Country Report: South Korea (February 2024)

In just a few months since early 2025, US President Donald Trump’s impact on South Korea’s policy direction has been profound. On North Korea, Trump’s North Korea policy could open diplomatic doors that were shut, yet it also poses the risk of Seoul being left on the sidelines. On trade, Seoul is preparing for a more adversarial US, formulating defensive and diversifying strategies to protect its economy​. On defense, the longstanding alliance is being renegotiated in real-time​. South Korea’s government has responded by doubling down on alliance commitments while also exploring new forms of contribution.

This “diplomatic paralysis” caused by the ongoing domestic political turmoil in South Korea raises doubts about whether Seoul can effectively coordinate with Washington on the North Korea issue. With the Trump administration’s transactional view of alliances, a survey conducted by the Institute for Far Eastern Studies¹ found that 64% of respondents expected ROK-US-Japan relations to weaken. Amid these uncertainties, the key questions are: Where is South Korea headed? How has South Korea tried to navigate these challenges in the first two months of 2025?

This report provides an overview of key developments in South Korea’s foreign policy during January and February 2025, focusing on the major challenges the country has faced and how it has responded. This report examines South Korea’s shifting approach to its alliance with the United States under Trump, the implications of his administration’s North Korea and trade policies, and the growing security concerns posed by deepening DPRK-Russia military cooperation. In addition to analyzing the government’s policy responses, this report explores how South Korea’s media landscape has interpreted these developments, highlighting divergent perspectives across the political spectrum. It presents key arguments, policy recommendations, and debates on how South Korea should navigate its evolving geopolitical environment.

South Korea’s Response to Trump 2.0

Trump’s North Korea Policy and South Korea’s Reaction

On his first day in office, Trump referred to North Korea as a “nuclear power.” This marks a major departure from previous US administrations, which had never explicitly recognized North Korea as a nuclear armed state. Trump’s statement follows a similar reference made by Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth during his January 14 confirmation hearing, where he also described North Korea as a “nuclear power.” Secretary of State Marco Rubio echoed this shift during his January 15 confirmation hearing, stating that sanctions had failed to prevent Kim Jong-un from advancing his nuclear weapons program and that a broader, more serious review of US policy toward North Korea was necessary. These statements suggest a fundamental shift in US policy because it potentially abandons the decades-long approach of negotiating for North Korea’s denuclearization. Moreover, Trump remarked that “Kim Jong-un will welcome my return,”² and hinted at a possible summit meeting. This contrasts sharply with the Biden-era approach of working-level talks and alliance coordination. Despite these indications of a policy shift, Trump and Japanese Prime Minister Ishiba issued a joint statement reaffirming the common goal of “North Korea’s complete denuclearization,” which some interpret as a reassuring sign. In response to concerns, South Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs reaffirmed that North Korea’s nuclear status will never be recognized under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Across South Korea’s political spectrum, Trump’s North Korean policy is viewed with deep concern. Drawing parallels to Trump’s handling of the Ukraine war and ceasefire talks with Russia and President Zelensky, South Korean media express apprehension about similar outcomes. Conservative outlets like Chosun Ilbo urged South Korea to “give up on hopes about the world order and the US as we know them.”³ While progressive newspaper such as Kyunghyang Shinmun suggested in an op-ed that South Korea must prepare for a worst-case scenario¾“A Korean Peninsula without the US,” and seek creative alternatives.⁴ A February report from the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU) concluded that Trump’s North Korea strategy is largely unpredictable, driven by his personal instincts rather than a consistent doctrine​.⁵

Nevertheless, the domestic response in South Korea reflects deep divisions. Conservative analysts broadly advocated three approaches:⁶ (1) deepening alliance coordination with the United States; (2) pursuing independent deterrence measures; and (3) engaging in diplomatic maneuvering with regional actors. An op-ed in the conservative Donga Ilbo reflects this perspective, advocating that South Korea should prioritize strengthening its alliance with the US while reevaluating its security policies to adapt to the evolving international order and effectively address North Korea’s nuclear threat.⁷ At the same time, concerns about a potential decoupling of US strategic interests from regional security raise the question of whether South Korea should explore alternative deterrence measures. Some conservative media suggest that Seoul should actively consider NATO-style nuclear sharing as a way to counter North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, both as a deterrence mechanism and as a tool to reinforce US commitment to extended deterrence.⁸

