In July and August, the strategic dilemma of South Korea in navigating the contest between the US and China was put into sharp relief by the ratcheted-up military and diplomatic tensions between the two superpowers over Taiwan. US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, the highest-level one in 25 years to the self-governing island which China claims as its own territory, drew angry and stern responses from China which included a week of live-fire military drills encircling the island and suspension of the import of more than 2,000 Taiwanese food products.
As the tensions over the Taiwan Strait deepened to their worst level in two decades following Pelosi’s visit, South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol declined to meet Pelosi who visited Seoul, after Taipei, as the fourth leg of her Asia tour and instead had a phone conversation, “considering the overall national interest.” Seoul’s open bid to placate Beijing, however, drew sharp domestic criticism, particularly from the conservative camp, which historically prefers a strong South Korea-US alliance to a strategic partnership with China. Yoon’s efforts to avoid antagonizing Beijing, however, might have been to no avail as Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi openly highlighted to his South Korean counterpart Park Jin during their meeting held in Qingdao, China, that Seoul should abide by the so-called, “five requirements” for improving South Korea-China relations, scarcely veiled demands to abstain from joining the US-led semiconductor partnership known as ‘Chip 4,’ and to renounce the additional deployment of the THAAD system on South Korean territory. Asserting its sovereignty over THAAD deployment, South Korea further revealed its intention to attend a preliminary meeting for Chip 4 scheduled to be held at the end of August or in early September.
Neither Washington nor Beijing has thus far openly asked Seoul to pick a side, but Seoul nevertheless increasingly faces a situation where it has to take sides however reluctant it may feel. It appears that Seoul’s push to reset its strained relations with Japan and Pyongyang’s stubborn efforts to cement itself as a nuclear power, which may culminate in its seventh nuclear test in the coming months, would further push Seoul towards the US.
NATO Summit and China
On the sidelines of the NATO Summit that was held in Spain from June 28 to 30, the leaders of South Korea, the United States, and Japan held the first in-person, trilateral meeting in four years and six months. They reportedly discussed the challenges posed by North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs and the US commitments to the defense of the two regional allies.1 Yoon Suk-yeol also met his Japanese counterpart Kishida Fumio several times during the summit.2
The Korean press largely viewed Yoon’s attendance as a positive development for enhancing allied security against North Korean threats and finding a way to improve the strained ties with Tokyo. The conservative Hankook Kyungjae editorialized that the 25-minutes-long trilateral meeting, albeit brief, signaled getting trilateral cooperation back to normal, which it claimed had been put on the backburner by the previous Moon government. The newspaper nevertheless cautioned that in the wake of growing North Korean threats, the three countries should focus on devising robust and effective plans including the resumption of the Extended Deterrence Strategy Coordination Group (EDSCG), and steering the international community to fully implementing international sanctions to restrict the flow of money to the North.3 The conservative Seoul Kyungjae echoed the view that given the North’s track record of six nuclear tests in total and 18 missile launches this year alone, South Korea should focus on strengthening defense readiness, including preventing North Korea’s cyber hackings through which the regime allegedly pilfered an estimated $395 million worth of cryptocurrencies.4
Some papers editorialized on the strained relations between South Korea and Japan and their chance of recovery. The center-right Kukmin Ilbo editorialized that the Yoon-Kishida encounters were reassuring and at the same time significant as they served as opportunities to build trust between the two leaders. Noting the interests of the two leaders in mending ties, as Yoon had pledged on the campaign trail to seek a comprehensive solution for improving the strained ties, and with Kishida, who led the moderate Kochikai faction within the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), in office, the newspaper suggested that the two leaders should prioritize resolving the wartime labor issue and henceforth expand the areas of cooperation.5
Meanwhile, the progressive Hankyoreh editorialized that the Yoon-Kishida encounters worryingly brought to the fore the possibility of trilateral military cooperation and cautioned the Yoon administration against yielding to the demands of Japan on the history issue.6 Citing a comment from an anonymous official at the South Korean Presidential Office that “at the level of the heads of government, Yoon and Kishida seemed poised to explore a top-down approach,” the progressive Kyunghyang Shinmun editorialized that pushing forward an agenda of improved ties with Japan, without consulting the Korean victims who were also the claimants seeking compensation from Japan, would bring domestic headwinds.7
Other papers editorialized on relations with China. The conservatives Segye Ilbo argued that the South Korean government, which requires Chinese cooperation on economic and security issues, should shy away from confronting China and rather signal to the country that the Korea-China bilateral partnership would continue as long as China does not violate the agreed rules and universal values in the international community.8 Also noting that China is a major trading partner, the conservative Joongang Ilbo urged the government to avoid being swept into the US-led new order, but to articulate its own approach to China on an issue-by-issue basis in line with pre-determined principles so as to avoid forging unnecessarily adversarial relations.9
Rededicated Korean War Memorial
