Country Report: Japan (June 2024)

Despite Chinese efforts to revitalize economic relations with Japan, the spring of 2024 saw no resurgence of optimism. The shadow of China’s boycott of Japanese marine products as well as demonization of Japan for releasing water polluted with nuclear waste never faded. The impact of arresting a prominent Japanese businessman for spying remained a thorn in the relationship. When a man knifed a Japanese woman and her son at a bus stop for a Japanese school, killing a Chinese woman who tried to shield them, Japanese media attributed it to the mood against their country and its citizens. Chinese social media in the following days was rife with invectives against Japanese, confirming this interpretation, even as censors tried to conceal it.

An unpopular leader at home, a troubling political situation in Japan’s essential ally, and news about geopolitics from North Korea to the South China Sea left Japanese discombobulated. An April 8 Yomiuri report on its own poll on national security found increasing alarm toward three countries. 65% of Japanese respondents anticipate a Chinese military attack on Taiwan, and 59% are particularly concerned about China’s military build-up and maritime advance. An even higher 62% are so concerned about North Korea’s nuclear and missile development, while the Russian invasion of Ukraine registered this way for 47%, and 35% chose Russian military activities around Japan. Yet as many as 42% opposed tax increases for the defense of Japan.

Recalling Prime Minister Kishida’s ebullient welcome in Washington in April and anticipating his return there for the NATO summit in July, Japanese media found some solace in joint defense. On May 11, Yomiuri pointed to the new security clearance system to put on the same level as Europe and the United States security protection for intelligence and to push Japanese firms in international business in such efforts. This will make it easier for Japan to be trusted and join in joint international research. The new system follows the 2014 law on protecting secrets and it helps to preserve important economic security information. The article expects all-out efforts to protect against intelligence leakage, furthering trust in international cooperation endeavors.

Working more closely with the United States was a dominant theme of the springtime media. An April 8 Yomiuri headline called the alliance indispensable. In a poll, 78% supported linking the SDF with US armed forces, while only 18% were opposed. Even 74% of the supporters of other parties out of office were in favor. 73% expressed support for defense cooperation with states or regions other than the United States, with 23% opposed. Reliance on US nuclear deterrence had a 54% approval, as 73% affirmed that Japan should stick to its three non-nuclear principles.

Reporting on Kishida’s visit to Washington and speech before a joint session of Congress, the stress in Yomiuri on April 12 was on his appeal for the US to keep leading the international order and continue its pivotal role. Yet, in spite of misgivings about Trump, Yomiuri the previous day carried former ambassador to Japan and current senator William Hagerty’s interview that Trump cares about Japan, and if he is elected, there should be strong expectations for him. Two days later the paper reported on bilateral relations entering a new era of alliance and referred to a “honeymoon” relationship between Kishida and Biden, cemented by cooperation over the Ukraine war. Yet, after his successful visit Washington, Kishida faces serious problems at home. An editorial that day emphasized deepening security cooperation to check China, while noting the importance of seeking understanding for how Japan is contributing to US security and economics that transcends parties, given the possibility that Trump will return as president. It said that Japan should play a leading role in defense of peace in Asia, as the US has limits in what it can do. It added that Japan ought to play a bridge role between the US and Europe and newly developing countries, while also pursuing dialogue with North Korea over the abductees.

On April 13, Yomiuri carried an article by Sasae Kenichiro on the successes as well as challenges ahead after Kishida’s transformative visit. One challenge is arms exports in parallel with the G7. Another is rapidly proceeding with linking command control to prepare for joint deterrence. Sasae acknowledged existing limits on collective defense and heralded the new developments. A day earlier Yomiuri had reported two divisions at the summit: (1) over AUKUS and Japan’s linkage to it, left undecided; and (2) over a Japanese firm acquiring US steel, blocked by Biden.

A May 9 Yomiuri article reported on references to the decision to drop atomic bombs on Japan in 1945 in connection with support for Israel using maximum force to end the war with Hamas. Republican congressman Tim Walberg drew the comparison, and, when pressed by Lindsey Graham, Lloyd Austin and C.Q. Brown agreed that the bombs had ended WWII. Later, Foreign Minister Kamikawa Yoko objected to these comments, although this is not covered on May 9.

