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In the waning summer of the Kishida administration, Japanese were concerned about a fast-deteriorating international environment. High hopes on the G7 continued, linked to praise of how the Hiroshima G7 a year earlier had set the foundation for dealing with China and North Korea. Yet, concern about the Global South had deepened, seen in responses to Russia’s ties India and Vietnam. Worry about the US elections was not far below the surface, as relief came from efforts to Trump-proof assistance to Ukraine in which Japan played an active part. Putin’s visit to North Korea raised considerable alarm about the impact on the North’s rising threat. At no point, was hope raised about China’s conduct or Sino-Japanese relations in this glum mood.
In the May/June issue of Gaiko former prime minister Fukuda Yasuo, now nearing 90 years old, reflected on foreign policy in his time as chief cabinet secretary under Mori and Koizumi and then as prime minister in 2007-08. He had a central role over a critical period. First, he noted the task force on diplomatic relations of September 2001, under the influence of economic forces, demonstrating Koizumi’s strong interest in foreign policy and following the secret use of funds by the Mori cabinet. This came as Foreign Minister Tanaka Makiko wreaked havoc in the foreign ministry through procedural and personnel changes. Coordination of the Kantei and the foreign ministry proved difficult, e.g., when Deputy Secretary of State Armitage visited Japan, Tanaka refused to meet him because he was of lower rank, and Fukuda as well as Koizumi did so. She did not last beyond January 2002, as the question of a Koizumi visit to North Korea was about to test Japan-US relations. Under Tanaka Hitoshi in the foreign ministry, plans advanced to make the trip to resolve the abductions issue, but few new of them, given the priority on secrecy. About a month before the visit Tanaka informed the United States shortly before the news were spread. Wariness followed, but Bush assented based on trust for Japan even as concern deepened over North Korea’s nuclear program. In 2003 Japan pressed for talks it would join on North Korea, and US trust played a big role in that outcome. As for the war on terrorism, Japan was intent on not repeating the situation in 1990-91 when it was slow to respond on the Persian Gulf War and did not get adequate credit for its $13 billion contribution, but it was put in a tough situation when the Bush administration attacked Iraq, concerning which Koizumi was skeptical before finally giving his clear support. Fukuda urged caution in saying anything at a press conference, especially as the situation with North Korea had grown tenser.
As prime minister, Fukuda benefited from a time without a big war or terror when China was trying to cooperate with international society, he recalls. Fukuda credits China in the global financial crisis with contributing greatly to recovery with the United States too appreciative. Deep trust was built with Japan, centering on concrete projects for energy efficiency and environmental goals. Fukuda credits Hu Jintao with being cooperative with international society and Japan, often listening to Japan and controlling the sprouts of disorder through diplomatic talks, as in the Six-Party Talks. Even as North Korea advanced its nuclear program, he adds that Japan needed talks to pursue the abductions issue, and the North agreed to joint investigations. The July 2008 G8 summit in Toyako, Hokkaido, was epoch-making for tackling global warming, but the one outlier was the United States. This played out with an expanded group of countries and a joint G8 and G20 summit. The US side held out, but he appealed to Bush, and at last a deal was reached, pleasing especially Germany and Great Britain. Fukuda faults the US side for not putting aside its core economic interests. He insists that Japan has indispensable partnerships with both America and Asian countries, for which Japan, given its longstanding ties, has deeper understanding, on which the US depends. Asian countries also rely on Japan to try to temper excessive US demands. Today as Sino-US tensions worsen, they do not want to get involved. Japan should exert influence from the point of view of stabilizing Asia in this rivalry. Moreover, as the US faces economic troubles, Fukuda sees it turning to diplomacy for solutions. In 1971 and 1985, it pressed Japan for such outcomes, leading to economic frictions. Lately, this has extended to pressure on allies to boost defense spending to 2% of GDP. “American First” is also evident in US economic security policy, including on semiconductors. Fukuda concludes with an appeal for a different perspective in discussions of America regarding international society.
Although an LDP politician, Fukuda Yasuo anticipated the DPJ leaders in 2009-11 after the brief stint of Aso Taro in questioning US policies in Asia. He offers a more benign view of China, failing to note the changes already visible in the second half of 2008 away from the positive images he conveys. He also discerns a long-term one-sidedness to US policy, continuing to today regarding economic security and defense contributions. Telling is his equation of Japan’s ties to Asia and to the United States without any suggestion that China is not a major part of the Asia Japan is prioritizing. In contrast to the Abe and Kishida wings of the LDP, Fukuda represents a holdover from earlier pacifism and idealism, justifying his policies as leader and rebuking those of others.