Meanwhile, progressive and centrist media outlets in South Korea largely call for South Korea’s autonomy in defense and strategic diplomatic maneuvering. An op-ed in progressive newspaper Hankyoreh starkly warned that South Korea must take primary responsibility for its own defense, with the US playing a supporting role. It emphasizes that a rapid transition of wartime operational control (OPCON) is essential because it would enable a defense structure where Seoul leads within the alliance framework. Even if US troops withdraw, America can still provide naval and air support, which could ease defense cost-sharing pressures. In contrast to conservative views, the op-ed also suggests that direct negotiations between Trump and Kim Jong-un should not be dismissed outright. While Complete, Verifiable, and Irreversible Denuclearization (CVID) remains the ultimate objective, the paper stresses that it should not be a precondition for dialogue. Instead, the immediate priority should be preventive diplomacy—reducing tensions, avoiding conflict, halting North Korea’s nuclear activities, and gradually reducing its stockpile.

Despite concerns over Trump’s unpredictable approach, upcoming diplomatic events may provide opportunities for engagement. The APEC Summit, scheduled to take place in Gyeongju, South Korea, in late October, could serve as a turning point for US-North Korea relations if Trump attends.⁹ The governor of the summit’s host region has also echoed optimism about this possibility.¹⁰ Notably, a member of South Korea’s Democratic Party nominated Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize, citing his past engagement efforts with North Korea. While largely symbolic, this move underscores the ongoing debate and hope over Trump’s potential diplomatic role in Korean Peninsula affairs.

South Korea’s response to Trump’s North Korea policy reflects deep political divisions, with conservatives advocating for strengthened deterrence and progressives emphasizing strategic autonomy and preventive diplomacy. However, any substantive policy shift requires a domestic social consensus on what South Korea is willing to gain and lose. Given the current domestic political climate, such a comprehensive discussion can be extremely difficult as of now.

Trump’s Trade Policy and South Korea’s Reaction

Trump’s escalating tariff war presents a direct challenge to South Korea’s trade-dependent economy, particularly in strategic industries such as semiconductors, automobiles, and critical supply chains. Adding to these fears, Trump ordered a comprehensive trade review by April 1, which could result in stricter trade demands on South Korea because South Korea’s large trade surplus with the US could make South Korea a prime target. In 2024, Seoul recorded nearly $60 billion in surplus with the US.

Major South Korean newspapers offer mixed takes. Conservative commentators see Trump’s stance as challenging but not without recourse. Chosun Ilbo highlighted that even opposition leader Lee Jae-myung acknowledged Trump’s unapologetic pursuit of US interests, saying “fighting trade wars even with allies for national gain […] we [Korea] should learn from that.”¹¹ This reflects a view that Seoul must likewise put its own economic interests first in negotiations. Business leaders wasted no time responding; about a month before Trump’s inauguration, a delegation of some 40 top Korean executives flew to the US, hoping to preemptively manage uncertainties. In other words, Korean industry is seeking pragmatic deals¾perhaps offering investments or cooperation (for example, in critical supply chains) to mitigate the risk of tariffs.¹² Conservative outlets suggest measures such as increasing imports of US crude oil, natural gas, and grain, relocating or expanding production facilities to the US, exploring alternative export markets, and strengthening domestic industries, particularly in the service sector.¹³ Drawing lessons from Japan’s proactive measures during a recent US-Japan summit, where Japan proposed economic investments and increased natural gas imports to mitigate US economic pressure, a South Korean think tank suggested a similar approach could be beneficial.¹⁴

Some even view it as an opportunity for South Korea. In an interview with Chosun Ilbo,¹⁵ international trade expert Choi Byung-il argued that Trump’s ambition to revive US manufacturing as a superpower by imposing a 60% tariff and enforcing export controls on China will buy South Korea four years to pull ahead of China. This is of great strategic importance: According to the technology assessment report, South Korea lags significantly behind China in future industries such as artificial intelligence (AI), next-generation communications, quantum technology, aerospace, and marine sciences. Experts warn that even in areas where South Korea currently holds a slight advantage—such as semiconductors, secondary batteries, hydrogen technology, and displays—there is a high likelihood of being overtaken by China in the near future. Choi argues that South Korea must use this time to widen the gap through semiconductor and AI technological innovation.

