Country Report: South Korea (January-February 2022)
In January and February, with increasing tension across the border between Russia and Ukraine, the US seemed to move the focus to Europe after its withdrawal from Afghanistan, creating a niche for North Korea to parade improvement in its missile technology. Despite President Moon Jae-in’s last-ditch effort to normalize inter-Korean relations, North Korea ramped up its missile launches to a record pace in January and announced it would reconsider its self-imposed moratorium on testing nuclear weapons and ICBMs. In addition, as Pyongyang announced it would skip the Beijing Winter Olympics, an end-of-war declaration appeared to be taken off the negotiating table. In the meantime, the appearance of a young woman wearing Hanbok, the traditional attire of Korea, during the opening ceremony of the Winter Games was met with public outrage, igniting a deep-rooted cultural conflict between South Korea and China. With regard to ROK-Japan relations, although the necessity to improve diplomatic relations between the two countries was reaffirmed at the trilateral ministerial meeting in Hawaii, Tokyo’s Sado mine bid for UNESCO World Heritage Sites emerged as another source of conflict.
As Russia launched an invasion into Ukraine on February 24, the Russia-Ukraine crisis not only escalated to another level in Europe but also became a serious threat to stability in the Indo-Pacific, especially in the context of the growing rivalry between the US and China and major security threats posed by North Korea. With less than two weeks until the presidential election, it remains to be seen how the new government will cope with these severe challenges.
Philip Goldberg Nominated as New US Ambassador to South Korea
On January 20, a day before US President Biden’s virtual meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio, the US and Japan announced a joint statement on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, reaffirming their commitment to the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement (CVID) of all of North Korea’s nuclear weapons.1
With North Korea’s saber-rattling causing an increase of tension on the Korean Peninsula, this announcement raised concerns about additional sanctions on North Korea and Seoul’s lack of effort to align its priorities with Washington and Tokyo. Segye Ilbo stressed the importance of the term “CVID,” as it implies a change in the US North Korea policy toward a hardline stance.2 Seoul Economic Daily argued that the Moon administration should not isolate itself with its reluctance to raise criticisms against Pyongyang. Otherwise, it added, the Moon administration would end up placing a great burden on the next government.3
Less than a month later, Biden nominated Philip Goldberg, a career diplomat currently serving as US ambassador to Colombia, for US ambassador to South Korea. The post has been vacant for over a year since Ambassador Harry Harris left office. Highlighting the fact that the nominee is a former US State Department coordinator for implementation of UN sanctions on North Korea, Chosun Ilbo noted the announcement was made at a time when North Korea said it would reconsider a self-imposed moratorium on nuclear and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) testing.4 In its editorial, Hankook Kyungjae warned that this should be seen as a wake-up call to the Moon administration that has stuck to the inter-Korean dialogue despite North Korean provocations. It also argued that the next government should focus on strong security and strengthening alliances underpinning “real peace.”5
Pyongyang Starting the New Year with Missile Launches
In his final New Year’s address, Moon Jae-in pointed out that 2022 marks the 50th anniversary of the July 4 South-North Joint Statement, which declared the goal of peaceful unification as the fundamental spirit of inter-Korean dialogue, and pledged to seek the normalization of inter-Korean relations until the end of his term.6 However, North Korea seemed to turn its back on South Korea as it launched a “hypersonic missile” on January 5.
North Korea’s Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported that the Academy of Defense Science had successfully tested a hypersonic missile and hit a target. In contrast, South Korea’s Ministry of National Defense remained skeptical of the capability of the missile, assessing it was a general ballistic missile.7 The Blue House held a meeting of its National Security Council (NSC), expressed concerns over North Korea’s missile launch, and stressed the importance of resuming talks with Pyongyang to ease tensions on the Korean Peninsula.8 On the same day, at a groundbreaking ceremony for railway construction to connect Gangneung and Jejin, Moon emphasized that despite concerns over increasing tensions and a deepening impasse in inter-Korean relations, the country should not let go of the chance for dialogue to fundamentally overcome this situation.9
Conservative media outlets focused on the Moon administration’s response to North Korea’s missile launch. Chosun Ilbo criticized the government’s emphasis on “peace” and pointed out that the word “provocation” has disappeared in the Moon administration’s vocabulary since Kim Yo-jong had complained about Seoul’s use of “provocation” to describe Pyongyang’s weapons tests.10 Echoing this view, Segye Ilbo drew a contrast between Pyongyang’s will to continue to advance its nuclear weapons program without yielding to UN sanctions, and Seoul’s reluctance to give up an end-of-war declaration.11 Donga Ilbo underlined the significance of North Korea’s new asymmetric threats and urged Seoul and Washington to complete new Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG) to counter North Korea’s increasing nuclear threats.12
Progressive media outlets, on the other hand, highlighted North Korea’s impact on the geopolitics of the region. With various variables that make the situation around the Korean Peninsula unstable, including the stalemate between North Korea and the US, COVID-19, and the upcoming presidential election in South Korea, Pyongyang’s missile tests would cause an escalation of tensions around the Korean Peninsula, especially in the context of a new cold war, Kyunghyang Shinmun noted.13 Thus, Hankyoreh said North Korea should come back to the negotiating table and play a role for peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula while the Moon administration is making a last-ditch effort to prevent a “long-term stalemate.”14