South Korea
In Toa, No. 6, Hirata Hideya covered South Korea’s dilemma in dealing with China after the Camp David declaration, balancing containing and engaging it. In the face of the Sino-US normalization of the 1970s, Seoul feared abandonment by the US, and now it fears entrapment due to Sino-US relations. Washington has sought strategic flexibility for its forces in South Korea. Roh Moo-hyun strongly opposed it. In 2021, there were US hints of this, and Moon Jae-in’s language shifted to seem to give some credence to them, but wording accepting division between authoritarianism and democracy that came with Yoon Suk-yeol did not mean agreement on how to respond to China. Yoon has resisted “excessive sensitivity” to China as unreasonable. In August 2022 he did not meet Nancy Pelosi when she visited Seoul after China’s uproar over her visit to Taiwan. He refers to China as an important cooperative partner for prosperity and peace in the Indo-Pacific. His national security strategy does not touch on the Taiwan Strait. South Korea is not part of the US missile defense aimed at China, suggesting that one of Moon’s “three noes” in late 2017 is still applicable. The language in the Biden-Kishida statement at Camp David was not the same as that in the Biden-Yoon statement, as China was left unmentioned in remarks on the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. Language about the healthy, mature development of the China-Japan-ROK (CJK) triangle is noteworthy, appearing to offer some balance or parallelism to the US-Japan-ROK triangle. No ROK-China summit occurred at the 2023 APEC summit, and, to Seoul’s disappointment, the US-China list of areas for cooperation omitted the Korean Peninsula. The article concludes that both conservatives and progressives seek to avoid entrapment in the US-China conflict. Yoon seeks room to improve relations with China and get Sino-US cooperation on the peninsula, but this gives China an opening to disrupt the Japan-US-ROK security triangle. As tensions mount over the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea, it will be difficult to restrain US insistence on “strategic flexibility” for its forces in Korea. South Korean diplomacy stands at a dangerous equilibrium in resolving the dilemma over containing or engaging China, concludes Hirata.
On June 11 Yomiuri pointed to the shared concerns about a declining birth rate in Japan and South Korea, the former with 1.20 and the latter at .72 in 2023, both new lows. The causes are similar: costly education, bias against women, and male lack of participation in child-rearing. Public opinion in both countries is doubtful that government policies are addressing the issue.
Another June 11 Yomiuri piece found a high degree of consensus in Japan and South Korea on strengthening trilateral security ties, but some differences regarding their targets. Japanese see the military threat almost equally from Russia, North Korea, and China (83-85%), but Koreans, having raised awareness of the threat from North Korea (from 70 to 80% in a year to 2023), are less attentive to the other threats (China 61%, Russia 52%–a rise of 8%. Asked to choose between the future importance of the United States and China for their country, 19% in Japan chose China while 28% of Koreans did so. On what cooperation should be favored in Japan-ROK relations, Japanese stressed diplomacy and security, but Koreans put tourism at the top even as more than 70% also listed diplomacy and security (72 vs. 88% in Japan).
The June 11 Yomiuri reported the results of a joint poll with Hanguk Ilbo on bilateral relations, noting that for two years running more than 40% (42%) of Korean respondents saw relations as good. In Japan the figure was 53%. Feeling friendly to the other side were 48% of Japanese and 33% of Koreans, the highest level since 2013. Approving strengthening three-way ties with the United States were 86% of Japanese and 79% of Koreans. Yet, worrying that the Yoon impact could be reversed in three years, the paper emphasized seizing the opportunity of the 60th anniversary of normalization in 2025 to boost the contents of cooperation, building on the past year of great expansion in cooperation in many spheres. On May 26 Kishida had visited Seoul for his 10th meeting with Yoon. When asked if relations would improve, Japanese were less hopeful, however, falling from 34 to 17% in a year in thinking so, while 70% forecast little change. Kimura Kan was cited as saying that while in Japan there was little difference in left and right in support for ties to Korea, in South Korea views were split although it had become harder for the critics to use the issue politically. In Japan unease had risen with the April Korean election results. In a Yomiuri editorial, the worsening regional security environment was cited for why Koreans now accept trilateral security ties. Young people in both countries have the friendliest attitudes. It says that the Korean opposition should take care since trouble in trilateral relations would not only be a boon for North Korea, Russia, and China, but also not in South Korea’s interest.
