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Two tendencies in 2025 stood out in Chinese writings on Northeast Asia: gaining a further edge on Russia and temporarily improving relations somewhat with Japan and South Korea. The Ukraine war (some avoided calling it that) offers advantages to Beijing in jockeying over multilateralism with Russia, putting more pressure on Moscow to accept the BRI, while accelerating de-Russification in Central Asia. Keeping Russia focused on multipolarity on a global scale remains the priority, and China can be patient as trends move in its direction, but the boldness visible in welcoming those trends suggests that patience is declining. As for Japan, the arrival of Takaichi Sanae and her frank comments on Taiwan reversed hopes under Ishiba of limited improvement in relations. Prospects for Lee Jae Myung appeared more promising, if still limited, as even his emissary to the September 3 victory-day parade rated an evaluation as rather high-level, keeping some momentum after Lee’s inauguration.
In Taipingyang Xuebao,No. 8, Li Xing described the effort and difficulties impacting Russian Eurasian unification, distinguishing between institutional mechanism building and discourse system construction. Russia is a Eurasian great power, which strives to promote regionalism since its independence. It has tried numerous approaches, including the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the SCO, and BRICS. It has proposed ideological and conceptual discourse frameworks such as the Greater Eurasian Partnership (GEP), Slavic Brotherhood, Russian civilization, and Russian world.
Despite recognizing certain successes, Li points to setbacks as well, explaining that there are significant tensions between ambitions and capabilities. Li highlights de-Russification trends in Eurasia and historical trends that defy Russia’s strategic preferences. They leave the path of Eurasian integration arduous and protracted. Ahead is the critical task of aligning Russia’s designs with the BRI, while achieving discursive complementarity. This is described as an important challenge. More candid than Russian sources that assume Moscow and Beijing have agreed on such complementarity, e.g., between the GEP and BRI, the apparent message is that Russia needs to accept the BRI and accommodate it in its own agenda for regional integration.
Li proceeds to question Russian designs for economic integration and the idea of using the CSTO for military integration in their alignment with BRI and GEP, noting analysts who discuss the motives and character of Russia’s Eurasian integration and whether Eurasian integration is complementary to or competitive with the BRI. For over 30 years, studies of Eurasian integration have remained quite weak, leaving many empty holes. Integration involves economics, trade, security, politics, society, transportation, etc. For it to be systematic, it needs to have a division of labor and an overall framework, including management. In a process of integration, the relationship of institutions and discourse narrows as soft power grows. Li observes that the Eurasian region occupies an extremely important place in international politics.
Overall, organizations have been expanding, but the CIS, starting with 12 former states of the Soviet Union, defied Moscow’s agenda, independent but not united, and under Yeltsin, Russia lacked the force for integration. The Eurasian integration process mainly came after Putin took charge. Russia had three favorable conditions in Central Asia: a gun barrel, an oil pipeline, and a lingua franca, drawing on cultural identity. Ukraine left with an EU free trade agreement. Uzbekistan left the CIS too. Losing Eastern Europe, Russia turned more to Central Asia, sharing leadership with China. At times, Russia conceptualized it. At other times, China did, as in “community of common destiny.” In 2017, they jointly proposed the “polar silk road.” Karaganov wrote that China and Russia are forging a new, united greater Eurasia from Lisbon to Vladivostok. Russians are accustomed to calling the space of the former Soviet Union “Eurasia.” Putin confuses community, a group with shared goals, with union, an entity with a joint central government. Often, the former can be the precondition of the latter. China and Russia are great powers of Eurasia. Their mixture of complementarity and competition in economic integration is especially noteworthy in their relationship. Russia’s position in Europe is now weakened, leaving Eurasianism mainly in the central and eastern parts of Eurasia. The GEP remains conceptual. The Silk Road Economic Belt and the GEP are, at the same time, complementary and conflictual.
Russia has sought a community based on Slavic ethnicity (in Europe), Russian culture (unique and self-contained), and then something else. The GEP has elicited much talk, calling for recognition of Russia as a Eurasian great power, extending from Europe to the Pacific (a Euro-Pacific great power) and serving as a cultural bridge between civilizations or a balancing geopolitical force between the US and China. As the West declines and other regions rise, global power moves to the East. Yet, Eurasian integration is challenging for Russia due to its insufficient capabilities and the assumption that Russia is the core, with no clear way to forge networks.
