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In the summer of 2024 Japanese were reflecting on Prime Minister Kishida’s legacy following his announcement that he would step down in September, were following Russia as its threatening actions in Northeast Asia intensified, were rattled by a murder of a Japanese schoolboy in China as well as other Chinese behavior and kept their eyes on North Korea and its new ties to Russia.
Kishida’s Legacy
Assessing Kishida’s record, as his time in office wound down, mid-August articles praised his foreign policy. Hosoya Yuichi, on August 13 in Yomiuri, welcomed Kishida’s diplomatic stability but saw a shortage of creativity. With the Kantei in charge from Abe’s second term and strong impact from METI veterans, Kishida is credited with professionalism and high-quality responses, both for Russia’s invasion and the Middle East crisis. Hosoya points to the Hiroshima G7 as a success, solidifying support for Ukraine and making Japan’s presence felt in boosting ties to the Global South. Kishida took a leading role also in the Quad and closer ties to NATO. Yet, Japan-China ties are in a difficult situation with no pipe to succeed Fukuda and Nikai. After Abe proposed the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” and the Quad, Kishida showed less initiative, e.g., in thinking on how to resolve the crisis in international society, Hosoya concluded.
On August 21, Hosoya praised Kishida’s response in grasping this turning point in world history and in Japanese history. In Yomiuri, he attributed an important role to Kishida in this juncture of fundamental change after the Meiji Restoration and the end of World War II, as the Ukraine war has shaken the foundation of the international order. His leadership in foreign policy should be highly evaluated, Hosoya adds, leading the criticism of Russia’s invasion and trying to become a bridge to the Global South, as ties to Europe and the United States of some states are ruptured. Hosoya also praised Abe’s impact on economic security, the Japan-US alliance, and trust with South Korea. Yet, he was not successful, we are told, in communicating philosophy and strategy, leaving the Japanese public behind without a deep understanding of what he had achieved. Kishida was praised for responding with understanding to this turning point in world history and giving Japan a major role in it. He calmly faced the Covid-19 pandemic and was ready for the shift from “peacetime” to “wartime” with the Ukraine invasion. There was great significance to his response to the “turning point in world history,” both in standing with the G7 and in striving to be a bridge as the “Global South” split deepened.
Jimbo Ken in Yomiuri on August 14 argued that increasing Japan’s defense budget, as Kishida has sought in response to a new security environment, requires public understanding. China’s 2024 defense expenditures will climb to about five times Japan’s. Deepening talks with both the ruling and opposition parties on defense policy is needed to gain broad understanding.
One dimension of Kishida’s legacy was defense preparedness, including extended deterrence agreed to with the Biden administration in a 2-2 joint statement, as reported in Yomiuri on July 21. Recognizing a worsening threat from nuclear weapons, Japanese found reassurance in this. July 29 saw a Yomiuri editorial on the necessity of doing this for trust in the alliance. Japanese are asking about the suitability of the three non-nuclear principles, notably for submarines coming to Japanese ports. There is debate over whether the US would really use nuclear weapons for Japan in a crisis. In order to boost trust in extended deterrence, Japan must support US forces in the country, readers are told. Also mentioned is a strengthened arms production system in Japan, agreeing on exports to the United States, aiming to fill gaps due to support for Ukraine.
On July 29 in response to the 2+2 meeting, Yomiuri headlined the fresh strengthening of the “nuclear umbrella” in response to a growing sense of danger in East Asia, owing to nuclear threats from Russia, China, and North Korea. Editorializing on August 29, it asked what Japan should do to reform the international order, saying diet members must point the prime minister toward it.