Progressive outlets are more pessimistic, e.g., economists writing in venues like OhmyNews and Hankyoreh warn that Trump’s bilateral, zero-sum view of trade could hurt Korea’s export-dependent growth. They point out that Trump’s first-term renegotiation of the KORUS FTA and ad hoc tariffs (e.g. on steel) may repeat or worsen. There is concern that negotiated global rules will be sidelined¾“the end of the rules-based order” that benefited Korea’s prosperity, replaced by tariff barriers. For instance, twenty percent of South Korea’s exports are semiconductors. If the US restricts even low-spec semiconductor exports to China due to the “Deep-Seek shock,” Korea’s exports will immediately take a hit.¹⁶ The Bank of Korea predicted that if Trump enforces a 60% tariff on China, South Korea’s exports to China could decrease by more than 6%.¹⁷

Some analyses also note Trump’s linkage of trade with geopolitical aims. For instance, Seoul might face pressure to join the US decoupling from China. It would force Korean firms to make costly choices in semiconductor and battery supply chains​ to join a trade war on China.¹⁸ In other words, the consensus in Seoul is that Trump’s economic nationalism presents a serious test.

To this, South Korea is already implementing strategies aligned with these recommendations. South Korea’s Minister of Trade, Industry, and Energy Ahn Duk-geun indicated that South Korea will use increased imports of US liquefied natural gas (LNG) and participation in the Alaska oil and gas development project as a negotiation strategy to counter US trade pressures. Indeed, expanding US energy imports has been seen as a viable strategy for managing bilateral trade. That is because since Trump has long advocated for increased fossil fuel production, US oil prices¾which are already cheaper than Middle Eastern alternatives¾are expected to decline. Moreover, reducing South Korea’s reliance on Middle Eastern energy could enhance its economic security amid geopolitical instability in the region.

Moreover, US Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick recently stated in a meeting with South Korean business leaders that the US seeks a minimum investment of $1 billion.¹⁹ Ahn remarked that this investment threshold is achievable.²⁰ He also stated that South Korea may expand its import diversification strategy beyond energy to include high-tech materials and the broader supply chain. Ahn embarked on the first ministerial-level visit to the US on February 26, which included meetings with US Energy Secretary Christ Wright. Ahn said he aims to reinforce South Korea’s status as a crucial US manufacturing and technology partner as Trump is likely to intensify decoupling efforts from China, and push for tariff exemptions on South Korean steel, automobiles, and semiconductors.

Alternatively, there are also calls to strengthen regional trade frameworks and cooperate with Japan. Given ongoing supply chain disruptions, a partnership between Japan, which excels in materials and components, and South Korea, which specializes in assembly and final production, could be mutually beneficial. An analysis from the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP) suggested specific areas of cooperation, including a joint response to US trade policies. If South Korea expands US LNG imports, it could coordinate with Japan on pricing negotiations. Additionally, both countries should persuade the US to continue participating in multilateral frameworks like the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) and Minerals Security Partnership (MSP). Even if the US withdraws, South Korea and Japan should work together to sustain these frameworks. The analysis argued that both countries can enhance global supply chain resilience through the IPEF Supply Chain Agreement’s Crisis Response Network. As MSP chair, South Korea should also lead efforts with Japan and other MSP members to secure a stable supply of critical minerals for the clean energy transition.²¹ A former lieutenant general in the ROK Army echoed this sentiment in an op-ed, emphasizing the need for South Korea to recalibrate its foreign policy to foster closer cooperation with Japan despite historical grievances.²²

Despite concerns over Trump’s protectionist stance, however, there have been some notable developments in ROK-US cooperation, particularly in trade and technology. The recent nuclear export and cooperation between Korea and the US is a case in point. South Korea and the US signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to collaborate on nuclear technology exports to enhance their strategic partnership and address increasing global competition, particularly from China and Russia.²³ The global nuclear reactor market is dominated by Russia, France, South Korea, China, and the US. China and Russia have been aggressively expanding their nuclear exports. They are becoming formidable competitors to the US which has lagged in price competitiveness and manufacturing capabilities. In particular, the US views China’s expanding nuclear exports as a security threat. The Biden administration has focused on revitalizing the domestic nuclear industry, a policy expected to continue with increased urgency under Trump. For South Korea, it offers a chance to solidify its status as a global leader in nuclear power, while the US benefits from access to South Korea’s manufacturing prowess, particularly in reactor construction. The partnership aligns with broader geopolitical and economic interests, with the US increasingly looking to South Korea as a key partner to counter China’s influence and bolster its own manufacturing sector.²⁴