On July 27, the US Department of Defense announced that the Korean War Memorial located in Washington D.C. was rededicated to feature the newly constructed Wall of Remembrance listing about 43,808 US service members and the Korean augmentees to the US Army who sacrificed their lives during the war.10 The conservative Chosun Ilbo editorialized that the wall, constructed with a fund of 28.7 billion Korean won offered by the South Korean government, symbolized the robustness of the ROK-US alliance, noting that the fallen US soldiers, who were mostly privates and sergeants, made the ultimate sacrifice, which built the foundation of today’s South Korea, an advanced economy and military.11 The conservative Maeil Kyungjae also noted that unlike the memorials for World War II and Vietnam, the Korean War Memorial had not thus far featured a wall of remembrance listing the names of the fallen soldiers while the Korean War came to be called “the Forgotten War,” which was dishonorable for all Koreans. The newspaper added that the construction of the wall, mandated unanimously by the US Senate in 2016 and funded by the South Korean government, finally filled this crucial gap and would raise the American public’s awareness of the sacrifices and help increase their support for the ROK-US alliance.12
US Treasury Secretary’s Visit to South Korea
On July 19, US Secretary of the Treasury Janet Yellen made a two-day visit to South Korea meeting with Yoon Suk-yeol, Finance minister Choo Kyung-ho, and Bank of Korea Governor Rhee Chang-yong. Yellen reportedly reaffirmed the importance of the ROK-US alliance in promoting peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region and discussed a variety of issues ranging from imposing a price cap on Russian oil to hold the country accountable for its aggression in Ukraine, countering non-market practices by some regional countries, and strengthening supply chain resiliency among the US and its allies. Yellen, as part of her visit, also toured LG Science Park.
The conservative Dong-a Ilbo editorialized that the meeting was a follow-on to the May joint leaders’ declaration of a comprehensive alliance and South Korea’s participation in the US Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), laying a path towards an alliance of economic security beyond military cooperation. The newspaper added that given South Korea’s heavy dependence on China for imports of raw materials, it should take extreme care to avoid conflict or tension through strategic dialogue and consultations.13 The conservative Joongang Ilbo also editorialized that Korean firms need to cooperate with the US, the largest consumer market and advanced and high-tech economy, in its effort to restructure global supply chains through friend-shoring while avoiding Chinese reactions in a fit of pique and increasing adequate levels of key raw materials in preparation for their shortage.14
The conservative Segye Ilbo welcomed that the accord between Yeltsin and Yoon that the ROK-US alliance is being further developed to address issues related to industry, technology, economy, and finance, noting that it was still a bit disappointing that the leaders fell short of resuming currency swaps, which South Korea needed to check capital flight and Forex market fluctuations, adding that to resume the swap Seoul should consider engaging in a give-and-take with the US by joining the US-led Chip 4 semiconductor cooperation framework as leverage.15 The conservative Seoul Shinmun editorialized that Yellen’s visit came amid rising inflation across the world and the US efforts to take the lead in the competition with China over technology, adding that since South Korea cannot eschew the increasingly inseparable link between economy and security, it should maximize the benefits of a technology alliance with the US by taking advantage of its geopolitical aims and the capacities of its firms.16 The centrist Hankook Ilbo also editorialized on a potential currency swap agreement between South Korea and the US, noting that although there was no direct mention of such a deal, the country, whose foreign exchange reserves had declined by $23.5 billion over the last four months, should continue close coordination with the US given the strong dollar, inflationary pressures, and expected interest rate increases by the Federal Reserve, which would further fan inflation and foreign capital flight.17
US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s Visit to Taiwan and to South Korea
Early in August, Pelosi and other members of a congressional delegation arrived in Taiwan despite China’s opposition, especially Xi Jinping’s stark warnings against “playing with fire over Taiwan” in a call with Joe Biden.18 Although Pelosi noted her visit to Taiwan did not contradict the One China policy,19 her high-profile visit to Taiwan left several aftershocks in the region, including China’s military drills around Taiwan that continued after Pelosi’s departure to South Korea.
With tensions growing sharply between the US and China, South Korea was in a difficult position, facing inevitable questions about its short- and long-term strategies to cope with potential conflict in the Indo-Pacific region. Would South Korea, along with its ally the US, criticize China’s military action against Taiwan? Would South Korea support US forces in Korea conducting military operations elsewhere in Asia or participate in operations to deter the Chinese northern fleet from moving south? Raising these questions to underline the need for a carefully calibrated strategy on the Taiwan issue, Chosun Ilbo argued that Nancy Pelosi’s 19-hour stay in Taiwan would have far-reaching impact not only on Taiwan but also on South Korea as it had mentioned “the importance of preserving peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait in its joint statement with the US.”20 Calling it a possible “turning point” of the US-China relationship, Kukmin Ilbo said that Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan diluted the effect of US strategic ambiguity, which acknowledged China’s One China policy while pledging to defend Taiwan. As a result, it added, South Korea would face further sensitive issues that require diplomatic choices, such as the country’s commitment to “three nos” on THAAD and the US-led “Chip 4” alliance.21 Hankook Ilbo noted, as the conflicts between Seoul-Washington-Tokyo and Pyongyang-Beijing-Moscow were further intensified after North Korea’s nuclear saber-rattling and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, these issues were likely to result in Seoul’s involvement in the US-China confrontation.22
Pelosi arrived in Seoul on August 3 amid heightened tensions over her visit to Taiwan. During her 23-hour trip to South Korea, she and her delegation had a bilateral parliamentary meeting with Speaker Kim Jin-pyo and other senior members of the National Assembly, visited the Joint Security Area (JSA), and met service members of the US Forces Korea to reaffirm their commitment to the ROK-US alliance for mutual benefits in security, supply chains, trade, and investments. While Pelosi’s visit was widely seen as a signal of strong determination to advance the alliance and a warning against North Korea,23 Yoon’s lukewarm welcome drew heavy criticism.