A full-page spread in Yomiuri on August 15 reviewed Kishida’s record, crediting his diplomacy and security policies in step with the G7 on the international order. It highlighted his hosting of the May 2023 G7 summit, which drew attention for his dealings with Zelenskyy and the “Global South,” while Kishida’s November 2023 meeting with Xi is credited with attempting to improve relations with a state bent on hegemonic behavior. His attempts to hold a summit with Kim Jong-un had no realistic prospect, meanwhile, leaving national security as Japan’s priority. Another Yomiuri article that day cited reports from Japan experts in the United States praising Kishida for deepening the alliance, including by increasing Japan’s defense spending
ASEAN and the Pacific Islands
A Yomiuri editorial on July 19 reported on Japan’s 10th summit since 1997 (every three years) with the countries and areas of the South Pacific. The focus with the 18 participants was on seven areas, including climate and security. Sending the coast guard and Self-Defense Forces as well as personnel exchanges will be strengthened. This is an important maritime transportation route for Japan, where there is cooperation on fishing. Island countries have concerns about China, but they are drawing closer through massive infrastructure assistance for ports, airports, etc. Japan has cultivated friendly relations with the islands and wants to continue its assistance. It is too early, however, to think that their good relations with China will be reconsidered.
On July 17, Yomiuri assessed the summit, portraying the islands as the front line in the leadership struggle between Japan, the US, and Australia on one side and China on the other. A similar summit had been hosted by China in 2018, of which Japan is intensely conscious as it exceeded China’s number of participants. The leaders of the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu went to China just before the summit to keep a balance, while the summit avoided naming China.
The July 31 Yomiuri reviewed the first US-Philippines 2+2, noting $500 million in support for the Philippine military to deter China. It explained that the US strengthening ties in preparation for a Taiwan contingency. No agreement was reached on a GSOMIA due to doubts about the US ally being able to maintain secrecy. This meeting followed the April three-way summit with Japan.
On September 6 in Yomiuri, Shoji Tomotaka wrote about three viewpoints in ASEAN on Russia’s comprehensive assault on Ukraine. Only Singapore has imposed economic sanctions, and only Myanmar’s military regime has supported Russia. While supporting sovereignty and territorial integrity as principles, others have avoided naming Russia and applying sanctions, and ASEAN has not excluded Russia from international gatherings. When Putin visited Vietnam in June, it made clear its posture of valuing Russia, even as it strives to win US support for designating it as a “market economy.” Unhappy with the visit, the US in August postponed the decision. Thailand and Malaysia have applied to join BRICS. They represent states with deep ties to China. Their applications mean that they are leaning to China in the Sino-US competition. In their views, the applications do not have anything to do with whether they approve Russia’s Ukraine invasion.
India
On August 21, Yomiuri reported on the Japan-India 2+2 meeting, saying there was agreement on containing China, while Japan sought India’s agreement on opposition to Russia’s Ukraine war. Both see danger in China, one pointing to ships by the Senkakus, the other to the 2020 assault. India, however, maintains strategic autonomy and receives about half its arms from Russia, even as it boosts domestic production and diversifies suppliers, which has promise for Japan’s exports
On September 11, Yomiuri covered the defense build-up at the northern edge of the Philippines, just 140 km from Taiwan. With a Taiwan contingency in mind, the United States has targeted this area and resumed joint patrols and dredging a port to facilitate visits by naval vessels and arms shipment. The article notes some uneasiness among local residents over this transformation.
Russia
On July 3, Yomiuri reported on rough sailing in Sino-Russian talks on gas pricing related to a new pipeline plan, even as China provides electronics and advanced technology with dual use to aid the Russian war activity. The “Power of Siberia” began operation in 2019, and in 2027 it will be connected to the far eastern route and supply more gas. For the ‘Power of Siberia 2” plan via Mongolia, China is demanding prices close to those used inside Russia and only indicates plans to purchase some of the gas. With Europe leaving Russian gas, Russia needs China, while China is wary of becoming overly dependent on Russian energy. The two sides differ in eagerness. On July 4, Yomiuri reported that at the Putin-Xi SCO summit in Astana, not long after Putin’s May trip to China, Putin said that relations are the best in history. Yet, Xi also values ties to Europe and seeks to avoid European and US sanctions. Just two weeks earlier he had been in North Korea, raising great concern in China, which values stability on the Korean Peninsula.
On July 29, Suzuki Muneo made his second visit since November 2023 to Russia, defying Japan’s foreign policy and seeking resumption of safe fishing in the area of the Northern Territories. He criticized Japan’s one-sided support for Ukraine and put some of the onus for the invasion of Ukraine. In his prior visit he appealed for resuming visits to graves on the Northern Territories.