This leaves things unstable. There is a lot of talk and little action or results. This is primarily government-driven, with scant follow-up. Academic, civilian, and enterprise voices are quiet. The contrast with the BRI is striking. Intentions belie forces to act. Russia’s economic power is not great; it is spending that on war, and its influence is limited. Members of the CIS are increasingly de-Russifying. Russia’s narrative logic draws scant support. The Global South has insufficient trust in Russia. In the CIS, Russia mainly relies on its military, security, energy, natural resources, and pipelines, i.e., hard power, not a development model or soft power. Another difficulty is the contradictory nature of Russia’s concept of integration. Eurasianism mixes politics, economics, and geography with history, culture, and ethnicity while seeking a new union of states, despite the GEP omitting this. In essence, Eurasianism is a concept of an ethnic state framework, and the GEP is a foreign policy notion, basically different from Eurasianism. Neither notion, as Chinese see them, is endorsed, in this skeptical account, omitting mention of what Eurasia means to Chinese.
The Silk Road Economic Belt’s core is “Asia-Europe,” while that of the GEP is “Europe-Asia.” They are mostly similar, but there is a real difference, as in the way Russia characterizes the “Polar Silk Road.” To date, the two sides have not found agreement. Russia does not refer to a “silk road,” just the “northern transport route.” Russian consciousness on the Silk Road Economic Belt or BRI versus the EEU has undergone a complicated transition, going through stages of incomprehension and doubt before gradual recognition and partial acceptance, but not happily. It finally wanted to board China’s economic wagon. However, Russia is a great power, and there is little possibility that it will fully embrace BRI. GEP has elements of complementing and countering BRI. Russia has an innate sense of insecurity and distrust. Its resistant psychology to some degree interferes with cooperation with some Eurasian countries and exerts a negative influence on the Eurasian integration process. Russia’s efforts at Eurasian (yaou, not ou, in Chinese writing; ouya when referring to Russian plans) have met with some success, sustaining its Eurasian great power status, serving a Eurasian and global multipower order, and keeping NATO and the EU at bay in the CIS arena. Russia and China have avoided antagonistic competition. The Silk Road Economic Belt and the EEU have found common ground. Russia is comparatively pragmatic, biding its time (taoguang yanghui), with still quite a bit of survivability (shengmingli). It has made a realistic choice in its “turn to the East.” Eurasian integration is an expression of striving for global multipolarity. Yet, it aims for regional leadership consistent with historical tradition and its ethnic character. In the 1990s and 2000s, the CIS was primarily an integration mechanism, but this changed rapidly, especially in the 2020s, slowing down. CIS states for economic, security, cultural, and historical reasons, have shifted and connected to the Silk Road Economic Belt. Efforts at Eurasian integration cannot disappear. Yet the record mixes success and failure. The future holds in store win-win ties with BRI, coexistence without fear, something Russians appear hesitant to embrace.
Great challenges will be faced in Russia’s Eurasian integration due to Russia’s weakness, especially its lack of comprehensive national power, notably its economy and development model. De-Russification proceeds. Plans are contradictory. A big question for Russia and also an opportunity is how cooperation with BRI will proceed, readers are told.
The essence of Li Xing’s article is that Russia is too weak to keep pursuing its own designs for Eurasian regionalism and must reconsider how to deal with the BRI. Its old model for integration to the 2010s centered on the CIS and had a big European component, but that had to be discarded. Its transitional approach accelerated in the 2020s, but so too did de-Russification. Russia and China, we learn, have only partially coordinated their integration strategies, differing on the term Eurasia, and on the name for the Northern Sea Route, as examples. Li hints at China upping the pressure on Russia to accept the BRI and adjust to its weakness through a strategy less autonomous and more accepting of China’s agenda.
In Elousi Yanjiu, No. 4 Xu Changzhi differentiated what is changing and not changing in Russian relations with Central Asian countries, saying that ties are complex and cannot be readily explained by the usual paradigms of relations between great powers and neighboring medium and small states. Xu turns to history and civilizational dimensions and to the turbulence and transformation of international relations, where a “once-in-a-century” global shift accompanies regional restructuring. If, as an external power, Russia is caught in the contradiction between geopolitical competition and regional state autonomy, the intensity of it has not yet resulted in a qualitative transformation. Russia lacks a development model that suits its conditions, while stressing its unique identity as a “civilizational state,” defying global trends. The Russia-Ukraine conflict has led to a third wave of “de-Russification” in Central Asia, which is not anti-Russian or pro-West but follows a diversified, balanced, pragmatic, and proactive foreign policy. Seeking to capitalize on its geographical, security, and cultural advantages in the hope of reinforcing its influence in the region after the conflict, Russia will find it difficult to reverse a long-term, gradual decline in its strategic primacy. It has yet to figure out its domestic and foreign direction, a problem given the complicated relations with Central Asian states, as it seeks space as an outsider great power, and they pursue autonomy. This contradiction has yet reached a qualitative change as Russia’s historical role still gives it influence.