According to the Yongsan Presidential Office, due to Yoon’s vacation plans, they were unable to have an in-person meeting, but instead held a phone call to discuss security issues, technological cooperation, and climate change. However, when asked whether it was because the Yoon administration was wary of ROK-China relations and Beijing’s furious response to Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, the presidential office said “the decision was out of consideration for the national interests as a whole.”24
Given the fact that the administration pledged to put top priority on strengthening the ROK-US alliance, major media outlets found the response rather confusing. Calling it “unconvincing,” Joongang Ilbo strongly criticized the government’s lack of consistency.25 Segye Ilbo expressed regret over the missed chance to show the administration’s unwavering solidarity with the US.26
On the other hand, Hankook Ilbo noted that the government’s response to the visit was an example of South Korea’s fate of seeking a balance between the US and China.27 Echoing this view, Kukmin Ilbo pointed out that neither China nor Taiwan was mentioned during the call.28 Dong-a Ilbo highlighted the dilemma of strengthening the ROK-US alliance and maintaining a close relationship with China, which had launched live-fire military exercises around Taiwan.29 The messages from progressive media outlets were also aligned with this view in the sense that both Hankyoreh30 and Kyunghyang Shinmun31 underscored the significance of consistency and coherence in the country’s diplomatic strategies to prepare for the upcoming issues of joining the Chip 4 alliance and dealing with a sharp response from Beijing.
Forced Repatriation of North Korean Fishermen
On July 11, a spokesperson of the South Korean Ministry of Unification in a press briefing announced that the 2019 decision to repatriate two North Korean fishermen was “obviously flawed,” reversing its prior position that the fishermen who allegedly had murdered 16 fellow fishermen could not be protected under the refugee convention.32 On July 12 and 13, the ministry released the images and footage of the two fishermen resisting being handed over to the North Korean authorities at the truce village of Panmunjom, roiling South Korea. One of the fishermen was shown to resist crossing the demarcation line, dragged his feet, and stooped down in fear. The controversial images drew condemnation internationally that the forced repatriation was in violation of the principle of non-refoulment.33
The conservative Chosun Ilbo editorialized that the forced repatriation was a rare barbarity, pointing out that the two fishermen who submitted a handwritten letter of intent to defect were considered “insincere” only after a three-day interrogation.34 The conservative Joongang Ilbo echoed that view, writing that the repatriation amounted to violation of Article 3 of the South Korean Constitution, which also provides South Korean citizenship to North Korean escapees, and Article 32 of the North Korean Refugees Protection and Settlement Support Act, which provides escapees the right of appeal, adding that the unhumanitarian act committed by the previous government requires a full probe.35
Citing the condemnations from international human rights organizations, the conservative Hankook Kyungjae editorialized that the previous government’s utter indifference to North Korean human rights issues shamed South Korea internationally, adding that the current government should fully investigate the case.36 On the contrary, the progressive Hankyoreh criticized the ministry for being irresponsible in reversing its position, without substantiated evidence, accusing it of serving as a political tool to defame the previous government and whip up McCarthyism.37
Yoon’s “Audacious Initiative” and Its Rejection
On August 15, in his speech to mark the 77th National Liberation Day, Yoon announced his “audacious initiative,” a plan to provide economic assistance to North Korea if the North ceases to develop its nuclear program and embraces a “genuine and substantive process of denuclearization.” Since denuclearization of North Korea is indispensable for sustainable peace on the Korean Peninsula, he said, the South would implement a large-scale food program, support modernizing infrastructure, and provide financial support.38
Yoon’s announcement faced two major criticisms from the media. Firstly, the plan was reminiscent of former President Lee Myung-bak’s North Korea policy known as the “Vision 3000 through Denuclearization and Openness,” which promised to raise per capita income in North Korea to $3,000 if Pyongyang had given up its nuclear program. Secondly, the “audacious initiative” was focused on economic aid rather than security issues, especially a security guarantee. Later on, the presidential office noted that the government had also prepared a roadmap for political and military cooperation, and if necessary, a partial exemption from the UN sanctions resolution could be discussed with the international community.39
