Country Report: China (July 2025)

Chinese articles on geopolitics and economics in great power and Asian relations are far more numerous than Russian, Japanese, and Korean articles. Rather than select a wide-ranging sample, this country report focuses on a single theme: the China-India-Russia triangle, including studies of India-Russia bilateral relations. In June and July, two events compounded the effect of two pervasive forces: the Russia-Ukraine clash and the “Trump shock wave,” impacting major power relations and the global order. Both are treated as systemic products of the US approach to the world since the end of the Cold War and its difficulty in adjusting to rival powers. The new events were the “12-day” aerial assault on Iran by Israel with the United States joining and the Brazil BRICS meeting, where neither China nor Russia was represented by its top leader despite insistence on the critical role of this body for ushering in a new global order. They posed a serious test for the China-Russia-India (CRI) triangle and its multilateral offshoots. Viewed as the nucleus of a new world order with the greatest impact in the “Global South,” BRICS had identified Iran as a new member in 2024 and partner in that sphere. Yet, responses to the outbreak of war in mid-2025 were all over the map. China responded most harshly, blaming Israel. Russia was critical of Israel but sought a role as mediator and hesitated to alienate Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. Least in favor of a joint response, India reasserted its strategic autonomy, even in the “Global South.”  At the BRICS summit, the three joined in criticizing the attack on Iran, but this was relegated to brief mention in the joint declaration, rather downplayed as a theme. Russia succeeded in inserting a critique of Ukraine’s attacks on its infrastructure, but this war also drew marginal attention. Criticism of a rise in unilateral tariff and non-tariff measures drew more prominence, as Trump served to rally consensus against ongoing US economic policies.

As host, Brazil appeared less interested in taking sides in the intensifying global power confrontation than in boosting the “Global South” with Brazil using its prominence as a founding member in the BRICS to showcase its leadership aspirations in multilateral settings. The China-Russia-India triangle, so central at the October 2024 Kazan BRICS summit, was left on the margins, as Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin chose not to attend. In the background, however, China kept following closely the “troika” with Russia and India, especially the thinking in those states on this triangle and on their bilateral relationship, clearly seen in 2024 and early 2025 writings,

India is difficult to ignore in Chinese frameworks for great power relations. The United States and Japan raised its profile as a cornerstone of the Indo-Pacific framework. For Russia India is one of a troika of Eurasian great powers, only growing in importance in the fallout from Russia’s war in Ukraine. However vague some Chinese may be about whether India warrants inclusion as a great power, when there is talk of powers beyond China, the United States, and Russia in a multipolar world, India figures along with the European Union as a pole. Its presence in BRICS and the SCO, settings critical for an international order not led by the United States, affirms its significance. Yet over the past decade, India’s image has fluctuated, as its relations with China have changed, its role in multilateral institutions has grown, and its relations with the US and Russia have become ever more enhanced.

If we look back to the late 2010s, we find a more upbeat mood regarding the triangle with Russia and India, but even then, there was clear recognition that the China-India dyad would limit triangular cooperation. In a 2018 article on the China-Russia-India triangle in Eluosi Xuekan, No. 5 by Wei Lin, one reads how Russia-India relations impacted the triangle at a time of relative optimism. Wei noted strong Russia-India ties but called for not pursuing a strategic triangle. Little concern was expressed about the Russia-India connection, as China-India ties might face challenges. By 2023, pessimism over the triangle prevailed, along with recognition that Russia-India relations had weakened and implicit Chinese advice to Russia on how to respond to this tendency and to put this bilateral nexus in the context of the triangle with China and the India-US relationship.