Relying on a “civilizational state” defiant of global trends leads to “de-Russification” and the pursuit of multilateral foreign policy. Russia is planning for the “post-Ukraine conflict period” through exerting more geopolitical, security, cultural, etc. superiority, but it will be hard to reverse the trend of declining strategic leadership. Divisions over ethnic history narratives have been widening, exerting a negative influence on bilateral relations, e.g., on how to assess Soviet ethnic policies toward Central Asian nationalities. Especially under the influence of the Ukraine crisis, the ethnic question has grown more sensitive in Russian-Kazakhstan relations. Kazakhs ask if Russia could treat them the same way. Putin has denied that Kazakhstan had established a state in the past, angering locals and fueling remembrances of Genghis Khan, as at the 2024 SCO meeting it hosted. There is talk of Central Asia being influenced by multiple Eurasian civilizations: Persian and Turkic among them. Russia’s role did not exceed 200 years, although it still exerts a big influence.
China’s historic ties go back thousands of years, including control over eastern Central Asia, but the impact of Chinese civilization is not deep. An upsurge in national identity feelings, compounded by the response to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, has accelerated de-Russification, an irreversible process. The first wave occurred in the 1990s, when Russia turned to the West and treated Central Asia as an albatross for its economic development, as the Central Asians struggled to forge their autonomy. The second wave started in 2012 when Putin clearly involved Russia more in Central Asia, accompanied by the reaction to the Crimean annexation. The article explains various facets of de-Russification. As for the third wave from 2022, states distanced themselves more from Russia, striving to separate from the Russian model but also to avoid Western sanctions. The SCO influenced the cohesion of the Central Asian states, raising their autonomous security and multilateral security cooperation and gradually reducing their degree of security dependence on Russia. Earlier de-Russification mainly was pushed by officials, and the new wave of change involves officials and citizens taking parallel action, as groups expressed dissatisfaction with Russia’s military actions and found some government support.
The first waves centered on culture, e.g., limiting Russian language use. The new wave intensified political reform and took a neutral stance on Russia’s Ukraine conduct, while expanding economic ties to the West and East as dependence on Russia fell. Some even called Putin a “terrorist.” The first waves solidified sovereignty and national identity. The third wave went deeper, boosting outside influences. Not criticizing Putin directly, this article concentrates on Central Asian reservations about his policies and intentions, confirming public wariness.
What are Russia’s strategy and goals in Central Asia? Compared to 2016, its 2023 white paper centered on deepening ties and mutual dependence with nearby areas, using shared language and culture and forging a collective security framework and economic integration process. Also cited was integrating the Eurasian economic and political space. It is still unknown if comprehensive national power will suffice. The next five years pose dangers, given the US drive to preserve its global hegemony and shifting great power ties. Yet, the overall trend is toward a common destiny for humankind. In this setting, Russia’s push for global multipolarity is a constructive force challenging the global order. Russia’s losses in Ukraine and Western sanctions both reduce Russia’s influence in Central Asia, exposing a growing contradiction between its intentions and capabilities. Choosing the Russian path and civilization would be out of the world’s mainstream. It will be difficult to reverse the de-Russification trend, but the process could proceed for quite a long time and not mean that states are completely leaving Russian influence. The message for Chinese is to wait Putin out.
Missing altogether in Xu’s analysis is China’s impact on de-Russification. In contrast, a big factor cited is the spillover from Russian behavior in Ukraine. Xu strikes a balance between the positive role Russia’s moves in Central Asia play for multipolarity versus the West and their negativity bucking natural trends. The message for China appears to be to stay patient and rely on long-run trends of declining Russian influence, staying silent on Chinese aims.