With regard to the North’s response to the proposal, major media outlets remained skeptical. Hankyoreh criticized that it would be irresponsible to expect the “empty proposal” to be an effective measure to manage inter-Korean relations in a situation where the North advanced its nuclear and missile capabilities and threatened the South with words such as “annihilation” and “main enemy.”40 Hankook Ilbo editorialized that North Korea’s response would be limited without specific measures to alleviate Pyongyang’s security concerns.41 Because the Lee government’s “Vision 3000 through Denuclearization and Openness” proved fruitless, Segye Ilbo argued that additional measures to assuage the North’ security concerns, such as military confidence-building and arms control, be put in place to bring North Korea back to the negotiating table.42
Despite the grim outlook for inter-Korean relations, Kukmin Ilbo underlined that rising military tension could not prevent the North’s diplomatic and economic isolation and urged the South and North to work together to build trust.43 Although a “rosy blueprint” alone would not change Pyongyang’s stance, Joongang Ilbo said, the government should spare no effort to communicate with the North rather than sitting and waiting for changes in North Korea.44
North Korea launched two cruise missiles on Yoon’s 100th day in office, marking its 4th missile launches since his inauguration. Pyongyang’s saber-rattling was followed by Kim Yo-jong’s denunciation of Yoon’s “audacious initiative,” an aid-for-disarmament offer announced on National Liberation Day. In her statement titled “Don’t Have an Empty Dream,” she lashed out at him for “talking about the audacious plan today and conducting war games tomorrow,”45 flatly refusing to accept the South’s offer and criticizing the joint South Korea-US military drills. Although North Korea’s rejection was widely expected, her vituperative remarks, calling Yoon and his offer “repulsive” and “impertinent,” elicited a negative response from the South.46
In response to Kim Yo-jong’s stinging rebuke, the presidential office expressed regret through a statement warning that the North’s distortion of the “audacious initiative” and its constant pursuit of nuclear weapons would not only be perilous to peace and prosperity in the Korean Peninsula but also lead to the isolation of North Korea from the international community.47 Foreign Minister Park Jin also expressed regret over Kim Yo-jong’s statement and reaffirmed US support for “audacious initiative” in a call with his US counterpart, Anthony Blinken.48
With regard to Pyongyang’s wild language, Hankyoreh noted that North Korea could increase the level of saber-rattling, quoting Park Jie-won, former National Intelligence Service, who noted that the North was paving the way for a nuclear test.49 Kukmin Ilbo saw Pyongyang’s expression of no intention to give up its nuclear program as a “misjudgment,” driving itself away from being recognized as a “normal country” of the international community.50 Yet Segye Ilbo argued that the administration’s efforts should continue to overcome Pyongyang’s deep distrust in Seoul’s North Korea policy in the long term.51 Kyunghyang Shinmun echoed this view, urging the government to work closely with the US and China to limit North Korea’s nuclear capabilities while taking a pragmatic approach to improve inter-Korean relations.52
ROK-China Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Qingdao
On August 7, Park Jin visited Qingdao, for a bilateral meeting with China’s State Councilor and Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi. Marking the 30th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between South Korea and China, both sides exchanged opinions on their future cooperation on supply chains, cultural exchanges, and regional peace and prosperity. As the meeting was held amid escalating tensions between the US and China following Speaker Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, attention focused on South Korea’s deployment of the THAAD system and participation in the US-led “Chip 4” alliance.
Unsurprisingly, a rift reemerged as China expressed opposition and insisted that South Korea abide by “Three Nos and One Restriction.” Wang Yi pointed to a “five-point commitment,” urging Seoul to abide by it, including ruling out external interference; showing consideration of each other’s major concerns; maintaining openness, unimpeded supply chains, and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; and committing to multilateralism and the principles of the UN Charter.53 In addition, Foreign Ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin argued in a regular press briefing that Seoul had officially committed to the “Three Nos and One Restriction.” China insisted that South Korea comply with the “one restriction” on the use of the THAAD system deployed in South Korea.54 The bilateral meeting ended up igniting a heated discussion about “China’s interference in South Korea’s internal affairs.”
