in the South China Sea: the Philippines and Vietnam see China as a threat and have sought to check and balance China; Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia, despite some concerns, have taken a more conciliatory approach toward China; and the remaining four countries, which do not have disputes with China, do not want South China Sea issues to impact their relations with China. Given these differences, ASEAN has been unable to reach a unanimous consensus on a position regarding the South China Sea.
A second example is ASEAN’s inability to adopt a shared response to China–US competition in the Indo-Pacific. As in the South China Sea case, intensified major power competition has increased pressure on ASEAN countries to choose sides, with China building relations with Southeast Asia through the BRI and the United States seeking to win over ASEAN in the context of its Indo-Pacific Strategy. Cognizant of the historical impact of national-level disagreements on the South China Sea, ASEAN countries have sought to maintain ASEAN centrality, autonomy, and coordination. Nevertheless, varied ASEAN responses toward China–US competition in the Indo-Pacific have emerged, with Indonesia strongly supporting the US Indo-Pacific Strategy; Malaysia and Vietnam adopting a more cautious, but still supportive, approach; and—Tan contends—the remaining countries adopting a fairly unwelcoming response. (Tan’s argument is notable because the Philippines and Singapore are generally seen as supportive of US policy.)
While the United States has persuaded seven countries to join the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, neither the United States nor these seven ASEAN countries have been able to persuade the remaining three countries to join. In the face of ASEAN’s inability to act, member states have turned to bilateral relationships with external actors, rather than operating through the institutional framework of ASEAN, further contributing to ASEAN’s marginalization.
Tan is pessimistic about ASEAN’s future, arguing that ASEAN countries will be unable to resolve their fundamental differences and that China and the United States will continue to compete for partners in Southeast Asia. Consequently, Tan believes that ASEAN’s regional influence will continue to diminish.
In Dangdai Yatai, 2024, no. 2, Tian Shihui and Zheng Xianwu take a more positive view, arguing that ASEAN maintains strong agency in setting the agenda on regional maritime issues. Regional agenda setting refers to the process by which priorities for countries or international organizations are determined. Tian and Zheng argue that the agenda-setting process goes through four steps: selecting and defining the topics, forming an issue alliance by mobilizing interests and framing the issue, identifying “entry points” by which the issue can be shared with the broader regional or international community, and institutionalizing or standardizing the issue so that it becomes a topic for which there is ongoing coordination.
Given their relatively weak comprehensive power, small countries (and groups of small countries) pursue a unique pathway for gaining agenda-setting power. First, they develop specific areas in which they hold an advantage by focusing on non-controversial topics or developing technical expertise. Next, they build alliances with a great power or network with other small powers. Third, they develop an institutional platform to ensure an entry point by creating regional institutions or working through the structures of the UN. Finally, they shape norms, often relying on their technical expertise and their moral reputation.
Tian and Zheng argue that ASEAN has actively promoted the “ASEANization” of maritime issues, supported by both China and the United States so long as it does not impact issues of sovereignty. This ASEANization has occurred through both collective action among ASEAN states (Tian and Zheng hold a much more positive view of ASEAN’s ability to reach consensus than does Tan Shujun) and through their external relations with other states via the ASEAN+ mechanism. Following the agenda-setting pathway available to groups of small states, ASEAN has focused on non-controversial maritime issues, such as piracy, environmental concerns, and illegal fishing. It has used the existing ASEAN relationship network, manifested through the principle of ASEAN centrality and the ASEAN+ mechanism, to build alliances. By working through the ASEAN+ structure, ASEAN can create an entry point to shape the agenda: it determines the location for regional meetings on maritime issues, who participates, and what topics will be addressed. Finally, ASEAN has shaped norms, notably through the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, which emphasizes a rules-based order, inclusivity, and mutual benefit and trust.
