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US Secretary of State Antony Blinken emphasized the importance of fostering military ties and collaborative security efforts during his November 8-9 visit to South Korea, particularly in the face of provocations from North Korea. A week later President Yoon Suk Yeol’s active engagement in the APEC summit may have served as a tangible commitment to cultivating alliances and effectively addressing both economic and security challenges on the global stage. Blinken’s discussions in South Korea zeroed in on the condemnation of North Korea’s actions and the reinforcement of the US-ROK alliance. Subsequent dialogues, including the ROK-US-Japan Defense Chiefs’ talk and the 55th ROK-US Security Consultative Meeting, explored strategies for enhancing defense capabilities and adapting tailored deterrence approaches to counteract North Korea’s nuclear threats.
The UNC Defense Ministerial Meeting and Yoon’s diplomatic initiatives at APEC underscored a dedication to coordinated responses to threats on the Korean Peninsula and a commitment to strengthening relations with the US and Japan. However, the notable absence of a separate dialogue with China in Yoon’s summit diplomacy raised concerns regarding the intricacies of regional dynamics. The geopolitical landscape faced by South Korea demands adept navigation, involving a balance of alliances, the response to provocations from North Korea, and the management of regional complexities. As tensions heighten with South Korea’s successful launch of a military reconnaissance satellite and North Korea’s subsequent ICBM launch, the challenge lies in diplomatic finesse, strategic planning, and an unwavering focus on achieving peace in the region, all of which remain crucial considerations raised by South Korean media.
ROK-US RelationsSecretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to South Korea
Blinken visited South Korea to discuss security issues surrounding Korean Peninsula, in particular strong military relations between North Korea and Russia. As part of broader tour of Asia, Blinken’s visit to South Korea was his first in 2 years. On the first day of the visit, Blinken discussed North Korea’s threats with National Security Advisor Cho Tae-young, strongly condemning the North Korea’s provocative actions on the peninsula and its military supplies to Russia.1 Blinken paid a courtesy call on Yoon, during which he expressed his will to strengthen the ROK-US alliance and Yoon said that South Korea will work closely with the US to protect core values and solidify the rule-based international order.2
Blinken also held talks with Foreign Minister Park Jin for 75 minutes to discuss further actions against North Korea’s support of military programs to Russia.3 Park said that we support US efforts to responsibly manage US-China relations.4 JoongAng Ilbo evaluated Blinken’s visit positively because he visited South Korea despite urgent international situations impacting the US such as the Ukraine-Russia War, and Israel-Hamas War.5It editorialized that the two wars create a new task for the two countries6; highlighting the need to redefine existing security and alliance strategies, taking into account the extreme situation in which the US might have to not only fight two wars but also three or four wars simultaneously.7
JoongAng Ilbo expected South Korea to deal with related issues in depth at the 55th ROK-US Security Consultative Meeting (SCM), attended by the. defense ministers, to be held in Seoul on the 13th.8 Segye Ilbo agreed, saying that concerns arising from close ties between North Korea and Russia can be reduced only if South Korea strengthens its position between the U.S. and China and carries out its own pragmatic diplomacy.9 Itemphasized that the highest level of extended deterrence is a cornerstone for solidifying the ROK-US alliance.10
ROK-US-Japan Defense Chiefs’ talk and SCM
On November 12, South Korea’s Defense Minister Shin Won-sik, and Lloyd Austin, U.S. Secretary of Defense, and Japanese Minister of Defense Kihara Minoru held ROK-US-Japan Defense Chiefs’ talks at the Ministry of National Defense in Seoul.11 Both Shin and Austin joined the meeting in person, whereas Kihara attended remotely to review the implementation of follow-up measures in the defense sector agreed upon at the Camp David Summit, discussing way to shore up security cooperation among three countries against North Korea’s threat.12 The three ministers emphasized international society’s role in order to dissuade North Korea from developing nuclear weapon and drive its complete denuclearization. They agreed to start sharing real-time data on North Korean missiles in December as well as to establish a framework for trilateral military training starting in January 2024.13 The following day, on the 13th, the ROK-US Security Consultative Meeting was held in Yongsan, Seoul,14 the 55th SCM held annually.15 It focused on strengthening the implementation of extended