Dong-a Ilbo criticized China’s “duplicity,” attempting to exert influence on South Korea’s decision on the THAAD deployment and participation in the Chip 4 alliance while calling for independence and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs.55 Chosun Ilbo editorialized that the “three nos” approach was the previous administration’s policy, not an official agreement on the THAAD issue.56 Joongang Ilbo chimed in, arguing that each of the “three nos” should not be the subject of negotiations between countries as it is related to South Korea’s security and sovereignty.57 Instead, given the increasing possibility of North Korea’s nuclear test, Kukmin Ilbo argued that China should join international efforts to deter North Korea from continuing to build nuclear capabilities rather than exerting pressure on South Korea.58
Establishment of Public-Private Consultative Body on Wartime Labor Issue
On July 4, the South Korean Foreign Ministry announced that it held the inaugural session of the newly established public-private consultative body in regard to the Korean victims of Japan’s wartime labor during World War II. The ministry said the meeting was intended to consult with multi-stakeholders, including victim support non-governmental organizations and attorneys representing the victims, academia, the media, and the business community, and to seek a reasonable solution.59 The conservative Dong-a Ilbo editorialized that the launch of the consultative body showed Yoon’s determination to resolve diplomatic rows with Japan, adding that in pushing for a scheme where the government first paid to the victims compensation and later was repaid by contributions from the Japanese government, the government should gain the support of the victims and the public while the Japanese government should show a change of attitude and take reciprocal measures.60
The conservative Joongang Ilbo editorialized that establishing such a consultative body was necessary to approach this sensitive issue, adding that a follow-on bipartisan eminent persons’ group could be established to elicit consensus on the way forwards.61 The newspaper also took note of the annual meeting between Korea and Japanese business leaders hosted by the Federation of Korean Industries (FKI) and the Keidanren in Seoul on July 4 whose 8-point declaration called for abiding by the spirit of the 1998 Kim Dae-jung-Obuchi declaration, reinstituting VISA-free programs, and maintaining good bilateral relations to contribute to peace and stability in the region.62 The conservative Hankook Kyungjae also took note of the joint statement issued from the meeting that it well-reflected the principles and action items necessary to build a future-oriented Korea-Japan bilateral relations.63 The conservative Segye Ilbo editorialized that it was encouraging that various proposals including creating a fund with contributions from South Korean and Japanese firms, and a fund with not only contributions from the firms, but public donations were aired in South Korean diplomatic circles, yet it cautioned that any proposal that does not reflect the views of the victims would ultimately be moribund.64
Passing of Abe Shinzo
On July 8, Abe, the longest-serving prime minister of Japan, died after being fatally shot during election campaigning. The Korean press expressed shock at the news and concern over potential radicalization of the far-right in the aftermath of his death. The conservative Segye Ilbo editorialized that political terrorism that threatens democracy should never be condoned for any reason and sent deep condolences to the Japanese for the loss of their former leader.65 The conservative JoongAng Ilbo also denounced in the strongest terms what it described as the vile acts of a suspect, adding that the demise of the prime minister should not undermine early momentum for a potential diplomatic thaw between South Korea and Japan made possible by the rare meetings between the two leaders during the NATO summit.66 The conservative Donga Ilbo editorialized that Abe was a prominent figure among Japan’s right-wing politicians and the national atmosphere of mourning would likely be conducive to favorable public opinion on amending the pacifist constitution, which it claimed would push the country one step closer to ‘a country that can wage a war.’ The normalization of Japan, the newspaper further argued, could have positive effects in terms of deterring North Korean threats but also prompt concerns given the country’s aggression during WWII and continued distortions of history, making it a priority for Seoul to review its approach to relations with Japan to insulate the ongoing diplomatic efforts from the prospects of Japan’s swing to the far right.67 The progressive Kyunghyang Shinmun cited the early voting results of the parliamentary election that an LDP landslide was likely, which could advance Abe’s stated goals of increasing military spending to over 2 percent of GDP and amending the pacifist constitution, a set of policies the newspaper cast as ‘right-wing.’ The newspaper also warned that the mourning for the loss of Abe should not become a pretext to strengthen the far-right foreign policy agenda.68
South Korea-Japan Foreign Ministers’ Meeting
On July 18, Park Jin met with his Japanese counterpart, Hayashi Yoshimasa, during his visit to Japan, marking the first in-person meeting between the foreign ministers of the two countries since December 2017. According to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the two agreed to find a solution before liquidation of assets held by Japanese companies is acted upon according to the 2018 South Korea Supreme Court ruling.69 In advance of the meeting, the progressive Hankyoreh editorialized that a solution on the South Korean court ruling on the Korean victims of wartime forced labor cannot be reached without sincere apology and compensation from Japan, citing the comments of the newly appointed South Korean ambassador to Japan Yoon Duk-min that “as it takes two to tango, the two countries should cooperate with each other.”70
The conservative Jooang Ilbo editorialized that although the in-person meeting during which the two ministers concurred on the necessity and urgency of improving the relations amid the intensifying standoff between the US and China, improving the relations still has miles to go as any solution requires bipartisan support within South Korea. The newspaper urged the Yoon administration to utilize to the fullest extent possible its political and diplomatic resources to normalize the relations with Japan.71 The centrist Hankook Ilbo editorialized that as the Japanese cabinet will have ‘three golden years’ in which no elections would be held and therefore allow the cabinet a stable condition to pursue its policies, it remains to be seen whether the soft-spoken centrist Kishida would pursue his own moderate and independent policies, which would require the Seoul government to closely follow Japanese domestic politics and look carefully to reach diplomatic breakthroughs.72 The conservative Seoul Shinmun editorialized that the absence of Abe would not be huge as there were many conservative, far-right politicians who can fill his void and asked the Kishida cabinet to positively respond to goodwill gesture of the Yoon government to solve a wartime labor issue.73
1. “Readout of President Biden’s Trilateral with President Yoon Suk Yeol of the Republic of Korea and Prime Minister Fumio Kishida of Japan,” The White House, June 29, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/06/29/readout-of-president-bidens-trilateral-with-president-yoon-suk-yeol-of-the-republic-of-korea-and-prime-minister-fumio-kishida-of-japan/.
