Country Report: South Korea (December 2024)

President Yoon Suk-yeol’s attempted imposition of martial law has plunged South Korea into political uncertainty, with its impact likely to extend beyond the country’s borders. On December 14, the National Assembly passed a second impeachment motion with 204 votes in favor, suspending Yoon from office. Now, Yoon faces a double reckoning: The Constitutional Court impeachment trial, with its official start scheduled on December 27, and a criminal investigation for charges of leading an insurrection.

As South Korea focused on its internal crisis, South Korea’s foreign policy, once a hallmark of Yoon’s presidency, has been sidelined by mass protests and political instability. South Korea’s ability and willingness to address global issues, such as the war in Ukraine and growing North Korea-Russia military ties, have waned as political attention shifts inward. The upheaval following the martial law declaration has reshaped events from November and December. Consequently, rather than following a strict thematic or chronological order, this November-December country report examines developments through the lens of this domestic upheaval, assessing its far-reaching implications.

Implications of Martial Law and Impeachment on South Korea’s Foreign Policy

The December 3 martial law crisis has shaken the foundation of Yoon’s value diplomacy as it negated the soft power that South Korea has built.¹ While key officials, such as People Power Party leader Han Dong-hoon and Prime Minister Han Duck-soo pledged to prioritize maintaining trust with allies as a broad attempt at damage control, the December 3 martial law crisis has undoubtedly introduced uncertainties into South Korea’s foreign policy.

All for nothing? The APEC Summit and the G20 Summit

Yoon attended the APEC Summit in Lima, Peru, and the G20 Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, on November 14 to 21. Yoon’s first South America tour was evaluated as an opportunity to review South Korea’s global response strategies ahead of Trump’s second administration. During this trip, Yoon held bilateral meetings with the leaders of the United States, China, and Japan, as well as a ROK-US-Japan trilateral summit to discuss measures to address North Korea’s provocations, Russia’s troop deployments, and other regional and global issues. The long-forgotten concept of “Four-way diplomacy (ROK-US-Japan-China)” has emerged in South Korean diplomacy again.

The key to this trip’s diplomacy was to focus international public opinion on illegal North Korea-Russia military cooperation. The bilateral summits and the trilateral summit served to send a strong message of condemnation. During the summits, Yoon also reiterated South Korea’s role as a “global pivotal state” and strongly denounced the illegal military cooperation between Russia and North Korea, emphasizing the need for the international community to unite and act to bring an immediate halt to such cooperation.  Conservative news outlets, such as Maeil Shinmun and Chosun Ilbo, called this a “milestone” in South Korea’s diplomatic history because Yoon raised security issues directly related to the security of South Korea on the stage of multilateral summit diplomacy and secured consensus not only from allies but also from liberal countries as a whole.²

However, the martial law crisis and impeachment proceedings overshadowed these diplomatic achievements at the APEC and G20 summits, diminishing their impact domestically and internationally. While Yoon’s efforts to spotlight North Korea-Russia military cooperation and reaffirm South Korea’s global role were praised, the political instability at home raised questions about his administration’s ability to sustain and capitalize on these diplomatic gains.

South Korea-China Relations

After Yoon Suk-yeok and Chinese President Xi Jinping met at the APEC Summit, high-level exchanges between the two countries gained momentum. Yoon met with Xi on November 15 for the first time in two years, and the two agreed to continue to develop mutual respect, good friendship, strategic cooperation based on common interests, and partnership in the future. In particular, Yoon called for China’s constructive role in military cooperation, to which Xi agreed on the need to ease tensions on the Korean Peninsula, as they promised to hold summits by inviting each other next year. Xi’s visit to South Korea would likely be on the occasion of the 2025 APEC summit, which is to be held in Gyeongju, North Gyeongsang Province. They also agreed to expedite negotiations on the service sector of the ROK-China Free Trade Agreement (FTA). Given that Xi has not visited South Korea in the past decade, it was evaluated as an effort to improve strained relations and serve as an opportunity for the South Korean government to expand its core diplomatic focus—from its ROK-US alliance and ROK-US-Japan trilateral cooperation—to include China within its broader diplomatic strategy.

