Country Report: South Korea (March-April 2022)

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Country Report: South Korea (March & April 2022)
Shin Munkyoung and Jung Seyoon

The outcome of South Korea’s presidential election in which the conservative candidate Yoon Suk-yeol won the presidency presages a readjustment of South Korean foreign policy in an increasingly precarious international environment. Given President-elect Yoon’s slight margin of victory, it is difficult to say, at this moment, that the South Korean voters fully endorsed his campaign promises of “peace through force,” strengthened bilateral South Korea-US alliance and trilateral South Korea-US-Japan cooperation, a set of policies that would effectively put an end to President Moon’s embracing of Pyongyang and sitting on the fence between Washington and Beijing in the name of so-called “strategic ambiguity.” South Korean voters as well as the foreign audience will be keen to watch how Yoon’s foreign policies take shape in a confoundingly complex international environment.

The ongoing conflict in Ukraine, highlighted by the emergence and consolidation of two opposing blocs in the world – the West and China and Russia –, begun to serve as a background to the North Korean nuclear issue and took a toll on South Korea’s goal of denuclearization, as seen from the paralysis in the UN Security Council discussions on the North’s March 24 ICBM test, a first such test since its self-declared moratorium in 2017. As the North continues to make clear its goal of being acknowledged as a nuclear weapon state through further testing of missile and nuclear weapons, political conflict with Beijing over the deployment of THAAD and enforcement of economic sanctions on the North could intensify with heightening public worries about its repercussions on their economy given South Korea’s trade dependence on China. Such conditions could nevertheless present a good opportunity to restore ties with Japan and strengthe trilateral cooperation with Washington and Tokyo, but the continued brawl over history issues would chip away at domestic support for this move. Given the competing and conflicting interests of the domestic audience and key state actors, South Korea needs, more than any other time, principled yet pragmatic diplomacy that carefully calibrates them. 

ROK

Moon’s March 1 Independence Day Speech
On March 1, Moon Jae-in, in marking the 103rd anniversary of the March 1st Independence Movement against Imperial Japan and establishment of the Korean Provision Government in Shanghai, delivered a commemorative speech. It drew attention to whether the president, who had merely two months until the end of his term, would make any new conciliatory message to Tokyo given his poor track record in managing this relationship. In the speech, the president mentioned the word, “peace” more than 10 times, highlighting the importance of dialogue and diplomacy in dealing with North Korea and Japan.

The press’s responses to the president’s speech were markedly different along political lines. Conservative newspapers largely criticized Moon’s contradictory foreign policies, while progressive ones produced positive assessments. The conservative Maeil Kyungjae editorialized that it was hypocritical of Moon to state that South Koreans inherited the spirit of the March 1st Movement—resistance against violence, discrimination, injustice, and hegemonic world order—while keeping silent about Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and its trampling on world peace. The newspaper claimed that cozying up to the Kremlin entailed high costs for Seoul as it became the only US ally excluded from the exemption from US export control measures, adding that South Korea should pursue a principled diplomacy as a responsible member of the international community commensurate with its increased power and prestige.1

The conservative Segye Ilbo took issue with the part of the speech where the president claimed that the paths of diplomacy and dialogue can lead to denuclearization and lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula, arguing that in light of the recent accelerating pace of the North’s missile tests, the president either turned a blind eye to the reality or became disillusioned. Listing a range of activities the Seoul government took towards the North, including its decision not to participate in the issuance of the US-led joint statement in condemnation of the North’s missile launches at the UN and its unwillingness to cast the North’s missile tests as provocations, the newspaper criticized the president for continuing to cozy up to Pyongyang.2

