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The late summer of 2025 was not a hopeful time for Japan. Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru announced his resignation, and uncertainty persisted over which LDP politician would be his successor—or even whether the LDP could long stay in power—at a time of a rightist surge that could damage relations with South Korea. Trust in U.S. economic and strategic policies had fallen sharply, as a deal to manage Donald Trump’s unilateral tariffs left uncertainty about how investment funds extorted from Japan would be determined. Trump’s hosting of Putin in Alaska aroused alarm about the direction of US foreign policy. Although Narendra Modi visited Japan to strengthen Japan-India ties, he proceeded to China, keen on stabilizing ties with the country most feared by Japan. This visit was immediately followed by Xi Jinping hosting Kim Jong-un along with Putin, deemed a sign of solidarity among the opposing camp.
With the election of Takaichi Sadae to lead the LDP, uncertainty did not fade away. Ties to South Korea could be rattled, reminiscent of 2013–14 when Abe Shinzo articulated a similar agenda that strained relations and tested U.S. diplomacy in support of trilateral relations. If her outlook on China meets longstanding US expectations, that too could be tested by the moves Trump was poised to make in visiting the region just weeks later. Also, stabilizing the US-Japan bilateral relationship would require Takaichi to handle Trump—a difficult task. As Takaichi formed a right-wing cabinet and searched for support from other parties required to govern, uncertainty prevailed over her regional diplomacy and economic agenda.
Trump
In Asahi Shimbun on September 9, Trump was criticized for disrupting the postwar international order based on free trade and the dollar, which had resulted in development. He applies tariffs to allies and non-allies alike, imposing tariffs as in the 1930s. China also bears responsibility, using a model of excess production, domestic investment, and exports. It should boost consumption. The US is threatening the stability of the world economy and is using coercion even against its allies. Japan must use the TPP and ties to Europe to defend an open, rules-based trade system while urging China to reform. It must not rely solely on the US-led order. For the first time in the postwar era, the next administration will face a difficult situation.
Asahi on September 9 also criticized the renaming of the US Department of Defense as the Department of War as not befitting this era. Defense and peace should be foremost. For an official change to occur, Congress must act. Trump also talked of an “age of winning wars,” raising the sense of threat. In the past, the US fought reckless wars in Vietnam, Iraq, etc. Given the current international environment, great powers are responsible for exercising strict restraint in wording regarding defense. The problem extends to Trump’s use of troops inside the US. With this new name, Trump contradicts his claim to be a “peace mediator.”
On September 25, Yomiuri argued that the UN is not functioning in dealing with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as well as with the Middle East strife. It appealed for the US to work for the revival of the organization, noting that Trump also found it not meeting expectations. Trump called its climate policy a fraud and faulted its assistance to illegal migrants. After leading the world after WWII by forming the UN, the US under Trump’s “America First” is turning its back on the organization. This is extremely problematic, inviting an end to multilateral cooperation and foreign assistance. Leaning toward Israel, the US is widening the rift with Europe, which puts a ceasefire even further away. The UN needs reform. In his UN speech, Ishiba faulted the Security Council and called for the expansion of permanent and non-permanent members. His successor should follow. In its coverage, Yomiuri warned that the crisis of international society is deepening and Japan’s security environment is rapidly deteriorating. Regrettably, it lacks concrete policies. The five candidates for LDP leader must continue the overall direction and firm up the financing. Takaichi has complained that Japan’s foreign policy force has weakened in comparison to Abe’s FOIP and TPP. It must boost its presence, and the prime minister should clearly engage in restoring the international order.
On October 9, Trump’s nominee to be assistant secretary of defense for Indo-Pacific security affairs, John Noh, drew attention in Japan after his testimony. Whether the new US strategy would mean redeployment of troops from South Korea—as suggested in the spring—was still unknown. Would pressure intensify on allies to increase their defense budgets more rapidly? That was on Japanese minds and a subject at the congressional hearings.
Japan–South Korea Relations
The South Korean response to the LDP election of Takaichi reverberated through Japanese publications in early October, expressing concern about the impact on bilateral ties. Her positions on historical issues and the sovereignty of Dokdo (Takeshima), as well as her regular visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, boded poorly for relations—especially with a progressive administration under Lee Jae-myung. She had only recently spoken confidently about showing no caution on the territorial dispute with South Korea. The important role of Aso Taro as her backer did not reassure South Koreans or progressive Japanese, as seen in their favored newspapers.