There was also speculation that the Yoon administration was attempting to shift from the US “value diplomacy” path to “pragmatic” or “balanced diplomacy.” During a written interview with national Spanish wire service EFE one day before the summit meetings, Yoon said his administration was devoting “diplomatic effort” to maintain “the necessary channels of communication with Russia.” There have also been other statements from government figures, such as an anonymous source within the Foreign Ministry, that focused on “diplomatic efforts” and “continuing diplomatic dialogue with Russia” regarding North Korean troop deployments. A senior presidential official also told reporters in Brazil on November 18 that the Korean Embassy in Russia is frequently talking with the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the government, and a recently planned 1.5-track academic conference has continued to be discussed, and the import of Russia’s energy, fish, and essential resources continues. Experts in South Korea argue that this is the Yoon’s administration’s effort to lay the groundwork for the post-Ukraine war by continuing behind-the-scenes communications with Russia, coupled with mending relations with China.

However, the situation has significantly changed since the December 3 martial law crisis. Initially, China maintained a relatively cautious stance, with the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs stating, “We are closely monitoring the recent changes in South Korea’s political situation. As this is an internal matter for South Korea, we will refrain from making any specific comments. As important neighbors and cooperative partners, it is in the mutual interest of both nations to develop healthy and stable bilateral relations.” This cautious attitude stemmed from the need to sustain the momentum in South Korea-China relations, created through the May ROK-Japan-China Trilateral Summit, as well as the bilateral summit held in Peru.

One editorial from the conservative newspaper Seoul Economic Network (SEN) suggested that China seemed to be satisfied with the criticism embedded in the impeachment motion against Yoon in South Korea’s National Assembly, which accused him of “hating China while getting closer to Japan.” (仇中親日)³ However, the hard-earned momentum for improved bilateral relations has once again stalled. The situation escalated on December 12 when Yoon defended martial law in a public address, explicitly referencing China by citing incidents involving alleged Chinese espionage and environmental concerns tied to Chinese solar equipment. China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs reacted strongly, expressing “surprise and dissatisfaction.” Despite efforts by South Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs to ease tensions and promote continued dialogue, China remained unconvinced, further straining bilateral relations. In light of this, the editorial expressed concern that South Korea-China relations face a significant diplomatic burden and argued that South Korea’s National Assembly must engage in bipartisan public diplomacy toward China to mitigate this risk.⁴

An editorial from the centrist newspaper, the Financial News, presents a more positive view, seeing the martial law and impeachment crisis as unlikely to alter the trajectory of improving South Korea-China relations, as China likely views its improving relations with South Korea as a counterbalance to the strengthening North Korea-Russia ties. The editorial argued that the foreign ministries of South Korea and China must quickly act to ease tensions to sustain the momentum in their relations through continued high-level communications, even if done privately.⁵

ROK-US-Japan Trilateral Cooperation

At the ROK-US-Japan trilateral summit during Yoon’s South America trip, the three leaders officially established a “ROK-US-Japan Secretariat” through a joint statement on November 15, a system designed to ensure institutional cooperation continues regardless of leadership changes. Japan’s prime minister, Ishiba Shigeru, stated that the trilateral cooperation has been “upgraded to a new level” and promised to institutionalize the secretariat. 

