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Russian writings on the Asia-Pacific region at the end of 2024 and into 2025 took note of shifts in leadership in South Korea and Japan as well as their relations with the United States, began to anticipate Trump’s return to power in the United States, and paid closest attention to China. The overall tone was optimistic: acclaim for the achievements of the “Turn to the East” in 2024; promise that troubles in US allies and Trump’s impact on them would be good for Russia; and expectations of further Chinese interest in boosting cooperation with Russia. Yet, a strain of pessimism could be detected as well. On themes such as coordination on regionalism and historical interpretations of bilateral relations, serious concerns could be discerned. As for the future of Trump’s impact, Taiwan, and Sino-US relations, alternative scenarios drew notice, as the greatest likelihood appeared to be no fundamental change. To prepare for any impact the best option for Russia, futurologists advised, was to avoid overdependence on China and find other powers, perhaps in the West but in Asia, to realize more balanced relations.
On December 23 in Kommersant Kirill Babaev assessed the achievements of the “Turn to the East” over the past year, calling it very successful. At last, Russia fully recognized that the Asian vector could pay great dividends, politically and economically. Over the past three years, Russian businesspersons, officials, experts, and cultural figures have become much better oriented to the new environment for them, seeking seminars and briefings on how to deal with China, India, Vietnam, or Indonesia. Now such panicked exchanges are fewer. Breakthroughs in 2024 to the east and south strengthened the formation of the Greater Eurasian Partnership, the main task of diplomacy in the ongoing decades. The most important role was played by the Kazan BRICS summit, where Russia demonstrated its growing influence in the “Global South,” proving to the West that its efforts to isolate Russia on the world arena had come to naught.
Russian moves to turn BRICS into the main anti-western force in the world are fully vindicated. If Trump threatens BRICS with 100-percent tariffs if they use the dollar, the US will begin to see BRICS as its key opponent. Bilaterally, Russia succeeded with India. Modi visited Moscow in July. India is a great energy partner, and it opens the way for a North-South transport corridor, as it makes Russia a major vector in its multi-vector foreign policy. Personal ties with Anwar Ibrahim were key to Malaysia’s participation in September’s Eastern Economic Forum. Four ASEAN states—Vietnam, Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia—in BRICS symbolize the breakthrough in Southeast Asia, which must be strengthened with economic successes. Iran ties are strong with a treaty in the works and Iran becoming a de jure ally of Moscow, at least economically. In the Far East the DPRK is a new ally with practically a full military-political alliance—de facto with Russia-China-North Korea in symmetry with the US trilateral deal. China is the main Asian partner of Russia, and ties have quietly leapt ahead. The number of Russian going to China in 2024 rose 2.5 time, making it soon the leading destination for both businessmen and tourists, ahead of the Gulf States, Egypt, and Thailand, and soon catching Turkey. Tourism in the opposite direction rose seven-fold. Russians and Chinese continue rapidly to draw closer. The “Turn to the East” is becoming fixed in consciousness as well.
In the 2025 annual economic and foreign policy prognosis of IMEMO on Russia and the world, we find sections on the economies of Japan, India, and China and on foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific region, among others. India is seen as continuing to outpace China in the rate of growth, as both lead the ranks covered (in 2023-2025, 8, 7, 6.5% for India, vs. 5.2, 4.8, 4.5% for China), both on the BRICS list, which easily surpasses the non-BRICS list, apart from ASEAN states and Saudi Arabia. Despite its slowdown, China is strengthening its position in the world economy, expanding its exports as it continues to surpass others in trade, while also drawing closer to the US level in national debt as a percentage of GDP. Given arms budgets, militarization of economic growth has been advancing. As part of the ongoing Chinese export boom, industrial exports to Russia and India have climbed, while the share of Japan and South Korea has fallen. Despite the paradigm of decoupling, US imports from China exceed the share reached in 2019. As a percentage of Chinese exports, Russia’s share has risen the fastest, followed by Mexico, Malaysia, and Vietnam. Although trade in yuan is rising, it remains only one-third of the total. For China’s imports, Russia’s growth is also first, while Japan’s share has fallen the fastest. In ASEAN states, prominent is the rising force of Chinese companies producing for the US market. In 2025, US tariffs on Chinese goods and retaliation could reverberate across the world, having a serious impact on exports of agricultural products, minerals, and metals, i.e., Russia’s staples.