On September 15, Yomiuri called for expanding the TPP to respond to the danger to the world free trade system posed by US high tariffs. South Korea has expressed its intention to study entering the TPP, responding to concern that exports will be reduced by Trump’s policy. The TPP, led by Japan, has 12 members, and all must accept South Korea’s application. The best policy is to open mutual markets and enliven trade, with Japan, Europe, and others taking countermeasures to the chaos caused by “America First.” The TPP comprises 15 percent of the world’s GDP, a huge free trade area. If South Korea—a middle power second to the G7 in economic scale—were to join, we could expect the free trade system to be strengthened. The TPP has also aired plans to link up with the EU. In 2021, under Moon Jae-in, South Korea weighed applying to join the TPP, but resistance from agricultural groups and others to removing tariffs, as well as Moon’s anti-Japan line, worsened relations and blocked discussion. Afterwards, under Yoon Seok-yul, relations greatly improved, and Lee Jae-myung has expressed the desire to build future-oriented relations. As bilateral ties continue to improve, why cannot Japan back Korea’s entry? This would be a plus for strengthening military cooperation at a time of unprecedented tension in the security environment of Northeast Asia. Yet there is an issue Japan cannot overlook. Since September 2013, after the Great East Japan Earthquake tragedy, South Korea has prohibited imports of marine products from eight prefectures. While 55 countries and areas had done this, only China, South Korea, and four others still do.
On October 2, Yomiuri editorialized about Ishiba’s visit to South Korea on the eve of leaving office to keep shuttle diplomacy alive. This sent a message to his successor that relations must be further developed, despite doubts that a progressive president who had criticized Japan prior to taking office would be reliable and that a possibly more conservative LDP figure replacing Ishiba would unsettle the relationship. Yomiuri reported that the two leaders faced shared problems, including an aging, low-birth society and a population concentrated in the capital region, and they agreed on the need to accelerate cooperation. Despite the nuclearization of North Korea, no new success was registered after Lee Jae-myung had visited Japan in August and affirmed plans for tighter bilateral and trilateral ties with the US. Even so, t continued shuttle diplomacy after such a short time had great significance, according to top officials, making bilateral cooperation much more concrete.
Defense Minister Nakatani in September made the first visit by a Japanese defense head to South Korea in ten years. He agreed with his counterpart to strengthen military relations. For Japan, South Korea is the number-three trading partner after the US and China, and it is an important export destination for semiconductors and other products. Visits to each other’s country continue to increase. Given the alienation between authorities on both sides, there is a need to strengthen this important partnership. History questions remain, and Lee, on the “comfort women” issue and others, asserted that problems persist in public attitudes. Through repeated summit talks, the psychological distance can be narrowed, raising mutual understanding. Ishiba hopes that his successor will respond accordingly.
Sankei and Yomiuri did not see eye to eye on the merits of managing history issues with South Korea in the forefront. Yomiuri prioritized stable bilateral relations. Sankei regarded history as too important to let South Korean sensitivities stand in the way. Takaichi could not expect sympathy from progressive publications, while she faced a conservative divide.
India
When Modi visited Japan and then went to China for the SCO summit, coverage of India intensified in Japan. Yomiuri expressed concern that Trump has pushed away India, as well as other democratic states, even leading some to show understanding of China’s positions. Despite tense relations with China over territorial disputes, Modi went to China for talks after the US imposed onerous tariffs, Yomiuri reported, expressing regret at this shift away from giving priority to cooperation with Japan, the US, and Australia. Given the impossibility of Trump focusing on maintaining the international order, the appeal is to cooperate more closely with Europe and others and to maintain ties to developing states that are leaning more toward China. It is up to Japan to do more to preserve the international order and to strengthen its own defenses while deepening its US alliance in these circumstances.
Modi’s August visit to Japan saw enhanced collaboration on defense industries, greater cooperation on economic security and cybersecurity, and a joint statement against using force to change the status quo in the Indo-Pacific. A joint vision targeted $67 billion over the next decade in Japanese investment in India, with emphasis on semiconductors and diversification of supply chains away from China. A goal was set for 500,000 visits to each other’s country within five years, including by more highly skilled Indian professionals.
At the SCO summit, Modi repeated his wish for stable, long-term relations with China as critical for peace and prosperity, both regionally and globally. In an apparent rebuff to Trump, he called for the two states to cooperate in stabilizing the world economy. Modi also expressed support for a multipolar Asia and world. Yet, in an obvious reference to Pakistan, Modi also sought SCO action against terrorism. In an August 29 interview with Yomiuri, Xi made clear his hope for stabilized ties with China. He noted progress in ties since the Kazan SCO summit of 2024, expecting further improvement at the Tianjin SCO summit.