A May 15 Yomiuri editorial supported tightening export controls of dual-use items to Russia, while gaining the understanding of Japanese firms. Russia has been importing semi-conductors, cameras, etc. for drones, satellites, etc. Such action was urgent. Firms have limited capacities to make inspections, and violations can occur unknowingly. The government will provide the needed intelligence to enable firms to avoid the risk, heightening awareness of the danger.

A May 3 Yomiuri article on an opinion poll on reforming the Constitution, pointed to growing support for the end of Article 9. Yomiuri reported that support has grown four straight years to reach 63%, as people recognize the need to boost military power. In 2015-20, support hovered around 50%. Critical to the shift has been the perceived threat to Japan, notably that of China.  

Below we review coverage of Sino-Russian relations, Russian-North Korean relations, China and Sino-US relations, Japanese-Chinese relations, Taiwan and its new president, Japanese-South Korean relations, Southeast Asia and Japanese-ASEAN relations, and the late May CJK summit. Besieged by threats and nervous about Washington and Seoul, Japanese had little to celebrate.

Japanese-Russian relations

On April 6, Yomiuri reported on the announcement the previous day that Japan had imposed export restrictions on 164 items banned from Russia. These included engine oil and certain batteries as well as various chemicals. In step with the United States and EU, Japan earlier sanctioned exports of high-capability computers and other dual-use items. Imports have also been affected, including non-industrial use diamonds, even those sent through third countries.

The April 14 Yomiuri reported that Russia had banned navigation around the islands claimed by Japan, i.e., the Northern Territories. This applied to April 11 to 17.  Treated as a possible strong response to Kishida’s visit to the United States, this was accompanied by Russia calling in the Japanese ambassador on April 12 to complain of “dangerous tendencies,” adding that bilateral ties had fallen to an “unprecedentedly low level.” In response, Japan’s ambassador blamed it on the invasion of Ukraine by Russia. 

A Yomiuri editorial on May 30 urged rapid action at the G7 on using Russia’s frozen assets but noted that in the discussions Japan’s position is to not act in contradiction to international law. In covering the G7 summit and Kishida meeting with Zelensky in Paris, Yomiuri on June 13-14 emphasize the close partnership of Japan and Europe and the relevance to responses to Russia and China. The historic importance of using frozen Russian assets to assist Ukraine drew notice, as did the surplus the response to Chinese surplus EV production. Attention was paid as well to G7 interests extending to the Global South, getting understanding not to ally with Russia or put up with Chinese market violations, while securing agreement with the G7 on liberal economics. As Kishida repeated his mantra that today’s Ukraine is tomorrow’s East Asia, mention was made of Japan imposing sanctions on firms in China for the first time, joining in opposing supplies of military-use goods to Russia. In May in Seoul Japan had relayed this concern to Li Qiang. Such actions took into account US moves, including imposition of new sanctions on Chinese firms. Kishida signed a separate bilateral assistance and cooperation accord with Zelensky. Within the limits of Japan’s Constitution, this non-lethal aide aimed partly at Ukraine’s recovery is proof that the Ukraine problem goes beyond Europe; it is matter for international society as a whole. This is the first such document between Ukraine and a country in the Pacific region.

Sino-Russian relations

A May 8 editorial in Yomiuri warned against the impact on the world of a Russian victory in the Ukraine war and emphasized the responsibility of the West, including Japan to persistently persuade China to stop supporting Russia’s aggression there. On May 18 the paper treated the honeymoon between Russia and China as a danger to the world, adding that without China’s assistance Russia would not be able to continue the war. Amid the deepening confrontation between the United States and China, such assistance increases US opposition to China and lowers the trust in international society in China. The US, Europe, and Japan must continue to persuade China unstintingly to behave as a “responsible great power,” readers are told.

On May 17, Yomiuri noted that Sino-Russian trade would rise further. Already 90% is conducted in local currencies. Russia’s oil exports to China in 2023 climbed 50%, as it has become the top supplier. New plans announced by the leaders include joint development of AI. Separately, the indispensable role of China in Russia’s existence is showcased in an article by Hirose Yoko. A May 18 Yomiuri article noted the Sino-Russian consensus on the world order and linkage of Ukraine and Taiwan, but it pointed out that China wanted to avoid excessively leaning to Russia and the two leaders might not be completely in agreement despite their stress on closeness.

On May 29, Yomiuri editorialized that China and Russia are facilitating the growing threat from North Korea. Not only is Russia’s arms trade an issue, but China’s position also has shifted to protecting the North, abandoning resolutions it had approved. It has lost trust in international society.