2. “Kishida, Yoon meet in person for the first time in Madrid,” The Asahi Shimbun, June 29, 2022, https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/14656649.
3. “5년 만의 한·미·일 정상회담, 북핵 실질적 해결 길 터야,” Hankook Kyungjae, June 30, 2022, https://www.hankyung.com/opinion/article/2022063086951.
4. “한미일, 北 핵·미사일 개발 돈줄 옥죄기 적극 공조하라,” Seoul Kyungjae, July 1, 2022, https://www.sedaily.com/NewsView/268CNTKZO9.
5. “돌파구 찾은 한·일 관계, 시급한 현안 풀며 신뢰 되찾아야,” Kukmin Ilbo, July 1, 2022, https://news.kmib.co.kr/article/view.asp?arcid=0924252977&code=11171111&stg=ws_real.
6. “한·일 ‘관계 개선’ 의지 확인, 군사협력 논의는 경계해야,” Hankyoreh, June 30, 2022, https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/opinion/editorial/1049214.html.
7. “다자 무대서 제재만 외친 윤 대통령, 한반도 긴장 대책 뭔가,” Kyunghyang Shinmun, June 30, https://m.khan.co.kr/opinion/editorial/article/202206302032015#c2b.
8. “尹 나토서 “韓, 더 큰 역할 할 것”, 정교한 외교 뒷받침돼야,” Segye Ilbo, June 30, https://www.segye.com/newsView/20220630522266.
9. “한·중 관계 세심하게 관리해 국익 손상 막아야,” Joongang Ilbo, July 2, https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25083593#home.
10. “Rededicated Korean War Memorial Lists Names of Fallen,” U.S. Department of Defense, July 27, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3107882/rededicated-korean-war-memorial-lists-names-of-fallen/.
11. “워싱턴에 영원히 남을 한미 젊은이들의 숭고한 희생,” Chosun Ilbo, July 27, https://www.chosun.com/opinion/editorial/2022/07/27/AJCSTD7SDBFVFETSNSG3WOFE4I/.
12. “워싱턴 ‘추모의 벽’에 새겨진 4만3808명의 영웅을 기린다,” Maeil Kyungjae, July 28, https://www.mk.co.kr/opinion/editorial/view/2022/07/663546/.
13. “한미 경제안보동맹 강화… 中 역풍도 단단히 대비해야,” Dong-a Ilbo, July 20, 2022, https://www.donga.com/news/Opinion/article/all/20220719/114537408/1.
14. “‘프렌드쇼어링’ 동참하되 자원전쟁 대비해야,” Joongang Ilbo, July 20, 2022, https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25088222#home.
15. “한·미 ‘필요시 외화유동성 공급’, 통화스와프로 이어지길,” Segye Ilbo, July 19, 2022, https://www.segye.com/newsView/20220719524406.
16. “경제안보 동맹 강화 재확인한 한미 재무장관 회의,” Seoul Shinmun, July 19, 2022, https://www.seoul.co.kr/news/newsView.php?id=20220720031011.
17. “강달러 속 외환시장 선제 대응 합의한 韓美,” Hankook Ilbo, July 20, 2022, https://www.hankookilbo.com/News/Read/A2022071918140002842.
18. “Don’t ‘play with fire’ over Taiwan, China’s Xi warns in call with Biden,” Reuters, July 29, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/biden-looks-tamp-down-taiwan-tension-during-china-xi-call-2022-07-28/.
19. Nancy Pelosi, “Why I’m leading a congressional delegation to Taiwan,” The Washington Post, August 2, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/08/02/nancy-pelosi-taiwan-visit-op-ed/.
20. “펠로시 대만 방문이 남긴 숙제,” Chosun Ilbo, August 5, 2022, https://www.chosun.com/opinion/correspondent_column/2022/08/05/4INEWRENKZBJTGPIM5KSR6JAKQ/.
21. “대만서 충돌하는 미·중… 한국 외교전략 더 정교해야,” Kukmin Ilbo, August 3, 2022, https://news.kmib.co.kr/article/view.asp?arcid=0924257631&code=11171111&sid1=opi.
22. “펠로시 대만 방문에 최고조 달한 미중 갈등,” Hankook Ilbo, August 3, 2022, https://www.hankookilbo.com/News/Read/A2022080214480001848.
23. “펠로시, 金의장과 회담 후 23시간 방한 마치고 일본으로 출국,” Chosun Ilbo, August 4, 2022, https://biz.chosun.com/policy/politics/2022/08/04/G4KYD7FBXFGS5DOAFVZILGDOJI/.