North Korea to Skip the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics
In a letter to China, North Korea said it would not take part in the Beijing Winter Olympics. According to North Korea’s state news agency KCNA, the letter said, “We could not participate in the Games due to the hostile forces’ moves and the worldwide pandemic, but we would fully support the Chinese comrades for all their works to host a grand and wonderful Olympic festival.”15
Pyongyang’s decision to skip the Winter Olympics was widely seen as an end of Seoul’s plan to push an end-of-war declaration. Hankook Ilbo editorialized that the Moon administration’s strategy to exert leverage on China for a dialogue with North Korea has failed.16 Seoul Economic Daily pointed out that North Korea’s letter was sent to China on the same day it test-fired a hypersonic missile and argued that Pyongyang has already sent a clear message to Seoul that it would no longer want to formally declare an end to the Korean War.17
US Sanctions Against North Korea
Following its announcement to skip the Beijing Winter Games, North Korea launched a suspected ballistic missile that may be a hypersonic missile on January 11. In response to North Korea’s second missile launch in less than a week, the NSC held an emergency meeting and expressed strong regret. Moon Jae-in also expressed concern over North Korea’s missile launches ahead of the presidential election.18
This time, there was a strong push from the Biden administration, imposing sanctions on five North Korean officials. On January 12, the US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated five North Korean individuals responsible for procuring goods for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile-related programs.19 In addition, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, the US ambassador to the United Nations, suggested UN sanctions in response to North Korea’s six ballistic missile launches since September.20
In its editorial about Pyongyang’s intention to stage provocations, Donga Ilbo noted that regardless of international sanctions, North Korea would continue to stage provocations following its timeline of weapons development.21 Calling it “déjà vu,” Kukmin Ilbo said that North Korea is showing the same pattern of parading its missile technology and sending messages to the international community by launching more missiles as it had done in 2017 after Moon’s inauguration.22
Kyunghyang Shinmun argued that North Korea’s latest missile provocation would only lead to an arms race, escalation of tensions on the peninsula, and little likelihood of the UN easing sanctions on it.23 On the other hand, Chosun Ilbo criticized the fact that the government failed to respond properly as it initially downplayed the capability of North Korea’s hypersonic missile.24 This view was endorsed by Joongang Ilbo, which also expressed criticism about the Moon administration’s adherence to an end-of-war declaration and improvement of inter-Korean relations.25
Concerning the US sanctions against North Korea, Hankook Ilbo said it was a clear message that the US would respond to missile provocations with punitive sanctions.26 Donga Ilbo argued that Seoul’s muted response to North Korea’s missile launches might cause isolation from allies and the international community in their collective efforts to deter North Korea.27
North Korea Considering End to Moratorium on Nuclear and Long-range Missile Tests
On January 16, two North Korean freight trains reportedly arrived in China’s border city Dandong. It remained uncertain whether North Korea would open its border and resume trade by train across the border. Nevertheless, Hankook Ilbo viewed it as a positive step to forestall a vicious circle of further provocations and sanctions.28 Likewise, Kukmin Ilbo highlighted the necessity of humanitarian assistance to North Korea to create an environment for dialogue.29
The hope did not last long as North Korea launched two short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) KN-24 designed to evade interception on January 17. It was three days after North Korea launched two rail-mobile KN-23 SRBMs. Donga Ilbo condemned the government’s passive response when the NSC only expressed “strong regret” without any effective measures.30
On January 20, when North Korea hinted at lifting its moratorium on testing nuclear weapons and ICBMs, media outlets extended their concern beyond the government’s response to Pyongyang’s saber-rattling. According to KCNA, North Korea held a politburo meeting of the ruling Workers’ Party and decided to resume “all temporally suspended activities.” Kyunghyang Shinmun said North Korea intended to take the lead in negotiations, especially when the Biden administration was focusing on the US-China competition and the Russia-Ukraine crisis.31 Calling it “adventurous,” Donga Ilbo argued that Kim Jong-un’s provocative move could cause a strong US reaction to North Korea.32
Major media outlets were unanimous in expressing concern over the possibility of a return to 2017. Hankook Ilbo expressed concern that North Korea’s return to brinkmanship would cause a period of “fire and fury” that could allow policymakers to take a hardline stance on North Korea and put the peninsula in a difficult position between the US and China.33 With less than 50 days left until the presidential election, Kukmin Ilbo insisted that the presidential candidates come up with solutions on how to face the North Korean nuclear threat and how to harmonize the ROK-US alliance and ROK-China relations.34
January 30 IRBM test
On January 30, North Korea launched a Hwaseong-12 intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM), which it claimed was intended to evaluate the operational readiness of the missile variant. Noting that the IRBM, if shot at its normal angle of 30 to 45 degrees, can have a maximum range of 4,500 to 5,000km reaching all the areas in the continental US, YonhapNewseditorialized that the test was “the most serious military provocation since the country declared a self-moratorium on its missile and nuclear tests in 2017.” Pointing to the fact that a spate of missile tests in a single month was the first since Kim Jong-un came to power in 2011, the newspaper argued that North Korea’s brinkmanship diplomacy had made a comeback and that the country should not resort to its past behavior of holding hostage security on the Korean Peninsula to gain diplomatic advantage.35