deterrence including specifying the operation of the ‘Nuclear Consultative Group’(NCG), to which the leaders of South Korea and US agreed through the “Washington Declaration” in April.16 Assessment of the North Korean situation, cooperation in policy toward North Korea and defense technology, and regional security cooperation were discussed as major agenda items. The ministers also revised “Tailored Deterrence Strategy” (TDS), a strategic document to respond to North Korea’s growing nuclear and missile threats, for the first time in 10 years.17 TDS is classified for security reasons, but the revision reportedly reflects a plan to utilize all capabilities of the ROK-US alliance, including American’s nuclear capabilities, in preparation for North Korea’s possible nuclear or WMD attacks.18 Both sides also agreed to suspend the 9/19 Inter-Korean Military Agreement made during President Moon’s visit to Pyongyang, in September 2018.19 JoongAng Ilbo closely followed the revision of TDS, saying that the outcome must be a strong defense shield against North Korea’s nuclear threats,20 editorializing that if everything goes as agreed, we can look forward to a rosy future for the alliance.21
Kookmin Ilbo editorialized that strengthening extended deterrence is essential for South Korea in the light of North Korea’s growing missile and nuclear threats.22 Regarding the suspension of the 9/19 Inter-Korean Military Agreement, a cautious approach is required given that North Korea may use it to justify provocations in the border area.23 Saying South Korea would have to endure international criticism from breaking the agreement first, Kookmin Ilbo editorialized that it would be better to decide whether to suspend it based on national consensus.24 Kyunghyang Shinmun went further in warning that the systemization of military training among South Korea, the US, and Japan has the potential to provoke not only North Korea but also China and Russia,25 adding that strong security can be secured not only through strong military preparedness but also through efforts to communicate and build trust with the other party.26 In this context, iteditorialized that it is unwise for the Yoon administration to rush to take steps to abolish the 9/19 Inter-Korean Military Agreement.27 By mentioning that Lloyd Austin said that he would monitor the situation further and communicate closely on matters of suspension, Kyunghyang Shinmun asked why South Korea is rushing to suspend the agreement.28
ROK-UNCMSUNCMS Defense Ministerial Meeting
On November 14, South Korea’s Ministry of National Defense hosted the Defense Ministerial Meeting of the United Nations Command Members States (UNCMS) in Seoul.29 Including Shin Won-sik and Lloyd Austin, there were defense ministers of 14 member states sending combat troops and 3 member states providing medical support during the Korean War, and foreign delegations to South Korea at the meeting.30 The United Nations Command (UNC) was established in July 1950 following North Korea’s invasion and enforces the Armistice Agreement with a focus on lasting peace on the peninsula.31 South Korea and the 17 member states gathered to reaffirm the UNC’s contribution in maintaining security on the Korean Peninsula, condemning North Korea’s illegal nuclear and missiles programs in violation of the UN Security Council resolutions,32 while discussing an expansion plan for UNC member states.33 They called for a collective response if hostile acts or armed attacks that threaten the security of the Republic of Korea resume.34 South Korea expressed its plan to dispatch senior officials to the UNC for the sake of expanding its role in the UNC.35
A day later, the UNC member states declared with one voice that they would jointly respond to emergencies, showing that the two pillars of security of the ROK-US alliance and the UNC had become more solidified.36 Kyunghyang Shinmun, however, warned that the goal was to revitalize the UNC, which was limited to managing the armistice agreement system,37 butit is not clear whether the reactivation of the UNC will increase or decrease the risk of war on the Korean Peninsula,38 and by doing so, it could stimulate not only North Korea but also Russia and China to strengthen the structure of a new Cold War.39
ROK-APEC
Yoon’s summit diplomacy at APEC
On November 15-17, Yoon Suk Yeol at the APEC summit in San Francisco,40 called for boosting interconnectivity in: ⑴ trade, investment, supply chains; ⑵ digital; ⑶ and future generations (at the APEC CEO summit in which CEOs of major US companies, such as Apple’s Tim Cook, gathered.41 Yoon met US President Joe Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio on the sidelines of the APEC forum,42 three months after they held a trilateral summit at Camp David.43 He also participated in a summit of the US-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) to discuss measures to restore supply chains in the region including critical minerals.44 14 member states of IPEF agreed to launch a “Critical Mineral Dialogue” with the aim of building stable supplies as well as to establish an IPEF Network for promoting people-to-people exchanges among member states.45
