Country Report: South Korea (July 2021)
On May 10, in a speech to mark four years in office, President Moon Jae-in again indicated his willingness to breathe new life into the Korean Peace Process, solidify the ROK-US alliance, and strengthen South Korea’s responsibilities and role in the international community. With the ensuing diplomatic activities in May and June, especially the ROK-US summit in Washington and the G7 summit in Cornwell, South Korea seemingly had achieved its diplomatic goals, especially its close coordination with the US on policies toward North Korea and emerging technologies, including semiconductors and supply chains. However, in the context of the intensifying US-China rivalry, the implications of Seoul’s diplomatic achievements remain perplexing. Does the Moon Jae-in administration’s willingness to play bigger roles mean the withdrawal of strategic ambiguity? The follow-up measures of the May 21 ROK-US summit and South Korea’s management of relations between the US and China remain to be seen.
Moon Jae-in’s First Summit with Joe Biden
On May 21, Moon Jae-in had his first in-person summit with US President Joe Biden in Washington, DC. As the US-ROK Leaders’ Joint Statement was announced, the public and media attention largely shifted from a “vaccine swap” arrangement, which was said to be the major agenda during the summit, to newly unveiled changes and issues, including the termination of the missile guidelines, reaffirmation of the 2018 Panmunjom Declaration and Singapore Joint Statement, and reference to the Quad, the South China Sea, and the Taiwan Strait. The South Korean government and the ruling Democratic Party of Korea welcomed the outcome. On May 23, Moon Jae-in praised his first summit with Biden as “the best visit, the best summit” on his social media. Song Young-gil, the leader of the ruling party, said in a meeting of the supreme party council: “I evaluate that the ROK-US have reached a tipping point, which is a momentum of complete change that is qualitatively unprecedented.”1 The main opposition People Power Party, on the other hand, warned that “ROK-US relations, which have been creaking for the past four years, cannot be normalized at once with a meeting and a joint statement,”2 and underlined the importance of follow-up measures to implement balanced foreign and security policies.
Many analysts and commentators highlighted a change in strategic ambiguity. In a report published on June 4, the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security noted that South Korea abolished its passive diplomatic framework, but expanded its diplomatic space under the US-China competition by achieving a win-win outcome without crossing China’s putative red line.3 Hankyoreh editorialized that the ROK-US alliance was upgraded to a “global alliance” beyond the Korean Peninsula and pointed out that the two sides balanced their interests by exchanging what they wanted, rather than exposing their differences.4 South Korea won US cooperation on Korean Peninsula issues, including North Korea policy and the termination of the missile guidelines, and the coronavirus vaccine. The US side achieved the massive investment of major businesses from South Korea, including Samsung Electronics, LG Energy Solution, SK innovation, and SK hynix, and the first reference to the Quad and the Taiwan Strait in the joint statement, which was described as an important signal of South Korea tilting toward the United States by Kyunghyang Shinmun.5
Conservative newspapers took a similar stance but shed more light on the potential conflicts with China. Chosun Ilbo wrote in its editorial that “the Moon administration changed its attitude toward China over the past four years, and this time it has largely granted what the US wanted,” and urged the government to genuinely “open a new chapter” of the ROK-US alliance as mentioned in the joint statement.6 Joongang Ilbo noted the possibility of a backlash from China, but said that “the government should not cause distrust from both sides by saying one thing to the US and another to China.”7
US Release of Interagency Review on Supply Chains
On June 8, the US government released key findings from a review done by its inter-agency task force on America’s supply chains for four critical products: semiconductors; large-capacity batteries; critical minerals and materials; and pharmaceuticals and active pharmaceutical ingredients (API). The report came out at a time when alarming views were taking hold in Washington on China’s increasing share in global supply chains and its national security implications. The report drew considerable attention from South Korean media outlets as one of its recommendations was engaging with allies and partners to invest in and provide a diverse supply base, promoting research and development and addressing supply chain concerns through such intergovernmental groupings as G7 and the Quad. Hankook Kyungjae noted that the fact that the 250-page report came out just before the G7 Summit hinted that countering China would likely be at the top of the summit’s agenda and called upon South Korea to forsake walking a thin line between the US and China.8 Seoul Kyungjae recalled that at the May Korea-US summit, South Korea agreed to transform its security alliance with the US to address economic and technology issues, urging South Korea to stand clearly on the US side in protecting democratic values and the free market.9 Hankook Ilbo expressed concern that the reports and mid- to long-term plans therein foreshadowed a second round of the US-China trade war and called for South Korea to adopt “cool-headed and pragmatic diplomacy” between the two powers and manage relations with China to stay on good terms.10
Group of Seven Financial Ministers’ Meeting and Summit
On June 5, the finance ministers of the Group of Seven nations met in London and agreed to establish a global minimum corporate tax rate of 15% to be levied on the world’s largest and most profitable multinational companies.11 Also discussed was a digital economy tax scheme, awarding the market countries taxing rights on at least 20% of profit exceeding a 10% margin for offshore digital economy firms.12 Under the proposal to be further elaborated at a G20 meeting scheduled in July, the multinational companies would be prevented from tax avoidance.