A June 12 Yomiuri story focused on addresses to the US Congress, noting that Kishida’s was the fifth for a Japanese leader but that 54 years had passed between Ikeda’s and Abe’s (Yoshida and Kishi had spoken in the 1950s). Economic frictions and later rapid turnover of prime ministers had taken a toll. In 2006 an address by Koizumi was explored, but chairman of the foreign affairs committee Hyde had opposed it after Koizumi’s Yasukuni visit. South Korea had tried to stop Abe’s address over the comfort women issue, but “nemawashi” with members of Congress of Korean descent helped to bring it about. Yoon’s 2023 address was the seventh for a Korean. In comparison to Japan, Germany and Italy at five each also are ahead, readers are informed.
On June 24 Yomiuri reported the appointment of Park Cheol Hee as ambassador to Japan. It noted that Park, an expert on Japan, had been sent to Japan in April 2022 as a member of the Yoon post-election delegation, served as a foreign policy “brain” for Yoon, and would be seeking to strengthen bilateral relations in accord with the 60th anniversary of normalization in 2025. Not noted is that, along with Chung Jae Ho, ambassador to China, Yoon has selected professors at Seoul National University recognized as the top specialists in Korea to serve in key positions.
Sino-Russian Relations
On June 3 Takemori Shunpei reflected in Yomiuri on Sino-Russian relations. He found that in the 2000s economic ties were boosted by China’s rapid growth, demanding energy, which boosted Russian growth through high prices. Putin’s success depended heavily on China’s economic power, as both benefited from globalization led by the United States. The shale revolution in the 2010s eventually turned things around as did the shift away from globalization, but the Ukraine war has driven China and Russia even closer together. Russia has needed imports lost elsewhere and export markets also lost. Chinese decoupling from the West and protectionism driven by high inflation is leading toward an autonomous Sino-Russian interdependent economic sphere.
On July 4 after Putin and Xi Jinping had met in Astana, Yomiuri focused on how they had tightened their pact against the United States, called by Putin the pillar of a just, multipolar world order and by Xi a force for a community of common destiny. The Russian side said the leaders pointed toward early agreement on the “force of Siberia-2” natural gas pipeline. On July 5 a Yomiuri article cited an American NATO officer as saying that China knowingly exported arms for Russia to use in the Ukraine war, and by doing so it sacrificed good economic relations with the West. This hinted at increased sanctions against Chinese firms. On new Russo-North Korean closeness, the article said while China is not necessarily, but it will not stand in the way.
Russia
A visit by the Romanian ambassador to Russia to the Northern Territories drew criticism in FNN Online on July 18. Russian media had reported she was totally satisfied with this tourist visit. A visit there by a high official of a country friendly to Japan is noted by Russian media. Developing the islands, Russia has been appealing for investments by Chinese firms and North Korean labor.
Russo-North Korean Relations
On smuggling between North Korea and Vostochnyi port in Russia, Yomiuri on June 9 carried an extensive study of the regular traffic, including oil and arms. Blatant sanctions violations eased by silencing AIS signals, proceed without the scrutiny of the UN expert group, now disbanded. The Security Council has been rendered helpless. China and Russia from 2018-19 have opposed sanction enforcement and drawn closer with North Korea after Russia in 2022 invaded Ukraine further. In response the Japan-US-ROK triangle and G7 have strengthened their relationships. A part of the smuggling, kerosine used for rocket fuel may be supplied to North Korea.
The mid-June Putin-Kim summit in Pyongyang drew extensive coverage in Japan. It cemented the view that Russia is a dangerous menace, not only in Europe but in Asia. On June 21 Yomiuri called for tightening ties to the United States and South Korea for regional security. Weapons to North Korea were a primary concern. Advice offered to China was to stop joining with Russia and North Korea since it is not in China’s interest to intensify pressure from the US and others. Renewal of the military alliance between Moscow and Pyongyang was of deep concern. Such messages came shortly after Yomiuri editorialized on the “peace summit” in Switzerland in support of intensified pressure against Russia. On June 18 it called for galvanizing international public opinion to assist Ukraine, fretting that the Global South, including India, had refused to attend or sign the joint statement. Japan’s long record of assistance to these countries, building trust, had been cited by Kishida at the summit as a reason it could lead in rallying opinion. The June 17 Yomiuri explained that the Global South was wary of arousing Russia, as India clung to its understanding of “strategic autonomy” and all-around diplomacy. On June 20 Yomiuri noted a Japanese government warning of North Korea’s further nuclear development, stressing the need to tighten strategic cooperation with the United States and South Korea.