Leaders from the US and Japan each held a bilateral summit with China despite an uneasy relationship; however, Yoon only exchanged greetings with Chinese President Xi Jinping for 3-minutes without holding a bilateral summit at APEC. Opinions diverged on Yoon’s summit diplomacy at APEC. Seoul Shinmun said that China put South Korea on the back burner, but strongly claimed that the solution to advancing Korea-China relations lies in the consolidation of ROK-US-Japan relations.46 A close cooperation system among the three is important to ensure that China engages in dialogue with South Korea with a forward-looking attitude.47 In contrast, JoongAng Ilbo and Kyunghyang Shinmun took a similar tone, the former editorialized that Yoon produced diplomatic achievements, further restoring South Korea-Japan relations and strong ROK-US-Japan cooperation; however, it regretted that Yoon did not have separate talks with Xi Jinping.48 Considering the circumstances in which Xi met Biden and Kishida without holding a meeting with Yoon, JoongAng Ilbo argued that the estranged relationship with China cannot continue.49 It editorialized that China is Korea’s largest trading partner and a country that can exert influence over North Korea, which is increasing military tensions on the peninsula; therefore, South Korea must create space for diplomacy with China so as to discuss economic cooperation, North Korea’s denuclearization, and repatriation of North Korean defectors.50 Kyunghyang Shinmun took note of Xi’s bilateral meetings with the US and Japan,51 arguing that leaders met Xi Jinping to manage conflicts, knowing they need to cooperate with China. By doubling down on his close relationship with US and Japan during his visit to APEC,52 Yoon failed to seriously reexamine whether it is in the national interest to continue this approach next year.53 At the very least, the national interest is to reduce the atmosphere of a new Cold War on the Korean Peninsula, an area in which South Korea has influence. Restoring relations with China must be given greater priority than it is now.
The ROK-US-Japan Initiative
On December 9, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan engaged in the fourth trilateral meeting with ROK National Security Advisor Cho Tae-Yong and Japanese National Security Advisor Akiba Takeo, just four months after the Camp David Summit, where Biden, Yoon, and Kishida ushered in an era of collaborative efforts among the three nations. The national security advisors conducted a thorough assessment of advancements in various trilateral initiatives. These included the Commitment to Consult during regional crises, the exchange of ballistic missile defense data, and joint endeavors to counter the DPRK’s utilization of cryptocurrency for funding its prohibited Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) programs. Additionally, they delved into the forthcoming stages of collaborative efforts in economic security, encompassing the early warning initiative for supply chain issues. Discussions also touched upon the alignment of Indo-Pacific Strategies and capacity-building efforts of the three nations throughout the region.54 Jake Sullivan affirmed endeavors to tackle North Korea’s space and ballistic missile trials, noting the objective of fostering a more liberated, inclusive, prosperous, and secure Indo-Pacific while upholding peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and ensuring freedom of navigation in the East and South China seas.55
In its editorial, Segye Ilbo highlighted that the national security advisors engaged in discussions regarding the North Korean nuclear and missile threats, along with examining the patterns in military collaboration between Russia and North Korea, also committing to actively cooperate in fulfilling and preventing violations of United Nations Security Council resolutions in the international community. Furthermore, the advisors positively assessed the joint sanctions imposed by South Korea, the United States, Japan, and Australia last month in response to North Korea’s military reconnaissance satellite launch. They agreed to seamlessly advance security cooperation, including real-time sharing of North Korean missile alert information and the establishment of tripartite training plans over the years, in response to the launch.56
North Korea
North Korea’s designation of “Missile Industry Day” to mark test-firing an ICBM