In Guoji Anquan Yanjiu, 2023, No. 5, Wei Han focused on the dependency between India and Russia generated by arms sales. Calling this heavy dependency, Wei sees it created and reinforced by proactive lock-in tactics successfully employed by Russia. While this has served to consolidate bilateral relations, it has also undermined India’s strategic flexibility. Yet, Wei points to a more competitive arms export market, recent friction in their arms trade, and increasing US-India military ties as causes of some instability in this pattern of dependency. India has a record of silence about Russian military operations: Afghanistan, Syria, Crimea, and since 2022, the wider Ukraine crisis. This relates to its dependence on Russia for what are 70% of its arms imports: 63% in 2011-2020, 75% in 2001-2010. Russia’s power falls short for maintaining arms supplies abroad, but it is difficult for India to switch. India has no choice but to continue its reliance. Russian arms are losing international competitiveness, Russia’s transaction process has problems with delays and price rises, while its methods often aim to increase dependency. Quality problems arise. India has been boosting arms imports from the US, France, and Israel. US export controls impact Russian arms.

Tong Yutao in Nanya Yanjiu, No. 3, 2023, compared India’s arms procurements from Russia and the United States, reflecting its adherence as a swing state to strategic autonomy. India has responded to the Russia-Ukraine conflict as a neutral state to preserve this autonomy. Tong explains this, proceeding to identify differences in its approaches to the two rivals. In the short term, India is seen as not changing its reliance on Russian arms even as it deepens military cooperation with the United States, resulting in some tensions. Facing the policies of both, India will react to the international setting and its own interests. It purchased Russia’s S-400 despite US objections and did not vote with the US on the Russia-Ukraine conflict, given its heavy reliance on Russian weapons. Yet. strategic ties to the US are gradually drawing closer. It is not beneficial for the US for India to be heavily dependent on Russia for arms, as it becomes second only to Israel as a purchaser of US arms and a nexus of US geopolitical strategy. US arms sales have risen explosively since 2006. When Modi made a state visit to Washington in mid-2023, plans were set in motion to accelerate defense cooperation, including in high-tech weapons, but the US trails others in advancing this. Meanwhile, some contradictions impact India-Russia arms trade: delays causing big increases in prices; Russian attitudes and expertise issues; and Indian dissatisfaction with limits on technology transfers. With the US, India remains distrustful of an abrupt shift in policy, dissatisfied with insufficient technology transfers, and nervous about loss of strategic autonomy. Meanwhile, the US sees India as refusing to follow it on some international issues, leading to wariness. India is wary too of US-Pakistan ties. For the near future India will sustain close arms ties to Russia and increasing weapons purchases from the US, impacting its foreign policy but not sufficing to change it much since India is not like a small power. The reason why India refuses to follow the West is not Russian arms dependence but its national interests and overall foreign strategy. It seeks a balance between the two states. For Russia, India serves as a steady anchor in its third-world policy and a core market for arms sales. The US arms sales are for the “Indo-Pacific” region and containment of China and to reduce dependency on Russia, reasons for deepening arms cooperation. India has sought diversification from too much dependence on Russian arms and avoidance of being too close to it for “strategic autonomy.” Playing the two off, it seeks to boost high-tech domestic production. India is indispensable for the US with many shared interests despite some prominent discord.