Russian-North Korean relations

On May 2, Yomiuri commented on the weakening of sanctions enforcement on North Korea after the expert panel was not renewed after fifteen years due to Russia’s veto. There is fear that the North will speed up its nuclear and missile programs. Three of the eight panel members in April had done to Kyiv and reported on Russian use of North Korean armaments. On May 1, an article noted that their report to the Security Council remains unofficial. As Russia expands its arms dealings with North Korea, it clearly did not want the oversight of such an expert panel.

Japanese newspapers responded differently to Vladimir Putin’s summit with Kim Jong-un in spite of unanimity in condemning this new threat to peace and stability in Northeast Asia. Asahi editorialized on June 21 about Putin’s visit to North Korea, criticizing the return to a Soviet-era military alliance and the honeymoon contracted in opposition to the Japan-US-ROK grouping which threatens to destabilize East Asia further. Yet, the paper explains that through hardline measures in response there will be no breakthrough. The answer is to enlist China, which does not want to see world split into blocs as in the Cold War. Asahi found hope in the China-ROK 2+2 dialogue just before Putin visited North Korea and the Chinese side’s statement that it will “play a constructive role” in resolving questions on the Korean Peninsula. The West must extend strong efforts and wisdom to pursue China through multiple channels, it concludes.

Mainichi on June 21 posted an opinion piece on the greater threat to Northeast Asian security posed by Putin’s visit to North Korea and the new commitment to mutual military support—a direct threat to Japan and South Korea. Russia is not acting in a manner befitting a permanent member of the Security Council. Again, the answer is sought from China’s role, distancing itself from this renewed alliance. It should recognize that if it draws close to these two states it will invite international isolation, and it needs to act in accord with its own national interests. What China considers to be its national interest is assumed here, overlooking Chinese publications.

Yomiuri’s June 21 response to the Putin-Kim summit also warned that they were deepening the isolation of their countries under international pressure and would be left having to rely on the military, while directly threatening Japan and South Korea. Japan must not be cowed and must strengthen its links to the United States and South Korea. As for China, it was in step with Russia and North Korea in opposing the US-led order, but the US and others tighten pressure on it, there is a possibility it would use self-restraint rather than silently acquiescing to the other two.

Sankei editorialized on June 21 that Japan must explain to its people that it needs to redouble its defense efforts, including in the north, while facing contingencies in Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula. If China invades Taiwan and North Korea engages in military activity against Japan, the US, and the ROK, there is fear that Russia will join in antagonistic moves. It is necessary to leave sufficient forces in the north to deter Russia if a Taiwan contingency led to moving forces to Kyushu and the southwest islands. With this Russia-North Korea alliance, there is doubt Japan has the necessary defenses. Kishida should explain Japan’s response to this threat.

China and Sino-US relations

A lengthy Yomiuri article on April 8 focused on Chinese surplus production and intensification of cheap exports with prices undercutting competition, as in the case of steel. The term for this situation is “deflation exports,” which are treated alongside “anti-dumping” responses.

On April 27, Yomiuri reported on Blinken’s visit to China and meeting with Xi Jinping. Both sides seek to avoid conflict and continue to build on the November 2023 Biden-Xi summit. Yet, no response was given to the US request for China to stop supporting Russia’s Ukraine war, backed by pressure to cut off some Chinese banks from the international financial system. The other big issue mentioned was China’s preparation for Lai Ching-te becoming Taiwan’s president coupled with Blinken’s promise not to support Taiwan’s independence, but no meeting of the minds.

On May 1, a Yomiuri editorial said it is the responsibility of both the US and China to avoid conflict. In meeting Blinken, Xi did not want relations to deteriorate further, but there was no breakthrough on bilateral concerns. The US strongly urged China to case support for Russia in Ukraine, which is costing China trust in international society. For China, Taiwan is a red line, while the China-Philippine clash in the South China Sea and the Japan-US strengthened ties to the Philippines are kept in mind. If China wants to stabilize Sino-US relations, a precondition must be to alter its hegemonic behavior, the editorial argues. 

Japanese-Chinese relations

The 2024 Diplomatic Bluebook revived after five years the term “strategic, mutually beneficial” for the relationship with China, suggesting more active diplomacy, while after a decade it took notice of the “partnership” with South Korea. Yomiuri on April 17 reported on these changes, noting that the terminology with China dates to 2008 and was renewed with the November 2023 Kishida-Xi summit. Negative language, however, was added for Russia and North Korea.