On November 5, North Korea designated November 18th, when the test launch of the ‘Hwasong-17’ Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) was claimed to be successful, as “Missile Industry Day.”57 Rodong Shinmun explained that it was a day when the majesty of the country with the strongest ICBM was demonstrated to the world. North Korea’s designation of “Missile Industry Day” raised speculation that North Korea may launch another armed provocation at this time.58 In response to a reporter’s question about the designation of “Missile Industry Day,” Unification Minister Kim Young-ho said that “Kim Joo-ae, daughter of Kim Jong-un, first came out on November 18 last year” and “Shouldn’t there be an intention to give meaning to it?”59 The ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff also announced that it is monitoring the possibility that North Korea will launch its third military reconnaissance satellite on November 18.60 Lee Seong-jun, Joint Chiefs of Staff Public Affairs Director said that South Korea and US intelligence authorities are working in close cooperation to monitor North Korea’s possible provocations including the third launch of a space launch vehicle claimed by North Korea.61
Seoul Kyungjae said North Korea is threatening peace on the Korean Peninsula by mentioning “nuclear war” and “World War Ⅲ.”62 Referring to North Korea’s designation of “Missile Industry Day”, Seoul Kyungjae said there is a possibility that the Kim Jong-un regime will launch an ICBM or reconnaissance satellite around this day,63 adding that South Korea must have overwhelming military power in order to protect peace on the Korean Peninsula by strengthening security without being swayed by North Korea’s threats. With Austin’s visit, South Korea must reaffirm thorough security cooperation posture based on the upgraded ROK-US alliance to prevent North Korea from even thinking about provocations. For this, Seoul Kyungjae highlighted that it is necessary to hold concrete discussions to strengthen US extended deterrence against North Korea’s threats such as nuclear and missile provocations.64
Partial suspension of the 9/19 (or September 19) military agreement
On November 21, North Korea claimed that it had successfully launched a spy satellite into orbit after two failed tests in May and August due to booster malfunctions.65 According to North Korea’s state-run news agency (KCNA), launching a reconnaissance satellite is a legal right to strengthen self-defense. It reported that Kim Jong-un had congratulated scientists and officials on the site after the successful launch.66 The launch came after Kim Jong-un visited Russia in September in order to ask for military technical support from Russian President Vladimir Putin.67 In response, the Japanese government issued a J-Alert missile warning for Okinawa and Kishida said at least one ballistic missile flew over Okinawa into the Pacific Ocean.68 South Korea’s Joints Chief of Staff (JCS) confirmed that North Korea had launched a suspected spy satellite, adding that South Korea, the US and Japan had shared information on the launch.69 Shin Won-sik said “Prepare in detail military measures in preparation for the partial suspension of the 9/19 military agreement” after North Korea conducted the launch.70
During a state-visit to the UK, Yoon also held a NSC meeting and ordered the suspension of part of the 9/19 military agreement,71 hours after North Korea launched a rocket carrying the Malligyong-1 military reconnaissance satellite. JoongAng Ilbo said if North Korea does not respond to dialogue and continues to escalate tensions, in addition to suspending the entire 9/ 19 military agreement, various measures at a higher level must be reviewed and prepared.72 Segye Ilbo stated that the prevailing view is that Russia’s technology transfer will result in North Korea’s eliminating defects in launching sky satellites; therefore, it is a natural step for the government to suspend the effect of Article 1, Paragraph 3 of the 9 /19 military agreement and to restore the reconnaissance and surveillance activities against North Korea in the area of the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) that were implemented in the past.73 Hankyoreh expressed concern over North Korea’s launching a spy satellite by mentioning the fact that this violated a United Nations Security Council Resolution.74 However, Hankyoreh editorialized South Korea’s decision to suspend the 9/19 military agreement in response could backfire. 75
Kyunghyang Shinmun said that the government left open the possibility of revoking or suspending the agreement in the wake of the surprise attack by Hamas and immediately implemented it when North Korea launched the spy satellite.76 It editorialized that this is the first time that South Korea has suspended an inter-Korean agreement adopted in writing.77
South Korea’s military reconnaissance satellite
As of the 2nd of December, Korea has effectively deployed its first-ever military reconnaissance satellite, securely placing it into orbit. The testing and evaluation phase, involving the adjustment of satellite imagery focus, is scheduled for the next 4-6 months. Anticipation is high for it to achieve full operational status in the initial half of the upcoming year.78 The scheduled release of five surveillance satellites by 2025 aims to improve the Kill Chain’s ability to identify early signs of North Korea’s missile launches. Despite the fact that Korea’s surveillance satellite launch occurred more than ten days after North Korea’s, its ability to identify satellites is impressively 100 times better than that of North Korea.79