The conservative Chosun Ilbo also criticized the president for not denouncing the Russian aggression as a leader of the country that had been assisted by the 16 countries who contributed their troops to defend it from the North Korean invasion during the Korean War, questioning whether the president was qualified to be a part of the liberal democratic camp.3 Noting Tokyo’s lukewarm response to the president’s conciliatory message, the conservative Dong-A Ilbo noted that the strained ROK-Japan relations, aggravated by each other’s series of tit-for-tat moves motivated by domestic political considerations, have made it difficult to reconfigure the ROK-US-Japan trilateral cooperation to support the US’s new Indo-Pacific strategy and respond collectively to the North’s nuclear and missile threats and the confrontation between the West and Russia over Ukraine. The newspaper added that the very first step to mending the strained ties would be overcoming the temptation of using foreign policy for domestic politics.4

The progressive Kyunghyang Shinmun positively assessed the president’s speech for containing what appeared to be collection of thoughts and advice and endorsed his claim that national power to lead in history, cultural power, and democracy would be the three requisite elements to cope with the changing world order reverting to the Cold War era. The newspaper further noted that the next South Korean government to be elected should continue to increase national power and make efforts to protect individual sovereignty while solving the polarization of wealth, income, and jobs.5

2022 Presidential Election
On March 9, the conservative People Power Party candidate Yoon Suk-yeol won the presidential election as the twentieth president in May. The conservative Hankook Kyungjae noted that the phone conversation the US President Joe Biden had with the president-elect a day earlier than scheduled showed that the US was eager to restore the alliance with South Korea. The newspaper expressed hope that the ROK-US alliance would be strengthened under the new administration given the president-elect’s campaign promises of “peace through force,” further development of the ROK-US comprehensive and strategic alliance, and agreement on CVID (complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement) of North Korean nuclear programs.6 Conservative Dong-a Ilbo advised careful recalibration of foreign policy, particularly with Beijing over the potential flashpoint of deploying additional THAAD on South Korean soil and called on the president-elect to use more diplomatic language and let a capable person take the helm of South Korean diplomacy given the increasing importance of engaging with neighboring countries to enforce sanctions on the North for its denuclearization.7

On the telephone conversation that the president-elect had with his US counterpart, the centrist Hankook Ilbo editorialized that it reflected high US expectations and his campaign promises of restoring the ROK-US alliance, joining the Quad, and mending ties with Tokyo, a set of policies markedly different from Moon’s strategic ambiguity between Washington and Beijing. The newspaper further noted that an uncoordinated and abrupt change in foreign policy without diplomatic efforts to reduce any misunderstanding and conflict with China may impose a heavy price on Seoul.8 Noting that North Korean leader Kim Jong-un unveiled a plan to launch multiple military reconnaissance satellites over the next five years during his visit to a space agency a day after the announcement of the results of the presidential election, the conservative Seoul Kyungjae called on the president-elect to make a visit to the US as early as possible and discuss specific measures to thwart the North’s accelerating pace of provocations.9

Russia-Ukraine War

Newspaper Commentaries on Developments in March
Since February 24, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine has continued with Russian troops advancing on multiple fronts from the north, east, and south, towards key Ukrainian cities including the capital Kyiv. In the month of March, the South Korean press focused on the following main developments of the war in Ukraine: the March 2 UN General Assembly Emergency Session resolution (“Aggression against Ukraine,” A/RES/ES-11/1); Russia’s alleged illegal use of indiscriminate weapons against civilians; and the ripple effects of the war on the global and South Korean economies.

On the passage of the UNGA resolution, the Yonhap News Agency editorialized that Russia should follow it and choose the door to dialogue and diplomacy over its aggression against the Ukrainians. At the same time, the newspaper urged the South Korean government to minimize the ripple effects of the war on South Korean firms.10 The conservative Kukmin Ilbo editorialized that the UNGA resolution represented the stern judgment of the international community against the Russian aggression and that Russian president Vladimir Putin miscalculated the odds and lost the unjustified war.11 The conservative Segye Ilbo contrasted the strong responses of the international community against Russia including the March 2 resolution and the 39 countries’ referral to the International Criminal Court of the situation in Ukraine for opening investigations into allegations of war crimes with the lukewarm response of the South Korean government. Pointing out that Seoul belatedly joined the West’s efforts to impose economic sanctions on Russia, the newspaper claimed that it was high time for Seoul to join the international efforts to hold Russia accountable for its atrocities against the Ukrainians.12