The conservative Chosun Ilbo editorialized that North Korea’s latest IRBM test proved the country’s intent to take South Korea hostage to nuclear blackmail. In the face of the North’s proven IRBM capabilities, the newspaper argued that all the candidates for the March presidential election should suggest concrete measures on how to defend against the North Korean threats, including building a multi-layered missile defense system comprised of THAAD and Patriot batteries to intercept the North’s missiles.36 JoongAng Ilbo also opined that with North Korea reaching halfway in the lead up to the resumption of its ICBM and nuclear tests, Moon Jae In’s Korean peace process turned out to be an abject failure. Cautioning against the North’s tests of tactical nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future, the newspaper urged bipartisan support for strengthening South Korea’s defense posture against the North.37 Segye Ilbo also echoed the view that it was not unusual for North Korea to raise military tensions at a sensitive time such as a US or South Korea leadership transition.38 Seoul Kyungjae put the blame on Moon and his cabinet for falling short of calling out North Korea’s IRBM test as a provocation, urging them to abandon pursuit of phony peace with the North, reinforce the Korea Air and Missile Defense System (KAMD), and restore the alliance with the US.39
The progressive Kyunghyang Shinmun editorialized that the IRBM test was the most serious development among the North’s spate of missile launches in January as the test would be construed as a preparatory step to future ICBM tests. The paper presaged the North’s ICBM tests on the 80th anniversary of Kim Jong-il’s birth on February 16 or the centenary of founder Kim Il-sung on April 15, which it says would worsen opinion in the US and the international community and lead to discussions at the UN Security Council on imposing additional sanctions on the North.40
UN Security Council Emergency Meeting
On February 3, the UN Security Council held a closed-door emergency meeting on North Korea’s IRBM test at the request of the US. A day after the meeting in which China and Russia opposed expressing condemnation of North Korea over its IRBM test on January 30, US Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield read a statement on behalf of nine countries, including Albania, Brazil, Britain, France, Ireland, Japan, Norway and the United Arab Emirates, and the United States of America. Noticeably absent was South Korea’s permanent representative. Ambassador Greenfield condemned the test as “the unlawful action” intended to further destabilize the region and marked “a new and troubling record,” adding that “the cost of the council’s ongoing silence was too high” and “would embolden the North to further defy the international community, normalize its violations of relevant resolutions, and threaten international peace and security.”41
In the wake of the joint statement, the conservative Chosun Ilbo criticized Seoul for opting out of the February 4 joint statement and the two previous joint statements issued by the EU and ASEAN in condemning the North’s January missile tests. Pointing out that the Seoul government continued to act as when “Nero fiddled while Rome burned,” the newspaper cautioned that this should be the last time that Seoul acted subserviently to Pyongyang.42 Hankook Kyungjae also criticized Seoul for being engrossed in minimizing the significance of the North Korean tests, though the North made its aim clear to neutralize the South Korea-US missile defense system. In the light of the situation, the newspaper demanded Seoul put in place effective deterrence against the North Korean nuclear weapons.43 Donga Ilbo also editorialized that the paralysis of the Security Council, in the wake of the North’s impending nuclear and ICBM tests, took place with China and Russia defending North Korea and South Korea looking on idly. The newspaper warned that if the North Korean situation is left unaddressed, it will also not be in the interest of China as the North would become a time bomb to its flank.44
2022 Beijing Winter Olympics
On February 4, an opening ceremony of the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics was held at Beijing National Stadium. The appearance of a young woman wearing the Korean traditional attire called “the Hanbok” among the representatives of 56 ethnic groups in China passing the Chinese flag across the stadium, sparked furor among South Koreans who denounced it as China’s attempt to appropriate their culture. The South Korea newspapers criticized Seoul for its reluctance to stand up against China. The conservative Kukmin Ilbo editorialized that the incident worryingly took place amid China’s attempt to claim other South Korean cultural symbols as its own, urging Seoul to speak against the Chinese acts.45 The progressive Kyunghyang Shinmun noted that the Chinese attempt to claim Korean history and culture as part of its own fueled anti-Chinese sentiments in Korea, particularly among the youth. The newspaper added that as this year marked the thirtieth anniversary of the South Korea-China diplomatic relationship, Seoul should calmy respond while Beijing should forsake exceptionalism and respect other countries’ distinct cultures.46 The center-right Hankook Ilbo, the centrist Seoul Shinmun, and the conservative Asia Today and Segye Ilbo all criticized South Korean Culture Minister Hwang Hee for his seemingly lukewarm response, urging Seoul to speak out against the Chinese acts and lodge a formal complaint.47
On February 9, in the middle of the Olympics, the South Korean media again lambasted China, for marring the Olympics spirit in the wake of the controversial refereeing decision at the men’s 1,000-meter short track speed skating semi-finals. Two South Korean world-record skaters, Messrs Hwang and Lee, were disqualified for rule violations. Although Mr. Hwang finished the race first after having passed two Chinese skaters, he got disqualified for a late pass. In a separate semi-final, Mr. Lee was disqualified for a lane change causing contact. The two Chinese skaters who advanced to the final won gold and silver medals.