The conservative Segye Ilbo editorialized that the successful launch of reconnaissance satellites should be taken as an opportunity to further enhance deterrence against North Korean provocations.80 In an editorial, Kookmin Ilbo highlighted that, despite numerous warnings from the international community, North Korea persisted with the launch of reconnaissance satellites after three attempts. The editorial points out that North Korea is attempting to shift responsibility for nullifying the September 19 military agreement comprehensively onto the South, aiming to build a justification for further provocations. It has been noted that there is a potential danger of North Korea initiating localized provocations by reinstating surveillance outposts and deploying troops and artillery within the demilitarized zone. The chance of unmanned aerial vehicle provocations, akin to the intrusion into Seoul airspace last year, cannot be ruled out. Thus, the military should sustain its ability to react to any signs of North Korean provocation and stay alert, avoiding any relaxation of its posture at any given time.81 Hankook Kyungjae highlights the regrettable delays and budget cuts during the parliamentary review of the first reconnaissance satellite project, causing a three-year setback from the original goal, and notes that despite the urgency, the opposition party is expressing concern by considering potential cuts to next year’s reconnaissance satellite budget.82
ROK-US second Nuclear Cooperation Group (NCG)
On December 15, South Korea and the US held the second Nuclear Cooperation Group (NCG) meeting in Washington, emphasizing that "any nuclear attack by North Korea on the U.S. and its allies will not be tolerated and will lead to the ‘end’ of the Kim Jong-un regime." Discussions included plans for deploying US strategic assets to enhance the effectiveness of extended deterrence against the North’s nuclear missile threats, as well as joint planning, exercises, simulations, and training. The NCG was established to fulfill the "Washington Declaration" adopted during Yoon’s state visit to the US in April, aiming to strengthen the combined deterrence capabilities against North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats.83
North Korea counteracts with ICBM
Following a short-range ballistic missile launch on the night of December 17, North Korea immediately fired an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) on December 18. The launch is interpreted as a response to South Korea and the US. announcing during the second Nuclear Cooperation Group (NCG) meeting on the December 15 that they would include "nuclear operation scenarios" in next year’s joint exercises. The arrival of the US strategic nuclear-powered submarine USS Missouri in Busan on the 17th is seen as a corresponding move. A tense confrontation on the Korean Peninsula persists, escalating tensions.84
According to military sources, the ICBM was fired from the vicinity of Pyongyang towards the East Sea, taking a trajectory with a steeper angle than the usual (30-45 degrees) and remaining airborne for around 70 minutes. It traveled a distance of 1000 km, reaching an altitude exceeding 6000 km.85 This event signifies the third launch of the Hwasong-18 ICBM, indicating a transition to the operational phase of solid-fuel ICBMs. The Joint Chiefs of Staff categorize it as a "blatant violation of UN Security Council resolutions."86
The conservative Segye Ilbo editorialized that this recent ICBM provocation not only appears to be a response to the recent South Korea-US Nuclear Cooperation Group (NCG) meeting but also seems to be strategically timed with a focus on the upcoming US presidential elections. Segye Ilbo pointed out that it is crucial to consider the intentions behind completing the solid-fuel ICBM, possibly aiming to engage in negotiations with the United States after achieving a nuclear-armed status, with the ultimate goal of lifting North Korea sanctions. And also, as the US presidential election approaches, the likelihood of North Korea playing the card of a seventh nuclear test becomes significant.87
South and North Korea face each other in a tense standoff, neither side willing to hit the brakes first. South Korea is closely aligned with the US, while North Korea maintains close ties with China and Russia, leaving little room for international mediation. The progressive Kyunghyang Shinmun emphasized that responsibility rests with both Koreas, as the primary stakeholders, to seek a resolution. In the face of difficulties in immediate dialogue, it becomes imperative to adopt a rational approach, avoiding the escalation of tensions to armed conflict and prioritizing efficient crisis management. The newspaper asserted that leveraging domestic political factors to manipulate inter-Korean relations should be avoided, and diplomatic initiatives, such as enhancing ties with China, need to persist.88