Li Qingyang and Wang Weimin in Induyang Jingjiti Yanjiu, 2024, No. 3 analyzed the state of shifting India-Russia strategic relations and their prospects. They stressed the negative effects of the “Indo-Pacific strategy” and India continuously drawing closer to Western countries on this special relationship. India’s external, geopolitical environment improved after the Cold War, becoming a pivot in great power competition, while Russia’s need for India has risen. Meanwhile, India’s dependence on Russian armaments has gradually diminished, while Russia needs to strive to meet rising competition. In the Cold War era the Soviet Union had the superior position. Now, India is in the driver’s seat, as Russia’s fragility has become clear. In the new great power competition, India has opted for limited outreach to the US and limited distancing from China, while Russia keeps stressing the importance of the China-India-Russia triangle. As Russia’s international influence has receded, this triangle has become more limited for India, weakening the Indo-Russian link. India is suspicious of China-Russia cooperation. As one link has tightened, another has inevitably weakened in this triangle. Russia insists that Sino-Indian contradictions cannot impact Sino-Russian ties and that Indo-Russian cooperation on regional issues will strengthen. Given the Indian drift toward the US and Russian drift toward China, their bilateral relationship faces a contradiction and strategic decision. India will make relations with the West the core of its foreign policy, and US “Indo-Pacific” strategy rests on India. Ever more people see the US and Indian Indo-Pacific vision as a geopolitical continuation of the Cold War, containing Russia as well as China, while some Western states even see Russia’s strategy of inclusion in Asia as a “turn to China strategy.” The rise in India’s comprehensive national power leads it to assume an unprecedented international position, but it also is caught in an extreme nationalist trap with its strategic culture. The turnabout in relative power with Russia has impacted dependency ties, as has India’s unprecedented position in great power competition. With the US relatively weakened, China in the short run still behind the US, and Russia’s decline, India is sought by all and has less need of Russia. Relations are heading toward alienation, but due to India’s insistence on multilateral autonomy it needs Russia too. Key to understanding the situation is India’s thirst to be a great power. It cannot fully follow Western sanctions on China or not reject Russia’s role as one of the power centers, countenancing its behavior. Strategic ties to Russia were largely about continental security, to the US for maritime security, with Russia’s role persisting despite limited alienation of ties. They have shared interests in Central Asia, both seek a multipolar world, but ties have become less settled. When Putin visited India in 2021, they strove to narrow their differences, as India welcomed Russia’s neutrality on Sino-Indian tensions. Yet, ties were loosening. Russia’s strategic value was falling. India is the limiting factor in US-Indian relations, keeping some distance for its great power aspirations. Worsening Sino-Indian relations have to impact Indo-Russian ties too. Modi seeks to be the leader of the third world, while also joining with Japan and others in the Indo-Pacific for great power status. He also sees the SCO and BRICS as well as ASEAN ties as important platforms. Yet, his extreme nationalism could damage relations. At present Russia still has important strategic value for India, but there is no mutual strategic trust as a foundation for the troika with China.

Calling for an upgrading of strategic trust in the China-India-Russia triangle, the article asks Russia to better grasp India’s strategic concerns and India to more positively respond to Russia on regional matters, while China-India ties need a breakthrough. The three need to accentuate their common agenda, advancing economic growth and social stability, while criticizing Western foreign military behavior and supporting the global standing of developing countries. All three should support BRICS, the SCO, and other multilateral international organizations. Russia should play a positive role in Sino-Indian relations, given its eagerness to push this troika model. The stress was on India-Russia ties, downplaying bilateralism for multilateralism, i.e., with China included. Alternatively, Russia may lose all strategic value for India, ties weaken, and India tilt fully to the West, an outcome some are discussing as they see the first steps toward an alliance. India still takes a pragmatic attitude toward cooperation with Russia, as Russia still possesses considerable national power and regional influence, notably in Central Asia, while serving as India’s leading source of arms. If the Ukraine war continues to expand and Russian comprehensive national power suffers a steep decline, this not only would not be helpful for India-Russia strategic trust, it would also intensify the level of dependence on China. Various scenarios make the US the biggest winner from India’s shift. The upshot of the article is that the India-Russia relationship has changed, as Russia’s value has fallen, and it could weaken much further. India needs to proceed carefully in its foreign policy. Russia must recognize it could slip further as a partner for India. India-Russia ties reverberate in China-India, India-US, US-Russia, and China-US great power ties. They are an important bilateral nexus in world affairs and Asian security. Russia needs to get this right for its regional cooperation model.