A number of South Korean media outlets editorialized on the implications of the agreed proposal on domestic firms. Seoul Shinmun editorialized that as the envisioned digital economy tax will likely affect the smartphone, electronic products, and automobile industries where South Korea’s major firms such as Samsung Electronics, LG Electronics, and Hyundai Motors operate, it called upon the South Korean authorities to carefully examine any foreseeable disadvantages.13 Maeil Kyungjae editorialized that given a large trade volume flowing into China through Hong Kong, a known tax haven in Asia, South Korea has to examine the impact of the new global tax regime and as a strong trading power should actively take part in forging new rules of the world economy based on the principles of fair taxing and fair opportunity.14
After the June 11 to 13, G7 Summit, in the government and the ruling Democratic Party a celebratory tone was evident. Cheong Wa Dae said, “the president’s participation attests to South Korea’s improved standing in the world as an advanced-industrial democracy.”15 Prime Minister Kim Boo-kyum added, “the summit reflects that South Korea has become a new economic powerhouse that has made noticeable progress and success in the fight against COVID-19 and climate change.”16 Song Young-gil, a leader of the ruling party, said the summit showed that a country rejected at the international conferences held in the Hague and Yalta in 1907 and 1945 has been transformed into one seated alongside powerful states.17
A number of moderate newspapers echoed that view. Asia Today said, “President Moon expanded South Korea’s diplomatic horizon,” noting his pledge to donate $1 billion to COVAX to assist developing countries’ vaccination campaigns and informal talks he had with leaders from the UK, Germany, Australia, and the EU on strengthening bilateral cooperation on the issues of vaccine supplies, economic recovery, and peace on the Korean Peninsula.18 The newspaper, however, qualified its compliments by noting that it was slightly disappointing that the president fell short of making a breakthrough in the Korea-Japan relationship through face-to-face talks with his Japanese counterpart at the venue of the summit.
In marked contrast to the progressives’ positive view, conservative media outlets remained pointedly reticent about Moon’s multilateral diplomacy. They rather highlighted what the G7 Summit signified in the context of escalating tensions between the US and China. Segye Ilbo noted that the B3W (Build Back Better World) Agenda adopted by the G7 at the urging of the US, a $4 trillion-dollar global infrastructure plan, was intended as a counterbalance to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Casting South Korean diplomacy between the US and China as “unclear and ambiguous,” it called upon South Korea to firmly oppose any attempt by China to interfere in its internal affairs and to advocate democracy and free markets, the core values of the ROK-US alliance.19 Highlighting Biden’s B3W agenda and the Atlantic Charter adopted at the summit, Chosun Ilbo noted that leaders of G7 countries decided to put up a fight against China and questioned what Moon felt, at the face-to-face summit, about the looming contest between the US and China.20
On June 14, thirty Member States of NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) held a summit after which they issued the Brussels Summit Communiqué. The South Korean media outlets noted Paragraph 51 reaffirmed their full support for the goal of “complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization (CVID) of North Korea” and called upon North Korea to “return to the NPT and IAEA” and “engage in a dialogue with the U.S. to achieve the goal.”21
A number of conservative media outlets took note of the phrase “CVID” contained in the statement. Both Segye Ilbo and Seoul Kyungjae noted that CVID, was much stronger than “CVIA” (complete, verifiable, and irreversible abandonment) used in the G7 communique, which they said reflected the strong political commitment of NATO leaders to fully implement the enforcement measures in UN Security Council resolutions on North Korea. Both newspapers contrasted what they portrayed as a strong and firm stance of G7 and NATO leaders on North Korea and its proliferation activities with what they criticized as the “conciliatory” and “impatient approach” of Moon towards the North. Noting Moon’s mention of providing vaccines to the North in the future at the joint press conference with the Austrian leader on June 14, the newspapers warned that by making hasty moves out of impatience, the president would likely face difficult political headwinds and could derail the restored alliance with the US. Hankook Kyungjae joined the criticism, stating that the South Korea government “beat around the bush by praising President Moon at the G7 Summit” while maintaining an “ambiguous stance” towards China and North Korea to which G7 and NATO leaders voiced grave concerns and agreed to adopt a strong collective action as shown by their communique.22