Change in the ROK national security lineup
Yoon Suk Yeol put forward the nominations of Cho Tae-Yong, the current chief of the National Security Office, as the prospective head of the National Intelligence Service, and Cho Tae-yul, South Korea’s former ambassador to the United Nations, to lead the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The appointment of the present national security adviser to lead the intelligence agency is particularly significant as the position has remained unfilled for over three weeks, coinciding with escalating tensions on the Korean Peninsula due to North Korea’s recent ballistic missile tests, both long and short-range, as the year 2023 comes to a close.89
The conservative JoonAng Ilbo pointed out in an editorial that during the second meeting of the Nuclear Cooperation Group (NCG) held in Washington, South Korea and the US agreed to complete the "Nuclear Strategic Planning and Operations Guidelines" by next year and conduct joint exercises incorporating "nuclear operational scenarios." Thus, the ROK’s newly appointed national security lineup must closely communicate and cooperate with the United States to ensure the smooth progress on this agreement. Additionally, the newspaper asserted that active engagement in multilateral diplomacy against North Korea’s nuclear weapons at the UN Security Council is crucial, and stabilizing the National Intelligence Service’s internal affairs, which has experienced turbulence within its leadership, stands out as a key task for the nominee Cho Tae-Yong.90
The progressive Kyunghyang Shinmun editorialized that in the realm of domestic politics, which is closely tied to internal conflicts, the newly appointed national security line must take a step back and pursue diplomacy based on national interests and pragmatism. To achieve this, foreign affairs advisors should be proactive, pragmatic, and forthright in providing candid advice to the president without hesitation. Kyunghyang Shinmun stressed that South Korea faces the challenge of navigating through the deepening strategic competition between the US and China, along with the increasing nuclear and missile capabilities of North Korea.91 Kookmin Ilbo also pointed out that, as seen in the war between Israel and Hamas, failures in intelligence can lead to national tragedies and, thus, a comprehensive overhaul of the national intelligence framework is essential.92
1. “[속보] 美국무부 “블링컨, 북한의 도발행위와 러시아에 무기 제공 규탄,” Maeil Kyungjae, November 9, 2023, https://www.mk.co.kr/news/world/10870336
2. “박진, 블링컨 75분 회담… ‘북러 군사협력 중단 위해 추가 조치,’’” Chosun Ilbo, November 10, 2023, https://www.chosun.com/politics/diplomacy-defense/2023/11/09/RVVBBDQDTBFPJBYELND7ZAMVMI/
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. “한미 동맹, ‘다중 전쟁 시대’ 안보불안 해소 대책 강화해야”, JoongAng Ilbo, November 10, 2023, https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25206236#home
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. “[사설] 한미 외교안보회담, 核억제와 급변 정세 공조 다졌다”, Segye Ilbo, , November 9, 2023, https://m.segye.com/view/20231109521344
10. Ibid.
11. “한미일, 내년부터 계획된 일정따라 훈련…3국 공조 강화한다,” JoongAng Ilbo, November 12, 2023, https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25206626
12. “한미일 국방장관회의 개최,” Ministry of National Defense, November 12, 2023, https://www.mnd.go.kr/user/newsInUserRecord.action?command=view&newsId=I_669&siteId=mnd&page=1&id=mnd_020500000000&newsSeq=I_13494
13. Ibid.
14. “한미 국방장관, ‘맞춤형 억제전략’ 개정 논의…SCM 개최(종합),” Yonhap News, November 6, 2023, https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20231113015251504?input=1179m
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. “한미, ‘맞춤형 억제전략’ 10년만에 개정…북핵 고도화 반영,” Yonhap News, November 13, 2023, https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20231113072000504?section=politics/defense
18. “[속보] 한미 ‘맞춤형억제전략’ 10년만에 개정…북핵 고도화 반영,” JoongAng Ilbo, November 13, 2023, https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25206798
19. “미 국방장관 ‘한국 측과 협의’…9.19 군사합의 효력 정지 미국 속내는?” Kyunghyang Shinmun, November 13, 2023, https://m.khan.co.kr/politics/politics-general/article/202311131921001#c2b
20. “한.미 ‘맞춤형 억제전략’ 개정…강건한 북핵 방어막 되길,” JoongAng Ilbo, November 14, 2023, https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25207055
21. Ibid.
22. “[사설] 한.미 SCM서 합의한 ‘확장억제 강화’는 선택 아닌 필수,” Kookmin Ilbo, November 14, 2023, https://news.kmib.co.kr/article/view.asp?arcid=0924329998&code=11171111&sid1=opi
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. “미국도 신중한 ‘9.19 남북군사합의’ 파기, 서둘 이유 뭔가,” Kyunghyang Shinmun, November 13, 2023, https://m.khan.co.kr/opinion/editorial/article/202311131914011#c2b
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. “6.25 이후 첫 한자리 모인 유엔사 17개국 ‘한국 유사시 공동대응,’” JoongAng Ilbo, November 15, 2023, https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25207282