By contrast, Tan asserts, the United States and China try to shape the agenda differently. China seeks to become a strong maritime nation by implementing the 21st Century Maritime Silk Route. Like ASEAN, China focuses on non-traditional maritime security issues. China acts through its BRI partnership network to build an issue alliance and uses ASEAN-centered regional cooperation frameworks and UN maritime governance mechanisms as entry points. China’s efforts to institutionalize these issues include its attempts to develop a South China Sea Code of Conduct and its efforts to propose global development and security initiatives. Meanwhile, the United States seeks to preserve its maritime hegemony and advance its Indo-Pacific strategy by focusing on both traditional and non-traditional maritime security issues. It has attempted to build an issue alliance by developing an Indo-Pacific maritime alliance system, composed of both formal bilateral alliances and minilateral quasi-alliances. The United States seeks to use these minilateral security mechanisms as an entry point, in addition to ASEAN-centered regional frameworks and the UN system. Ultimately, the United States seeks to maintain norms, such as “freedom of navigation” and “rules-based order.”
This competition among China, the United States, and ASEAN to set the agenda for regional maritime issues has posed challenges for ASEAN, most significantly marginalizing ASEAN on issues related to sovereignty, though ASEAN maintains a significant degree of agency in other aspects. On the one hand, as China and the United States compete for ASEAN support, they have tried to align with ASEAN on some maritime issues. ASEAN has demonstrated greater defense cooperation both internally and in relation with outside partners, including through joint military exercises with China and with the United States, and many external countries have promoted the alignment between their own Indo-Pacific strategies and ASEAN’s Outlook on the Indo–Pacific. At the same time, however, cracks have emerged, and ASEAN has sought to hedge between the United States and China to avoid choosing sides. Tian and Zheng argue that ASEAN prioritizes economic and non-traditional security issues, while the United States has militarized regional maritime issues. Further, they claim that US efforts to contain China have threatened ASEAN centrality. By contrast, they contend, China’s BRI strongly supports ASEAN centrality and regional economic growth. Significantly, Tian and Zheng charge that China–US maritime competition weakens ASEAN centrality. They argue that US actions in the South China Sea have undermined China’s efforts to seek peaceful resolution with its neighbors and that US efforts to contain China have led the United States to create new issue alliances and entry points—the new minilateral structures, like the Quad and AUKUS—that “bypass” ASEAN. Consequently, ASEAN risks marginalization, despite vocal Chinese and US commitments to ASEAN centrality.
Tian and Zheng conclude that contrary to common belief, groups of small countries like ASEAN can maintain significant agency over the regional agenda. Nevertheless, major power competition threatens ASEAN’s influence, with both China and the United States advancing their own visions of regional order because they do not feel their interests can be fully achieved within the existing ASEAN-centered framework. Tian and Zheng believe that ASEAN’s regional cooperation mechanisms are likely to limit the harm posed by China–US competition and argue that proposed Chinese and US maritime orders should supplement the existing ASEAN-centered architecture. They urge China to use the BRI and practical cooperation to reinforce ASEAN centrality and advise ASEAN to maintain a neutral approach toward US overtures.
In Guoji Guancha, 2024, no. 3, Li Chang assesses how much leadership authority ASEAN possesses by evaluating the strength of the concept of ASEAN centrality. Li argues that ASEAN centrality can be disaggregated into three components: unity (the consistency of ASEAN member states’ respective positions), regional neutrality (support for ASEAN’s efforts to build Southeast Asian cooperation and balance between competing great powers), and support for the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. Together, these indicators measure support for ASEAN’s leading role in regional governance. Li assesses each of these indicators by conducting a quantitative analysis of a dataset drawn from ASEAN countries’ voting behavior in the UN General Assembly.
Li finds that ASEAN member states demonstrate a strong degree of unity in their voting positions, with the notable exceptions of Myanmar and Cambodia. Li posits that these two countries’ deviation from the unity expressed by the other eight countries may result from the strength of their commitment to certain issues; their relatively late arrival to ASEAN; and their low level of economic development, which makes them more sensitive to the demands of international donors. It is worth noting, however, that all countries have certain issues that they believe to be significant. Furthermore, while Myanmar and Cambodia joined ASEAN relatively late—in 1997 and 1999, respectively—they have now been members for a generation. Two other countries that joined at about the same time (Laos and Vietnam) do not demonstrate the same behaviors. Consequently, while Li does identify an interesting pattern, the reasons for the deviation of Myanmar and Cambodia remain largely unexplained.