Inevitably, ROK-US-Japan trilateral cooperation also faced temporary setbacks following political instability in South Korea. The U.S. State Department postponed the “ROK-US-Japan Women’s Economic Empowerment Conference,” a 1.5-track dialogue, which was scheduled for December 12, at the last minute. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, who had planned to visit South Korea, canceled his Korean itinerary during his final visit to Northeast Asia in office, opting to visit Japan instead. Concerns are emerging that the South Korea-Japan relationship, which had shown signs of improvement through “shuttle diplomacy” involving reciprocal visits by Yoon and former prime minister Kishida Fumio last year, might once again grow frosty and the trilateral cooperation framework could falter. When asked about the outlook for South Korea-Japan relations, Ishiba commented, “It is not my place to speak on another country’s internal affairs.” However, Yomiuri Shimbun reported that officials from Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs expect bilateral relations to face significant challenges moving forward.⁶ Japan and South Korea resumed full-fledged trilateral dialogue with China last year after a four-year hiatus, creating momentum for re-engagement with Beijing. As the next chair of this trilateral dialogue, Japan had planned to host a meeting of the three countries’ foreign ministers early next year, setting the stage for a summit of their leaders in the spring. However, these plans are now likely to be put on hold. A senior Japanese foreign ministry official stated, “For the time being, we’ll focus on bilateral diplomacy between Japan and China and aim for reciprocal visits by foreign ministers.”⁷

However, there are signs of “stabilization” of ROK-US and ROK-US-Japan relations. On December 23, Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell and Vice Foreign Minister Kim Hong-kyun held talks at the State Department in Washington, in which both sides agreed to completely resume major diplomatic and security schedules that have been delayed since the martial law crisis. There are optimistic voices that these talks could restart working-level discussions on diplomatic issues, such as establishing the ROK-US-Japan Secretariat.

One editorial from conservative Chosun Ilbo pointed to the first impeachment motion against Yoon, which included criticism of Yoon’s efforts to improve ties with Japan, arguing it is unjustifiable to use such diplomatic achievements as grounds for impeachment. A similar argument was raised in another editorial from Chosun Ilbo, which questioned the content of the first impeachment motion proposed by the Democratic Party, as it included criticisms of the current administration’s foreign and security policies that are entirely unrelated to the martial law situation.⁸ The impeachment motion states that “President Yoon has antagonized North Korea, China, and Russia while adhering to an unusual Japan-centric foreign policy,” but the editorial strongly argues that as South Korea faces domestic political turmoil, it is absolutely crucial to maintain a robust ROK-US-Japan trilateral relationship.⁹

Implications of President-elect Trump

Since Donald Trump’s re-election, numerous newspapers, op-eds, experts, and think tanks in South Korea have extensively analyzed the country’s strategic position to navigate the challenges of a second Trump administration. The first policy report to this effort was “Towards Co-Resilience: What the United States and South Korea Can Do Together in an Era of U.S.-China Rivalry” by the Institute for Future Strategy at Seoul National University on November 20. This report received considerable media attention from both conservative and progressive newspapers not only because it was the first policy paper to be released since Trump’s re-election but also because it notably frames ROK-US relations and South Korea’s strategy toward the United States in the context of the US-China rivalry. Major policy recommendations under this report are as follows:¹⁰

• Economic-security front: ROK-US to strengthen supply chain resilience through initiatives such as the ROK-US Shipbuilding Alliance and Alternative Asian Supply Chains (Altasia) to build critical materials for batteries that replace those from China; elevating the CHIP-4 Alliance to a fully integrated collaboration among allied nations, promoting the concept of a G9 or G9 Plus involving the ROK and Australia;
• Security front: establishing a regional military strategic consultative body involving the ROK, the United States, Japan, the Philippines, and Australia to enhance multilateral security coordination; establishing a Northeast Asian security consultative body at the NSC level on Taiwan, North Korea, and the East China Sea and Joint ROK-US crisis management systems for coordinated minilateral or multilateral responses to potential Taiwan contingencies; promoting ROK-US-Japan trilateral security dialogue and strengthening sustained and institutionalized ROK-US strategic dialogue through Track 2 diplomacy;
• Indo-Pacific nuclear order: the United States to resume negotiations on North Korea’s denuclearization alongside nuclear arms control talks with China and pursue the four-way dialogue between the Koreas, the US, and China; the United States to consent to the ROK’s low-level uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing to reduce nuclear fuel dependency on Russia and promote joint nuclear power plant export efforts to third countries; South Korea to pursue a close NCI, similar to the NATO nuclear-sharing model.
• Sea-security front: ROK to enhance its participation in the US-led Regional Sustainment Framework (RSF) for MRO (maintenance, repair, and overhaul) operations in the Indo-Pacific and thereby reduce maintenance cycles for US naval vessels as well as secure more defense contracts. 