A July 6 article warned of North Korea sending troops to eastern Ukraine, occupied by Russia, saying that in September 2023 Putin had requested as much, but Kim Jong-un answered that further discussion is needed. In June in Pyongyang Putin apparently repeated his request. In the evening July 12 issue, it was reported that Japan together with the United States, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand had expressed great concern about Russia-North Korea illegal military cooperation.
North Korea
n Toa, No. 6, Makino Yoshihiro commented on Japan-North Korea relations and their prospects, noting that after May 2023 both states began to take a positive view of talks going forward, but it ground to a halt again at the end of April 2024. In the spring of 2023, there were at least two meetings of officials in Thailand and Malaysia, and in January 2024 Kim Jong-un sent a telegram expressing deep sympathy over the losses suffered from the Noto peninsula earthquake, the first time a Japanese national disaster had prompted such a response. There were no political demands to this apparent intention to draw closer to Japan. On February 9, Kishida told the Diet of his strong interest in boldly changing the state of relations. North Korea responded on the 15th, calling for new political determination in Japan and abandonment of the abductee issue as well as acceptance of the North’s legitimate defense rights, offering no concessions. Explaining the North’s thinking, the article points to its preoccupation with Donald Trump returning to the presidency, not being serious about Japan. It knows that economic assistance from Japan will not be forthcoming by dealing with the abductee issue even if there is normalization; only the nuclear weapons and missiles will lead to that. If Trump returns, it seeks to persuade him to agree to full or partial withdrawal of US forces from South Korea and recognition as a nuclear state. Hints of North Korea’s refusal to proceed with talks were evident in late March 2024.
As for the evolution of the Kim Jong-un regime, it started with a shift from Kim Il-sung’s “thought power” to Kim Jong-il’s “military power” to a proposed “economic power.” Talks with Japan were secretly explored. However, in March 2013 there was a shift to “byungjin” parallel goals, refocusing on the military, followed by the purge and murder of Jang Song-thaek, the conduit to economic ties to China, pointing to the victory of hardliners over economic reformers. In the 2018-19 amid diplomacy there was no compromise on security. If North Korea closed its borders in 2020, it reopened for cargo in the fall of 2022, for truck traffic in early 2023, and for exchanges in August 2023 for economic reasons. Yet, it limited private markets and sought to revive worker ration cards. Of the 17 suspected abductees, only five have been returned. The military, at the center of the hardliners, is likely against Japan-North Korea cooperation, but with normalization economic assistance has an allure, on the precedent of what went to South Korea in 1965, as discussed in 2012. Yet, the pathway to Tokyo is now seen as going through Washington. North Korea criticizes the United States, but not Trump. If Trump is not elected, it will wait for someone like him. The article argues that Japan’s task now is to go all-out in urging the US not to acquiesce to the North’s nuclear weapons and missiles in return for abandoning its ICBMs. If a Taiwan contingency arises, the greatest concern is that the US will seek to improve ties to North Korea to avoid multiple contingencies simultaneously in the Indo-Pacific region. If Trump were to win, it might take to 2026 for this scenario to play out on the eve of 2027, when China is seen to be prepared to act on Taiwan, as the US rushes to build up its forces in the region. Recognizing that Japan is its most important ally, Washington should respect Japan’s interests in the region. Japan must do all it can to prepare for this.
BRICS
On June 12 Yomiuri covered the June 10-11 BRICS foreign ministers’ meeting in Nizhnyi Novgorod, where Russia sought to forge an axis in opposition to the US and Europe despite wide differences among the attendees. Having expanded, BRICS is at a turning point.Some states have joined for economic reasons, but do not share the views of Russia and China, notably India, Egypt, and Brazil, and especially Argentina under new leadership. Saudi Arabia is in observer status. It will be difficult to reach consensus due to political and economic system differences, the article concludes.