On August 1, Kato Kiyofumi connected the experience of Japanese in Manchuria from 1945 to the current situation in Ukraine, again at the hands of Russian forces. He argues that the effect endures after 100 years. Social order in war is broken, and rebuilding lives takes a long time.
On August 14, Chjiwa Yasuaki recalled the end of the war in 1945 and argued that once a war has begun it is difficult to end it, as also seen in the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East. He described needless sacrifices resulting from not finding a way to bring a war to its conclusion, citing the illusion of relying on the Soviet Union to end the war in 1945, offering it territory in exchange for its efforts as an intermediary, which has parallels today with no end-game strategy.
The September 6 Yomiuri reported on Putin’s announcement at the Eastern Economic Forum that Russia would erect a memorial hall in honor of the conquest of the Kurile Islands, aiming to legitimate the illegal seizure of the Northern Territories. This will leave a memory forever of the landing on the islands, again declaring to the Japanese that they have no right to the territory.
Citing a new book by an Asahi Shimbun author, which draws from conversations with Russians involved in foreign relations and knowledgeable about Japan, an AERA article by Komaki Akiyoshi on September 9 asked if a peace treaty were concluded between Japan and Russia, whether Japan would no longer be able to maintain its sanctions on Russia. In the background is clashing Japanese and Russian thinking about a peace treaty and resolving the territorial issue. The Japanese government does not recognize Abe’s November 2018 concession to agree to two islands, rather than four, but it remains insistent that a territorial issue exists and must be resolved. In contrast, by early 2016, Lavrov denied the existence of this issue, while insisting that in order to sign a peace treaty Japan must recognize the results of WWII and Russia’s right to all of the islands. Recently, Russia has demanded also a wide range of cooperative relations, which excludes antagonistic policies, including sanctions.
Kyodo Tsushin on September 14 reported on a meeting of foreign ministry department heads in Moscow, where the Japanese appealed for renewal of visits to ancestral graves by the residents who had been displaced and of safe operations by Japanese fishing boats. The Japanese side also sought an immediate end to the invasion of Ukraine, a clear violation of international law. Russia, in turn, blamed the low level of relations on Japan’s short-sighted antagonistic policies.
China
In the June and July Bungei Shunju, Tarumi Hideo first reported on China’s aims in Taiwan and then reviewed how Nikai Toshihiro, Abe Shinzo, and Kan Naoto had dealt with China. Tarumi had led a team preparing a Taiwan strategy, presented in 2016 to Abe and Kishida, in addition to twice being posted to Taiwan (the only career official to do that). His unusual career was all spent in the Chinese circle, including seeking intelligence on China at the Hong Kong consulate. Tarumi recalls June 2008 when a Taiwanese ship violated Japanese territorial waters, a half year before the PRC did so for the first time. In 2016 there was another incident under Ma Ying-jeou of Japan capturing an illegal Taiwanese fishing boat. Contacts with Tsai Ying-wen about to take office in May smoothed the way for a ship to withdraw and then to resume marine exports from five prefectures including Fukushima. His Taiwan service ended in July 2018. He does not see urgency for China to use force, even toward Jinmen Island of no economic value and bound to exact a price in foreign investments withdrawn from China. In the short run, he does not see China using force against Taiwan in order to avoid discontent at home already aroused by a bad economy. Corruption in the PLA also works against readiness. Since time in on China’s side, why act in haste? The possibility of Sino-US relations deteriorating is high, although Trump could agree to some sort of deal. He may not grasp the strategic importance of Taiwan. Meeting with Biden in November 2023, Xi seems to forget about a summit with Japan. US officials meet Xi, but Japan has almost no channels of late, at great cost. Wang Yi at his March press conference did not even take a question from a Japanese reporter. Japan’s importance has slipped. Xi wants to leave his name in history by unifying with Taiwan. Lai Ching-te should avoid independence, which would give China a pretext. Blinken said the US will not support independence, but Japan has not of late repeated that. It is time to renew Japan’s Taiwan strategy, Tarumi concluded.
On July 2, Yomiuri reviewed one year of the anti-spy law, noting its lack of transparency and its demoralizing impact on foreigners, as it affected all of Chinese society. Its targets ranged from the military to economics to culture to science and technology to natural resources. Even critics of China’s economy can fall prey to it. After the March 2023 arrest of a Japanese businessman, the risk is felt among lots of people, readers are informed.