 On April 21, Yomiuri reported on the reopening of exchanges following the Kishida-Xi summit in November 2023. With Japanese public opinion in mind, China is cautiously improving ties, but on the two issues of water discharge and arrest of Japanese no breakthrough is in sight.  Nor is there progress on the Senkaku issue or resumption of short-term visa-free travel for Japanese, as has occurred for European and Southeast Asian countries. The Japanese ambassador now has more meetings with high Chinese officials. Local Chinese are at the center of voices calling for expanded economic ties and exchanges. A downturn in relations cannot be ruled out over Japan’s ties to Taiwan and strengthening ties to the United States, the article warns.

The May 30 Yomiuri reported on the reopening of parliamentary exchanges with China, noting the Tokyo meeting headed by Motegi Toshimitsu of the LDP and CCP official Liu Jianchao. Past meetings of this sort led to “pipes” between the two countries, such as the role played by Nikai Toshihiro, who met with the Chinese delegation head. The article suggests no such optimism.

On June 2, Yomiuri reported on the 50-minute meeting in Singapore between the Japanese and Chinese defense ministers, noting the many concerns raised by the Japanese side on advances in the East and South China seas, the supplies going to the Russian military, and North Korea’s repeated missile launches. China insisted that Japan stay out of the Taiwan, internal issue. On that same day, Yomiuri editorialized in response to a South Korean report that North Korea would conduct its 7th nuclear test around the time of the US elections, hoping for a Trump victory. No test has occurred since preparations were complete owing to Chinese opposition to a test just 80 km from its border. Concern is over the pollution of the Yalu River and the eruption after an earthquake of the Paektu (Changbai) volcano, which over 900 years to 1925 erupted 31 times. Mention is made of the oil and rice sent from China to North Korea as sources of leverage.

Yomiuri on June 5 regretted that China does not allow mourning for those murdered in 1989 at Tiananmen. On the 35th anniversary, it asserts that Japan misjudged that if China developed it would become democratic and was first in the West to reopen assistance to that country.

The CJK summit

The May 27 Yomiuri pointed to Sino-ROK agreement on improving relations, saying that for China’s influence on North Korea and economic reasons, Seoul is proceeding, agreeing to a bilateral diplomacy and security dialogue in June. In turn, China is seeking to drive a wedge in the Japan-US-ROK triangle and to strengthen the China-ROK FTA signed in 2015. On May 28 Yomiuri emphasized the alignment of Japan and South Korea against China on security. The CJK summit called for a jump in tourism from 30.54 million to 40 million visits in 2030 and to talk about a three-way FTA, but these were treated in an editorial as minor matters in light of the deterioration of ties since the CJK talks in 2019 with security in the forefront. Li Qiang showed no give on marine exports or a buoy in Japan’s EEZ, harming the prospects of China securing the investments it is seeking or of slowing the strengthening of Japan-US security ties. Li sought an economic circle excluding the United States, but with China’s ties to North Korea and Russia continuing to tighten, one can only expect the Japan-US-ROK opposition axis to strengthen.

On May 29, Yomiuri covered China’s proposal at the Seoul summit of an “industrial network” as a shared supply chain. Japan rejected the wording, noting EV oversupply export intentions and AI plans as well. Japan was concerned also with Chinese rare earth metal export restrictions. On a three-way FTA, Japan limited the wording to “under discussion,” while on security and North Korea, China avoided their mention. Oddly omitted is South Korea’s positioning on the issues.

The May 31 Yomiuri asserted that the CJK summit has acquired added importance for urging China to behave responsibly as divisions are deepening. Yet, it notes that Japan and China clashed a lot. Japan sought to put the focus on security and exchanges, while China put most emphasis on economic cooperation. As for an FTA, Japan insisted that China must correct protective policies for state-owned enterprises and state subsidies, facing joint opposition from China and South Korea on FTA plans, in contrast to Japan-South Korea versus China on security.