The conservative Joongang Ilbo editorialized that the men’s 1,000-meter short track speed skating was marred by an unprecedented series of biased refereeing that conferred a gold medal on a Chinese skater who had not taken the lead in any heats leading up to the final. It deplored that Beijing could not be expected to show the Olympics spirit where a loser accepts the outcome with good grace while the crowd applauds a loser.48 The newspaper further pointed out that other controversies, those involving the Hanbok dress and a emperor-like banquet hosted by Xi Jinping to foreign dignitaries, caused concern that these would be recorded as the worst Olympics in history.49 Asia Today echoed the view writing that the Beijing Olympics fueled messages of conflict rather than those of peace and that Beijing regrettably marred the Olympics spirit by prioritizing winning the medals at the expense of running the games well as the host country.50
The centrist Seoul Shinmun editorialized that a prediction of a South Korean short track skater that even a blowing wind could become grounds for disqualification at Beijing became a reality. The newspaper further noted that the Chinese political leadership’s attempt to use the games to allay the fatigue of the Chinese under stress due to Xi’s long-running rule would contradict Olympic values and subject China to the derision of the international community.51 The conservative Chosun Ilbo added that China’s medal streak was intended to embellish Xi’s rule and help Xi secure his third-term rule expected at the Party Congress by the end of this year. The paper added that it became no secret that the Chinese Communist Party sought to attain its goals by all means at all costs.52
Japan’s Sado Mine Bid for UNESCO World Heritage
On February 1, the Japanese cabinet approved the recommendation of the Council for Cultural Affairs to nominate ancient gold and silver mines on Sado island in Niigata Prefecture for inscription in UNESCO’s World Heritage Site in 2023. Seoul opposed the listing on the grounds that the mines had been used to employ Korean laborers who were forcefully conscripted for producing materials during World War II. Seoul expressed deep regret that Tokyo neglected to follow-up measures on the 2017 UNESCO World Heritage Committee’s recommendation that it redress an insufficient interpretative strategy to allow visitors a full understanding of the existence of Korean forced laborers who were brought and worked against their will under harsh conditions at Hashima Island. The island was inscribed along with 22 other industrial locations in the World Heritage List in 2015.
Yonhap Newseditorialized that it was deeply regrettable that Tokyo continued to distort history, rubbing salt into the wounds of neighboring countries victimized by Imperial Japan during WWII. Pointing out that Japan failed to include the complete history of the 23 sites at Hashima Island, the newspaper argued that Tokyo’s bid for a UNESCO World Heritage Site designation for the Sado mines would throw cold water on normalizing the strained South Korea-Japan relations despite the need to resolve outstanding issues such as a row over history, trade disputes, and the North Korean nuclear crisis.53 The center-right Hankuk Ilbo editorialized that Tokyo’s recommendation of Sado mine for a UNESCO World Heritage Site designation, without following-up on the previous recommendation on Hashima Island, amounted to declaring a war on history, urging Seoul to mobilize its full diplomatic power to stop Japan’s perverted distortion of history.54 The conservative Maeil Kyungjae editorialized that Japan’s motivation for the bid was to gain political support from right-wing voters in the upcoming July House of Councilors election, urging Tokyo to halt the politicization of history.55 The progressive Hankyoreh presaged a continued row with Japan until the next summer when the decision on the bid would be decided, calling for continuity in staging opposition to Japan’s bid, after the March presidential election, and seeking cooperation with China and the international community.56
The standoff over Ukraine between the US and Russia continued with the Russian build-up of troops on the border with Ukraine from November 2021. While shuttle diplomacy between capitals went on, the possibility of an impending war loomed large as western countries began relocating their embassies from Kyiv to the western city of Lviv. Yonhap Newseditorialized that looking at the situation, it felt bitter that great powers were engaged in a tug of war over the fate of a sovereign country. It asked the international community to respect the will of the Ukrainian people on the accession to NATO, and urged Seoul to prepare measures to counter the expected economic fallouts including a spike in the price of energy, raw materials, and cereals and conduct a safe evacuation of South Korean nationals in Ukraine.57 The view was echoed by the conservative Kukmin Ilbo and centrist Seoul Shinmun that Seoul should put in place contingency plans for ameliorating an expected economic impact on raw material prices, financial markets, and consumer prices.58 The progressive Kyunghyang Shinmun asked the US, Russia, and the international community to proactively pursue a diplomatic way out to prevent the political and economic repercussions, which it says will go beyond the borders of Ukraine and Russia.59 The conservative Donga Ilbo editorialized that should the war break out in Ukraine, the world would head towards a new cold war between the US and Europe on the one side and Russia and China on the other, making it uncertain how far the repercussions would spread. The newspaper cautioned against some optimism that the fallouts from a war in Ukraine would be limited within its borders and asked Seoul to put in place a proactive response strategy.60 The conservative Segye Ilbo noted that Moon, for the first time, presided over an Economic and Security Strategy Meeting, a group created last October, a fact which it says proves the significance of the events in Ukraine on South Korea’s economy.61
Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine
After Russia passed a bill to officially recognize the independence of two breakaway regions, Donetsk and Luhansk, and deployed troops to eastern Ukraine, President Moon Jae-in presided over a meeting of the National Security Council (NSC) and expressed support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. While stressing the importance of a peaceful resolution of the crisis in Ukraine, President Moon said, “South Korea will actively participate in these efforts as a responsible member of the international community.”62 However, whether South Korea would take part in the sanctions against Russia remained unanswered.