30. Ibid.
31. “Under One Flag,” United Nations Command , November 15, 2023, https://www.unc.mil/About/About-Us/
32. “한-유엔사 첫 국방장관회의… 한반도 유사시 다시 참전 재결의,” Seou Shinmun, November 14, 2023, https://www.seoul.co.kr/news/newsView.php?id=20231114500188&wlog_tag3=daum
33. “6.25 이후 첫 한자리 모인 유엔사 17개국 ‘한국 유사시 공동대응,’” JoongAng Ilbo, November 15, 2023, https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25207282
34. “한-유엔사 ‘한반도 유사시 공동대응…16개국 재참전 확인,’” Hankyoreh, November 15, 2023, https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/defense/1116313.html
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. “무엇을 위한 유엔사 ‘재활성화’인가,’” Kyunghyang Shinmun, November 14, 2023, https://m.khan.co.kr/opinion/editorial/article/202311141904001#c2b
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. “尹대통령, 15일~18일 美 샌프란 APEC 참석… 20~23일 英 국빈,”Yonhap News, November 8, 2023, https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20231108133100001
41. “尹 ‘APEC 중심으로 세계 경제 연결성 가속화해야,’“ JoongAng Ilbo, November 16, 2023, https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25207700
42. “한미일 정상, 석달만에 APEC서 별도 회동,” Chosun Ilbo, November 17, 2023, https://www.chosun.com/politics/blue_house/2023/11/17/JHVMTKURBRATPGJOTWSZATOMPQ/
43. Ibid
44. “한미일 등 인태 14개국 정상 ‘에너지 안보, 기술 협력 확대,’” Yonhap News, November 17, 2023, https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20231117037400001?section=politics/all
45. Ibid.
46. “[사설] 한미일 공고화, ‘유연한 중국’ 지댓대 되길,” Seoul Shinmun, November 19, 2023, https://www.seoul.co.kr/news/newsView.php?id=20231120027004
47. Ibid.
48. “불발된 한.중 정상회담…양국 대화채널 점검 계기 삼아야,” JoongAng Ilbo, November 20, 2023, https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25208466
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
51. “한.중 정상회담 불발된 APEC 회의, 대중국 외교 재점검 계기 삼아야,” Kyunghyang Shinmun, November 19, 2023, https://www.khan.co.kr/opinion/editorial/article/202311191735001
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
54. “Readout of National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan’s Trilateral Meeting with the National Security Advisors of Japan and the Republic of Korea,” The White House, December 8, 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/12/08/readout-of-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivans-trilateral-meeting-with-the-national-security-advisors-of-japan-and-the-republic-of-korea/
55. “한미일, ‘북 위협 대응’ 새 대북 이니셔티브 추진,” Segye Ilbo, December 9, 2023, https://www.segye.com/view/20231209506244?utm_source=dable
56. “한·미·일, 北 핵·미사일 위협 차단 ‘대북 新이니셔티브’ 추진,” Segye Ilbo, December 10, 2023, https://www.segye.com/newsView/20231210512111
57. “北 ‘정찰위성 발사’ 날 잡았나… 오는 18일 ‘미사일 공업절’ 제정,” JoongAng Ilbo, November 5, 2023, https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25204814
58. “北, 11월 18일 ‘미사일공업절’ 전후 도발 가능성…29일 항공절 관측도,” Dong-A Ilbo, November 5, 2023, https://www.donga.com/news/Politics/article/all/20231105/122029508/1
59. “통일장관 ‘북한 ‘미사일공업절’ 지정, 김주애 등장과 무관치 않아,’” Kyunghyang Shinmun, November 6, 2023, https://m.khan.co.kr/politics/north-korea/article/202311061714001#c2b
60. “합참 ‘북한, 18일 미사일공업절 계기 정찰위성 3차 발사 가능성,’” Yonhap News, November 6, 2023, https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20231106066300504
61. Ibid.
62. “北 ‘핵 전쟁’ 겁박… 압도적 군사력만이 안보와 평화 지킨다,” Seoul Kyungjae, November 6, 2023, https://www.sedaily.com/NewsView/29X4NP1CKE
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
65. “북한 ‘군사정찰위성 발사 성공적…궤도에 정확히,’” JoongAng Ilbo, November 22, 2023, https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25209097
66. Ibid.
67. “ ‘푸틴 노하우’ 받은 김정은, 예고보다 앞당겨 군사 위성 쐈다,” JoongAng Ilbo, November 22, 2023, https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25209027#home
68. “日기시다 ‘북한에 엄중 항의…한미일 협력하며 대응 계속,’” Seoul Shinmun, November 22, 2023, https://www.seoul.co.kr/news/newsView.php?id=20231122500003