The Biden Administration’s “Practical, Calibrated Approach” to North Korea
Now in his final year in office, Moon Jae-in again expressed his determination for complete denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula, urging that the Biden administration should not “kill the 2018 Singapore agreement” in an interview with The New York Times. 23 As the US government announced its completion of the North Korea policy review ahead of the ROK-US summit, media attention promptly turned to North Korea’s response. In his address to a joint session of Congress, Biden called the nuclear programs of Iran and North Korea “serious threats” to American security and reaffirmed cooperation with allies to address the threats by diplomacy and “stern deterrence.”24 On the next day, White House press secretary Jen Psaki told reporters that the US will not seek a “grand bargain” in denuclearization negotiations, but its goal remains the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. On May 3, Secretary of State Antony Blinken in London at the G7 Foreign and Development Ministers’ Meeting shared the outcome of the US policy review on North Korea with Minister of Foreign Affairs Chung Eui-yong and urged North Korea to “take the opportunity to engage diplomatically.”25
In responding to the outline of the policy review, Pyongyang lashed out at South Korea and the United States in a series of statements. Kim Yo-jong, vice department director of the Workers’ Party of Korea Central Committee, accused the South Korean government of failing to stop a group of defector-turned-activists from releasing anti-North Korea leaflets. Kwon Jong-gun, director-general of the Department of US affairs of North Korea’s Foreign Ministry, criticized Biden over his intent to keep pursuing a hostile policy toward North Korea and warned that North Korea will take corresponding measures. In a separate statement, North Korea’s Foreign Ministry slammed the US for insulting the dignity of their supreme leadership.26
Acknowledging that it was exceptional for North Korea to announce three statements in a day, major South Korean media outlets argued that South Korea and the United States need to come up with a flexible and realistic plan to bring North Korea back to the negotiating table. Kyunghyang Shinmun criticized the absence of any incentives to engage North Korea in the Biden administration’s policy–although it was said to be open to diplomacy, it did not even suggest where “the entrance to the conversation” was.27 However, Hankyoreh pointed out the negative effect of North Korea’s harsh remarks, damaging mutual trust while raising unnecessary tensions, and urged North Korea to “behave itself prudently as it waits for Seoul and Washington to coordinate their policy.”28
As for the intent behind North Korea’s harsh words, Hankook Ilbo said that it appears to leave room for reversal, pointing out differences in the subjects of three separate statements of North Korea. Kim Yo-jong issued the statement reported in the state-run newspaper, Rodong Sinmun, while the others issued by a working group were carried on state news agency Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).29 Segye Ilbo30 and Kookmin Ilbo31 underlined the fact that Foreign Minister Chung Eui-yong, at the G7 Foreign and Development Ministers’ Meeting in London, welcomed the result of the policy review, which was decided in a realistic, practical direction, urging North Korea to seize the diplomatic opportunity rather than wasting time on widening the gap between South Korea and the US. While other newspapers paid attention to the importance of North Korea’s choice, Chosun Ilbo harshly criticized that South Korea has been reluctant to mention human rights issues not to provoke North Korea and argued that South Korea should clearly emphasize that the goal is “dismantlement of the North Korea’s nuclear weapons” rather than using the ROK-US summit as a political event.32
Termination of the Missile Guidelines
During a joint news conference after the ROK-US summit, Moon Jae-in announced a joint decision to terminate the missile guidelines that were signed under the Park Chung-hee government in 1979 and revised four times. Based on the latest revision announced in July 2020, the range was extended to 800km with the payload restriction lifted, and the development of solid-propellant space rockets became feasible. As Seoul and Washington agreed on terminating the missile guidelines, major media outlets, both conservative and progressive, welcomed the recovery of “missile sovereignty.” However, on May 31, in an article titled “What Is Aim of Termination of ‘Missile Guidelines’” published by North Korea’s state-run KNCA, North Korea condemned the decision to lift all restrictions on South Korean missiles as a “stark reminder of Washington’s hostile policy toward Pyongyang.”