Parliamentary exchanges resumed, explained in the July 23 Yomiuri as a sign of economic trouble and the need for investment, leading to stress on dialogue with Japan. Yet, without economic reform and progress on issues critical to Japan (the marine product boycott and imprisonment of an arrested Japanese), little was expected. With no replacement for Nikai as a pipe, party-to-party relations would be difficult to manage, the article concluded.
A July 13 Yomiuri article described the increasingly lively Chinese military activities surrounding Japan, including joint exercises with Russia raising stronger security concerns. It warns that China has become a greater security threat than ever before as part of the harshest security environment Japan has faced since the start of the postwar era, citing the 2024 Defense White Paper, including the first mention that what happened in Ukraine could be repeated in East Asia. This followed a July 10 editorial on the placement of a Chinese buoy, causing more alarm about protecting Japan’s maritime rights, Japan repeatedly appealed for the removal of another buoy placed in July last year in its EEZ by the Senkaku Islands, but China did not respond. The editorial draws a linkage to China’s actions in Philippine waters and calls for more government support.
On July 14, Yomiuri warned that anti-Japanese emotions aroused in China were intolerable, citing the late June stabbings in Suzhou, in which a Chinese woman died, leading Japan to lower its embassy and consulate flag to half-mast. This was blamed on extreme nationalist emotions aroused in media, which were then more tightly controlled. Unable to criticize the Chinese government despite rising grievances, Chinese are finding an outlet in charges against Japan, spiking on the Internet at the time of the epidemic. Earlier, it is alleged, Xi Jinping displaced criticism of his deepening dictatorial behavior to criticism of Japan, capitalizing on the legacy of anti-Japan patriotic education. Now Xi permits a measured amount of anti-Japanese material amid an economic slowdown and social blockade. Limits are less about the safety of Japanese in China than concern for maintaining the stability of the system if emotions were left to boil up.
Another July 14 Yomiuri article praised the limited success of Kishida’s visit to Washington for the NATO summit, calling securing Europe’s interest in the threats from China and North Korea a matter of life and death. It repeated the mantra that today’s Ukraine is tomorrow’s East Asia and that security in Asia and Europe is indivisible. At his third consecutive NATO summit, Kishida is strengthening relations of trust. He is credited with raising wariness of China and North Korea. A previous day’s article focused on the linkage of Japan-South Korea-Australia in opposition to China-Russia collusion as well as the strengthening will in European countries to counter China in the Indo-Pacific, including direct criticism of it, but it recognized differences of degree, such as Macron’s real thinking to avoid excessively arousing China.
On July 27 Yomiuri reported on troubles for Japanese automobile makers and the Baoshan steel company joint venture, which supplied them but is now losing its Japanese imprint. Instead, Japanese companies are reducing risk by turning to the United States, India, and some states in Southeast Asia. The Nittetsu-Baoshan partnership dates to a 1977 start and a 1985 completion of the complex. Its high-quality production symbolized Japan-China economic cooperation, but the result was building a powerful rival. The number of cars sold in China by Toyota, Honda, and other Japanese companies fell by 30% to 1.46 million in the first half of the year versus five years earlier. Mitsubishi pulled out, and Nissan closed its factory in Jiangsu. Japanese firms were slow to shift to EV, and Chinese steel technology has improved. As Japan has few births and young people move away from cars, demand for steel is dropping. A centerpiece in the steel-making plans is the acquisition plan for US Steel. The US-China competition will not stop, which is reflected in Nittetsu cutting its China ties, which may influence other Japanese firms in China.
On August 25, Yomiuri pointed to appeals to end the marine products boycott and editorialized about the distrust generated by the captivity of Japanese in China without transparency in the legal system. To compensate partially for the loss of the Chinese market, exports of scallops had jumped by 64% to the United States and multiplied to Canada and Vietnam, but that covered only about half of the loss. As for the detention in March 2023, it is seen as having been a big shock to businesspeople, who still do not know the nature of the charges. Since the first anti-spy law in 2014, 17 Japanese have been arrested, five of whom remain incarcerated. The hunt for spies is intensifying again from July of this year with measures to check computers and cell phones. In this way, business cannot feel safe in China. In 2023, direct investments by foreign firms fell by 80%, national security being one reason. Student exchanges have stagnated. Many Japanese researchers have put off traveling for fear of arrest. When Chinese students go back home on a brief visit, they may disappear without a trace without explanation. Distrust reigns.