In Guoji Zhengzhi Kexue, No. 3, Huang Bei and Si Xiaoyu described an opportunity to ameliorate Sino-Japanese relations amid indeterminate conditions. They depict 2024 as a year of recovery on many dimensions, temporarily eluding the obstacles of Japan’s one-sided tilt to the United States, and in 2025 Japan deepening cooperation with China in the face of the Trump shock. Therefore, the coming year under Ishiba’s expected leadership (July 2025-June 2026) brings an opportunity for further stabilization, although bilateral contradictions cannot be resolved. Given uncertainty about Japanese politics and the US factor, there is a limit to the degree of improvement possible, the authors conclude.
Bottoming out and rebounding in the final months of 2024 under Ishiba, relations were on an upward track, readers were told, but they appeared to be warned of a leadership change or Trump’s unpredictability complicating the prognosis. The authors credit Ishiba’s intent and the Xi-Ishiba dialogue in Lima, invigorated exchanges of officials, Sino-Japanese-South Korean cooperation, and progress on the Fukushima water discharge effects. They warn that Taiwan and other security and territory issues remain sensitive, while historical issues persist. Hope in Ishiba is linked to his role as a disciple of Tanaka Kakuei and his shift away from Kishida’s positions toward the US and China. Trump’s impact on Sino-Japanese ties has been mixed. Unlike Biden, he does not link allies in containment while challenging them economically and on military budgets and downplaying values as on Ukraine. At the same time, Ishiba’s comments after the February summit with Biden showcased negative views on Taiwan, the Diaoyu Islands, and the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” as well as bilateral military cooperation.
As Trump’s strategic competition policy toward China grows clearer, it will have a negative impact on Sino-Japanese relations. Sino-Japanese contradictions are mainly three-fold: the rightward drift of Japanese politics, raising the “China threat theory” and shaping public opinion, including many in the LDP opposed to Ishiba’s China policy; the addition of Taiwan and the South China Sea to the issues exacerbating relations; and Japan’s new military policies and alliance strengthening. Predicting stabilized ties for the next year, the authors missed the shift to Takaichi, although Trump’s Busan summit with Xi Jinping may have a countervailing effect, as an April Trump visit to China is being prepared.
In Guoji Zhengzhi Kexue, No. 2, optimism is expressed for limited recovery of China-ROK relations by Jin Cizhen and Zhao Yujia, noting that tensions had risen from early 2023. Yoon had aroused Chinese dissatisfaction through his military cooperation with the United States and others while interfering in China’s internal affairs. On Taiwan and the Philippines, he had crossed red lines. The period from September 2022 to April 2025 was the low point in ties since the THAAD issue arose. Given Lee Jaemyung’s June accession and the shift in US policy toward South Korea, we expect restoration of ties in 2025-26, but it will be limited by the US-ROK security alliance relationship and shifts in the Sino-ROK economic and trade framework. Thus, relations will not revert to the level reached before Yoon.
Explaining why relations deteriorated under Yoon, the authors blame his disregard for longstanding “strategic ambiguity” and his support for pro-US, anti-China “values diplomacy.” Yoon ignored China’s core interests. Siding with the US on foreign policy crossed China’s red lines, harming the foundation of relations. Cooperating with US allies (including triangularity with Japan that impacted China’s regional security environment’s peace and stability) and joining Biden’s global strategy, going beyond the peninsula in a kind of “NATOization.” Yoon also joined the US in restricting supply chains and cutting-edge technology, while joining the “Indo-Pacific economic framework.” Lee Jae-myung is expected to be more careful on sensitive themes, greatly reducing talk that touches on China’s core interests, while Seoul looks for space vs. Trump’s policies. The imbalance caused by Yoon in foreign policy to the US and China could be ended. Yet, the security dependence on the US and the intention to stabilize ties with the US will limit progress. Youth growing distrust of China pressures the leadership. Meanwhile, economic ties, long the pillar for stable relations, saw exports to China dropping below 20$ for the first time in 20 years and exports to the US overtaking them. As China’s technology has improved, it does not need South Korea’s intermediate inputs as much, as in semiconductors, while South Korea is becoming more dependent. The dependency relationship has switched, and China is viewed as a competitor, requiring Seoul to find other markets. Ties will, thus, be limited.
In Dangdai Hanguo, No. 3, Wu Yuejin, Ha Weiyu, and Ling Shengli wrote about Lee Jae-myung’s pragmatic diplomacy, crediting him with flexibly handling Sino-US relations. Based on “pragmatic diplomacy centered on national interests,” he is enhancing centrism and Korea’s middle power status. However, consolidating the US-ROK alliance and continuing the US-Japan-ROK security partnership destabilizes regional security. Yet, there are quite favorable conditions for “pragmatic diplomacy” to advance gradually. Lee should avoid letting Northeast Asia split into two camps, instead following a win-win approach. Similar to other Chinese sources, the only focus is on South Korean behavior, ignoring any actions of China, North Korea, or Russia, which could provoke this behavior or impact Lee’s moves. The message is to put national interests first, as if closer ties with the US and Japan fail to do that, and strive for greater foreign policy autonomy, as if there are no forces against that.