Progressive newspapers interpreted North Korea’s first public reaction to the outcome of the ROK-US summit. Kyunghyang Shinmun noted that the termination of the missile guidelines is the only subject of North Korea’s denunciation in the article and said North Korea moderated the level of criticism to buy more time and keep its options open.33 Hankyoreh quoted Lee Jong-ju, spokesperson for the Ministry of Unification, that Kim Myoung-chol, the author of the article, is an international affairs critic in North Korea, not a political official.34 In contrast, some newspapers and analysts stressed the importance of follow-up measures to lead North Korea into a dialogue, considering the overall achievements of the ROK-US summit. Segye Ilbo editorialized over the “continuity in US policy toward North Korea” and underlined the implications of the reaffirmation of the 2018 Panmunjom Declaration and 2018 Singapore Joint Statement and the appointment of Sung Kim as US special envoy to North Korea.35 Lee Dae-woo said in a report of the Sejong Institute that South Korea had renewed its driving force to relaunch the Peace Process on the Korean Peninsula while strengthening its “defensive defense” capabilities.36
China’s Response to the ROK-US Summit
As the joint statement of Moon and Biden touched on sensitive issues such as “freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea” and “peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits,”37 the eyes of the media swiftly moved to China’s reaction to the summit. Much of the media attention was focused on three major issues, China’s official opinion on the ROK-US joint statement, the mention of the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, and the plan for Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to South Korea.
During a daily press briefing on May 24, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian voiced China’s concern over the joint statement, underscoring that “the Taiwan issue is purely an internal affair of China.” He added, “We urge relevant countries to be prudent in their words and actions on the Taiwan issue and refrain from ‘playing with fire.’”38 As for Xi Jinping’s visit to South Korea, Zhao said he did not have information to provide. In an interview with the Korea Herald, Chinese Ambassador to South Korea Xing Haiming said he acknowledged “the difficult balance Seoul had to strike,”39 but urged that developing its ties with the US should not target China. Xing underlined the importance of “genuine multilateralism” which should be open and inclusive, condemning the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) as an example of fake multilateralism that excludes and targets a specific country.
While the summit was broadly seen as an important signal of South Korea becoming less neutral between the US and China, the South Korean government refrained from overanalyzing China’s words. On May 24, First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Choi Jong-kun said, “China would actually appreciate that South Korea did not explicitly mention China in the joint statement”40 in a radio interview with TBS, comparing it to the joint statement between the US and Japan, which had a specific mention of China. With regard to including reference to the Taiwan Strait in the joint statement for the first time, a presidential official said, “Seoul has been maintaining communication with Beijing on President Moon’s recent visit to the US,”41 and explained that the Taiwan Strait issues were included to state a basic principle that regional stability is important to South Korea.
The major media outlets speak with one voice on the impact of the joint statement that it would not seriously undermine ROK-China relations, while underlining the importance of what follows, warning that pendulum-like diplomacy which swings back and forth between the US and China would cause distrust from both sides. When it comes to its diplomatic principles, Kyunghyang Shinmun put weight on strategic ambiguity and said in its editorial that it is not desirable to pursue “zero-sum diplomacy,” which means strengthening ROK-US relations causes deterioration of the ROK-China relations.42 On the other hand, Chosun Ilbo called on the government to “stop making excuses” to China, fearing the possibility of the alliance falling apart without trust if Moon fails to keep his promise.43 Segye Ilbo pointed out that the way South Korea deals with the so-called “China risk,” which is increasing pressure from China as South Korea takes a step toward the US, is going to face an important challenge. It also claimed, “the decision of tilting toward the US should not be a temporary expedient to make improvements in inter-Korean relations.”44
South Korea-Japan Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in London
Early in May, Chung Eui-yong had the first meeting with his Japanese counterpart Toshimitsu Motegi in London, where the Group of Seven Foreign and Development Ministers’ Meeting (G7) was held. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the two ministers exchanged views on matters of mutual interest.45 On the one hand, both sides acknowledged that the Republic of Korea and Japan should closely cooperate for the peace and prosperity of Northeast Asia and agreed to develop future-oriented relations. But on the other, they confirmed serious impediments to constructive conversation, including Japan’s decision to discharge contaminated water from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, the court rulings on the civil actions filed by “comfort women” victims, and the Supreme Court’s ruling on victims of forced labor.