In Eluosi, Dongou, Zhongya Yanjiu, 2024, No. 4, Wang Shida examined Russia-India relations. This followed another article distinguishing three options for India: adhering to the status quo, joining the US side in the sanctions regime, or favoring one side and compensating the other, e.g., by increasing help to the US on issues other than Russia as India supports the US in its rivalry with China in exchange for enabling Russia in the Ukraine conflict. Treated as a middle power, India is viewed as having limited options. Wang sees India-Russia ties shifting from a quasi-alliance (even after the Cold War, there was a “special and privileged strategic partnership”) to pragmatic cooperation. Although India has not followed the Western lead on sanctions and has bolstered energy relations, ties to Russia have been downgraded and marked by discord and instability, readers are told. On the Indo-Pacific strategy, there is a sharp divide. In bilateral ties, India has more leverage and initiative. Common interests have narrowed, as in economic ties, arms exports have faced more intense competition, the great power framework has grown more complex and unbalanced, and South Asia regional security ties are fragile. We wait to see how India’s multisided partnerships will shift. In 2023 Wang finds a qualitative improvement in US-India relations accompanying noticeable change in ties between India and Russia, dedicating his article to explaining these shifts and considering their possible consequences.

The article reviews considerable successes in Chinese studies of India-Russia relations. One author found ever closer ties of late across numerous dimensions with an impact on China. Another found them meeting complementary needs, concluding that closer ties have a positive influence on current international relations. A third author pointed to the impact of India-US relations on both China-Russia and China-India relations. Both states have been rising in this century, and they have agreed to strengthen cooperation with some positive effects for China, although they differ in their thinking about China. Thus, on the critical question of how China should react to their closer ties, the answer is approval. Security ties are a historical legacy, making geopolitics one nexus. Energy and economic ties meet future needs. Yet, the US “Indo-Pacific strategy” vs. China poses a problem, obstructing ties. The Ukraine crisis has exacerbated this, but in-depth, overall studies are few, and the Western ones lack objectivity. Agreement on a multipolar world and democratization of international relations meant considerable overlap on international relations after the Cold War, with no big clash of interests. Milestones were reached in 2000, 2010, 2017, and 2019, and India weathered external criticism for its response to Russia’s 2014 role in Crimea. In 2022, it also refused to join the Western camp and rejected simplifications that “Russia invaded Ukraine,” given the historical background and NATO expansion to the east. It kept importing the S-400 air defense system and bought lots of oil. Yet, India-Russia relations already had some discordant elements and conflicts of interest, as India took the lead. On the Russia-Ukraine clash, there was implicit criticism of Russia, as at the September 2022 SCO meeting, when Modi said this was a time of war and also expressed regrets in a call with Zelenskiy, while separately opposing the use of nuclear weapons there. India ignored Russian views of the “Indo-Pacific strategy,” as containing China and Russia, and “Cold War thinking” dividing the region. Thus, in 2017-21, India’s clear involvement in what became this strategy could not be overlooked as indirect criticism of Russia’s approach.

During the Cold War, there were three bases of India-USSR relations: security, mainly through arms exports; economics, seen in Soviet support for heavy industry; and the geopolitical impact of US-Pakistan ties and later China too vs. the Soviet Union. All of these have attenuated. Russia’s economic significance for India has dropped, especially as a market and as India’s economic model has changed, leaving only arms and oil from Russia. Coal exports from Russia and pharmaceuticals from India were tops in 2020. Russia-China trade and US-India trade and investment dwarfed Russia-India trade and investment. As for security, US and European arms exports pose fierce competition, as India diversifies its suppliers and becomes more self-sufficient. As Russia’s battlefield advances in Ukraine have not gone as expected, India’s trust in Russian weapons has declined, and Russian industry has had trouble satisfying Russia’s needs, impacting exports. In geopolitics, the importance of Russia has also fallen, as US-Pakistan ties deteriorated, especially under Trump. The US “Indo-Pacific strategy” prioritizes India versus China, leaving Russia aside, as Russia-Pakistan ties strengthen in response. Meanwhile, Sino-Indian relations, due to the border question and India welcoming the “Indo-Pacific strategy” have faced obstacles, while Sino-Russian ties drew closer. All this impacted India-Russia relations.