In September, articles and transcripts of CCTV coverage explained the significance of the victory-day parade on September 3 (9/3), looking back on history for its contribution to the success of China. It sends a message that other states and areas should not use war to resolve conflicts. The dual theme was war to resist Japan and international anti-fascist war, and the dual objective was to celebrate victory and advance the situation in Northeast Asia as well as global change.
Most critical was North Korea, where the Chinese invitees participated in the war and achieved relative stability in the region. Kim Jong-un’s attendance was related to Lee Jae Myung’s foreign policy of leaning on the United States for security and on China for economics. Kim is also preparing for the conclusion of the Russia-Ukraine war, for nuclear talks with the United States, and for using multilateral diplomacy. Russia is hard-pressed to continue the war to its desired end, in which case its need for North Korea would greatly diminish. It has received energy, grain, and capital, and it is now preparing for that outcome, hoping that China could replace Russia’s role. Ties to Russia were temporary. Whether China would do this is not guaranteed, but Kim had to try.
Kim is intent on getting recognition of North Korea as a nuclear state. A South Korean source raised the possibility of a “security to Russia, economy to China” pathway for the North, requiring China’s consent. Despite external speculation, there is no trilateral union. Yet, cooperation is growing and will depend on the external environment, while impacting the state of Northeast Asia. North Korean coverage of Kim’s reception was more effusive than China’s, which was more low-key. Moreover, Russian coverage of Power-of-Siberia-2 was exuberant, while Chinese were wary, not having settled on the price for the gas and still uncertain about Trump’s secondary sanctions while the war continues. Even so, cooperation of China, Russia, and North Korea will undoubtedly advance the situation in Northeast Asia, perhaps pushing Trump to talks on North Korea and advancing Sino-ROK ties, both spurred by Sino-North Korea cooperation. In turn, Sino-Russian cooperation will influence the end of the Russo-Ukraine war and the change in Russo-US and Sino-US relations. In this way, China’s memorial activity without doubt will deeply impact Northeast Asia and the entire globe. On September 13, Wang Yiwei expanded his analysis of the significance of the September 3 victory events, saying their point is that China cannot be defeated and should be left in peaceful coexistence, avoiding a world war and a Sino-US clash.
On September 18, an article reflected on the history of the war of resistance and the parade, while insisting that China’s contribution is being greatly underappreciated in the West. Given the parade, people are asking how to evaluate the history of WWII and to maintain the postwar international order. This assumes the US is threatening this order and peaceful development. Noted is the fact that China and the Soviet Union made the greatest sacrifices in the war. Chinese found it unjust that many treated WWII as starting in 1939 or, for most Americans, 1941. China faced the bulk of the Japanese army. The aim of the parade was to recall history, preserve peace, and open the way to the future. Yan Xuetong remarked that the fact that South Korea sent to the parade the chair of the National Assembly, a rather high post, suggests it cannot completely, one-sidedly lean to the US, and still needs a degree of balance between China and the United States. As the number of states cooperating on security with China grows, today’s bipolarity is even more obvious, he adds.
The September 3 victory parade in Chinese publications served three purposes but was not a game-changer for the China-Russia-North Korea triangle despite some foreign reports. First, it served as a statement about history: China played a big role in forging the postwar international order, its historical role is severely underappreciated in the West, and the order realized through the war (Japan’s pacifist obligations, etc.) and through the Korean War, for which Kim Jong-un’s presence was a clear reminder, is inviolable. Second, China’s military might now require others to accept its terms for peaceful coexistence, accepting its core interests, and the high-level official delegations are proof of that understanding. As a third purpose, we can discern the outlook that China is in charge in Eurasia, relegating Russia to a secondary role and touting the BRI. Pleading for closure on Power-of-Siberia-2, Russia’s claims of success rang hollow with China’s wary response. Putin, as well as Kim Jong-un, occupied a place of honor, but the substance of their treatment was not that of an equal partner in forging a new order, as commentaries on the Russia-Ukraine war, Central Asia, and Russia’s economy depicted a declining power, which China needs to a degree.
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