Some media outlets expressed expectations for this to become a starting point for resolving the conflicts between South Korea and Japan. Acknowledging the different standpoints of the two countries, Kyunghyang Shinmun wrote, “Albeit belatedly, it was very meaningful that the heads of foreign affairs had their first meeting.”46 Segye Ilbo noted that to seek for normalization of the bilateral relations through continuous conversation, it is necessary for Japan to change its attitude and acknowledge past wrongdoings, and urged the South Korean government not to make the mistake of merging foreign affairs and domestic politics.47 By contrast, Yonhapunderlined the major role of the US in the meeting and explained the unlikelihood that the conflicts between South Korea and Japan will be resolved within the Moon administration, which has only a year left in office.48 Joongang Ilbo reported remarks from an anonymous diplomatic source that “unlike the North Korean nuclear issue, which has been a serious security threat to Japan and also requires trilateral cooperation with South Korea and the US, Japan has no interest in bilateral issues.”49
Court Ruling on Wartime Forced Labor Case
On June 7, the Seoul Central District Court dismissed a claim of damages filed by 85 South Korean victims of wartime forced labor and their families against 16 Japanese companies. The trial court’s decision came after the controversial 2018 Korean Supreme Court’s ruling in a similar case that four South Korean victims of wartime forced labor were entitled to monetary compensation from two Japanese companies, leading to a deep downward spiral arguing over whether their 1965 bilateral treaty on the postwar settlement of property and rights covered individuals’ rights to post-colonial reparation claims.
The trial court held that given the text of the 1965 treaty, the intent of the two contracting parties, and circumstances existing at the time, the treaty ought to be construed as applicable to individual claim rights and so such claims cannot be brought.50 On June 14, the National Association of Realizing Justice for Victims of Forced Labor, a civil society organization representing the plaintiffs in the case, held a protest in front of the court premises and filed an appeal accusing the lead judge of “unfairly treating 7.8 million victims of forced labor and their families and warranting impeachment.” A family member of one of the deceased victims at the protest said, “this court rendered a judgment which went against history and the Supreme Court’s earlier decision and which was tinged with political reasoning” adding, “I wondered to which country the court belonged.”51
The ruling Democratic Party, which in 2018 endorsed the Supreme Court’s ruling and cautioned the Japanese government to acknowledge its past guilt in employing forced laborers, joined the criticism. Song Young-gil said, “it is concerning that the lower court disregarded the Supreme Court precedent,” adding, “the mistake should be rectified by the Appellate Court and the Supreme Court.” Lee Yong-bin, a spokesperson of the party issued a statement stating, “[the court’s decision] reflects a remnant of pro-Japanese thinking that has not been cleansed out.”52 Progressive newspapers also took a critical stance. Hankyoreh editorialized that the court’s ruling was “confounding,” as it dismissed torts of Japan’s past colonial rule and based its decision on a political consideration of improving relations with Japan, described as a neighboring democracy that shares constitutional values, and the US, a security ally.53 Kyunghyang Shinmun argued that the court “should take care to faithfully conduct the matters within its competence while leaving the matters of foreign affairs to the executive branch.”54