On Russia’s alleged use of indiscriminate weapons against the Ukrainians, the conservative Dong-a Ilbo editorialized that the use of weapons such as the vacuum bombs or cluster munitions on densely populated areas was a violation of the judgments at the ICJ and ICC and that Putin’s threat of using nuclear weapons was altogether unjustified under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, requiring the international community to accelerate the pace and scope of sanctions against Russia.13 The conservative Kukmin Ilbo editorialized that Russia should come to its senses and withdraw its troops from Ukraine, noting that even in a war, shelling civilians including children and patients and civilian facilities, would amount to heinous war crimes in violation of the Geneva Convention.14 The conservative Hankook Kyungjae focused on the pivotal role of social media in the hyperconnected world where the live broadcasts of Russian soldiers’ illegal acts and the courageous resistance of Ukrainians drew international condemnation and galvanized various stakeholders including multinational corporations and volunteer hackers to counter Russia, portending what a 21st century war would look like.15

The progressive Hankyoreh editorialized that Putin was already defeated in shaping international public opinion in his favor and that in the face of the growing solidarity between the citizens of the world and the Ukrainians against his aggression, he should immediately stop inhuman aggression and carnage.16 On the ripple effects of the conflict on the economy, the conservative Seoul Kyungjae editorialized that another global financial crisis such as the Lehman Brothers moment and the 2008 subprime mortgage crisis could erupt in case of Russia’s sovereign default on its $121 billion debt owed to foreign banks, cautioning the South Korean government and entities to prepare against a potential cascade of defaults and liquidity shortfalls.17 The conservative Hankook Ilbo editorialized that rising prices, as seen from the 3.7% increase in the Consumer Price Index year-on-year, the 20% increase in refined petroleum products, and the 6.2 % increase in restaurant menu items, would cost the middle class dearly, urging the government to take substantive measures rather than window dressing to protect low- and middle-income households.18

Russia Suspended from the UN Human Rights Council
Soon after the retreat of Russian forces in the Ukrainian city of Bucha, the devastation of the city and the evidence of Russian atrocities against civilians drew outrage from the global community. In editorials, major media outlets called the mass executions committed by Russian forces an “unforgivable war crime.” Kyunghyang Shinmun shed light on the fact that Russia has a history of similar war crimes during the Second Chechen War in 1999 and its deployment of special forces to Syria in 2015.19 Expressing concern over the “barbaric times” looming over the world, Hankyoreh urged the international community to hold Russia accountable by investigating the evidence behind the Bucha killings thoroughly.20

Less than a week after satellite images of the streets of Bucha reaffirmed Russia’s killing of civilians, the UN General Assembly voted to suspend Russia from the Human Rights Council in response to Moscow’s “gross and systematic violations of human rights.”21 The decision was widely welcomed, however, with the increased number of member states that abstained and voted against it, Hankook Ilbo noted that the vote was a retreat from the initial UN resolution in March that demanded an end to the Russian offensive in Ukraine.22 More alarming was that China and North Korea defended Russia, voting against suspending the country from the Human Rights Council. Concerned about the strengthening ties among the three nations, Chosun Ilbo argued that the incoming government should put more emphasis on its democratic allies and the ROK-US alliance.23

Ukrainian President Zelensky’s Virtual Speech to the National Assembly
Seoul’s concern over escalating tension on the Korean Peninsula partly explains its reluctance to send military weapons to Ukraine. On April 11, in his virtual speech to the National Assembly, Zelensky drew an analogy between the Korean War and the ongoing crisis in Ukraine and highlighted the urgency of the need for “indispensable” weapons for its air defense that South Korea already has.24 However, the Ministry of National Defense drew the line at sending lethal weapons to Ukraine. According to Hankyoreh, Defense Minister Suh Wook said that there were “limits” in military support in consideration of the security situation on the Korean Peninsula and its potential impact on South Korea’s military readiness.25