24. “휴가→국익 고려…尹이 펠로시 안 만난 이유, 하루 만에 바뀌었다,” Chonsun Ilbo, August 4, 2022, https://biz.chosun.com/policy/politics/2022/08/04/YMD3ATIYV5BEZFI72ZMMJLHD4I/.
25. “동맹 강화 외치며 펠로시 안 만난 윤 대통령,” Joongang Ilbo, August 5, 2022, https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25092196#home.
26. “韓·美 경제안보 포괄적 동맹 재확인한 펠로시 방한,” Segye Ilbo, August 5, 2022, https://www.segye.com/newsView/20220804520354.
27. “국익 고려해 펠로시와 만남 대신 통화했다는 尹,” Hankook Ilbo, August 5, 2022, https://www.hankookilbo.com/News/Read/A2022080414370001397.
28. “펠로시 방한, 한·미 동맹 강화 속 대중 외교 숙제 남겼다,” Kukmin Ilbo, August 5, 2022, https://news.kmib.co.kr/article/view.asp?arcid=0924258097&code=11171111&sid1=opi.
29. “尹-펠로시 만남 대신 통화… 의전 혼선 드러낸 ‘중추국가’ 외교,” Dong-a Ilbo, August 5, 2022, https://www.donga.com/news/Opinion/article/all/20220804/114816428/1.
30. “윤 대통령-펠로시 통화, 혼선 가중시킨 오락가락 외교,” Hankyoreh, August 4, https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/opinion/editorial/1053552.html.
31. “펠로시 방한 둘러싼 ‘오락가락 외교’와 미숙한 대응,” Kyunghyang Shinmun, August 4, 2022, https://www.khan.co.kr/opinion/editorial/article/202208042020005.
32. “통일부 정례브리핑 – 속기자료,” Ministry of Unifiacation, July 11, https://unitv.unikorea.go.kr/unitv/web/vod/view.do?id=6580&aid=9
33. “영국 알톤 상원의원 ‘한국, 탈북 어민 북송 말았어야…영국, 안보리에서 북한 정권 압박’,” VOA 한국어, July 20, https://www.voakorea.com/a/6665384.html; “국제사회까지 규탄에 나선 ‘강제 북송’ 사건,” 대구신문, July 17, https://www.idaegu.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=388750.
34. “탈북 어민 강제 북송 현장의 충격적 사진,” Chosun Ilbo, July 13, https://www.chosun.com/opinion/editorial/2022/07/13/F2HA4KA4UFHY7IIZFZGMCMCTIA/.
35. “탈북 어민 북송 사진에서 드러난 문 정부의 반인권 행태,” Joongang Ilbo, July 15, https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25086439#home.
36. “서해 피격·강제 북송 사건, 세계가 지켜보고 있다,” Hankuk Kyungjae, July 20, https://www.hankyung.com/opinion/article/2022071904701.
37. “‘북송’ 동영상 공개까지, 정치공세 ‘도구’ 자처한 통일부,” Hankyoreh, July 19, https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/opinion/editorial/1051576.html.
38. “윤석열 대통령 제77주년 광복절 경축사,” 대한민국정책브리핑, August 15, 2022, https://www.korea.kr/news/policyNewsView.do?newsId=148904758.
39. “대통령실 "정치·군사 로드맵도 준비…필요시 北제재 면제 협의,” Hankook Kyungjae, August 15, 2022, https://www.hankyung.com/politics/article/202208153505Y.
40. “현실성도 원칙도 안 보인 윤 대통령 광복절 경축사,” Hankyoreh, August 15, 2022, https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/opinion/editorial/1054805.html.
41. “북한 비핵화 시 획기적 지원 제안한 尹 대통령,” Hankook Ilbo, August 16, 2022, https://www.hankookilbo.com/News/Read/A2022081516010005426.
42. “尹 ‘비핵화시 식량 등 담대한 지원’, 이젠 北이 화답할 차례다,” Segye Ilbo, August 15, 2022, https://www.segye.com/newsView/20220815512599.
43. “‘한·일 관계 복원’ ‘담대한 대북 구상’ 천명한 8·15 경축사,” Kukmin Ilbo, August 16, 2022, https://news.kmib.co.kr/article/view.asp?arcid=0924259342&code=11171111&sid1=opi.
44. “담대한 8·15 대북 제안…북한 호응이 관건,” Joongang Ilbo, August 16, 2022, https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25094514#home.
45. “북, 윤 대통령 ‘담대한 구상’ 거부…‘어리석음 극치, 절대 상대 안 해’,” Hankyoreh, August 19, 2022, https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/politics_general/1055370.html?_fr=mt2.
46. “김여정, ‘윤아무개’ ‘그 인간 자체가 싫다’ 비난 담화,” Chosun Ilbo, August 19, 2022, https://biz.chosun.com/policy/politics/2022/08/19/5JL4BSZEZFAVVNQF6BXZ4LTWEY/.
47. “대통령실, 김여정 담화에 "매우 유감… 자중하고 심사숙고하길,” Hankook Ilbo, August 19, 2022, https://www.hankookilbo.com/News/Read/A2022081911070001638.