Conservative newspapers, on the other hand, generally held that the case falls in the realm of foreign policy and so a diplomatic solution should be sought out with Japan. Chosun Ilbo casted overturning the Supreme Court’s decision by a trial court as “legal chaos” for which, it said, the current government should be faulted as it employed the forced labor and “comfort women” issues to fuel anti-Japan sentiments among the domestic populace and shore up its popularity.55 The newspaper further blamed the government for sidestepping the forced labor case in court on the stated reason that “it cannot interfere with the decisions made by the judiciary” and disregarding implementing a political solution to turn around deteriorating relations with Japan. JoongAng Ilbo editorialized that the government should do away with its stance that it respects the decision made by the court and actively search for common grounds with the plaintiffs and Japan to reach a solution.56
Hankook Kyungjae opined that in its view, the ruling was “reasonable and valid,” for the court adhered to the important provisions of international law, specifically Article 27 of the Vienna Convention that prohibits a state from invoking its internal law to justify a failure to fulfil a contracted treaty and the doctrine of estoppel that prevents a state from acting inconsistently to the detriment of other states. Ascribing the problem of resorting to judicial review on what are essentially matters of foreign affairs to both South Korea and Japan, the newspaper called upon the two countries to “find a way to join hands to address the issues of common concern, which are the North Korea nuclear issue and Chinese hegemony.”57 The Financial News held that awarding the plaintiff reasonable compensation is warranted, but the matter cannot be resolved through internal law that is in conflict with international law. Citing a “comfort woman” case similarly dismissed by the trial court on the grounds of state immunity, the newspaper pointed out that the well-meaning court decisions and executive inaction have not given the plaintiffs a single penny and urged South Korea and Japan to actively seek a diplomatic solution to untie the Gordian knot.58
1. “송영길, ‘한미정상회담, 성과 대단…판문점선언 국회비준 협의,” Yonhap News Agency, May 24, 2021, https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20210524045600001?section=search.
2. “野, ‘최고의 회담’이라는 與에 ‘자아도취 할 때 아냐, 이후가 중요’,” Chosun Ilbo, May 23, 2021, https://biz.chosun.com/policy/politics/2021/05/23/7S2LU7H2EJBITJUHSUUYAGJXIY/.
3. Kim Hyun-wook, “한미정상회담 분석,” Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, June 4, 2021, https://www.ifans.go.kr/knda/ifans/kor/pblct/PblctView.do?csrfPreventionSalt=null&sn=&bbsSn=&mvpSn=&searchMvpSe=&koreanEngSe=KOR&ctgrySe=&menuCl=P01&pblctDtaSn=13805&clCode=P01&boardSe=.
4. “새로운 기회와 도전이 될 한미동맹 ‘글로벌’ 격상,” Hankyoreh, May 23, 2021, https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/opinion/editorial/996323.html.
5. “한국, 미·중 ‘줄타기’서 미국으로 ‘한 발 더’,” Kyunghyang Shinmun, May 23, 2021, http://news.khan.co.kr/kh_news/khan_art_view.html?art_id=202105232319005.
6. “‘미사일·쿼드·기술’합의, 한미 동맹 정상화의 출발 되길,” Chosun Ilbo, May 24, 2021, https://www.chosun.com/opinion/editorial/2021/05/24/UBC3ERP7V5AQ5EW2P56SJLJ2FU/.
7. “한·미 동맹 강화 재확인한 정상회담, 실천으로 이어지길,” Joongang Ilbo, May 24, 2021, https://news.joins.com/article/24064655.
8. “韓 74번 언급한 美 공급망 전략, 경제·안보 다 잡을 기회다,” Hankook Kyungjae, June 10, 2021, https://www.hankyung.com/opinion/article/2021061065651.
9. “美, 중국 견제 총력전···文, G7서 ‘민주 동맹’ 분명히 해야,” Seoul Kyungjae, June 11, 2021, https://www.sedaily.com/NewsVIew/22NLECS52W
10. “거세지는 미·중 2차 무역전쟁, 외교 역할 막중하다,” Hankook Ilbo, June 10, 2021, https://www.hankookilbo.com/News/Read/A2021060914080001600
11. “G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Communique,” GOV.UK, June 5, 2021, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/g7-finance-ministers-meeting-june-2021-communique/g7-finance-ministers-and-central-bank-governors-communique.
13. “G7 ‘최저법인세 합의’ 국내 후폭풍 대비를,” Seoul Shinmun, June 7, 2021, https://www.seoul.co.kr/news/newsView.php?id=20210608031008.
14. “G7 최저법인세 합의에 한국 새질서 대응외교 시급하다,” Maeil Kyungjae, June 7, 2021, https://www.mk.co.kr/opinion/editorial/view/2021/06/545882/.