Looking ahead, India is the only country in both the Quad and the China-Russia-India cooperation system, two separate strategic directions, but declining India-Russia ties threaten to break this equilibrium. Internationally and regionally, India seeks multipolarity. The China-Russia-India grouping serves the former; the Quad is seen as serving the latter, which is foremost. The article highlights 2023 Modi-Biden agreements, ranging from South Asia to East Asia, to the South Pacific to the Middle East. Russia’s influence in India will keep falling, but India will not abandon its long-time good relationship, as seen in the Ukraine crisis. India and Russia lack both a common enemy and a common friend. The Russia-Ukraine conflict has accelerated the realignment under way.

In Guowai Lilun, 2024, No. 4, Men Honghua and Xu Boya compared great power strategies toward the rise of the “Global South,” using the US, Japan, India, and Russia as examples. As changes unseen in the world for 100 years accelerate, the collective significance of the “Global South” keeps growing, becoming a new agenda of great powers. To a degree, this puts pressure on China’s own foreign policy there, with implications for how it prioritizes the BRI. The Ukraine crisis caused great power geopolitical competition to visibly accelerate, and the “Global South’s” role as an independent political and economic force increased, impacting change in the international order. Its strategic value grew; great powers divided in their response. The West, led by the US, sought to split the “Global South.” Japan and other US allies aimed to “draw the South to the West” and use India. Russia shifted its “turn to the East” to the South, seeking to break the sanctions regime.

The rise of the “Global South” as an international force is one of the important indicators of an era of great change unseen in 100 years, impacting Western leadership of the global economic and political system that marginalized this area. First, world economic trends accelerated “rise of the South, fall of the North.” China is an important member of the “Global South,” striving to advance South-South science and technology advances and self-reliance of the region. India and Brazil are other rising economies, proving that developing countries need not blindly follow Western countries. After the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, states in the South refused to join or openly opposed Western sanctions against Russia, rapidly raising consciousness of a “Global South” political awakening. The African Union in 2023 joined the EU as the second regional member. Clearly, the very notion of “Global South” suited China’s hopes for a new world order and rejection of protectionism, reducing countries’ dependence on a West-centered order.

Major states are focusing great energy on the “Global South.” The US did so, seeking to split it and to get support for sanctions on Russia, but even NATO ally Turkey as well as ally the Philippines, balked. As China and other “Global South” states grew ever closer, the US was alarmed. Japan saw relations with the “Global South” as a big opportunity, seeking both to represent the West there and to express an autonomous foreign policy. It claimed that it would be more successful by eschewing ideology and regional fragmentation by offering a third way, neither the West nor China-Russia. India sought to use the G20 to position itself to lead the “Global South” and become a leading great power, the southwestern power, and a bridge between South and North. It wanted to avoid being marginalized between the US-Russia and China-US paradigms, while using the US desire to contain China. Russia also made this region a priority, globalizing its actions to completely break from the West in 2022 and prioritizing the South along with the East in place of the West, aiming to replace the US in Africa, where US influence was falling.  It sought to sustain its great power status and strengthen a multi-sided world, but the author ignores its aim to separate from China
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The US seeks to make the Indo-Pacific a center of the “Global South,” using India and Japan as forces and focusing on Southeast Asian states as well as an India-Middle East-Europe economic corridor. Japan counts heavily on India as well as Southeast Asia, India is turning east to Southeast Asia as well as the Middle East. Russia prizes the BRICS for turning east and south. Great powers are each looking in this new direction competitively, accelerating the global fragmentation. The US seeks to sideline China, break “Global South” cohesion, and separate China strategically and ideologically (soft power) from this arena, also seeing a division of West, East, and South. The article views China as a natural member of the “Global South,” its top economy and market and asks how to deepen cooperation through shared identity, stress on South-South relations not divisions, stress the autonomy as well as common prosperity of the South, advance the BRI concept vs, the Indo-Pacific one, and solidify supply chains with economic growth foremost and pursuit if a common destiny.