Framing South Korea’s foreign policy strategy in the context of the US-China rivalry was also apparent in an interview by Chairman Lee Yong-joon at the Sejong Institute with the centrist newspaper Hankook Ilbo. He advocates abandoning strategic ambiguity in favor of strategic clarity, aligning South Korea firmly with the liberal democratic community. He emphasizes that US-China competition will only intensify, with even the Biden administration escalating its confrontation through strategies like “de-risking.” Lee highlights the urgency for South Korea to identify new opportunities within this US-China rivalry framework.¹¹

An editorial from Chosun Ilbo also argues that while the world recalibrates to align with Trump’s aggressive, America-first foreign policy, South Korea risks falling behind due to domestic political turmoil and indecision.¹² Trump’s foreign policy has driven significant geopolitical shifts globally: in the Middle East, Israel has dismantled pro-Iran forces, leveraging support from the Trump administration; European countries have increased defense spending and rearmament efforts to meet Trump’s demands for equitable NATO burden-sharing. These developments, the editorial suggested, reflect a pragmatic realignment from US allies with US priorities, enabling Trump’s second administration to focus on countering China’s growing influence. The editorial thus contended that South Korea must avoid adopting pro-China policies, recognizing that it cannot remain insulated from the US-China rivalry. Instead, it should strategically navigate to maintain the alliance with its most critical partner, the United States.

In contrast, one article from Sejong Institute contends that South Korea should transition from US-and Japan-centric ideological diplomacy to “comprehensive, cooperative, and pragmatic diplomacy.”¹³ While maintaining the ROK-US alliance, South Korea should reduce its dependence on the United States and strengthen efforts for self-reliance. These efforts include bolstering independent defense capabilities, advancing cutting-edge technologies, diversifying supply chains, and expanding export markets. It further argues that South Korea should fully restore its strategic partnership with China and prepare for the recovery of a strategic partnership with Russia as soon as the Ukraine war concludes.

Another recurring theme in the media was leveraging South Korea’s strengths. An editorial from conservative Chosun Ilbo argues that South Korea is relatively shielded from potential risks under Trump’s leadership. Factors such as its substantial military spending (2.8% of GDP), significant investments in the United States, and a trade deficit that is not a priority for Trump distinguish South Korea from other countries like Mexico and Japan. The editorial argued that leveraging these strengths, South Korea can present itself as a dependable ally and mitigate vulnerabilities.¹⁴ This was echoed by Korea Society President Thomas Byrne, during his interview with Chosun Ilbo, who argued that South Korea should prioritize practical, sector-specific cooperation such as shipbuilding while downplaying concerns over potential policy reversals by Trump.¹⁵  

Regarding North Korea, Yong-joon Lee in an interview with the centrist newspaper Hankook Ilbo, argued that while Trump is highly likely to push for a third US-North Korea summit the deep, irreconcilable differences between the two sides make the chances of a positive outcome very slim. Neither Trump nor Kim Jong-un would want to hold a summit that ends in failure. He further suggested that as a key stakeholder in Korean Peninsula issues, South Korea’s explicit or public opposition to a US-North Korea summit could make it difficult for the United States to proceed.

Furthermore, the concept of a “nuclear freeze” is highly unlikely to be agreed upon by the United States and North Korea as North Korea has already rejected denuclearization, and has insisted it has no secret facilities and cannot reveal such sites. Since a nuclear freeze would require Pyongyang to disclose all nuclear facilities hidden outside Yongbyon and subject them to international verification, a “nuclear freeze” will be highly unlikely under Trump’s second administration.¹⁶

In contrast, a policy report entitled “Prospects for the North Korean Nuclear Issue and Our Response after the U.S. Presidential Election” by the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) sees the possibility for the resumption of negotiations with North Korea.¹⁷ While the report assessed the likelihood of US-North Korea talks in the short term as low—given that the United States is prioritizing the wars in Ukraine and Israel—it also highlighted that an early resolution of the Ukraine war could prompt North Korea to actively propose dialogue with the United States as part of an “economic exit strategy.”