15. “문 대통령 G7 정상회의 참석, 선진국 반열 올랐다는 의미,” 대한민국정책브리핑, June 13, 2021, https://www.korea.kr/news/policyNewsView.do?newsId=148888646.
16. “김 총리 ‘G7 국가들과 어깨 나란히…국민 기대도 높아져’,” 대한민국정책브리핑, June 15, 2021, https://www.korea.kr/news/policyNewsView.do?newsId=148888757.
17. “與 ‘사실상 ‘G8’ 도약, 통쾌하고 뿌듯…달라진 국격 실감,’” Yonhap News Agency, June 14, 2021, https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20210614130600001.
18. “한국 외교 지평 크게 넓힌 G7 정상회의,” Asia Today, June 13, 2021, https://api1.asiatoday.co.kr/view.php?key=20210613010007688.
19. “G7 ‘세계재건구상(B3W)’… 어정쩡한 외교로는 안 된다,” Segye Ilbo, June 13, 2021, https://www.segye.com/newsView/20210613507657.
20. “G7의 對중국 ‘경제 영토 전쟁’, 현장에 간 文은 무얼 느꼈나,” Chosun Ilbo, June 14, 2021, https://www.chosun.com/opinion/editorial/2021/06/14/JPSPGT4TBZB7DKMOX6OQGHBHJU/.
21. “Brussels Summit Communiqué,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, June 14, 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_185000.htm.
22. “자화자찬 아니면 중국·북한만 바라보는 ‘외골수 외교’,” Hankook Kyungjae, June 16, 2021, https://www.hankyung.com/opinion/article/2021061517031
23. “After Trump ‘Failed,’ South Korean Leader Hopes Biden Can Salvage Nuclear Deal,” The New York Times, April 21, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/21/world/asia/biden-north-korea-nuclear-deal-president-moon.html.
24. “Remarks by President Biden in Address to a Joint Session of Congress,” The White House, April 29, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/04/29/remarks-by-president-biden-in-address-to-a-joint-session-of-congress/.
25. “Blinken tells North Korea: diplomatic ball is in your court,” Reuters, May 4, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/uk/blinken-tells-north-korea-diplomatic-ball-is-your-court-2021-05-03/.
26. “Harsh N.K. statements up pressure on U.S. ahead of disclosure of new policy on Pyongyang,” Yonhap NewsAgency, May 2, 2021, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20210502002800325.
27. “대화 유인책 빠진 바이든 대북정책, 한·미 회담서 보완해야,” Kyunghyang Shinmun, May 2, 2021, https://www.khan.co.kr/opinion/editorial/article/202105022044005.
28. “Time for S. Korea, N. Korea, US to pursue conversation over confrontation,” Hankyoreh, May 3, 2021, http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_editorial/993700.html.
29. “’美 대북정책 검토 완료’ 하루 만에 퍼부은 北 ‘담화 폭탄’ 의도는,” Hankook Ilbo, May 3, 2021, https://www.hankookilbo.com/News/Read/A2021050214280002790.
30. “美 ‘외교 기회 잡아야’, 北 살길 뭔지 생각해 보길,” Segye Ilbo, May 4, 2021, https://m.segye.com/view/20210504513912.
31. “외교에 방점 찍은 미국… 김정은, 기회 놓치지 말아야,” Kookmin Ilbo, May 5, 2021, http://news.kmib.co.kr/article/view.asp?arcid=0924190162&code=11171111&cp=nv.
32. “‘핵 폐기’ 흐릿해지고 北은 도발 예고, 그래도 ‘김정은 쇼’ 생각뿐인가,” Chosun Ilbo, May 3, 2021, https://www.chosun.com/opinion/editorial/2021/05/03/MQ5YE253DNC5JEEB53LIHZYVMA/.
33. “북은 도발 자제하고, 한·미는 대화 계기 만들길,” Kyunghyang Shinmun, May 31, 2021, https://www.khan.co.kr/opinion/editorial/article/202105312034005/?utm_campaign=rss_btn_click&utm_source=khan_rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_content=total_news.
34. “N. Korea calls missiles guidelines termination act of hostility, 9 days after S. Korea-US summit,” Hankyoreh, June 1, 2021, http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/997556.html.