China
n Gendai Business on July 9 concern was raised about the extreme social media in China, which aroused a man to violently attack a Japanese school bus in Soochow. Amid rising unemployment and other social concerns, China is turning to more negative language about foreigners, notably Japanese, readers are told. In response to this incident and an earlier one against Americans in Jilin province, the Chinese government delayed coverage and minimized it. On social media, hate toward Japan spewed, asking why the Chinese woman in Soochow did who lost her life go to the rescue of Japanese. Anti-American postings prevail without responsibility too. Removing this time hate speech against Japan may reflect concern about China’s economic slowdown. Japanese firms have an important place in China and transfer of technology from them is still indispensable. The flying of Japan’s flag at half-mast in honor of the dead Chinese women has been widely mentioned on social media, creating a good impression in Chinese society. While the terms decoupling and de-risking are used in the Sino-US clash, Japanese firms are limiting their response to reducing the China risk.
One theme in Japanese publications, e.g., in Daiyamondo Online on July 11, was the growing number of Chinese fleeing abroad, including to Japan. This is not limited to wealthy Chinese. The real estate bubble, youth unemployment, and a deflated economy are driving this. So too is tightening censorship over social media arousing dissatisfaction. Rich Chinese are leaving for the United States, Singapore, and Australia, and in 2024 the number in Japan has risen too, utilizing the cheap yen to buy real estate. Poorer Chinese are illegally going to the United States too.
Taiwan
n the July Bungei Shunju, Fuse Satoru anticipated a showdown over Taiwan, noting that more than Japanese are aware the US government is grasping the seriousness of an impending Taiwan contingency. He proceeds to trace the thinking (mondai ishiki) in its statements, documents, and actions. Fuse starts with Indo-Pacific Commander Philip Davidson in 2021, arguing that over three years the sense of danger has only grown through a high degree of consensus in security and intelligence elites. Just in the past one year a remarkable shift in the US military has occurred, including using the Philippines as a pre-stationing base, accelerating production of hypersonic missiles and drone deployment, and preparing for China’s assault. In addition to US government activity, Fuse is struck by the attention now paid at US think tanks.
G7
On June 12 Yomiuri depicted Japan’s position at the G7 summit, stressing the appeal to link-up with developing countries. It recalled Japan’s successful input as leader of the Hiroshima G7 in opposing one-sided change by force or pressure, and it pointed to Japan’s continued leadership in discussions about East Asia, including North Korea and China. Japan strives to draw attention to the indivisibility in security of Europe and the Indo-Pacific and, as the only Asian state in the G7 to get Europe and the United States to strengthen their involvement in the security of the Indo-Pacific.
The G7 summit, covered on June 16 by Yomiuri, went beyond Ukraine concerns, to warn about advancing Russia-North Korea ties, China’s export-led economic push, and China’s deepening support for Russia. As Asia’s lone representative, Japan was fully invested in raising these issues. On June 15 the paper showcased the opposition to China by the G7, noting it accounts now for 90% of Russia’s imports. It also stressed that the summit aimed to lock in long-term assistance to Ukraine, preventing Trump from changing course. The G7’s leadership of international society in facing China and North Korea in the Indo-Pacific drew headlines in Japanese coverage. June 20 saw a summary account of the summit’s success despite the relative decline of G7 influence. Citing Japan’s financial pledges for Ukraine, Yomiuri noted that they could not be for military uses, but they mattered for mine clearing, agricultural development, and overall recovery. A parallel was drawn between locking in long-term support despite leadership changes and the plans in place to sustain Japan-ROK relations even after Yoon leaves office. The key to diplomacy for the G7, the article argued, is linkage to the Global South. As Japan had invited six Asian states to the Hiroshima G7, Italy invited eight states in the Middle East and Africa. As for the focus of criticism at the G7, mention of China stood out, as a “name and shame” approach. The search for constructive, stable relations with China continues despite the hardened outlook.
On June 18, covering the G7 summit, Yomiuri stressed that it built on the foundation set in Hiroshima when Japan led the summit. As the only Asian member, Japan has a leadership role to fill. It is also the only non-NATO member in the G7, driving home the message that today’s Ukraine is tomorrow’s East Asia and responding amid assistance fatigue in Europe and the United States. Based on the Hiroshima statement, the G7 summit has repeated the wording on the Indo-Pacific. On China policy the other leaders are following Japan, it is suggested. Even as the Global South and China are rising, the role of the G7 in leading international society must keep growing, readers are told.