Hankook Ilbo was supportive of the decision to refrain from providing lethal aid to Ukraine. With Russia allegedly looking for military support from North Korea,26 South Korea should not get involved in the Ukraine war, because it would lead to further danger on the peninsula.27 On the other hand, Kukmin Ilbo criticized South Korea’s late participation in the multinational sanctions against Russia and urged the government to take proactive measures to protect the democratic order and national sovereignty.28

ROK-US Relations

US Special Representative for North Korea Sung Kim’s Visit to Seoul
Following the crisis management staff training (CMST) from April 12 to 15, the combined command post training (CCPT) of South Korea and the US kicked off on April 18. The last joint ROK-US military drills under the Moon administration were planned to be a computer-simulated command post exercise without any field training exercises. According to Dong-a Ilbo, Echo of Unification, North Korea’s radio station broadcasting anti-Seoul propaganda, denounced the joint military drills and Yoon Suk-yeol’s delegation visiting the US to discuss the ROK-US joint defense posture.29 As North Korea was expected to hold a military parade to commemorate the 90th anniversary of the founding of the Korean People’s Revolutionary Army on April 25, its criticism of Seoul was expected to continue.30

US special representative Sung Kim’s visit to Seoul came amid this mounting sense of tension. On the first day of the joint military exercise, he arrived in Seoul to meet his counterpart and the transition team of Yoon Suk-yeol and discuss North Korea issues including the international response to Pyongyang’s new ICBM test.31 In his meetings with his counterpart Noh Kyu-duk32 and Foreign Minister Chung Eui-yong,33 Sung Kim emphasized the need to respond decisively to North Korean provocations with close cooperation between South Korea and the US, while reiterating US openness to dialogue with North Korea at any time without conditions.

With the inauguration of the new administration drawing near, media attention moved to Biden’s visit to Seoul in May. Along with the upcoming military parade in which Pyongyang would likely unveil new weapons, what messages Washington, Seoul, and Pyongyang would exchange remained to be seen.

North Korea

March 24 ICBM Test
On March 24, North Korea revealed that it tested what it said was a “new type of intercontinental ballistic missile,” called the Hwasong-17, which flew for 1,090 km to a maximum altitude of 6,248.5 km and hit a target in the East Sea. It was the 12th missile launch the North has conducted this year, following the March 5 ballistic missile launch, the March 16 failed Hwasong-17 test, and the March 20 firing of a short-range multiple rocket launcher.

The conservative Chosun Ilbo editorialized that having achieved the range that can hit any targets on the continental US, it remains to be seen whether North Korea has acquired the technologies of building re-entry vehicles and single missiles that can carry multiple warheads. Chronicling  Moon’s overtures to North Korea since the 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympics, the newspaper noted that the North Korean test showed that diplomatic engagement so far turned out be “a phony peace show” and that no matter which party won the presidency, it must not fall into the illusion that treating the North with good intentions can make it forsake its nuclear weapons, adding that future governments must increase military preparedness against the North’s nuclear weapons and missiles.34 The conservative Dong-a Ilbo editorialized that the ICBM test, which appeared to be a last slap at Moon before he leaves office, was completely different from its previous shows of force in that it had the intention to go head-to-head with the US. The newspaper called on Moon to acknowledge that his peace process was a failure and to collaborate with Yoon to coordinate a robust response with the US.35 The conservative Seoul Shinmun editorialized that in light of North Korea abandoning its self-imposed moratorium on missile tests, South Korea should issue a warning at the highest level and put in place a robust response by calling in strategic assets during the ROK-US combined military exercise to make the North aware of the consequences of crossing the red line.36