Politically in 2025, unpredictability is in the forefront with negative consequences. Pointing to Increasing contradictions and competition to lead the “Global South,” the book cites experts who think that India’s chances are greater than China’s. It notes that Russian prospects in 2025 are quite limited, despite rising interest in BRICS visible at the Kazan summit. Making Russia’s problem complicated is the fact that its main competitors, China and India, are its key partners in world politics. The Global South may turn from an arena of intensive development to one of military confrontation involving the global powers, the analysis warns in its conclusion.
China
S.N. Goncharov in Rossiiskoe Kitaevedenie, No. 4, wrote a second part to his coverage of a “non-peaceful variant” for reunification of Taiwan with the mainland. He pointed to factors influencing Lai Ching-te recognized by Chinese specialists: (1) the radical change in the balance of forces, as the Ukraine crisis had some undesirable effects for the interests of the PRC, showing that a clash could turn into a drawn-out process, in this case with NATO expanding to the East; (2) Lai recognizing that the US will categorically oppose steps toward the island’s independence, leading Lai to stress maintaining the status quo and proceed quietly; (3) close allies of Lai, extreme separatists, in private advising to cool the clash and improve ties to the PRC; (4) appointment of Cheng Wen-tsang to deal with policy toward the mainland, capitalizing on his experience in cooperation, despite China, without criticizing this, saying Lai needed to accept the “1992 consensus”; and (5) given the loss of the DPP assembly majority and the visit of Ma Ying-jeou to China, along with his appeal to Lai to recognize the consensus as the current KMT leader did and opposed independence. Meanwhile the head of the Taiwan People’s Party saw no problem with the principle of “one China.”
Opinion in the West, recognizing Beijing’s military superiority and that nothing will stand in its way in acting soon, is keen on preparations to respond early. Repeated prognoses of a war have been issued, although a few respectable voices talk of preventative measures. An armed conflict could mean the seizure of islands under Taiwan’s administrative control, a quarantine, or a full air and sea operation. Yet, leading figures close to the Pentagon see an invasion as not feasible at present and anticipate boosting the potential resistance. They warn of a huge loss to China’s GDP, now ten times Russia’s. If the Ukraine conflict dealt a blow to replaceable oil, gas, and grain production, a Taiwan conflict would impact Taiwan’s computer chips and various Chinese products that are very hard to replace. Thus, Western analysts argue that the real plans of the PRC radically differ from its public positions, noting too that Xi Jinping has not concentrated forces for an attack on Taiwan’s capital infrastructure nor do Chinese experts regard resources as sufficient for that. The leadership is not arousing the public to quickly resolve the “Taiwan problem,” aiming to find ways to alter the situation by mid-century, while the US is wary of independence provocations despite “black swan” possibilities. As for US alarm in 2021-24, it was linked to Russia’s concentration of troops on the Ukraine border and its special military operation, fearing a rapid result diverting the US from Taiwan and enabling Beijing to use that as an opening.
In Rossiiskoe Kitaevedenie No. 4 P. O. Safronov examined PRC policy toward religion, noting that the freedom of belief was only nominal despite its affirmation early and again in 1982. Restricting that were demands that believers must participate in the construction of socialism and that religious ideas not undermine social stability and political order. Religious leaders were required to be educated in accord with state policies and ideology. Laws issued in the past 5-7 years significantly tighten supervision over religious activity. Sinification of religious activities as a political process to strengthen the role of the CCP and forge patriotic feelings is under way. Tibet in 2023 entered a new era of Sinification and religious controls. Overall, religion has been forcibly suppressed in favor of political and ideological pursuits, Safronov notes objectively.