The August 25 Yomiuri assessed the state of marine sales one year after the start of China’s boycott, which reduced total scallop exports by 26.6% over the prior year. A campaign to expand consumption at home helped, as Thailand, Vietnam, and Mexico consumed more too. The slogan “datsu Chugoku” or leave China is a reminder of “datsu-A” (Asia) 150 years earlier.
Reviewing the 3rd plenum on August 26, Yomiuri asked why there were no signs of a policy shift. It compared wording in the plenum’s resolution to that in the 2013 third plenum on economic policy. While references to security and state had risen noticeably, those to market, economy, democracy, and freedom had dropped. Having grasped absolute power, Xi could pursue policies unpopular with the public and stay on course without difficulty. Japan’s experience after its bubble economy burst has shown that putting off the problem leads to requiring a longer time and costs rising. “Reform of the political system” had also been dropped from the resolution. On July 19, Yomiuri summarized two plenum themes: more power for Xi, no real economic reform. Its editorial on July 21 said that foreign firms must be wary of doing business in China in order to make Xi conscious that the economic slowdown will endure, social unrest will spread, and national security will become difficult to protect with an agenda to tighten control under him.
On August 28, Yomiuri editorialized for China to stop dangerous challenges by violating Japan’s territory. China ignores warnings, planes and drones encroach on the Senkaku Island space, and there is no doubt that these are not accidents. As for the South and East China seas, Japan must cooperate with the United States, the Philippines, and others to boost the capacity to resist.
On September 8, Yomiuri took note of the planned establishment at the Dalian Maritime University of a center for the study of the Ryukyus. It raised the possibility that this was aimed at restraining Japan from cooperating with the United States in a Taiwan contingency. At a conference in preparation for the center about 20 specialists gathered in an effort to bolster international influence in the study of the Ryukyu question, it was said. Left unmentioned was the prospect that China would be raising historical questions about Okinawa’s correct status.
Taiwan
On July 18, Yomiuri warned that it would take China less than a week to land forces on Taiwan, before US forces and others could intervene. Possibly delaying such interference, China would use hybrid tactics including cyber on important infrastructure. Given the possibility of a super-fast war, a speedy response is the focus of the response of Japan, the United States, and others.
The Japanese and Taiwanese coast guards undertook joint drills for the first time since 1972, Yomiuri on July 19 reported. This was in preparation for forceful Chinese behavior in the East and South China seas. Amidst growing alarm about a Taiwan contingency, such will be regular. That same day, the paper discussed the challenge of evacuating Japanese, especially in case of a Taiwan contingency but also from South Korea and the Middle East. If the situation shifted from level 2 to level 3 urgency, difficult decisions would be necessitated.
North Korea
On July 5, Yomiuri carried an article on the rift in the Sino-Russian honeymoon caused by the sudden new Russia-North Korea relationship, calling this “same bed, different dreams.” As Xi and Putin meet for the SCO summit, aimed at swinging the “Global South” away from its drive to stay neutral, China is uneasy, readers are told, about the rapid improvement in these ties. Of late Thailand and Malaysia have sought entry into BRICS. Putin called the SCO and BRICS major pillars of the world order that is newly emerging. Including China, Russia, and India, the SCO and BRICS are predicted to advance through an expanded pathway, but the article also notes a sense of China distancing itself from North Korea and struggle for a sphere of influence in Central Asia.
The July 27 Yomiuri described the tightening of controls on the “Korean wave” in North Korea in the face of it clearly spreading among young people. Noted is a 2020 law countering this culture and South Korean thought, even including the death penalty. Speaking in the manner of South Koreans is an object of punishment. Lately groups of escapees from North Korea have flown balloons with USB memory cards carrying K-Pop, while movies also have drawn wide appeal. A recent escapee on a wooden boat spoke of the adverse reaction of youth to tighter controls.