The conservative Joongang Ilbo editorialized that North Korea has attempted to tame newly inaugurated administrations in the South as seen from its third nuclear test in February 2013 as well as the sixth nuclear test and the Hwasong-12 intermediate range missile test in May 2017. Although the situation in Ukraine made it difficult for the US to focus on the Korean Peninsula and an international consensus was difficult to come by given the standoff between the West and China and Russia, the newspaper noted that the North would not obtain what it wanted through such tests as the ROK-US alliance and the solidarity of democracies would only grow stronger.37 The center-right Hankook Ilbo editorialized that the North’s recent twelfth round of provocations might have been driven by its desire to express dissatisfaction with the Biden administration’s North Korea policy and/or to cause security concerns among the South Koreans during the leadership transition period, adding that the North would be wrong to expect US inaction due to the situation in Ukraine.38

A number of editorial commentaries were also issued on the March 25 UN Security Council emergency meeting held at the request of six members including Western P3 (the US, Britain, and France) to discuss the March 24 ICBM test. The Yonhap News Agency editorialized that among the three types of actions that the UN Security Council could take on issues under its agenda – a resolution, a president’s statement, and a press statement– the council failed to take any on the North’s March 24 ICBM test due to the opposition of Russia and China, who sit as permanent members, lamenting that the UN had degenerated into an ineffectual entity in the face of the New Cold War.39 The progressive Hankyoreh, also commented on the paralysis at the council, editorializing that China and Russia should not use the council as a means to face off against the US and should take responsibility for finding a peaceful solution.40

The conservative Chosun Ilbo editorialized that China was apparently an accomplice to the North’s nuclear adventurism as it failed to keep its promise of restricting the exports of materials such as carbon fiber and aluminum alloys to the North, which appeared to have been used to build 11-axle transport trucks and missile parts. The newspaper further noted that China, if it did not like South Korea’s additional deployment of THAAD on its soil and the strengthening of the trilateral alliance between Seoul, Washington and Tokyo, should halt its backchannel efforts to support the North.41 The conservative Dong-a Ilbo editorialized that the North’s drive for nuclear weapons and China and Russia’s support leads to strengthening the ROK-US alliance and ROK-US-Japan trilateral cooperation and the liberal democratic camp, calling on the ROK-US alliance to prepare a long-term plan to make North Korea regret playing a game of nuclear brinkmanship and China and Russia regret keeping in step with the North.42

Kim Yo-jong’s Statements to Criticize South Korea
Early in April, Kim Yo-jong, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s sister serving as the deputy department director of the Publicity and Information Department of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK), released two statements ahead of the North’s key anniversary. The first statement was aimed at Defense Minister Suh Wook’s remarks about the military’s capability and readiness to strike the locations of the North’s missile launches and command facilities if they appear to target the South.43 Addressing North Korea as a “nuclear-weapon state,” Kim Yo-jong said that talking arrogantly about a “preemptive strike” against the North would never be beneficial to the South as it would cause serious consequences. On the same day, Pak Jong-chon, secretary of the Central Committee of the WPK, also warned that Pyongyang would focus its military force on destroying the main targets in Seoul and the South Korean military if Seoul carries out dangerous military actions such as a “preemptive strike.”44

However, two days later when Kim Yo-jong released another statement in Rodong Shinmun, she softened her tone and said that Pyongyang opposes war and would never fire a single bullet toward South Korea. Notwithstanding, she reiterated the position that North Korea could use nuclear force in case of a military confrontation with South Korea.45 In response to the North’s hostile message, the Ministry of Unification said that it was paying close attention to mention of a nuclear-weapon state and nuclear force.46