In a futurological analysis on China in 2049 for UKSA (the Institute of China and Contemporary Asia), A. Lukin, I. Denisov, V. Kashin, and S. Tsyplakov explore trends and outline scenarios in advance of offering recommendations for Russia. They argue that internal challenges will continue to prevail over external ones. In this “new era,” China’s leadership is inclined to resolve problems through tightening party control and central management of the economy, rejecting “disorderly expansion” of private capital. It treats an absolutist understanding of security as the precondition for development, despite such methods in recent years proving far from effective. In the coming decades, owing to the “technological cold war,” the world will be split in alliances in which critical technologies will be more important than military might with China seeing itself as the leader of one, despite the demands to overcome political and cultural contradictions. Much depends on creative initiative and freedom. One cannot exclude China falling into the Japanese model of “lost decades,” but even with this scenario slow growth is more likely, and more likely is wither a deep crisis or recovery of growth. We can expect it to catch the US in fighting potential with a wide network of foreign bases. China will strive for decisive superiority in the most promising military technologies, starting with artificial technologies, as space will be an arena of sharp competition. Security will take precedence from defense to foodstuffs, as anything else would be taken as a threat to social stability and the existing system of authority. China will seek to avoid conflict with the US, while leading the “Global South” and using contradictions in the western camp as it faces growing economic and political pressure from the United States and its allies.
No full “divorce” with the US will occur to 1949. Beijing will keep strategic flexibility toward Russia, recognizing its importance as an ally and the value of northern border security but not joining in a formal alliance without a full “hot war.” If Beijing continues to overestimate its prospects in the South China and East China seas, it will forge a coalition against it harmful to its “Global South” ambitions. Great powers err in getting caught up in costly foreign conflicts. This could have devastating consequences for China. A new generation, raised in a time of economic growth, will see economic growth as the pathway to international influence, treating economic stability as a key part of foreign policy; however, seeking “rejuvenation” they may go beyond “wolf warrior” diplomacy and adhere strongly to “Chinese exceptionalism.” Threatening progress would be losing balance between internal stability and foreign ambitions. The internal situation could worsen due to inequality and demographic problems or ecological crises, forcing China to refocus at home. Western pressure could slow its growth and lead it to stress regional matters.
The volume concludes with four possible scenarios: (1) a serious stagnation crisis, most unlikely and least advantageous for Russia and its economy and security, which should help to avoid sources of instability in Korea, the Taiwan Strait, and the Sino-Indian border; (2) a serious stagnation crisis accompanying one in the West, unlikely for both, for which Russia should prepare through self-strengthening and avoiding being caught in a global conflict, while combining the closest cooperation with China without serious economic and political dependence on it; (3) China surpasses the US and its allies in development, somewhat more likely than the first two scenarios, albeit doubt has risen of a decisive victory over the West prior to 1949; this would create opportunities and problems for Russia, despite Chinese claims of no hegemonic intentions; current tendencies to rely in a one-sided manner on China in foreign policy could lead to one-sided dependence. Russia must seek a power balance, improving ties to other centers of power and development; (4) continuation of the current balance of forces between China and the West, most likely, in which case Russia must boost all-out cooperation with China to cope with the threat from the West, while actively developing cooperation with other non-western power centers and try, if possible, to forge constructive ties with traditional partners in Europe, avoiding isolation and boosting sovereignty in conditions of competition. This is optimal considering all the scenarios.
In Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn, Andrei Sudorov discussed China’s BRI regarding the Black Sea region. BRI is characterized as developing trade and transportation corridors that turn Greater Eurasia into a single economic macroregion. One corridor of the SREB portion of BRI goes through Kazakhstan and Russia, another through Central Asia and Iran to the Black Sea area. Transport time between China and Europe will drop from 25-60 days by sea to 10 days, BRI represents “globalization Chinese-style.” By using its own materials, technology, and workforce, China is converting infrastructure into political influence. The US and others in the G7 are trying to block this and give it a negative international reputation to maintain a “West-centric” world. Reducing dependence on the United States, China is forging a Greater Eurasian macroregion, where the yuan becomes the reserve currency and China’s influence prevails. Turkey has plans for a different corridor but lacks the money and competence for them and is obliged to link its initiative with China’s, although since 2020 this process has slowed under US pressure. Eying closer ties with Greece, China somewhat reduces its dependence on the Turkish route. China is keeping the door open for Ukraine as a “friendly state” and strategic partner, but everything is on hold as the results of the “Special Military Operation” (SMO) are awaited. For Russia, BRI is a serious challenge. Participation in Eurasian transit could bring enormous benefits, and Russia as a member of the EEU participates in BRI, while considering it along with the SCO, ASEAN, etc., as the basis of integration for the Greater Eurasian Partnership (GEP). The problem is that China advances BRI in the Black Sea region on a bilateral basis. China has in mind a vast economic and civilizational project of the 21st century for a new Chinese superpower status. Hinting at wariness about Russia’s place in this endeavor, the article again raises uncertainty tied to the end of the SMO.
Ivan Zuenko in Rossiya v Global’noi Politike, No. 1, focused on historical interpretations in China and Russia, warning of problems in interpreting their shared past. He describes the bilateral relationship as interesting because it developed not thanks to cultural and civilizational closeness, but despite such differences. The foundation for realizing what Russia’s president rightly characterizes as the “best relations ever” were mutual concessions to resolve the territorial dispute by the beginning of the 2010s. However, forging cooperation over the last four decades occurred without the commensurate shared understanding of the record of historical cooperation, failing to keep up with political expedience. History is full of episodes which both Russia and China interpret through nationalist, patriotic prisms. They can cast a dark shadow over what has been achieved in the relationship. How serious are these divides? They could spill out in concrete actions, influencing ties, particularly at the local level. How will officials, businessmen, and experts maneuver between cooperation and feelings of alarmism? The purpose of this article is to establish the nature of the problem, to understand the concerns of the other side and to avoid mistakes in interpreting its language and actions, which could lead to taking offense, as has happened more than once.
Historical Retrospective: “Sore Spots” in the Relationship
The history of relations is cyclical, veering between antagonism and friendship, even leading to armed conflict in the 1650s, 1680s, 1900-01, 1929, and 1969—mostly local clashes with limited contingents. If sensitive historical questions are known mainly to a narrow circle of specialists, they remain fertile soil for Russophobic and Sinophobic emotions. Thinking back to why Russia and China fought, three key points arise. First, territorial demarcation occurred amid mutual expansion into lands that had not belonged to either. Second, contemporary China is a multi-national state under a titular nation which considers all lands where minorities lived to have been historically its own. Third, both countries used communist ideas to realize their aims, as heirs to existing empires and new players on the world stage. Chinese historiography treats Russia as Tsarist Russia, an expansionist, colonial power, preserving a negative outlook now. Little known events in Russia, associated with the Comintern and accompanying the schism in 1958-60, exert a negative impact too, seen as “hegemonic” and “social-imperialist.” In the Chinese world outside the PRC, such negative attitudes toward Russia are widespread, not only as a colonial power that seized a large chunk of Chinese territory, but also as the source of communist ideology, which “destroyed” on the mainland classical Chinese civilization.
In 1989, Deng Xiaoping declared the need to “close the past” for the sake of future cooperation. In 2004, formally renouncing territorial pretensions did not, however, mean rejection on the Chinese side of interpreting the 1858-81 treaties as “unequal.” Political intentionality trumps historical reflexes in giving a positive tone to official rhetoric over the “inconvenient past.” Silence reigns over complicated problems of shared history. “Sore spots” continue to be judged differently. Zuenko proceeds to list 14 of them in a table, identifying the disputed episode, the essence of the difference, and the positions of the Russian and Chinese sides.