35. “美 “외교할 준비 돼 있다”… 北, 대화 제의에 호응할 때다,” Segye Ilbo, May 24, 2021, https://m.segye.com/view/20210524514305.
36. Lee Dae-woo, “한미정상회담 성과와 과제,” The Sejong Institute, June 1, 2021, https://www.sejong.org/boad/1/egoread.php?bd=2&seq=5988.
37. “U.S.-ROK Leaders’ Joint Statement,” The White House, May 21, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/05/21/u-s-rok-leaders-joint-statement/.
38. “2021年5月24日外交部发言人赵立坚主持例行记者会,” 中华人民共和国外交部，May 24, 2021, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/t1878152.shtml.
39. “Korea-US alliance should not take aim at China: Chinese envoy,” The Korea Herald, May 30, 2021, http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20210530000140.
40. “최종건, ‘중국, 미일과 달리 중국 적시 않은 점 높이 평가할 것,’” Yonhap News Agency, May 24, 2021, https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20210524066800504.
41. “한·중 관계 ‘험악한 장면’은 피했다,” Kyunghyang Shinmun, May 24, 2021, http://news.khan.co.kr/kh_news/khan_art_view.html?art_id=202105242059005
42. “한·미 동맹 강화, 한·중관계 훼손으로 이어져선 안 된다,” Kyunghyang Shinmun, May 24, 2021, http://news.khan.co.kr/kh_news/khan_art_view.html?art_id=202105242046005#csidx36849488eb17c3db7c3529e281616cd.
43. “Why Is Moon Making Excuses to China?” Chosun Ilbo, May 24, 2021, http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2021/05/26/2021052601307.html2
44. “中, 한·미 공동성명에 반발… 원칙 입각한 전략적 대처 나서야,” Segye Ilbo, May 25, 2021, https://www.segye.com/newsView/20210525515429.
45. “Outcome of Republic of Korea-Japan Foreign Ministers’ Meeting,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 6, 2021, https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5674/view.do?seq=320617.
46. “한·미·일 외교수장 첫 대면, 대북·대일 문제 풀 전기 되길,” Kyunghyang Shinmun, May 5, 2021, http://news.khan.co.kr/kh_news/khan_art_view.html?art_id=202105052052025.
47. “15개월 만의 한·일 외교회담, 이해 넓히는 대화 계기되길,” Segye Ilbo, May 6, 2021, https://www.segye.com/newsView/20210506516503.
48. “日신문 ‘한일 외교장관 회담 성사에 미국 의지 크게 작용,’” Yonhap News Agency, May 7, 2021, https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20210507043700073.
49. “한ㆍ일 외교장관 만났지만 위안부ㆍ오염수 놓곤 평행선,” Joongang Ilbo, May 5, 2021, https://news.joins.com/article/24050909.
50. “대법원 전합 판결과 달리 日기업 16곳 상대 ‘강제징용’ 손배소 각하,” 법률신문, June 10, 2021, https://www.lawtimes.co.kr/Legal-News/Legal-News-View?serial=170604
52. “강제징용 피해자 패소에 與 맹공…송영길 “조선총독부 판사 판결,” ChosunBiz, June 9, 2021, https://biz.chosun.com/policy/politics/2021/06/09/2FAEYCVMMFBJTO7MAWQAJ76R5I/.
53. “대법원 판례 무시하며 ‘황당 논리’ 편 강제징용 판결,” Hankyoreh, June 7, 2021, https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/opinion/editorial/998369.html.
54. “법리 대신 ‘정치논리’로 대법원 판단 뒤집은 강제징용 판결,” Kyunghyang Shinmun, June 8, 2021, https://www.khan.co.kr/opinion/editorial/article/202106082048015.
55. “전례 없는 사법 혼란, 선거용 反日몰이의 필연적 결과,” Chosun Ilbo, June 8, 2021, https://www.chosun.com/opinion/editorial/2021/06/08/OXR2RAOETRAJTP2QRPE54GQE5Q/.
56. “엇갈린 강제징용 판결…외교적 타협으로 풀어야,” Joongang Ilbo, June 8, 2021, https://news.joins.com/article/24076696.
57. “국제법 중시한 새 징용 판결…정부는 한·일관계 ‘결자해지’해야,” Hankook Kyungjae, June 8, 2021, https://www.hankyung.com/opinion/article/2021060876921.
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