Michishita Narushige in the August 8 Yomiuri wrote about closer Russia-North Korea relations, saying that Kim Jong-un’s self-confidence has been restored after the humiliation of the 2019 Hanoi summit. Although China has signaled that it is putting distance between itself and the North, it privately welcomes the strengthening of the anti-US forces. The possibility can be seen of a “China-Russia-North Korea axis of evil.” The North’s leaders are worried about South Korean culture flowing into the country. In awareness of its weakness, it has become more aggressive toward South Korea. The Ukraine war has been a stroke of luck for it. By raising the possibility of using nuclear weapons, Putin has raised the value of the threat posed by the North’s weapons.
On August 14 in Yomiuri, the focus was put on China’s new controls on smuggling into North Korea and return of North Korean workers, as reported by diplomats inside China. It mentions a report on KBS of the home of a North Korean diplomat being searched and an article in Donga Ilbo on July 9 of tightened control over smuggling of coal and petroleum products. In March to June, traders and individuals were arrested for smuggling. Over the first half of the year trade feel 6% over the same period in the previous year. Despite the reopening of tourism between Russia and North Korea, there is no plan for China and the North to do the same. Ten persons working at a Shenyang North Korean restaurant returned home. At the 71st anniversary event on July 27 celebrating the armistice, there is no record of China’s ambassador attending, when other ambassadors, including the Russian one, were present. As North Korean foreign ministry officials say persuasion to denuclearize is a violation of sovereignty, this is widely perceived as making China unhappy. The Chinese side views the military cooperation between Russia and North Korea as strengthening defense ties among Japan, the US, and South Korea in nearby waters. In this 75th year of the establishment of relations, if there will be no summit, it will give the impression of a rift between Beijing and Pyongyang. Kim Jong-un is waiting for Trump, if reelected, to restart US-North Korean negotiations, but he needs China to have his back.
South Korea
In the evening July 11 Yomiuri, shared concern over Russia-North Korea military ties were seen as bringing Japan and South Korea closer along with the United States, as affirmed at summits in Washington. This story appeared besides a NATO warning that China was abetting the war in Ukraine. Impressions of polarization on international security were spreading. The next day it was noted that Japan has joined NATO summits for three straight years. Despite geographical distance, common threats in cyberattacks and the spread of false information bridged borders. Also noted was rising cooperation over concern about China but compared to alliance ties between Japan and the US as well as the US and Europe, Japan-Europe ties were weakest. Yet as China continues to lean to Russia, Europe is hardening its view. In a Taiwan contingency, the US would not be able to be involved in Ukraine, Europe is coming to realize. Security in Asia and Europe is indivisible, the article concludes, but omitted is any mention of South Korea.
The July 27 Yomiuri anticipated that South Korea would accept Japan’s offer on handling the Sado goldmine but warned that Korean progressives disparaged the agreement in a resolution. On July 28, Yomiuri explained the compromise between Tokyo and Seoul on the Sado goldmine controversy. The expression “forced labor” was not mentioned at the site, but after quiet talks the two sides agreed to wording on the severe working conditions for about 1500 workers from the Korean Peninsula. On July 27 the Korean Foreign Ministry accepted Japan’s sincere efforts to resolve the dispute, but leftist media and others stated they could not avoid criticism of this. An editorial in Yomiuri on August 4 praised Yoon’s handling of the issue as an opportunity to again recognize the importance of maintaining good relations in advance of the 60th anniversary year. Through dialogue the two sides are building trust despite differences in historical consciousness.
On August 1, Yomiuri posted news that Park Cheol Hee was just announced as the ambassador from South Korea. He had been serving as one of Yoon’s “diplomatic brains” and was expected to spur improved relations for the forthcoming 60th anniversary of normalization. Note was taken of a remark by the Japanese government that as an expert with accumulated knowledge and networking, Park is expected to contribute to forging future-oriented bilateral relations.
A September 7 Yomiuri article focused on the Korean opposition’s charge of “humiliating diplomacy” in response to Yoon hosting Kishida the day before and calling the improvement in ties to Japan the most significant thing he has done as president as well as for further improving trust with the next prime minister. Yoon did not win great support for his Japan policy. Still, he predicted more than 10 million visitors between the two countries in 2024, with South Koreans overtaking Chinese, who to 2021 had been the most numerous visitors to Japan.