Li also asserts that ASEAN countries have demonstrated a shared commitment to regional neutrality in the great power competition between China and the United States. Interestingly, because ASEAN’s earlier policies were close to China’s positions, this neutrality has manifested as a shift toward US positions. Among the ten ASEAN states, Li finds, Thailand, Singapore, the Philippines, Laos, and Cambodia have long paid particular attention to votes on matters that are of concern to the United States, while Malaysia, Indonesia, Myanmar, Vietnam, and Brunei shifted their positions toward the United States after 2008, when China’s growing power became increasingly evident and disputes in the South China Sea became increasingly tense.
Finally, Li argues that ASEAN member states demonstrate a continued commitment to the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states, but that Brunei, Indonesia, and Malaysia have challenged this principle through their votes related to the treatment of Muslims during the Rohingya crisis. Li contends that this deviation demonstrates that religious identity as a Muslim country takes precedence over the political identity of being an ASEAN state. Based on this finding, Li asserts that the “ASEAN Way” is being challenged even though ASEAN has significantly strengthened its leadership role since it expanded its membership in the 1990s and that this deviation from the principle of non-interference indicates a larger trend (however, Li does not offer additional evidence that this trend exists). Li identifies two macro-level causes of this purported trend. First, Li argues that ASEAN member states have experienced heterogenous social development which results in the lack of a common, supranational identity, due to their varied geography, religions, and levels of economic development. Second, Li argues that ASEAN member states share a pattern of late and sluggish development, and that limited state capacity hinders ASEAN’s efforts at regional governance.
Li concludes that despite support for ASEAN leadership from both within the region and outside it, these macro-level factors will weaken ASEAN’s ability to exercise stronger leadership for the foreseeable future. As a result, Li urges China to be “cautious” about the prospects for ASEAN’s leading role in regional governance. In contrast to Tan Shujun—who argues that China–US competition is undermining ASEAN’s regional role—and Tan Shihui and Zheng Xianwu—who emphasize how ASEAN has exercised agency through the agenda-setting process to maintain influence over regional maritime issues despite China–US competition—Li argues that the limitations to ASEAN’s regional influence arise from within.
Political and Security Cooperation in ASEAN
In Dangdai Yatai, 2024, no. 2, Sun Zhiqiang assesses the reasons for ASEAN’s varied effectiveness at regional and political cooperation. Moving beyond the simple binary of those who view ASEAN as successful at reducing conflict and developing a regional community and those who view ASEAN as weak and disempowered, Sun argues that a more nuanced analysis of the circumstances under which ASEAN is most effective at reaching cooperation consider its key institutional characteristics. ASEAN has no coercive enforcement mechanism, reaches final decisions at the top leadership level, and has an inflexible commitment to unanimous consensus. These design features derive from ASEAN’s origins; Southeast Asian countries long buffeted by colonialism and the Cold War interests of major powers were loath to part with their hard-earned sovereignty by giving up authority to ASEAN. As a result, the institutional design of ASEAN features loose constraints and substantial national autonomy, creating challenges for efforts to bring together disparate interests.
Given the weakness of institutional constraints, ASEAN member states’ willingness to participate in cooperation within ASEAN is driven by their own interests. Sun identifies two key variables, which drive the success of a country’s efforts to seek political and security cooperation through ASEAN: the scope of the benefits of cooperation (either large, advancing the interests of all of the ASEAN member states, or small, advancing the interests of only some) and the existence of alternatives to working through ASEAN (which impacts the costs of cooperation considered by other member states). Cooperation initiatives are successful when all countries stand to benefit and there are no alternative options to working through ASEAN. By contrast, cooperation initiatives fail when the benefits are limited to a smaller number of ASEAN countries and alternatives to working through ASEAN exist, such as implementing unilateral measures or working through bilateral or alternative multilateral organizations. In between are mixed outcomes: when every ASEAN country stands to benefit but there are alternatives to ASEAN, cooperation is “suspended,” meaning that efforts drag on without success; when only some ASEAN countries will benefit but there are no alternatives to ASEAN, cooperation is “downgraded,” meaning that the content of the final agreement is diluted as the countries negotiate with each other.