Seoul’s cautious approach lasted until Russia invaded Ukraine. On February 24, at the brink of war, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted the possibility of Seoul joining multilateral sanctions on Russia, including export controls, but set Russia’s all-out war against Ukraine as a precondition.63 As Russia unleashed a full-scale invasion of Ukraine on the same day, President Moon said South Korea would support international efforts to restrain armed aggression and seek a peaceful resolution by joining economic sanctions. However, Seoul crossed the line at imposing unilateral sanctions such as financial sanctions.64
With respect to the significance of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, major media outlets marked it as a prelude to the New Cold War. Hankyoreh strongly condemned Russia for violating the Ukrainian sovereignty while suggesting that Putin’s invasion would divide the world into two camps, the United States and its allies versus Russia and China, and plunge the nuclear powers into competition for influence and their interests.65 Drawing an analogy between the Ukraine crisis and the Taiwan issue, Chosun Ilbo expressed concerns over the possibility of Asia becoming the next stage of conflicts, including Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the Korean Peninsula.66 In this sense, South Korea is situated at the forefront of the New Cold War and ought to provide support to the Western allies to prevent North Korea from taking advantage of the ongoing crisis in Ukraine, Donga Ilbo noted.67
In contrast to the European Union, Japan, and Australia that joined the first tranche of the US-led sanctions on Russia, South Korea belatedly announced to follow suit. Hankyoreh argued that Seoul’s cautions response derived from three major concerns: any negative repercussions for denuclearization of North Korea and the Korean Peninsula peace process; the need to manage its bilateral relations with Moscow during a transitional period before and after the presidential election; and possible disruptions to energy and raw material supply chains.68 Nevertheless, Hankook Ilbo said, participation in international cooperation based on universal values is the responsibility of members of the international community, especially in the G-zero era in which Russia’s invasion confirmed the absence of global leadership.69
As the US-led sanctions on Russia aimed at blocking its access to cutting-edge technology and equipment, it was assumed that South Korea would focus on restricting its exports of semiconductors, automobiles, and electronics.70 With the increasing price of raw materials including oil and natural gas, Kukmin Ilbo urged the government to prepare measures to support business that have to bear the impact of sanctions against Russia with an uncertainty of how long it would last.71 Welcoming Seoul’s decision to join the effort to impose pressure on Russia, Joongang Ilbo insisted that South Korea, as a middle power and as a developed economy, play a responsible role by proactively expanding its role not only in economic sanctions but also in providing medical assistance to Ukraine and countering the Ukrainian refugee crisis.72
On February 2, the European Commission decided to classify nuclear energy and some forms of natural gas as “green investments” in its classification scheme known as “the EU taxonomy for sustainable financing,” whose aim is to guide private capital into sustainable economic activities. The news came when the technical jargon gained currency in the presidential race led by two primary contenders, Lee Jae-myung from the ruling Democratic Party who, following Moon from the same party, was in favor of a nuclear phase-out policy and Yoon Suk-yeol from the opposition People Power Party, who sought to revitalize nuclear power plants. The conservative Financial News editorialized that the EU’s decision belied Moon’s nuclear phase-out policy and K-Taxonomy, a South Korean equivalent to the EU taxonomy which, unlike the EU one, calls for the use of liquified natural gas on a conditional basis but phases out nuclear energy. Noting that the EU decided on its taxonomy on the rationale that achieving a 100-percent renewable energy mix without the use of nuclear energy would be infeasible, the newspaper criticized Seoul for its adherence to a nuclear phase-out policy. It urged presidential candidates from the ruling and opposition parties to put forward scientific visions for transitioning South Korea to green energy.
1. “U.S.-Japan Joint Statement on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” U.S. Department of State, January 20, 2022, https://www.state.gov/u-s-japan-joint-statement-on-the-treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons/.
2. “美·日 ‘북핵 강경대응’한다는데 정부는 종전선언만 되뇌나,” Segye Ilbo, January 24, 2022, https://www.segye.com/newsView/20220123507978.