The report further assessed that a scenario in which institutional improvement in US-North Korea relations occurs without complete denuclearization is “unlikely but dangerous.” In this scenario, limited denuclearization or arms control negotiations might allow North Korea to retain some nuclear warheads, fissile materials, and short-range missiles. The report warned that if North Korea maintains tactical nuclear weapons and short-range missiles, South Korea would remain vulnerable to potential nuclear attacks. This could undermine the credibility of extended deterrence, fueling arguments for South Korea’s independent nuclear armament and potentially leading to the weakening of the US-South Korea alliance. Regarding South Korea’s response to a Trump presidency, the report urged the government to ensure that US-North Korea negotiations do not exclude South Korea. It emphasized the importance of maintaining close communications between South Korean and US leaders and diplomatic channels, while also engaging with neighboring countries to garner support for denuclearization and peace on the Korean Peninsula.

In a Sejong Institute’s article, a similar concern was also addressed where Trump could compromise with Kim Jong-un by agreeing to freeze North Korea’s nuclear and long-range missile program while tolerating its nuclear possession or allowing the reduction of US forces in South Korea.¹⁸ Calling such a situation “worse than that under the 1994 Geneva Agreement,” the article argues that the South Korean government should persuade the second Trump administration that the ultimate objective of its North Korea policy must remain complete denuclearization, and jointly draft and coordinate a roadmap for denuclearization and peace on the Korean Peninsula to be discussed in US-North Korea talks.

North Korea’s Deployment of Troops to Russia

Since South Korea’s National Intelligence Service (NIS) confirmed last October North Korea’s deployment of more than 10,000 troops to Russia, there has been a visit of North Korean foreign minister Choe Son-hui to Russia on November 4, raising concern about North Korea’s growing military ties with Russia. There has been further confirmation by the National Intelligence Service (NIS) on December 19 that at least 100 North Korean soldiers deployed on the Russian-Ukrainian frontlines have died, and nearly 1,000 have been injured.¹⁹ The NIS has analyzed that North Korean troops have had limited actual combat engagements in the Ukraine war. Despite this, a high number of casualties have occurred because North Korean soldiers are being used in expendable roles, such as front-line assault troops, in the unfamiliar open battlefield environment.

The NIS reported that North Korea has sufficient capacity for additional deployments. The Storm Corps comprises 10 brigades with about 46,000 troops, and even considering the 11,000 already deployed, there is room for further mobilization. In return for these deployments, North Korea reportedly expects modernization of its conventional weapons from Russia. However, there are signs of internal unrest in North Korea regarding additional troop deployments. Reports suggest that soldiers are particularly concerned about being sent to the frontlines. On December 17, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky posted a video on his Telegram channel claiming that Russia is burning the faces of deceased North Korean soldiers to conceal their identities. The NIS responded by stating that Russia has not officially acknowledged North Korea’s involvement in the war and has instructed its forces to avoid exposing the presence of North Korean troops.

The NIS also provided insights into North Korea’s activities following South Korea’s December 3 martial law incident, noting that Pyongyang has maintained a “low-key” approach. This restraint is likely due to concerns that awareness of South Korea’s democratic system could undermine North Korea’s regime. Additionally, North Korea may perceive divisions in South Korean public opinion as beneficial, choosing not to comment on the situation. Lastly, the NIS reported no imminent signs of provocations against South Korea. North Korea has maintained its winter training exercises at typical levels and appears focused on avoiding military clashes along the Northern Limit Line (NLL) and the Military Demarcation Line (MDL). ²⁰