Sun illustrates this theoretical framework by drawing on several examples. Notably, Sun argues that Indonesia’s efforts to promote an ASEAN Outlook for the Indo-Pacific resulted in successful cooperation. Sun contends that China–US competition poses a security challenge for all ASEAN member states and that the US Indo-Pacific strategy threatens both ASEAN centrality and cohesiveness (echoing concerns conveyed by Tan Shujun). ASEAN states share an interest in avoiding the pressure to choose sides between China and the United States. At the same time, there is no feasible alternative to working through ASEAN. Consequently, ASEAN agreed to release the Outlook. On the contrary, the Philippines’ efforts to achieve the “ASEANization” of the South China Sea conflict failed. The scope of the benefits of cooperation was small—only four countries have disputes with China and not all of them agreed with the Philippines’ approach—and alternatives to ASEAN existed for the Philippines, such as pursuing a claim under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, bilateral negotiations with China, seeking US support through alliance relations, or pursuing unilateral militarization. As a result, ASEAN member states did not reach a consensus and the Philippines’ efforts to address its South China Sea claims through ASEAN failed.
Other cases are more mixed. Sun argues that Malaysia’s efforts to coordinate a common ASEAN response to conflict in Cambodia in the late 1970s–1980s resulted in “suspended” cooperation. Although all ASEAN countries stood to benefit, alternatives to cooperation through ASEAN existed, with key players like Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia aligning with different parties. As a result, Malaysia’s repeated efforts at diplomacy resulted in a drawn-out process. Meanwhile, Thailand’s efforts to reform the “ASEAN Way” by introducing the concept of “flexible engagement” in the wake of the Asian Financial Crisis resulted in cooperation “downgrading.” Thailand’s proposal to allow countries to comment on the internal affairs of other states if those domestic issues impacted other states challenged the bedrock ASEAN principle of non-interference, and therefore received scant support from other ASEAN states. Moreover, Sun argues, Thailand’s proposal reflected Thai efforts to promote Western-style democracy and gain support from the West, which aroused concern among more authoritarian-leaning Southeast Asian states. Nevertheless, there were no alternatives to working through ASEAN because the Thai proposal related to fundamental ASEAN norms. Consequently, the Thai proposal was watered down as it worked its way through ASEAN channels, reducing both its substance and its sensitivity, but ultimately resulted in a consensus.
Sun concludes that this framework for understanding when political and security cooperation within ASEAN will be effective is helpful for understanding outcomes under the present circumstances of China–US competition. ASEAN member states have divergent interests and an increasing number of minilateral alternatives (in addition to unilateral, bilateral, and more traditional multilateral options). Like Tian and Zheng, Sun argues that China should strongly support ASEAN centrality, which is under pressure due to these developments. Taking Sun’s analysis a step farther, given the many alternatives to ASEAN, one might expect to see that efforts to cooperate through ASEAN will succeed or fail depending on whether the states initiating the effort can convince other member states that cooperation is in every state’s interest. This persuasion may, in turn, depend on how effectively states initiating proposals can frame an issue as a shared concern and negotiate differences between countries that lean toward China and those that lead toward the United States.
ASEAN’s Response to AUKUS
In Induyang Jingjiti Yanjiu, 2024, no. 3, Feng Junze explores the reasons for the varied responses by ASEAN member states to AUKUS and argues that AUKUS poses an ontological security dilemma for ASEAN at the global level. While a traditional security dilemma occurs when states make security decisions in the face of uncertain threats to their physical security, an ontological security dilemma occurs when states make security choices in the face of uncertain internal and external threats to their identity. Feng argues that a nuclear balance exists in Southeast Asia between China and AUKUS and that the material power of the major states in the region is likely to stay the same for the foreseeable future, meaning that the threats posed to physical security are known and stable. Consequently, the major security dilemma facing ASEAN is ontological, with ASEAN countries’ varied responses to AUKUS arising from differences in their perceptions of a threat from China and in the consistency of their own identity narratives.