3. “美日 ‘CVID’ 공조하는데 나홀로 종전선언 매달릴 땐가,” Sedaily, January 24, 2022, https://www.sedaily.com/NewsVIew/260ZLQ3226.
4. “주한 미국대사 공석 곧 끝…대북제재 총괄했던 필립 골드버그 내정,” Chosun Ilbo, January 26, 2022, https://biz.chosun.com/policy/politics/2022/01/26/YEOF74ATXVB4NHKCV6AWYC7EUQ/.
5. “미국이 ‘대북 저승사자’를 주한대사로 보내는 이유,” Hankook Kyungjae, January 27, 2022, https://www.hankyung.com/opinion/article/2022012794651.
6. “2022 New Year’s Address by President Moon Jae-in,” Cheong Wa Dae, January 3, 2022, https://english1.president.go.kr/BriefingSpeeches/Speeches/1130.
7. “군 ‘북이 쏜 건 극초음속 미사일 아니다…기술 진전 없어,” Joongang Ilbo, January 7, 2022, https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25038977.
8. “청 NSC ‘북한의 탄도미사일 발사에 우려…대화 재개가 중요,” Hankyoreh, January 5, 2022, https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/bluehouse/1026054.html.
9. “문 대통령 ‘남북관계 정체 깊어질 우려있지만… 대화의 끈 놓아서는 안돼,” Cheong Wa Dae, January 6, 2022, https://www.korea.kr/news/policyNewsView.do?newsId=148897749.
10. “文 가짜 평화 쇼 끝을 장식한 北 극초음속 미사일,” Chosun Ilbo, January 7, 2022, https://www.chosun.com/opinion/editorial/2022/01/07/CXI35H4GEJG7LLSZ5VFQCAFIVU/.
11. “北 탄도미사일 쏜 날 남북철도연결 행사에 간 文,” Segye Ilbo, January 5, 2022, https://segye.com/view/20220105515406.
12. “北 극초음속미사일 속도전, 한미 작계 최신화 서둘라,” Donga Ilbo, January 7, 2022, https://www.donga.com/news/Opinion/article/all/20220106/111133305/1.
13. “문 대통령 남북철도 복원 착공식 날 탄도미사일 쏜 북한,” Kyunghyang Shinmun, January 5, 2022, https://www.khan.co.kr/opinion/editorial/article/202201052038005.
14. “새해 벽두 탄도미사일 발사, 북한 긴장 고조 말아야,” Hankyoreh, January 5, 2022, https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/opinion/editorial/1026156.html.
15. “북한 ‘베이징올림픽 참가 못하지만 중국 전적으로 지지,” Yonhap News Agency, January 7, 2022, https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20220107008900504.
16. “북한, 베이징올림픽 불참… 멀어진 종전선언,” Hankook Ilbo, January 8, 2022, https://www.hankookilbo.com/News/Read/A2022010715540003534.
17. “北 미사일 쏜 날 올림픽 불참 선언… 이젠 ‘평화쇼’ 접어야,” Sedaily, January 8, 2022, https://www.sedaily.com/NewsVIew/260S8Y8MOH.
18. “문대통령 ‘대선 앞둔 시기, 北 연속 미사일 발사 우려” Yonhap News Agency, January 11, 2022, https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20220111144000001.
19. “Treasury Targets Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Individuals Supporting Weapons of Mass Destruction and Ballistic Missile Programs,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, January 12, 2022, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0555.
20. “U.S. hits North Korean officials with sanctions after missile test,” NPR, January 12, 2022, https://www.npr.org/2022/01/12/1072657702/u-s-hits-north-korean-officials-with-sanctions-after-missile-test.
21. “北 엿새 만의 극초음속 재도발, 안보리 열린 날 대놓고 쐈다,” Donga Ilbo, January 12, 2022, https://www.donga.com/news/Opinion/article/all/20220111/111202219/1.
22. “北, 새해 두 번째 무력시위… 대충 넘어가선 안 된다,” Kukmin Ilbo, January 12, 2022, http://news.kmib.co.kr/article/view.asp?arcid=0924227032&code=11171111&sid1=opi.
23. “안보리 보란 듯 엿새 만에 탄도미사일 재발사한 북,” Kyunghyang Shinmun, January 11, 2022, https://www.khan.co.kr/opinion/editorial/article/202201112048005#c2b.
24. “‘극초음속 아니다’ 뭉개자 ‘마하 10’ 쏜 北, ‘넋 나간 바보’ 된 정부,” Chosun Ilbo, January 12, 2022, https://www.chosun.com/opinion/editorial/2022/01/12/UKPF5RQ72NHPZN75U5H5DVPZZ4/.
25. “북한 마하 10 극초음속 미사일 발사에도 안이한 정부,” Joongang Ilbo, January 12, 2022, https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25039963#home.
26. “北 미사일 도발 첫 제재한 美… 강 대 강 대립 우려,” Hankook Ilbo, January 14, 2022, https://www.hankookilbo.com/News/Read/A2022011316120004686.