ROK-US-Japan Relations

On January 3, Acting President Choi vowed to continue trilateral cooperation with Japan and the US. On January 13, Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul and his Japanese counterpart, Iwaya Takeshi, met and reaffirmed their commitment to bilateral relations, just a week before Trump was due to take office. Amid growing uncertainty due to South Korea’s martial law crisis and impeachment turmoil, as well as the inauguration of the Trump administration’s second term in the United States, the foreign ministers of South Korea and Japan have made it clear that they intend to maintain the momentum of improving bilateral relations. On February 17, Rubio, Cho, and Iwaya met on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference and reaffirmed their commitment to North Korea’s complete denuclearization. It was mostly meant to assuage South Korea’s growing concerns over the US’s potential shift in North Korea policy. They also expressed their commitment to strengthening trilateral cooperation amid growing concerns over North Korea’s military ties with Russia. In their joint statement, the three sides reaffirmed their “unshakable” partnership.²⁵

In general, South Korean newspapers evaluated this meeting as a breakthrough in resuming high-level diplomacy and easing concerns after Trump’s re-election. Analysis from the Institute for National Security Strategy (INSS) also pointed to Trump’s direct mention of “North Korea’s complete denuclearization” and its clear reaffirmation in the joint statement as a “major achievement,” and overall “encouraging indicator” which reflects the smooth functioning of South Korea-Japan relations.²⁶ However, they also noted its shortcomings, as Choi failed to secure a firm commitment from Trump for direct communication at the presidential or high-level ministerial level. This leaves South Korea without firm assurances on managing economic risks under Trump’s trade policies.²⁷

DPRK-Russia Military Cooperation

In early 2025, North Korea intensified its military and economic collaboration with Russia. Recent intelligence indicates that North Korea has deployed an additional 1,000 to 3,000 elite troops to Russia’s Kursk region between January and February 2025, supplementing the 11,000 to 12,000 soldiers sent in late 2024. North Korean units have faced substantial casualties. Reports suggest at least 3,800 soldiers were killed or wounded. Despite these losses, Pyongyang continues to provide critical military support, including artillery shells and multiple-launch rocket systems, which now constitute approximately 50% of Russia’s ammunition supplies.²⁸

The human cost of this alliance became evidence in late February when South Korean lawmaker Yu Yong-weon met with North Korean prisoners of war (POWs) during his visit to Ukraine. One of the North Korean soldiers interviewed said he wanted to defect to South Korea to seek a better life and the opportunity to reunite with his parents. Yu urged the Korean government to protect North Korean POWs from being repatriated to North Korea against their will.²⁹

In response to the intensifying DPRK-Russia military cooperation, South Korea has strengthened its strategic engagement with NATO. On January 15, South Korea and NATO convened the 14th Policy Consultation in Seoul. Additionally, from January 14 to 16, NATO’s Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs and Security Policy, Boris Ruge, visited South Korea and Japan. They agreed to advance flagship projects initiated at NATO’s Washington Summit¾support to Ukraine, boost cyber defense, counter disinformation, and forge Individually Tailored Partnership Programmes (ITPP).

Moreover, Japan also took a significant step by officially launching its NATO mission in Brussels on January 15. North Korea swiftly condemned this move, warning that it would “extremely heighten military tensions in the region.” A statement from Pyongyang further charged that “Japan’s independent NATO delegation manipulation scheme is an extremely dangerous act that adds a new element of instability to the regional situation.”³⁰

According to Doo Jin-ho, Russia is highly likely to seek a military victory or major operational gains before May 9, 2025, the 80th anniversary of Victory Day in World War II. Given Russia’s shortage of frontline troops, he predicted that North Korea would inevitably send additional troops to support Russian forces. From North Korea’s perspective, troop deployment provides military and economic benefits, and real combat experience in modern warfare. North Korea is used to working with Russia on the principle of “economic benefits in exchange for a geostrategic bonus.”³¹