Li argues that the countries that support AUKUS have a strong sense of a Chinese threat and an inconsistent self-identity narrative. Singapore views AUKUS as a useful entity that can balance what Singapore perceives as a strong Chinese threat, while Singaporean support for ASEAN centrality as a global identity has decreased over time. Vietnam is a “silent” supporter of AUKUS because of Vietnam’s territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea and historical memory of conflict with China, which lead it to perceive China as a threat, and, like Singapore, is becoming less committed to a global identity of ASEAN centrality. Likewise, the Philippines views China as a threat due to disputes in the South China Sea and the Philippines’ affinity toward the United States and concern about a threat from a Chinese “other.” Moreover, the Philippines’ self-identity has shifted, both regarding its identity relative to the United States and in its support for ASEAN centrality as a global identity.
By contrast, Li argues that countries that oppose AUKUS have a weak sense of a Chinese threat and a consistent self-identity narrative. Indonesia keeps its concerns about China in check and values regional stability and a balance among great powers; it sees the emergence of AUKUS as a threat to that balance and to the status quo. Moreover, Indonesia has consistently perceived ASEAN centrality as a key global identity and Australia as a threat to its national identity. Similarly, Malaysia has positive relations with China and its perception of a Chinese threat is low. At the same time, it is consistently committed to a global identity of ASEAN centrality and a national identity that emphasizes Malaysian “neutrality.”
Finally, Li contends, countries that maintain a position of “cautious neutrality” toward AUKUS—Thailand, Laos, Myanmar, Brunei, and Cambodia—have a weak sense of a Chinese threat and inconsistent self-identity narratives. For example, Thailand does not perceive China as a threat, but has a strong relationship with the United States and its allies. As it attempts to compensate for its own weakness, Thailand therefore attempts to maintain positive relations with various countries and has taken a neutral approach toward AUKUS. At the same time, Thailand’s inconsistent self-identity narrative also drives its cautiously neutral approach: Thailand is consistently supportive of ASEAN centrality as part of its global identity, but the positive role of the United States in Thai national identity has weakened.
In comparison, ASEAN as an institution has a strong sense of a Chinese threat and a consistent self-identity narrative, leading it to cautious acceptance of AUKUS and immersing it in an ontological security dilemma. Despite underlying differences in the threat perception among its member states, ASEAN views China as a threat and therefore seeks to use AUKUS to balance China. (Nevertheless, Li argues, ASEAN trust in China is growing in response to Chinese efforts to build relations.) Meanwhile, ASEAN’s self-identity narrative has remained consistent: ASEAN is deeply committed to the “ASEAN Way” and ASEAN centrality. Consequently, ASEAN remains “cautious” in its view of AUKUS. This cautious acceptance creates an ontological security dilemma because AUKUS poses a threat to ASEAN’s identity at the global level: the future of ASEAN centrality is at stake, and ASEAN support for AUKUS has the potential to further undermine ASEAN’s own global identity.
Feng contends that ASEAN and AUKUS are engaged in a “strategic stalemate.” One aspect of their identity competition is between AUKUS’s coercive deterrence and ASEAN’s soft consensus. AUKUS has exposed weaknesses in the “ASEAN Way”—its slow and deliberate policymaking process and its inability to protect ASEAN member states’ national security. The other aspect of their identity competition is between ASEAN’s threat to international rules and ASEAN’s practice of fairly implementing international rules. Feng charges that despite AUKUS’s claims to uphold a rules-based international order, it maintains dominance over what the rules are and to whom they apply. In contrast to this selective use of international rules, Feng argues, ASEAN promotes a fair application of the rules (but does not always have the power to implement them). In both cases, ASEAN’s cautious acceptance of AUKUS further undermines aspects of ASEAN’s own identity.
Feng cautions that increased great power competition increases the likelihood that ASEAN will have to choose sides, which may intensify the identity competition between AUKUS and ASEAN. The global identity of ASEAN centrality may erode, producing divisions among ASEAN member states and weakening ASEAN’s states’ regional identity as members of an ASEAN Community. Finally, Feng argues that AUKUS is seeking to “bypass” ASEAN by reaching separate agreements with countries like the Philippines, Vietnam, and Singapore. As AUKUS develops minilateral alternatives to ASEAN, Feng contends, ASEAN will tend to invite Chinese cooperation to strengthen ASEAN’s position in its identity competition with AUKUS. Feng’s analysis aligns with Tan Shujun’s in its assessment of China–US competition as a threat to ASEAN centrality.
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