On June 5, Sankei compared the editorial responses of six, main newspapers to the CJK summit and the remarks of the Chinese ambassador. Asahi, Mainichi, and Tokyo Shimbun stressed the importance of dialogue, urging Japan to make more effort to continue it. Sankei asked Kishida to make clearer to China Japan’s position on using force to change the status quo and took strong exception to the ambassador’s warning that if Japan contributed to splitting up China its people will be caught in a firestorm, a threat to kill Japanese. Nikkei and Yomiuri both chastised the ambassador. On coverage of denuclearization of North Korea, Yomiuri regretted the retreat from the 2019 CJK statement. Asahi blamed Kishida’s leaning to the United States for Japan’s fading presence and loss of balance and autonomy in East Asian diplomacy. Mainichi called for Japan to assume responsibility for accelerating dialogue in order to build trust and reduce tensions. These two papers and Tokyo Shimbun did not mention the ambassador’s wild statement. In contrast, Sankei asked if Japan should enter FTA talks with China when the marine export ban and surplus production issues loom.

Taiwan

In the April issue of Bungei Shunju, Liu Mingfu, whose 2010 bestseller monograph introduced the concept of the “China Dream,” explained to Japanese how China could unite with Taiwan without any deaths, having made its navy the focus. The Ming-Qing policy of forbidding sea travel had left China weak when sea powers arrived, but the lesson has been learned. England from the 1588 Spanish armada controlled the seas, and the United States and Japan used sea power to keep China constrained in later times. Now the maritime alliance of the US, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and others aims to contain China, as the maritime factor has risen sharply in global affairs, and China’s maritime interests extend to all of the oceans, enabling the “China Dream.”

The May 10 Yomiuri detailed the infrastructure expenses in Southwest Japan in support of ports and airports as part of the boost in defense spending announced in December 2022, not all of which is going directly to the defense ministry. In case of a contingency, SDF troops could be moved around more easily. Research, cyber, and foreign ministry security capabilities will be enhanced. Infrastructure expenses will go to Kyushu and Shikoku as well as Okinawa, reaching an island just 100 km from Taiwan. Preparations for a war are proceeding in this area of Japan.

Yomiuri on May 20 commented on the expansion of in-migration into Taiwan, leading to more competition with Japan and South Korea, which also suffer from labor shortages. Already host to 700,000 workers from Southeast Asia, Taiwan is adding India as a source. In 2026 Taiwan is estimated to exceed 20 percent elderly, while its 2022 birth rate was 0.87, compared to the 1:26 rate for Japan. It is short 219,000 workers. South Korea is now estimated to bring in 165,000 workers a year, while Japan has introduced a new system to ease the hiring of foreign workers. The upshot of the article is that importing labor is essential and the competition is heating up.

On May 21, Yomiuri marked Lai Ching-te’s inauguration with notice that Taiwan is now drawing increased awareness in East Asia. Lai seeks dialogue and exchanges with China on the principle of respect with equality, while following Tsai Ing-wen in rejecting “one-China” as a precondition. If Lai seeks “Taiwan independence,” more than 70 percent of the population of Taiwan wants to keep relations with China in the current arrangement, which the editorial favors. If China applies more pressure, it makes Taiwanese more pro-separation, which is not in China’s interest. For the China-Taiwan clash to intensify is not good for regional stability or for Japan and the United States, whose message to both sides should be to prevent this outcome.

On the same day Yomiuri covered the US-China-Taiwan triangle, pointing to the role of AIT Laura Rosenberger as well as former high officials and congressmen in urging caution on Lai Ching-te. The message was that peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait is important for global security and prosperity. They pressed self-restraint on Lai, the long-time independence advocate, and he carefully avoided the sensitive subject of sovereignty, also conscious of Taiwan public opinion. By reappointing key Tsai Ing-wen figures, he assuaged US unease. Lately, efforts have been seen in the United States and China to control the Taiwan situation, to avoid crossing a red line. In this triangle a subtle balance has been reached, but Trump’s election could affect it. In April a high-level delegation of high officials from the former Trump administration visited Taiwan, with Elbridge Colby, possible national security advisor in a new term, stressing the need for Taiwan to boost its self-defense, given limits on US resources and the fact its 2.5% of GDP falls far short of Ukraine and Israel. Taiwan should buy more US arms and take part in joint exercises. Moreover, the trade deficit, which has risen 5 to 6 times in 5 years to $35.6 billion could be Trump’s issue.