At the end of November, the defense ministers of Russia and Ukraine visited the Korean Peninsula in quick succession. On November 27, Ukraine’s Defense Minister Rustem Umerov visited Seoul as a presidential envoy and met with top diplomatic and security officials, including Yoon Suk-yeol. Just a days after Umerov’s departure, on November 29, Russian Defense Minister Andrey Belousov led a delegation to Pyongyang. The South Korean government announced independent sanctions targeting 11 individuals, including North Korean generals involved in the Ukraine war and missile experts, as well as 15 organizations, effective December 19. The sanctions also target Russian nationals and companies involved in North Korea-Russia weapons trade and entities supporting North Korea’s nuclear and missile development. Banks linked to illegal financial transactions between North Korea and Russia were also included. This move follows a joint statement by South Korea, the United States, Japan, Australia, six other countries, and the European Union condemning military cooperation between North Korea and Russia.²¹

Yoon Sang-hyun, a member of the People Power Party, called for parliamentary action on December 19 regarding the growing casualties among North Korean troops deployed in the Ukraine war. He proposed revisiting the joint resolution condemning North Korea’s deployment to Russia’s war, which had failed to pass in the National Assembly’s Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee last month, and including demands for the withdrawal of North Korean troops.²²

In an editorial, the conservative Donga Ilbo criticized South Korea’s reluctance to take a firm stance against North Korea-Russia military cooperation, arguing that Seoul missed an opportunity to deter this alliance.²³ It suggests that South Korea could have pressured Russia by issuing specific warnings, such as supplying Hyunmoo-2B missiles to Ukraine if North Korea-Russia cooperation crossed critical “red lines.” The piece argues that such measures should have been taken before North Korea decided to export weapons to Russia or dispatch troops. Instead, the South Korean government rejected even Ukraine’s requests to purchase weapons, citing domestic laws prohibiting the sale of arms to nations at war. This decision is portrayed as a declaration that South Korea cannot provide follow-up military support to countries using its weapons during conflicts, which undermines trust in its defense industry. The editorial argues that South Korea’s reasoning contradicts Trump’s own policies, which include continued US arms support for Ukraine if it pursues peace negotiations with Russia. Furthermore, it criticizes South Korea’s failure to share security burdens with allies, describing this as an anti-security stance that undermines deterrence strategies and weakens its diplomatic credibility.

In contrast, the progressive Kyunghyang Shinmun in an editorial expressed concern that sending offensive weapons could lead to direct or indirect confrontations between North and South Korea in Ukraine. Amid the shifting dynamics of the Russia-Ukraine war, South Korea’s arms support risks becoming a strategic blunder. Trump has stated his intention to cut aid to Ukraine in favor of focusing on competition with China over Taiwan. Citing Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Andrey Rudenko’s warning on November 14 that if South Korean weapons are used to kill Russian citizens, relations between the two countries would be completely destroyed, the editorial suggests that there is still much South Korea can do, such as mediating to help both sides achieve a peaceful resolution to the war and supporting local peace organizations assisting victims of the conflict.²⁴

South Korea-Russia Relations: Strategic Tightrope

For South Korea, the main strategic interest in maintaining relations with Russia has historically centered on leveraging Moscow’s influence as a complementary means to isolate North Korea and promote denuclearization. However, the deepening DPRK-Russia military cooperation, highlighted by North Korea’s unprecedented deployment of troops to Russia, and North Korea’s definition of inter-Korean relations as between “two hostile states,” significantly challenges this dynamic. Furthermore, the emergence of the DPRK-China-Russia triangular coalition poses a direct threat to South Korea’s strategic goals. This shift puts South Korea’s strategic position at odds with the very objectives of the ROK-US alliance, which was built on extended deterrence against North Korea. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated on September 26 that NATO and the ROK-US-Japan alliance pose extremely serious regional security threats, and that the term “denuclearization” of North Korea no longer makes any sense.²⁵

As the Ukraine war has served as a key variable in ROK-Russia relations, different views have emerged in South Korea regarding the future of DPRK-Russia cooperation: the first perspective is that DPRK-Russia cooperation will remain short-term because once the Ukraine war ends, Russia’s strategic need for maintaining strong military cooperation with North Korea will naturally diminish.²⁶ Conversely, others view that their cooperation will persist even after the war, driven by efforts to maintain the regional balance of power and reshape the international order.²⁷ In its pursuit of multipolarity, Russia is likely to focus on developing more concrete measures and establish new forms of cooperation and alliances. Moreover, Putin may perceive strategic value in further cooperating with North Korea as a negotiating lever in its diplomatic interaction with the United State.