A September 7 editorial on the last bilateral summit between Kishida and Yoon Suk Yeol noted the importance deepening cooperation and mutual trust between neighbors after the “worst relationship in the postwar.” Preparing for the 60th anniversary year after normalization of relations, the leaders agreed on a wide range of cooperative activities in economics, security, and a youth exchanges. As the situation in third countries worsens, they agreed to evacuate together their citizens as needed. They aim not to let relations backtrack after Kishida leaves office. Given its unstable security environment with North Korea possessing nuclear weapons along with China and Russia, keeping good relations with South Kores is vitally important, the editorial asserts. Instead of Japanese companies paying, a fund set up by the South Korean government has given cash to 11 of the fifteen families of former forced laborers. Export controls on both sides have been relaxed as contacts in the economic world reopened. Public opinion on both sides has improved, as seen in a May joint poll, as half of Japanese said relations are good and more than 40% of Koreans said so too. Yet reasons exist for a reversal. Four plaintiffs reject the resolution for forced labor of the Korean government, and South Korean courts keep ordering compensation from Japanese companies. Yoon’s term ends in 2027, and the opposition calls his Japan policy “humiliating diplomacy.”
On September 9, Tokyo Shimbun reported on shuttle diplomacy between Kishida and Yoon, at which the Korean president expressed concern about the next prime minister’s August activity. The Japanese leader affirmed that in next year’s 60th anniversary of normalization ties would grow even stronger. Agreement was reached on cooperation to protect nationals in case a contingency arises over a third country. This is the first such agreement for Japan. In April 2023, South Korea helped to remove Japanese from Sudan, and in October forces from the two sides joined in moving people from Israel. Now this type of cooperation has been institutionalized. To reduce time for tourists between the two countries, expedited entry and exit procedures are under consideration. Yoon stated that since he took office, the most significant thing he has done is the success he has achieved with Kishida. This was the 11th summit between the two leaders. The article adds that despite relations of trust between the two, issues remain, including the conscripted labor issue. After new leaders appear it is unclear if cooperative ties can be maintained, readers are told, yet both leaders stressed that even as leaders change, including in the United States, the structure of diplomatic and security relations will not be impacted in light of the authoritarian threats to stability in East Asia. Mention is made of an opposition politician criticizing a department head in the national security office as a “pro-Japan secret agent,” casting a shadow on summit bonhomie. Also, Korean concern about LDP candidates who visited Yasukuni in August is acknowledged.
A September 12 report on tourism among Japan, China, and South Korea noted that numbers will exceed the pre-epidemic period with the projection for 2030 of a rise to 40 million visits The Osaka-Kansai exhibition of 2025, local cities boosting exchanges, and the three countries encouraging tourism as a means to increase trust are all mentioned. In June 3.13 million tourists came to Japan, a new record, including 700,000 South Koreans (more than in June 2019) and 660,000 Chinese (almost back to the prior peak despite the delay in reopening direct routes). Prior to the pandemic, 60% of tourists came from these two states, versus 40% now but able to grow.
The intrusion of a Russian patrol aircraft into Japanese airspace on September 23 drew an official protest, followed by a harsh response in Russia, as Asahi reported, just a month after a similar violation by a Chinese aircraft.
On September 24 Asahibiz reported on a South Korean story that Kim Jong-un recently called China a “nemesis” over tightening control over smuggling. This followed the absence of North Korean diplomats at the July 31 reception marking the 97th anniversary of the founding of the PLA and China’s ambassador missing the September 9 celebration of the founding of North Korea. The article traces North Korean sensitivity to falling under China’s control to the trauma of Ming China’s treatment of Korea at the time Hideyoshi sent troops there. This has led other North Korean leaders also to consider China a “1000-year nemesis,” but a country on which it must depend anyway. When at the end of 2017 ties were at their nadir, there was talk that “Japan was a 100-year nemesis, China a 1000-year nemesis” reported in official media. Not succeeding in playing off the United States against China, Kim Jong-un has found closer ties to Russia the answer, while leading Xi Jinping to make his anger known to Kim.
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