Japanese-South Korean relations and the Japan-US-ROK triangle

On April 12 in Yomiuri, Nishino Junya analyzed the results of the National Assembly elections in South Korea, noting that the split between conservatives and progressives has further widened and that there is deep dissatisfaction with Yoon’s Japan policy, led by opposition party leaders. This relates to third party compensation for the forced laborers. Doubts have risen that more funds for this will be coming from the government. Nishino sees the prospects as not bright. A day later, also in Yomiuri, an editorial expressed the hope that the elections would not have a bad influence on bilateral relations and that Yoon could avoid rapid loss of centrality. It called Yoon’s Japan policy his biggest foreign policy achievement, noting the opposition’s critique of it as humiliating and expecting in the next presidential campaign that this would be a big theme. Given North Korea’s moves, the importance of Japan-ROK relations has risen. Shuttle diplomacy needs to continue to sustain the current of improving bilateral relations, readers are told. Two days later, Yomiuri warned of a revival of the “history war” by South Korea despite the start of Japan-US-ROK trilateral linkage in order to strengthen containment of North Korea and China.

On May 20, Yomiuri showcased the resumption of defense exchanges with South Korea, lagging the 2023 revival of future-oriented political and economic ties. While trilateral defense relations including the United States had advanced, that had occurred without this bilateral leg. Three days earlier the paper reported on the first joint, three-way maritime patrols, starting in June.

Jinbo Ken on May 10 in Yomiuri credited Japan-South Korean relations with being a huge plus for Japan in strengthening its defense against China, but he warned against excessively relying on Yoon Suk-yeol. Japan must understand the low level of acceptance of Yoon’s Japan policy in Korean society. Jinbo hopes in that the sixtieth anniversary year of normalization in 2025 will be
taken as an opportunity to heighten momentum for improving ties on multiple levels.

Yomiuri on May 25 remarked on South Korea’s Unification Minister’s shift on the recognition of South Koreans abducted by North Korea, joining Japan and the United States on the issue for the first time. A team has been established to address this issue and a symbol for it created.

On June 2, Yomiuri expressed concern about the future of Japan-ROK relations, noting concerns raised in South Korea about Japan’s pressure on Naver to sell its stake in LINE, the social media app used widely in Japan. It noted the problem of Kishida’s low popularity and lack of political capital as well as the fierce attacks by South Korean opposition against pro-Japan (chinil) Yoon.

On June 4, Yomiuri editorialized that the Japan-US-ROK triangular role is growing, pointing to the meeting of their defense ministers in Singapore, where the main themes were Taiwan and the East and South China seas not long after China’s show of force around Taiwan. Three-way joint exercises will begin this summer along with new attention to cyber, space, and so on. Japan and South Korea have normalized military cooperation. China’s ties to Russia are leading to a loss of trust, it should recognize. Yet, a slight note of concern about South Korea ahead could also be found.

Sankei in an editorial on June 4 expressed dissatisfaction with South Korea refusing to recognize its fault on the radar incident as the two sides agreed to move on with security cooperation. It objected to this repetition of “pampering diplomacy” by Japan. Noting that anti-Japan feelings are strengthening in South Korea and a change in administration could bring a big shift toward Japan, the editorial said that there is room to keep using Yoon’s comparatively realistic security outlook, but if this administration cannot recognize the radar action, this is a country with which Japan should deal carefully in case defense cooperation collapses under a leftist administration.

A Yomiuri editorial on June 12 urged Japan to explain to South Korea the merits of the world heritage site at the Sado goldmine and to avoid a political rupture over the designation of this site. It acknowledged the Korean concern over not mentioning forced labor at this location. The thrust of the editorial is to go all-out in pursuing an agreement, given the historical and cultural significance of this sight as well as the implied state of the Japan-ROK bilateral relationship.

Japanese-North Korean relations

On April 11, Yomiuri wrote of an appeal for dialogue to reach a breakthrough in Japan-North Korean relations, referring to Kishida’s conversation on the 10th on the importance of talks with North Korea, a forward-looking message shared by the United States with no preconditions. Via many routes Japan has secretly explored contacts with the North, most recently on March 25 proposing a summit at an early date. The North Insists that the abductee issue is already settled and completely rejects Japan’s overtures. On May 12, Yomiuri reported that Kishida had restated his desire for a summit the previous day, continuing a quest seen a year earlier, when the North had answered there is no reason for the two countries not to meet, only to be followed with insistence in February and March 2024 that the abductee issue is over. Yet Kishida persists and continues to send messages and claim to be awaiting a response from the North.