In Xinjiang Daxue Xuebao, 2025, No. 1 Yang Shenglan analyzed the drivers of India-Russia relations after Modi took power, pointing to both pragmatism and a great power dream. As close as ties have become with the US, the traditional partnership with Russia has not been greatly affected. Three features noted are: a suspension of annual, bilateral summits as some political differences surfaced; a gradual weakening of defense and security cooperation; and a continuing dearth of deep economic ties even as cooperation deepened. Driving factors remain strong: the need for Russia’s support for India’s great power dream; traditional ties leading to deepening relations; and common geopolitical and economic interests. Both India and Russia are called China’s neighboring great powers. While many studies cover arms trade, economic cooperation, and geopolitics, they mainly treat the early post-Cold War years to the early 21st century before a historic shift in the international environment, especially Modi’s impact over more than a decade.  Since late in his first term, divisions between the two states began to widen, especially over “Indo-Pacific” questions, even as economic cooperation was stressed more. Arms trade is the centerpiece of the relationship. In 2014-2018 27% of Russia’s arms exports and 57% of India’s imports were involved, but a downward trend followed after some big purchases were made and joint development advanced. Overall, trade and investment, apart from energy, is the weak link in relations. India imports far more than it exports.
Already in the 1960s India sought to be the third great power along with the US and Soviet Union, and in 2014 Modi reasserted that goal—to be a leading global power not a balancer. Modi boosted ties with Russia with this aim in mind, including for support to become a permanent member of the Security Council. Modi seeks a multipolar world, seeing Russia as a partner. He also views the Indo-Pacific as vital to his goal, including the Russian Far East as a regional interest. Thus, India seeks a balance among China, the US, and Russia. From the time of Putin’s visit to India in 2000 relations qualitatively improved. India values this. In Central Asia, they have shared interests, especially in security. For India, this includes containing China there. Modi also seeks Russian cooperation in the Indian Ocean, seen as its backyard, with one concern being Russia drawing closer to China. Russia also offers access to the Arctic with value in accessing natural gas and oil. Thus, in the Central Asian, Indian Ocean, and Arctic regions, Modi saw geopolitical and economic reasons for cooperation. Among great powers, Modi prioritized the US and Russia, but compared to earlier leaders, ties to Russia were less important.

Zhao Kejin wrote about new great power diplomacy in the China-US-Russia triangle in Eluosi, Dongou, Zhongya, 2025, No. 3, focusing on the impact of the “Trump shock wave” in 2025 in the context of change in the relative power of China and the United States. The logic of the triangle has changed, readers are told, combining competition and cooperation, and China must boost its role as the driving force. The US is currently the only superpower at the center of the world’s political and economic systems. The “Trump shock wave” has global effects, accelerating global change with the eye of the storm this triangle, and China needing to respond.
The idea of a ”grand triangle” (dasanjiao) dates to the 1960s. In 1969 under Mao and Zhou Enlai’s direction, Chen Yi and four others introduced “Initial Calculations of the War Situation” and other reports that recognized that the Sino-Soviet contradiction is greater than the Sino-US one, and the US-Soviet one is greatest of all. Thus, China could take the strategic initiative to impact mutual triangular relations at a time the US is responding to Sino-Russian ties through Kissinger’s grand strategic triangle (zhanlue da sanjiao) theory, aiming to improve ties to China and use that to improve ties to the Soviet Union and become the pivot in the triangle. Discussions of this triangle ever since have been the focus of strategic thinkers, including Lowell Dittmer’s analysis dividing strategic triangles into four types, which can shift from one to another if conditions are met. The rise of Western Europe and Japan as well as China had resulted in states seeking more autonomy in the two main cold war camps, giving rise to the Sino-US-Soviet triangle taking shape in the late 60s and early 70s, especially after the Sino-US ping pong diplomacy. With the US the sole remaining superpower in the 1990s the earlier strategic triangle ended, leaving China and Russia under US strategic pressure. Only China’s rise brought objective conditions for the revival of the strategic triangle with Russia, notably with its power in the Western Pacific. Increasingly, strategic parity is apparent. Russia, India, Japan, and other major powers have latent triangular relations with China and the US together. The US has shifted to viewing China as a strategic competitor, treating it and Russia that way in its “Indo-Pacific strategy.”  Since 2011 China and Russia have deepened relations, doing so comprehensively in 2017 and further in 2019. With the Russia-Ukraine clash, the US and its allies have sanctioned Russia further, leading Sino-Russian ties ever closer to the form of a bilateral marriage in a strategic triangle, even if both to date oppose an anti-US alliance and seek improved ties to it. As Sino-US ties reach a stage of strategic stalemate, Russia increasingly is in the pivot, able to influence their ties.