27. “美 전격 對北 제재에 뒷짐진 한국, 국제 ‘왕따’ 자초하나,” Donga Ilbo, January 14, 2022, https://www.donga.com/news/Opinion/article/all/20220113/111239647/1.
28. “연일 미사일 발사 속 북중열차 재개한 북한,” Hankook Ilbo, January 18, 2022, https://www.hankookilbo.com/News/Read/A2022011714280003337.
29. “北 코로나 국경 봉쇄 완화… 인도적 지원도 받아들이길,” Kukmin Ilbo, January 17, 2022, http://news.kmib.co.kr/article/view.asp?arcid=0924227714&code=11171111&sid1=opi.
30. “北 ‘南 전역 타격’ 미사일 시리즈에 靑은 ‘유감’ 시리즈,” Donga Ilbo, January 19, 2022, https://www.donga.com/news/Opinion/article/all/20220118/111311247/1.
31. “핵실험·ICBM 발사 재개 시사한 북, 선을 넘어선 안 된다,” Kyunghyang Shinmun, January 20, 2022, https://www.khan.co.kr/opinion/editorial/article/202201202021015.
32. “北 핵·ICBM 재개 시사… 껍데기만 남은 文 평화 프로세스,” Donga Ilbo, January 21, 2022, https://www.donga.com/news/Opinion/article/all/20220120/111351797/1.
33. “핵실험·ICBM 위협한 北 ‘레드라인’ 넘지 말아야,” Hankook Ilbo, January 21, 2022, https://www.hankookilbo.com/News/Read/A2022012016260000194.
34. “핵·ICBM으로 협박하는 北, 대선 후보들 대응전략은 뭔가,” Kukmin Ilbo, January 21, 2022, http://news.kmib.co.kr/article/view.asp?arcid=0924228570&code=11171111&sid1=opi.
35. “IRBM 발사로 4년만의 최대도발 北, 오판 말아야” Yonhap News Agency, February 2, 2022, https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20220202049000022.
36. “IRBM 발사로 4년만의 최대도발 北, 오판 말아야,” Chosun Ilbo, February 3, 2022, https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20220202049000022.
37. “북한 IRBM 발사…문 정부 ‘평화 프로세스’ 대실패,” JoongAng Ilbo, February 3, 2022, https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25045143#home.
38. “北 IRBM 도발, ‘레드라인’ 넘으면 파국 각오해야,” Segye Ilbo, February 3, 2022, http://www.segye.com/newsView/20220202509808.
39. “北 7번째 미사일 발사… ‘도발’이라 말 못한 ‘유감 정부,” Seoul Kyungjae, February 3, 2022, https://www.sedaily.com/NewsVIew/261ZWGWIUR.
40. “‘레드라인’ 다가선 북한, 무력 과시로 얻을 것은 없다,” Kyunghyang Shinmun, February 2, 2022, https://m.khan.co.kr/opinion/editorial/article/202202022025015#c2b.
41. “Joint Statement on the January 30 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s Ballistic Missile Launch,” UnitedStates Mission to the United Nations, February 4, 2022, https://usun.usmission.gov/joint-statement-on-the-january-30-democratic-peoples-republic-of-koreas-ballistic-missile-launch/.
42. “‘北 도발 규탄’에 ‘한국만 침묵’은 이번이 마지막이라야,,” Chosun Ilbo, February 7, 2022, https://www.chosun.com/opinion/editorial/2022/02/07/BVNZFW5HNZETDBUXNXT26JT2WE/.
43. “미·일·영·불 한목소리로 北 규탄성명…이번에도 빠진 韓,” Hankook Kyungjae, February 7, 2022, https://www.hankyung.com/opinion/article/2022020640431.
44. “안보리 무력화한 中, 북핵 방치하면 옆구리 시한폭탄 될 것,” Donga Ilbo, February 7, 2022, https://www.donga.com/news/Opinion/article/all/20220206/111610933/1.
45. “중국의 ‘한복 공정’ 유감… 정부는 왜 할 말 못하나,” Kukmin Ilbo, February 7, 2022, http://m.kmib.co.kr/view.asp?arcid=0924230337.
46. “한·중관계 민감성 보여준 베이징 올림픽 한복 입장 논란,” Kyunghyang Shinmun, February 6, 2022, https://www.khan.co.kr/opinion/editorial/article/202202062115025.
47. “中 ‘한복공정’ 논란, 분노뿐 아닌 진실 알리는 노력해야,” Hankook Ilbo, February 7, 2022, https://m.hankookilbo.com/News/Read/A2022020613150003957; “‘한복공정’ 보고도 無항의 황희 , 어느 나라 장관인가,” Seoul Shinmun, February 6, 2022, https://www.seoul.co.kr/news/newsView.php?id=20220207031009; “[사설] 정부, 중국의 문화공정에 할 말은 해야 한다,” Asia Today, February 6, 2022, https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/view.php?key=20220206010001903; “올림픽 ‘한복공정’ 논란, 中 문화침탈·역사왜곡 중단해야,” Segye Ilbo, February 6, 2022, https://www.segye.com/newsView/20220206508284.