As North Korea was scheduled to celebrate key anniversaries in April such as the 110th anniversary of Kim Il-sung’s birth and the 10th anniversary of Kim Jong-un’s leadership, Kim Yo-jong’s strongly-worded statements were seen as a prelude to further provocations. Kyunghyang Shinmun expressed concern over the possibility of North Korea conducting its 7th nuclear test following its launch of an ICBM last month.47 Likewise, Hankook Ilbo criticized North Korea’s unreasonable statements as likely to be rationalizations for nuclear tests and abrogating the Pyongyang Joint Declaration of September 2018.48 Considering the power transition in South Korea, Dong-a Ilbo argued that Yoon Suk-yeol should prepare a more elaborate North Korea policy to respond decisively to Pyongyang’s provocations while remaining open to future dialogue.49

North Korea’s New Tactical Weapons Test
Amid increasing concerns about a North Korean nuclear weapons test, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported that Pyongyang test-fired a new tactical guided weapon on April 16. Early in April, it was widely expected that North Korea would conduct a test marking the 110th anniversary of Kim Il-sung’s birth.50 Despite Washington’s warning of a “credible deterrence against any attack by North Korea,”51 Pyongyang launched two projectiles into the East Sea and highlighted the significance of enhancing its tactical nuclear capabilities.

On the next day, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) confirmed that North Korea launched two projectiles from Hamhung that flew about 110km to an altitude of 25km. President Moon Jae-in was informed of it by Suh Hoon, National Security Office Director, and instructed relevant ministries to closely monitor North Korea and thoroughly manage the situation.52 Considering that Seoul could be a potential target of Pyongyang’s new type of tactical guided weapon, Dong-a Ilbo criticized Seoul’s belated response, which could be seen as a lack of attention to national security.53 Joongang Ilbo chimed in, arguing that both the current and incoming governments should be alert to prevent a security vacuum when the primary focus of the US is on the Russia-Ukraine war at the moment.54 With increasing threats from North Korea’s nuclear program, Chosun Ilbo noted that there is no option other than securing deterrence equivalent to that of North Korea’s nuclear weapons.55

For the same reason, the Sejong Institute suggested that the incoming administration respond to the advances in Pyongyang’s missile capabilities by establishing a strategic command that integrates Seoul’s missile capabilities and reconnaissance assets. At the same time, it underscored the importance of close consultation with the US to elaborate on the details of “extended deterrence” so that the public can have confidence in the US’ extended deterrence.56 The Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS) shed light on Pyongyang’s intentions in resuming its ICBM tests. Since any major change in Washington’s North Korea policy under the Biden administration seems unlikely, Pyongyang will likely showcase its nuclear and missile capabilities focusing on completion of its five-year military development plan rather than a resumption of nuclear talks with Washington.57

ROK-China Relations

China’s GDP growth forecast
On March 5, Chinese premier Li Keqiang announced that China set its GDP growth target at around 5.5% for this year, the lowest figure since 1991. A few newspapers noted the looming risk of economic slowdown in China, the biggest trading partner of South Korea. The conservative Hankook Kyungjae editorialized that China changed its policy stance from cracking down on big tech and real-estate companies under the banner of “common prosperity” to tax relief recognizing that the slowed economic growth could endanger Xi Jinping’s plan to extend his term. Contrasting China’s change in economic policy with South Korea’s alleged inflexible pro-union, anti-business economic policies, the newspaper lamented what it called the “dismal employment rates and fiscal deficits” over the past five years.58 The conservative Seoul Kyungjae editorialized that China’s lowered growth target would be one of the biggest risk factors to the South Korean economy, citing the findings of the Hyundai Research Institute that a 1% decrease in China’s growth puts downward pressure on South Korean growth of 0.5%, adding that South Korea should diversify supply chain sources and trade with Southeast Asia and Central America and through partnership with the private sector maintain its technology edge.59

ROK-Japan Relations

School Textbook Controversy
On March 29, the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology announced that it authorized revised history and social science textbooks for second- and third-year students in high school that watered down the descriptions of the forced nature of Korean laborers and “comfort women” during World War II. The revisions included changing “forced conscription” to “mobilization” and “military comfort women” to “comfort women.” The textbooks also contained an assertion that the Dokdo islets, over which Seoul and Tokyo are embroiled in a territorial dispute, were inherently the territory of Japan and that Korea has illegally occupied the islets.