48. “한미 외교장관 통화(8.19.) 결과,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 19, 2022, https://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4080/view.do?seq=372641.
49. “‘담대한 구상’ 거부한 북 도발 자제하고, 남 실효적 방안 찾아야,” Hankyoreh, August 19, 2022, https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/opinion/editorial/1055452.html.
50. “김여정의 무례한 담화, 北의 위험한 오판,” Kukmin Ilbo, August 20, 2022, https://news.kmib.co.kr/article/view.asp?arcid=0924260045&code=11171111&sid1=opi.
51. “‘尹 담대한 구상’ 걷어찬 北, 허튼 도발로 파국 자초 말라,” Segye Ilbo, August 19, 2022, https://www.segye.com/newsView/20220819516996.
52. “북한에 거부당한 ‘담대한 구상’, 정부 실질적 노력 이어가길,” Kyunghyang Shinmun, August 19, 2022, https://www.khan.co.kr/opinion/editorial/article/202208192035005.
53. “Wang Yi: Promote Sound and Steady Growth of China-ROK Strategic Cooperative Partnership with a Five-point Commitment,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, August 9, 2022, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/wjbz_663308/activities_663312/202208/t20220810_10740381.html.
54. “2022年8月10日外交部发言人汪文斌主持例行记者会,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People’s Republic of China, August 10, 2022, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/fyrbt_673021/202208/t20220810_10739931.shtml.
55. “사드·칩4 노골적 압력 가하며 “내정간섭 말자”는 中의 이중성,” Dong-a Ilbo, August 10, 2022, https://www.donga.com/news/Opinion/article/all/20220809/114886546/1.
56. “내정 간섭 말자는 中, 한국 내정인 ‘사드 3不’은 강요,” Chosun Ilbo, August 11, 2022, https://www.chosun.com/opinion/editorial/2022/08/11/EYOYYWLTYJFBNJ6ATN4L23ZMPI/.
57. “중국의 3불 1한 억지, 내정간섭이자 안보주권 침해다,” Joongang Ilbo, August 12, 2022, https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25093832#home.
58. “중국, ‘3불 1한’ 강요 대신 북핵 억제에 동참하길,” Kukmin Ilbo, August 12, 2022, https://news.kmib.co.kr/article/view.asp?arcid=0924258959&code=11171111&sid1=opi.
59. “강제징용 관련 「민관협의회」 개최,” 외교부, July 4, 2022, https://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4080/view.do?seq=372482&page=1.
60. “강제동원 민관협의회 출범… 피해자 설득이 최우선이다,” Dong-a Ilbo, July 5, 2022, https://www.donga.com/news/Opinion/article/all/20220704/114287368/1.
61. “민관협의회와 재계회의, 한·일 관계 물꼬 트길,” Joongang Ilbo, July 5, 2022, https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25084410#home.
63. “경제계가 끌고 가는 한·일 관계 정상화…게이단렌 방한 의미 있다,” Hankook Kyungjae, July 4, 2022, https://www.hankyung.com/opinion/article/2022070455571.
64. “강제동원 ‘민관協’, 한·일관계 물꼬 틀 해법 찾아야,” Segye Ilbo, July 4, 2022, https://www.segye.com/newsView/20220704520288.
65. “아베 전 총리 피살, 민주주의 위협하는 정치테러 안 돼,” Segye Ilbo, July 10, 2022, https://www.segye.com/newsView/20220710513217.
66. “아베 사망으로 한·일 관계 흔들려선 안 돼,” Joongang Ilbo, July 12, 2022, https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25085837#home.
67. “아베 이후… 日 우경화에 안 흔들릴 한일관계 개선전략 짜야,” Dong-a Ilbo, July 11, 2022, https://www.donga.com/news/Opinion/article/all/20220710/114382182/1.
68. “아베 피습 속 자민당 참의원 선거 승리, 우경화 경계한다,” Kyunghyang Shinmun, July 10, 2022, https://www.khan.co.kr/opinion/editorial/article/202207102057005.
69. “Press Conference by Foreign Minister Hayashi Yoshimasa,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, July 19, 2022, https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/kaiken/kaiken22e_000088.html#topic2.
70. “한·일 외교장관 회담, ‘가해자 사과’ 담은 해법 찾아야,” Hankyoreh, July 17, 2022, https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/opinion/editorial/1051275.html.
71. “55개월 만의 한·일 외교회담…천천히 서둘러라,” Jooang Ilbo, July 19, 2022, https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25087908#home.
72. “아베 사망 속 참의원 선거… 한일관계 파장 주시해야,” Hankook Ilbo, July 11, 2022, https://www.hankookilbo.com/News/Read/A2022071014480002316.
73. “日 참의원 선거 압승한 여당, 한일관계 적극 나서야,” Seoul Shinmun, July 11, 2022, https://www.seoul.co.kr/news/newsView.php?id=20220711031009.