48. “올림픽 정신과 감동 실종된 베이징 동계대회,” JoongAng Ilbo, February 9, 2022, https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25046622#home.
50. “중국은 올림픽 개최국 자격 보여주길 바란다,” Asia Today, February 8, 2022, https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/view.php?key=20220208010003475
51. “스포츠정신 훼손한 중국, ‘깡통 올림픽’ 만들 셈인가,” Seoul Shinmun February 8, 2022, https://www.seoul.co.kr/news/newsView.php?id=20220209031018
52. “중국 공산당, 올림픽에서 ‘메달 공정’ 벌이고 있나,” Chosun Ilbo, February 9, 2022, https://www.chosun.com/opinion/editorial/2022/02/09/CBWVK4FN5FDXJO5K6PLMJ63GOA/.
53. “日 사도광산 세계유산 추천, 한ㆍ일관계는 안중에 없나,” Yonhap News, February 2, 2022, https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20220202036500022.
54. “일본 내 비판에도 ‘사도광산’ 역사 왜곡, 의도 뭔가,” Hankuk Ilbo, February 3, 2022, https://www.hankookilbo.com/News/Read/A2022020215070003138.
55. “사도광산 세계유산 추천한 일본, 역사의 정쟁화 멈춰라,” Maeil Kyungjae, February 3, 2022, https://www.mk.co.kr/opinion/editorial/view/2022/02/95837/.
56. “일본 사도광산 세계유산 추진, 국제사회 연대로 막아야,” Hankyoreh, February 2, 2022, https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/opinion/editorial/1029500.html.
57. “우크라이나 사태, 한국 경제 영향 최소화 해야,” Yonhap News, February 13, 2022, https://www.mk.co.kr/news/world/view/2022/02/133788/.
58. “우크라이나 사태 충격 최소화할 특단 대책 마련하라,” Kukmin Ilbo, February 14, 2022, http://news.kmib.co.kr/article/view.asp?arcid=0924231417; “러 우크라 침공 임박, 최악의 경제혼란 대비하라,” Seoul Shinmun, February 13, 2022, https://www.seoul.co.kr/news/newsView.php?id=20220214031010.
59. “우크라이나 위기, 국제사회가 합심해 전쟁만은 막아야,” Kyunghyang Shinmun, February 13, 2022, https://www.khan.co.kr/opinion/editorial/article/202202132019005.
60. “우크라이나 전운, 안보·경제 전방위 충격파 밀려오는 중,” Donga Ilbo, February 15, 2022, https://www.donga.com/news/Opinion/article/all/20220214/111788912/1.
61. “일촉즉발 우크라이나 사태, 경제충격 최소화 대책 세우길,” Segye Ilbo, February 14, 2022, https://www.segye.com/newsView/20220214514944.
62. “문 대통령 ‘우크라이나 주권 존중돼야…한국, 평화적 해결 노력 동참’,” Cheong Wa Dae, February 22, https://www.korea.kr/news/policyNewsView.do?newsId=148899217.
63. “외교부 ‘러시아 전면전 감행시 수출통제 등 제재 동참’,” Yonhap News, February 24, 2022, https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20220224086352504.
64. “문 대통령 ‘무력 침공 유감…러 제재 동참할 것,” Hankyoreh, February 24, 2022, https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/bluehouse/1032451.html.
65. “러시아의 우크라이나 침공, 강력히 규탄한다,” Hankyoreh, February 24, 2022, https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/opinion/editorial/1032510.html.
66. “러시아 우크라 침략, 다극화 정글로 가는 세계 질서,” Chosun Ilbo, February 25, 2022, https://www.chosun.com/opinion/editorial/2022/02/25/2HBQ6SDHKZHNBGK7P4OJCAT2LY/.
67. “푸틴의 不義한 주권 유린에 국제연대로 맞서야,” Donga Ilbo, February 25, 2022, https://www.donga.com/news/Opinion/article/all/20220224/112032072/1.
68. “Why S. Korea is being cautious when it comes to sanctioning Russia,” Hankyoreh, February 24, 2022, https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/1032480.html.
69. “푸틴, 우크라 전면전 개시… 제재 동참은 국제사회 책임,” Hankook Ilbo, February 25, 2022, https://www.hankookilbo.com/News/Read/A2022022416410005533.
70. “한국, 대러제재 동참…북한, 우크라 전쟁에 ‘침묵’,” Yonhap News, February 26, 2022, https://www.yna.co.kr/view/MYH20220226011900038.
71. “러·우크라戰이 불러온 ‘경제 냉전’ 대비하라,” Kukmin Ilbo, February 26, 2022, http://news.kmib.co.kr/article/view.asp?arcid=0924233509&code=11171111&sid1=opi.
72. “우크라이나 사태 해결에 한국 정부도 적극 동참을,” Joongang Ilbo, February 25, 2022, https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25051026#home.
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