In the first decade of this century, after officially rejecting pretenses, things grew complicated by the upsurge in nationalist emotions. This was more so in China in Zuenko’s opinion, who argues that China verged toward a systemic crisis at the start of the 2010s, as the period of explosive economic growth ended. Passivity of the fourth generation of leadership sabotaged measures for reconstructing the economy and combatting corruption before Xi Jinping took charge, with a loss of loyalty to the communist party. To avoid a collapse of the Soviet Union type, Xi sounded the alarm in practically all spheres of life, including ideological work and strict rules on the presence of foreigners in China. Patriotic propaganda intensified. The most popular interpretation of his “China Dream” was the revival of China as the world leader, as across most of the history of humanity. Building a “nationalist state,” Xi sought to turn the 55 national minorities of China into a single “Chinese nation.” Much revanchist stress was placed on 1842 to 1945 as the crisis of the Chinese nation. This treated China’s recent achievements as far from sufficient, requiring rallying behind the party and its “core,” Xi Jinping. This led to the “rectification of names,” an old Confucian idea, regarding historical orthodoxy. As an example, a new history of the communist party was issued in November 2021.
Changes are observed in comparing the 1945 and 1981 resolutions on history, including some related to Russia. On the defeat of Japan in 1945, the Soviet Union is not mentioned—a contrast to the 1981 resolution. Also, unlike 1981, Soviet assistance to China in the 1950s is omitted. Thus, the CCP role is “absolutized” in military and development tasks. The paradox is that a leader who has done so much for Sino-Russian relations is axing the positive role of Moscow from Chinese history, which after a change in leadership in both countries could negatively impact the relationship. The differentiation into “Tsarist Russia” and “contemporary Russia” enables criticism of an “expansionist and colonial power,” setting aside cooperation with today’s Russia. Also, the period of the Sino-Soviet split continues to influence the information agenda. Taiwan, Hong Kong, and foreign Chinese intellectuals ill-inclined toward Russia, are actively commenting in Chinese on the Internet about Chinese history, mostly accessible on the mainland. On the Ukraine crisis, they expound that drawing closer to Moscow severs normal relations with the West optimal for China’s development. This can be rooted in consciousness of Russia of some Chinese. Thus, two worrisome tendencies are at work: Patriotic treatment of China’s sacrifices to Western colonial powers, one of which is Russia; and boosting the CCP and PRC at the expense of silence on Russia’s role in the development of the party and the country. This process is accompanied by actively circulating materials describing Russia and the USSR in a negative light or with historical tracts directly contradictory to Russian ones. Beijing repeats criticisms of Russian colonial expansion and the loss of 1 million square kilometers of territory.
Intent on consolidating society, Beijing fuels possible revanchist attitudes toward contemporary Russia. Episodic manifestations of Russophobia may not be desired by China’s leadership. If there is silence on the most painful episodes, such as the “Blagoveshchensk tragedy,” the Aigun historical museum’s exhibition, from the 1970s but still updated regularly and supported by the government, is an exception. If the theme of Russia as aggressor were pedaled, it would expose previous party leaders and Xi as wrong. Russophobia contradicts the interests of the ruling elite and could even be used to accuse them of betraying the national interest. If there is a change in authority, these emotions could have far-reaching consequences. Public opinion is potentially ready to reexamine relations with Russia insofar as from school time Chinese attention is focused on episodes of the past associated with humiliations of China, including by Russia, while much less attention is given to positive moments in joint history. The main barrier to the resurgence of Russophobia remains the political will of China. The best strategy for Russia is to intensify efforts to preserve memories of the settlement of the Far East and “peaceful periods” of cooperation with China, while responding diplomatically, not aggressively, to excesses on the Chinese side. Russia can only fuel revanchist emotions in China, not compromise on them, warns Zuenko.