A strategy report by the Institute for National Security Strategy (INSS)²⁸ aligns with the second view and further expects that the two countries will pursue high-level and working-level exchanges across political parties and in various sectors. It also states that Russia is likely to promote North Korea’s participation in multilateral institutions, including BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), and actively support the easing of UN Security Council sanctions. As global interest in the “Global South” grows, there is a possibility that North Korea will leverage its Cold War-era Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) experience to join multilateral institutions with strong Russian support. Article 8 of the new DPRK-Russia treaty formalizes mutual backing for membership in international and regional organizations, and North Korean officials’ active participation in Russia-led “Global South” conferences also underscores this possibility. The report further argues that both Russia and North Korea share a military necessity to counter the United States and its allies in Northeast Asia, making mutual defense and military cooperation a critical component of their relationship moving forward. North Korea is likely to seek military technology and weapons from Russia, including enhancements in nuclear warhead potency, stabilization of warhead reentry capabilities, development of multi-warhead intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICMBs), and nuclear-powered submarines. While the possibility that Russia would actually transfer sensitive nuclear technologies to North Korea remains uncertain as Russia has been a key pillar of the NPT, Russia may nonetheless use this military cooperation to pursue a balance of power against ROK-US-Japan security cooperation, including possible establishment of a regular “2+2” consultation channel between Russia and North Korea. The report concludes that South Korea should actively warn against nuclear and advanced weapons cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang, and should also avoid providing Russia with any justification for supporting North Korea with nuclear or ICBM-related technology by, for instance, providing lethal weapons to Ukraine or heightened military cooperation with NATO.  

This strategic tightrope is further complicated by the prospect of the second Trump administration. Trump’s transactional approach to alliances, renewed emphasis on cost-sharing for US troop deployments in Korea, and potential reduced US commitment to extended deterrence in Northeast Asia, might compel South Korea to seek alternative diplomatic channels, potentially including Russia, to address regional security concerns. Trump has consistently expressed a willingness to engage with Russia, particularly concerning the Ukraine War, and has pledged to broker a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine. Moreover, Korean media have frequently raised concerns he might trade the normalization of US-North Korea relations for a freeze on North Korea’s nuclear capabilities just at a level that limits the potential to directly threaten the continental United States, effectively recognizing North Korea as a nuclear armed state.      

While South Korea aligns closely with the United States in its Russia policy and North Korea policy, the second Trump administration might deprioritize objectives that serve South Korea, such as countering the North Korean nuclear threat, leaving South Korea with fewer common goals to anchor its alliance with the United States.

Looking ahead, South Korea must prepare for the geopolitical challenges posed by Trump’s second administration. His transactional diplomacy, coupled with a potential deprioritization of North Korea’s denuclearization, could leave South Korea navigating a delicate balance between alliance commitments and regional security concerns. In this volatile environment, Seoul’s ability to leverage its strengths—resilient defense spending, strategic partnerships, and diplomatic adaptability—will be critical in shaping its foreign policy priorities amid unprecedented uncertainty. Domestically, bipartisan cooperation will be crucial to navigate the fallout from Yoon’s impeachment and restore trust in South Korea’s diplomatic direction. Efforts must focus on stabilizing key partnerships, particularly with the United States and Japan, while recalibrating strained relations with China. The restoration of high-level communications with China and a pragmatic approach to Russia, balancing sanctions with dialogue, are essential to sustaining regional stability.