Southeast Asia and Japanese-ASEAN relations

On April 6, Yomiuri explained that Indonesia’s president-elect visited China, Japan, and Malaysia in his first post-election outing, seeking balance between China and the United States and using Japan as a proxy for the US with defense foremost in mind amid alarm over China’s increasing hegemony in the South China Sea. For economics China is key, especially after the opening in October 2023 of Southeast Asia’s first high-speed railroad with China’s assistance and in light of 2045 goal of transferring the capital. Concerned about the United States, Prabowo Subianto chose Japan to demonstrate his equidistance diplomacy, agreeing on regional and global issues.

On April 8, Yomiuri covered a split between the president and vice-president of the Philippines, the latter the daughter of the previous president. She has become more critical of Marco in advance of next year’s interim elections and the 2028 next presidential election after Marcos in an interview touched on the subject of constitutional revision and the six-year term limit. When talks in November 2023 with communist forces were decided, Sara Duterte criticized Marcos. The two families represent different political parties. Also possibly unfolding is a split over China with which Rodrigo Duterte had close relations before Marcos took a very different approach.

Japanese media paid close attention to the Japan-US-Philippines trilateral in Washington. April 13 saw a Yomiuri article on three-way defense cooperation for the East China Sea, South China Sea, and for the United States, a Taiwan contingency and a framework for the Indo-Pacific. On April 19, Yomiuri linked the three maritime challenges from China in the South China Sea, by the Senkaku Islands, and over Taiwan, covered in the Kishida-Marcos joint statement. The value of the Philippines was noted for supply chains important for semi-conductors and geopolitically in containing Chinese aggression. In place of the old hub and spokes approach and with no NATO security framework and traditional cultural bonds in sight, Biden is forging multilateral lattice linkages in response to the relative decline of the US and rise of China, including Japan-the ROK, Japan-the US-Australia, and the Quad. The new trilateral follows a US-Philippine downturn in the period of Duterte’s presidency. The Japan-US alliance is the common denominator. Japan’s joint exercises with the Philippines and other ties are deepening. Japan’s approach to China is standing on two legs, reviving after five years talk of “strategic, mutually beneficial ties” along with dialogue as well as deterrence, a combination cited in Japan’s 2024 diplomatic bluebook.

On May 4, Yomiuri reported on the four-way meeting in Hawaii of defense ministers, approving joint maritime exercises. Having met first in 2023, the four, including Australia, have a shared vision of peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific, US Secretary Austin asserted. Tensions have risen in the South China Sea due to Chinese actions, and expanded multilateralism follows.

On June 3, Yomiuri reported that ASEAN states are rejecting appeals to join the summit on the Ukraine war planned for Switzerland. Almost no Asian states will attend. China is refusing and pressuring other states not to take part. At the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, Zelensky’s appeals generally fell on deaf ears, as states refused to abandon their neutrality on the war.

India

On May 3, the 508 km Mumbai-Gujarat high-speed railroad being built by Japan was covered in comparison to the BRI railway construction and as having great significance for what lies ahead. Shinkansen abroad began with Taiwan in 2007. Yet, China has been extending its influence through high-speed railways in many countries, as in debt traps, such as that which may face Laos after spending $6 billion on its railroad, mostly with funds provided by China.

Yomiuri on May 6 carried a piece by Takemori Shunbei on divisions in India threatening growth in its economy, as it is predicted to surpass Japan in GDP in 2025. He lists religion, language, culture, and caste, contrasting the more prosperous South and West coast, where Hindi is not the main language, with the North and East. When socialist-inspired controls were relaxed, the country grew at 6.8% in 2004-13, but the time has ended when removing state interference suffices. In East Asia, the Japan model worked for South Korea, Taiwan, China, and others, but India is not lifting the quality of the workforce or advancing primary education in that way. China’s GDP is now 2.6x India’s, when in 1990 they were about equal per capita. Mention is made of the politicians resistant to reform elected in some regions, reflecting the divisions.

On May 28, Yomiuri noted India’s rising arms exports even as it remains the world’s largest arms importer, trailing only the US, China, and Russia in its military budget. Having spent 60% of its arms import budget on Russia in 2012-21, India is now being criticized for keeping good relations. On June 6, Yomiuri opinion page discussed the prospects for Modi’s third term as president. On the one hand, attention was paid to India being a responsible great power aligned with Europe and the United States in facing China, while strengthening economic and security ties to Japan, as both states reduce their supply chain dependency on China. Note was taken of current very close ties with Japan, including the highway being built to the northeast as 1400 Japanese firms operate there. On the other, lot of problems are mentioned, including freedom of information and human rights, by Tamori Kazutoshi, who emphasizes their agreement in opposing China.