69. Ibid.
70. “신원식 장관, ‘9ㆍ19 일부 효력정지 군사적 조치 준비’ 지시,” Hankyoreh, November 22, 2023, https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/defense/1117324.html
71. “尹, 영국서 NSC 상임위 주재… 9ㆍ19 합의 1조 3항 효력 정지 추진,” Dong-A Ilbo, November 22, 2023, https://www.donga.com/news/Politics/article/all/20231122/122293616/2
72. “9ㆍ19합의 일부 파기만으로 북한 ‘질주’ 막을 수 있나,” JoongAng Ilbo, November 23, 2023, https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25209438#home
73. “北 정찰위성 발사… 9ㆍ19 합의 효력 일부 정지는 당연하다,” Segye Ilbo, November 22, 2023, https://m.segye.com/view/20231122516000
74. “북 위성 발사에 9ㆍ19 ‘안전판’ 제거, 충돌 위험 높인다,” Hankyoreh, November 23, 2023, https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/opinion/editorial/1117442.html
75. Ibid.
76. “정찰위성에 9ㆍ19 합의 파기로 맞선 남북, 우발 충돌 없어야,” Kyunghyang Shinmun, November 22, 2023, https://m.khan.co.kr/opinion/editorial/article/202311221853001#c2b
77. Ibid..
78. “한국 첫 정찰위성 성공… 감시정찰기능 강화해야,” Kookmin Ilbo, December 04, 2023, https://v.daum.net/v/20231204040432085
79. “첫 정찰위성 발사 성공, 北 도발 억제력 강화 계기로 삼길,” Segye Ilbo, December 3, 2023, https://m.segye.com/view/20231203508472
80. Ibid.
81. “한국 첫 정찰위성 성공… 감시정찰기능 강화해야,” Kookmin Ilbo, December 04, 2023, https://v.daum.net/v/20231204040432085
82. “첫발 뗀 군 정찰위성, 24시간 北 감시 체계 차질 없어야,” Hankook Kyungjae, December 3, 2023, https://www.hankyung.com/article/2023120306121
83. “”북, 핵공격시 김정은 정권 종말”…한미, NCG 2차 회의 공동성명,” Donga Ilbo, December 16, 2023, https://www.donga.com/news/Politics/article/all/20231216/122652060/1
84. “한·미 확장억지 강화에 북 ICBM 응수, 긴장고조 모순,” Hankyoreh, December 18, 2023, https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/opinion/editorial/1120887.html
85. “北 ICBM 또 발사, 국제사회 제재·고립 말고 얻을 게 있나,” Segye Ilbo, December 18, 2023, https://www.segye.com/newsView/20231218514501
86. “한·미 확장억지 강화에 북 ICBM 응수, 긴장고조 모순,” Hankyoreh, December 18, 2023, https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/opinion/editorial/1120887.html
87. “北 ICBM 또 발사, 국제사회 제재·고립 말고 얻을 게 있나,” Segye Ilbo, December 18, 2023, https://www.segye.com/newsView/20231218514501
88. “’한미 핵 작전’ 대 ‘북 ICBM 발사’, 평화 지렛대 찾아야,” Kyunghyang Shinmun, December 18, 2023, https://m.khan.co.kr/opinion/editorial/article/202312181812001#c2b
89. “복합 위기 속 외교안보팀 교체…긴장감 갖고 쇄신하라,” Kookmin Ilbo, December 20, 2023, https://m.kmib.co.kr/view.asp?arcid=0924335627&code=11171111&sid1=opi
90. “북핵 대비, 국정원 안정, 미 대선…과제 사적한 2기 안보팀,” Joongang Ilbo, December 20, 2023, https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25216111#home
91. “’그 나물에 그 밥’ 2기 외교안보라인, 국익.실용 외교 펼쳐야,” Kyunghyang Shinmun, December 19, 2023, https://m.khan.co.kr/opinion/editorial/article/202312192009001#c2b
92. “복합 위기 속 외교안보팀 교체…긴장감 갖고 쇄신하라”, Kookmin Ilbo, December 20, 2023, https://m.kmib.co.kr/view.asp?arcid=0924335627&code=11171111&sid1=opi
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