On January 14, Iury Tavrovsky in Nezavisimaya Gazeta wrote about Xi’s American strategy. In 2013 Russia was startled to learn of Xi’s new ideas raised with Obama of the “creation of a community of common destiny for mankind” and of a new type of relations between the superpower, discarding earlier passivity on the world stage and quiet acceptance of US hegemony. After the 2007-08 global financial crisis the US had to recognize a new world-class power and even proposed a G2 to run the world in 2009, which gave it the leading role. Instead, a new era of “containment of China” followed. In essence, Xi in 2013 was agreeing to the G2, but he insisted on equality, G=G. He was not thinking of competition, even less of confrontation with Washington. China was not challenging international organizations, but US commentators were skeptical, seeing it only to buy time. China underestimated anti-China feelings in the US, unwilling to accept an equal partner. China tried again for equal relations in 2017, as Xi broke precedent by visiting out of turn in April and promised contracts, but Trump answered with news of his plan to attack Syria, presaging new threats. When Trump in November went to China, he received an unprecedented welcome. Yet, weeks later the threats resumed. As in the case of Stalin on the eve of Hitler’s attack on the Soviet Union, when Stalin understood the inevitability of a clash but tried to delay it with increased trade and bans on criticism, Xi found his awakening in July 2018 with a trade war, an attack on China, followed by an ultimatum to act within 90 days. In 2019 new attacks occurred in Hong Kong, Tibet, Taiwan, and Xinjiang. If Democrats and Republicans were united, Chinese were not, and concessions followed to no avail. Under Biden relations continuously deteriorated, as he never even visited China. Even prospects of minimal normalization did not deter haters of China. China was gaining moral superiority. At the November 2024 Lima summit China again raised the global responsibility of the “G2,” not tiring of its “new type of relations between great powers,” a concept applied to cooperation with Russia too, as a model. Americans differ too, some arranging a triumphal meeting with Xi in San Francisco after his failed summit with Biden. Elon Musk represents them and intends to influence the new president. In Beijing, despite all the sanctions and humiliations as well as NATO on its borders, advocates of normalization suffice, recognizing trade and American science and universities as valuable. Leaders are not anti-American. They are going the distance to 1949, patiently awaiting Trump, halting criticisms of the US.
Japan, South Korea, and Australia
In Nezavisimaya Gazeta December 24 Valery Kistanov wrote of the alarm in Tokyo over the second coming of Trump, although noting that the commotion is less than eight years before. Trump once said that the only thing he likes about Japan is that people bow instead of shaking hands. Unlike the first Trump administration, when there were people who considered themselves internationalists, now people are loyalists above all and share Trump’s views on most world problems, worrying countries with his creed and the military costs to be paid. Trump’s return could be most painful for allies in the Asia-Pacific region, above all for Japan and South Korea. Nervous about Trump’s return, Japan earlier sent Aso Taro, able to meet him on the second attempt, and Ishiba tried to duplicate Abe’s “achievement” with a meeting prior to the inauguration, but he only got a 5-minute phone call, which was interpreted in Tokyo as a snub or a sign of no confidence in his staying power or international authority. Yet Trump did receive Abe’s widow and then Masayoshi Son, who promised $100 billion in investments in US projects linked to artificial intelligence over four years. Unexpectedly, Trump then offered to meet Ishiba before January 20. The main theme will be the alliance, key to Japan’s security and the main instrument of US military strategy in Asia. Both Ishiba and Trump seek to alter the alliance, but will they agree? Japanese are greatly alarmed by Trump’s promise to impose tariffs, not only on China but also on allies, including on Mexico and Canada, where Japanese auto companies produce in large quantity for the American market. Some suppose that Trump’s pressure could drive Tokyo and Beijing closer. Xi Jinping extended friendship to Ishiba in Lima. Although China is cautious to Ishiba over the Taiwan question, it noted that unlike Abe he has not visited the Yasukuni Shrine. Although he is a conservative, his policies are expected to be relatively “balanced and moderate,” while Trump can facilitate improved Sino-Japanese ties.