Philippines
On the deepening clash between China and the Philippines, Yomiuri on June 22 warned of the ongoing escalation, which raises more alarm in the United States and Japan, both of which are tightening ties to the Philippines. It traces the more coercive Chinese approach to 2023. On June 21 Yomiuri had reported on Putin’s visit to Vietnam, showcasing cooperation on energy and security. This followed Putin’s visit to North Korea, which accelerated military cooperation, restoring alliance ties from the Cold War era, although leaving uncertain how Russia would react to a contingency on the Korean Peninsula, given the conditionality of the wording Russia used. On June 21 the newspaper relayed South Korea’s alarmed response, including beginning to consider arms shipments to Ukraine and further tightening bilateral security cooperation with the United States and trilateral cooperation including Japan. ROK-Russia ties will take a hit too. The big shift toward Russia may involve lethal weapons to Ukraine and more export controls. On that day too, Putin’s Vietnam visit elicited mention of Global South countries staying neutral. Its “bamboo diplomacy” aims to keep equal distance among the US, Russia, and China, one reads.
Vietnam
On June 27 Yomiuri warned about Russia’s closeness with Vietnam as well as North Korea and China. Today, 80% of Vietnam’s arms are from Russia, and in a fluid international situation, it sticks to a balance among great powers. Russia seeks to add Thailand and Malaysia to BRICS, as it awaits hosting as chair in October. If the Global South extends cooperation to Russia, this has the effect of weakening the West’s sanctions and prolonging the Ukraine war. The article adds that, having long assisted development in the Global South, Japan must deepen its cooperation.
Australia
The meeting of Li Qiang and Australia’s Albanese in Jakarta boosted economic cooperation, it was noted in the June 18 Yomiuri, as China sought to avoid US-led encirclement. Pandas sent to Adelaide smoothed the way. Ties had been improving since 2022, when Albanese took office. In security the gap remains, but China has removed high tariffs on wine, etc. as it seeks to join TPP.
India
n the June Toa Nagao Satoru asked if India will be a reliable ally for Japan. It is the focal point of the Quad, which Abe was the first to propose, and the Indo-Pacific, a critical pillar of Japanese foreign policy thinking. No new framework was needed for Japan-the US-Australia linkage due to both being allies of the United States, but in October 2017 Japan forged alliance-like ties to India, but India resists the idea of an alliance, given its “all-alignment” ideal. Certain features to the Japan-India relationship are reassuring: 1) India seeks to surround China and Pakistan with its partners; and 2) India’s diplomacy seeks to draw closer to Japan and the West, including ties to Taiwan and Israel, having dropped mention of “one China,” considering China not recognizing “one India.” Given these factors, Japan can rest assured that India can be trustworthy.
The Modi visit to Russia drew scrutiny in Japan. Yomiuri on July 10 reported that economic ties were strengthening. In 2023 India’s imports reached $55 billion, ten times the level of 2021. A visit from the leader of the Global South had reduced Putin’s international isolation. India was not able to overlook the tightening ties between Russia and China and remained dependent on Russian arms—still 30-40% of its total arms imports. Five sets of the S400 missiles have already been deployed, and two more are due by 2026. Modi seeks to stabilize the supply of parts. The article noted, however, that this occurs despite the differences in their thinking about China.
In July a collection of articles on Yoon’s foreign policy after two years appeared from the Kajima Institute of International Peace. Nishino Junya focused on three distinct features: values diplomacy, strategic clarity, and peace through strength. Yoon reversed Moon’s stance on the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” enlivening diplomacy with the Global South. If at the start of his administration, Yoon showed interest in joining the Quad, he latter shifted the focus to the Japan-US-ROK trilateral. Japan is positive about South Korea joining the Quad. Yoon realized that strengthening the US-ROK alliance was part of a package with improving Japan-ROK ties and embracing trilateral cooperation; so, he rushed to reach a breakthrough with Japan. After the 2017 deterioration of relations with China post-THAAD and the 2022 collapse of relations with Russia after its Ukraine assault, Seoul needed closer ties to the United States as well as a revamped supply chain to withstand Chinese pressure. Yoon was keen on economic security. Yet, in continuity with the Moon administration, Yoon had a penchant for boosting Seoul’s role as a diplomatic vision, e.g., by entering the G7. Although South Korea was not present at the 2024 G7 after invitations in 2020, 2021, and 2023, its internationalism endures. Yet, Korean opposition rejects Yoon’s foreign policy thrust, the CJK summit of May 2024 is an opening for another focus, and Trump could have an impact if elected. Even so, Yoon’s positive diplomacy is staying the course.
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