Conservative media outlets expressed heightened concerns over the deepening military ties between North Korea and Russia. They argued that this collaboration could destabilize regional security and embolden North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. For instance, Chosun Ilbo published an exclusive interview with Kyrylo Oleksiyovych Budanov, a Ukrainian military officer currently serving as the head of the Main Directorate of Intelligence (GUR) of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense. He said North Korea is accumulating real experience in 21st-century modern warfare, and the North Korean military of the future could become a completely different force from the past. He provided an example of the KN-23 missile that North Korea provided to Russia that had serious accuracy issues, with an error range of 500 to 1,500 meters. However, Russian missile experts intervened and made technical improvements to resolve the issue. As a result, accuracy has significantly improved, which allowed the missile to strike targets more precisely. He warned that this development and DPRK-Russia military collaboration pose a serious threat not only to South Korea but also to Japan. As North Korea gains real combat experience and modernizes its military capabilities, the continued DPRK-Russia military cooperation could become a long-term challenge for South Korea.

While conservative voices in South Korea advocate for stronger deterrence measures against the DPRK-Russia military cooperation, centrists and progressive perspectives emphasize diplomatic engagement. While acknowledging the gravity of the situation, progressive media outlets argued that South Korea should adopt a more nuanced approach to its relations with Russia and emphasize diplomatic engagement with it. They cautioned against actions that could escalate tensions and lead to a renewed arms race.

One op-ed from a progressive newspaper, Kyunghyang Shinmun, suggested that Putin, having established a friendly relationship with Trump, could act as a mediator in US-North Korea talks and assist North Korea in evading sanctions without fearing US retaliation.³² The piece further warned that if diplomatic discussions were structured around a US-North Korea-Russia framework, South Korea could face a phenomenon known as “Korea Passing,” where it is excluded from crucial regional negotiations. To counteract this risk, experts have urged Seoul to gradually improve relations with Russia to rebuild strategic ties and create strategic space.

Similarly, the progressive newspaper Hankyoreh published an interview with former president Moon Jae-in, who criticized the current administration’s foreign policy approach.³³ He described South Korea-US-Japan military cooperation as “hollow,” arguing that prioritizing the alliance with the US above all else¾at the expense of other diplomatic relationships¾has led to Trump’s pressure policies serving solely US national interests. He further contended that despite the touted improvement in relations with Japan, South Korea has gained nothing tangible in return.

Moon’s criticism is rooted in the historical principle of South Korea’s balanced diplomacy, a strategy that has been proposed by prior, progressive administrations. Since the Nordpolitik policy under President Roh Tae-woo, both progressive and conservative governments in South Korea have maintained the US alliance while also fostering strong ties with China and Russia. However, Yoon Suk-yeol’s administration prioritized closer alignment with the US and Japan at the expense of relations with China and Russia, raising questions about continued diversification. Moon contends that an early end to the Ukraine war could present an opportunity to reset relations between the US and Russia, as well as between Russia and Europe. He concluded that South Korea must be prepared to take advantage of this shift and proactively rebuild its relationship with Russia when the time comes.

Conclusion

This report has provided an overview of key foreign, economic, and security policy developments on the Korean Peninsula in the first months of 2025. The report examined the impact of Trump’s potential North Korea policy, ongoing denuclearization challenges, and the potential for renewed diplomatic engagement at the APEC Summit. Economically, South Korea has been discussing ways to respond to a trade imbalance with the US, including diversifying partnerships, increasing US energy imports, and using key industries like semiconductors and nuclear energy as leverage. In the meantime, trilateral cooperation with the US and Japan was reaffirmed and cooperation with NATO has been strengthened. However, deepening DPRK-Russia military and economic ties pose long-term security concerns for South Korea.

South Korea faces a shifting geopolitical landscape where old assumptions about security, alliances, and trade no longer hold. The challenge ahead is not just to respond to immediate threats but to redefine its long-term strategy. However, deep political divisions and domestic turbulence in South Korea complicate this task. Without political cohesion and decisive leadership, South Korea risks being caught in great-power competition rather than shaping its own strategic future.