The US debate on this triangle picked up rapidly from 2017. One issue was whether China or Russia is the main competitor, leading to “dual containment” and driving a wedge as well as other approaches, reflecting contradictions. In Trump’s first term, he focused on improving ties to Russia to counter China together, but he was inexperienced in dealing with intelligence and policymaker pushback, and this ended in failure. Now he is set to launch a new “Trump shockwave” without the limitations he faced previously. He plans to resolve the Ukraine question, boost US-Russia ties, concentrate on the Sino-US strategic competition, and realize a strategic triangle effect, making room for two goals: internal political transformation and competition with China. However, Trump’s plans are not proceeding as smoothly as expected—on the war and normalization of ties to Russia—even as West vs. West divisions are rising. Biden carried on Trump’s China policy, and the overall direction will remain with changes in strategy and methods to achieve comprehensive economic containment. Improving ties to Russia is a new card in competition with China, while on this basis holding summits with Chinese leaders to avoid relations spiraling out of control. Trump has a clear strategic logic in what is seen as a dog-eat-dog world. There will be lots of limiting factors: in US-Russia normalization, in splitting China and Russia, and in disrupting Sino-US relations. Globalization has created a new context for great powers, increasing non-government actors’ impact and the role of regional groups as China’s BRI, Russia’s EEU, and the US “Indo-Pacific strategy.” Trump’s shock wave is a non-traditional diplomatic force, reflecting right-wing forces and the “tech right-wing” against Wall Street and impacting great powers. Yet, Trump as well as Biden has no intention of engaging in a great power war. There is no way the three states will cut ties to each other or find a path to victory via pressure. They need a win-win result unlike the Cold War era. A new logic applies, which China must identify and pursue. The Sino-US relationship is the most important bilateral tie in the world, as the balance of power draws ever closer, GDP totals together are reaching 40% of the global sum. What matters is the complication in stabilizing world relations more than the Russia-Ukraine war or Trump’s impact on the world in this time of unprecedented change over 100 years. Other states, including Russia, are losing their opportunity to impact this relationship. It is Sino-US relations in the driver’s seat in this triangle and world affairs. China should manage the “Trump shock wave” to stabilize the triangle, positively resolving regional hot spots. As Sino-Russian relations have improved, outside influences, such as US-Russia ties, have had little impact. They can be maintained and strengthened in the face of Trump. On the Ukraine crisis, China should not sacrifice its interests with a third party in return for its actions. The Ukraine violence and Western sanctions have led to an upgrade in Sino-Russian relations. Trump is prompting a new logic in great power relations. Yet the triangle differs from the Sino-US-Soviet one due to the shared opening of the world economy through globalization. The world cannot be fragmented. Despite Western sanctions on Russia since 2014 and trade tensions with China, conflict of the great powers should be avoided, China needs a new great power logic in the face of the Russia-Ukraine clash and the “Trump shock wave,” supporting new neutral regions and tightening globalization, while stabilizing Sino-US ties on a foundation of stronger Sino-Russian cooperation for a new era.