It is not excluded that Trump will reexamine the US strategy on the Korean Peninsula, to the South and North, which will oblige Japan to correct its course to both in an unfavorable situation, affecting the three-way alliance, which Trump does not favor, and Japan-South Korean relations. The internal changes in South Korea are not only bad for the triangle but will impact ties to Japan, to which unjust concessions were made. Japan sees the Russia-DPRK treaty as a direct threat to the security not only of South Korea but of Japan and is very worried about Trump’s stance toward North Korea and possible deal on its long-range rockets, allowing it to keep rockets targeting South Korea and Japan. Ishiba lacks the authority of Abe with Trump. The South Korean opposition is poised to regain power, impacting this scenario as well.
Japan has been drawn ever deeper into the US strategy of containing China with the help of the Taiwan factor, directly tied to Japan’s security. It is understood that as a US ally it will be inevitably drawn into the conflict over Taiwan if it occurs, wary that at any moment Trump could change his approach. Yet, the Taiwan issue is likely to become an even bigger divide with China. Japan-Russia relations at the worse they have been in the postwar period, as Japan warns that today’s Ukraine could be tomorrow’s East Asia, and Ishiba intends to stick to this course, but Japan is nervous about Trump’s approach to Ukraine. If Trump shifts US policy there, it will deal a blow to Japan, not excluding the possibility Japan would seek normalization with Russia.
On November 11 in Kommersant, Sergei Strokan’ reviewed Yoon Suk-yeol’s interview with a Brazilian newspaper after Ukraine was allowed to use long-range missiles against Russian territory in response to military ties between Moscow and Pyongyang. Yoon called this cooperation a “direct challenge to the international order,” allowing North Korea to carry out significantly greater scale provocations. Yoon also called for powerful sanctions over this. At the same time, South Korean officials are talking of further steps Seoul can take, including the supply of lethal weapons to Ukraine dependent on the level of said military cooperation and, if needed assistance to strengthen self-defense. Earlier after Putin’s visit to Pyongyang, Yoon had warned that Putin had to choose North or South, which is more important for Russian interests, and on that would depend on the future of ROK-Russian relations. Peskov rejected that and said Moscow would seek good and balanced relations with both. Seoul’s decisions on Ukraine will be complicated by Trump’s return, both due to his Ukraine policy and his pressure on Seoul. One more troublesome factor could be Trump’s China policy, as Yoon says no choice is needed.
In AF Journal of IMEMO, No. 4, 2024, D.A. Selezneva examined nuclear non-proliferation in the Asia-Pacific region, referring to Russia, the PRC, and the US as the leading powers and warning of the impact of US policies in Asia on the non-proliferation regime. The emphasis is on AUKUS and Australia’s access with mention too of South Korea and Japan acquiring nuclear weapons through a similar deal on submarines. New military alliances have serious but still unpredictable consequences, readers are told. If at present the US-ROK-Japan trilateral lacks a nuclear component, Seoul and Tokyo are interested in the US deploying nuclear weapons in the region and participating in nuclear planning, seriously risking the spread of nuclear weapons. In opposition to US influence in the region, China too is developing strategic partnerships with Russia and others. The article mentions both the BRI and GEP as integration processes along with the EEU, SCO, and ASEAN. It explains that US refusal to remove sanctions scuttled the Hanoi summit, where Kim Jong-un agreed to disarm in stages in return. Only afterwards did Kim choose to build up his nuclear arms. Also, North Korea was provoked by Yoon’s refusal to boost trust and strengthening of alliances. South Korean society has warmed to the idea of possessing nuclear weapons. As regional tensions grow, and fears spread of a new US administration reexamining the alliance the probability grows of a policy shift on nuclear weapons. In response to the rise of the trilateral, Lavrov called it “NATO expansionism” aimed at breaking up ASEAN and against Russia and China, while Kim Jong-un was even harsher. While soon the establishment of an “Asian NATO” is unlikely, recent initiatives cannot but raise alarm about nuclear proliferation. Thus, these moves seriously complicate effective resolution of problems of proliferation and diplomacy to that end.
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