80th Anniversary of War’s End
Sankei on August 20 contrasted how newspapers were covering the eightieth anniversary of the end of the war, editorializing on its view versus that of Asahi. It praised a wartime conference in Japan as historically significant in raising consciousness of all races being equal, with lasting impact on the world. It also called for ending apologies for the war. Sankei saw Asahi as speaking in line with Chinese propaganda. Disagreeing also with Mainichi and Nikkei, it seemed wary of Yomiuri’s view that Japan should deepen support for the international order and strive to stabilize the world. As for Ishiba avoiding an eightieth-anniversary statement, Asahi said that was no way to convey lessons to other generations, and Mainichi called for clearly reflecting on the war to avoid its repetition. Tokyo Shimbun also regretted the failure to continue responding as a peace state. In a severe security environment, Japan not only should avoid singing the praises of peace but instead fight to defend the homeland—it should cast off “postwar pacifism.”
On September 4, commentaries warned of the threat from China, Russia, and North Korea to the international order, which had brought stability for eight decades. Left uncertain was whether the democratic countries, including Japan, would stand up to this coordinated challenge and defend that order. The fact that China embraces the other two states—both flaunting their opposition to the existing order—is showcased as evidence that China too is destabilizing the order, as seen in its military expansionism. The September 3 military parade is the third in a decade, further attesting to China’s threat. Coverage was not limited to alarm about the threats on display; it extended to concern about both US decline and Trump’s disregard of the rule of law and other pillars of the international order. Warnings also focused on Trump’s negative treatment of allies and friends while seeking deals with autocratic leaders, including those of Russia, North Korea, and China. India is perceived as being pushed away from the US, making it harder for Japan and Australia too. Thus, Japan’s role is increasingly important in holding together the international order while also doing what it can to strengthen the alliance with the US and its own defense capabilities.
China
In July 2025, Yomiuri covered China’s decision to resume seafood imports from most of Japan, noting that the move was politically timed ahead of Japan’s upper house election.
Yomiuri on August 19 referred to China’s anti-Japan propaganda as complicating the restoration of relations. In 2025, China continued to showcase its victory in the anti-Japan war as a way to boost patriotism, fanning anti-Japanese emotions and impacting relations. Since summer, a number of movies on the war have been screened, as national media daily convey box office results in line with national propaganda. Accompanying this are incidents since last year of harm to Japanese in China. At the same time, since last year, China has been striving to restore ties with Japan in light of an intensifying confrontation with the US. It has removed import restrictions on marine products, allowed imports of Japanese beef not permitted since 2001, and resumed issuing short-term visas without procedures. Yomiuri concludes that without guaranteeing the safety of Japanese citizens, one cannot expect the exchanges and economic cooperation sought by China to strengthen.
Sankei on September 10 reported that China had denied Seki Hei, a Diet member from Nihon Ishin no Kai, entry and frozen his assets in China due to his views on Taiwan, the Senkaku Islands, history, the Uyghurs, Tibet, Hong Kong, etc. He insisted, however, that he has no assets in China, not having gone there for decades. Also cited were his visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. Japan is a country that protects freedom of expression. China should rescind this ban. Seki, at the time of the Tiananmen incident in 1989, was an exchange student in Japan who later criticized China’s authoritarianism and human rights violations. Now his close relatives in China are denied visas.
Speaking to a delegation from Taiwan’s parliament, Aso Taro asserted that Taiwan shares fundamental values with Japan. Takaichi suggested in 2025 that Japan could form a “quasi-security alliance” with Taiwan.
Russia
The Trump–Putin summit in Alaska on August 15 drew criticism in Japan for failing to result in a ceasefire and for legitimizing Putin amid international isolation. Given a warm reception usually reserved for US allies, Putin received validation, which risked leaving Ukraine and European states uncertain of US support. If Trump could make a deal with no regard for Ukraine, would that set a precedent for a deal with China, ignoring Taiwan and allies such as Japan? That was on the minds of Japanese observers. In an August 17 editorial, Yomiuri called Trump’s treatment of Putin naïve. It said he should have worked with partners in Europe and elsewhere to strengthen support for Ukraine, adhering to the norm of not tolerating aggression. Such behavior could cause the international order to collapse, warned Yomiuri, calling for a return to rejection of violations of sovereignty.
On September 10, the Jiji news service reported that Japan will close its six economic centers across Russia—another fallout from Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. Russia had already unilaterally suspended the memorandum of understanding on the centers. It had also inspected the Japan Center in Vladivostok twice since July 30. Other centers were in Khabarovsk and Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk in the Far East and Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Nizhny Novgorod. They dated from 1994 and were used to train persons involved in economic relations.
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