TheYonhap News Agency editorialized that the trend of the last 10 years shows that successive Japanese cabinets from Abe Shinjo to Kishida Fumio have reversed the 1993 Kono Statement in which the Japanese government acknowledged that comfort stations were established at the request of the Japanese military and “comfort women” were recruited against their will through coaxing and coercion. It added that bilateral relations without adequate understanding of history would be a “house of cards” and the only way to restore the bilateral relationship would be for Japan to make sincere apologies and halt its distortion of history.60 Citing the Japanese government’s registration of Hashima island as a World Heritage Site and its recent bid to register the Sado mine as one of the sites, the conservative Segye Ilbo editorialized that such actions obviated any need to restore bilateral relations, but given the precarious situations in Northeast Asia due to the intensifying US-China strategic competition and the North’s ICBM test, both governments should nevertheless work to forge a future-oriented relationship.61 The conservative Dong-a Ilbo noted that the Japanese government’s approval of the revised school textbooks apparently poured cold water on the president-elect’s initiative to revive the spirit of the 1988 Kim-Obuchi Declaration and restore talks between the leaders.62 The newspaper further noted that although a priority for Seoul and Tokyo remained separating history and economic and security issues and reaffirming willingness to restore t strained ties, the very first step in that direction would be for Tokyo to squarely face history.63 The conservative Kukmin Ilbo editorialized that the Japanese government, in effect, forced a distorted view of history on textbook publishers, questioning whether it was serious about improving relations with South Korea.64

The progressive Kyunghyang Shinmun editorialized that it felt despair at the Japanese government’s “endless distortion of historical facts.”65 The progressive Hankyoreh also cited the 1993 Kono Statement to criticize Tokyo for backsliding from its previous commitments, urging it to stop the distortion of history and show a responsible attitude to rebuilding the bilateral relationship.66



1. “평화 강조하면서 러시아 침공에 침묵한 3·1절 기념사,” Maeil Kyungjae, March 2, 2022, https://www.mk.co.kr/opinion/editorial/view/2022/03/193047/.

2. “北 ICBM 발사 수순 밟는데 3·1절에 대화·평화만 외친 文,” Segye Ilbo, March 1, 2022, http://www.segye.com/newsView/20220301510485.

3. “전 세계가 우크라 돕는데 ‘러 침공’ 한마디도 안 한 文,” Chosun Ilbo, March 3, 2022, https://www.chosun.com/opinion/editorial/2022/03/03/QNZETZVEXBGR3BTWA32TGBAITI/.

4. “文 끝내 못 푼 한일관계, 양국 국내정치 악용 땐 다시 평행선,” Dong-A Ilbo, March 2, 2022, https://www.donga.com/news/Opinion/article/all/20220301/112103790/1.

5. “대일·대북 대화와 자강론 역설한 문 대통령 3·1절 기념사,” Kyunghyang Shinmun, March 1, 2022, https://www.khan.co.kr/opinion/editorial/article/202203012053015.

6. “尹, 당선 직후 바이든과 통화…한·미동맹 정상화 기대한다,” Hankook Kyungjae, March 10, 2022, https://www.hankyung.com/opinion/article/2022031073281.

7. “북핵에서 4강 외교로… 尹 정제된 메시지로 전환 준비해야,” Dong-a Ilbo, March 14, 2022, https://www.donga.com/news/Opinion/article/all/20220313/112312410/1.

8. “尹 당선인과 바이든 통화한 날, 북한은 도발 시사,” Hankook Ilbo, March 11, 2022, https://www.hankookilbo.com/News/Read/A2022031016420001048.

9. “무력 강화 천명한 北… 한미 ‘원팀’으로 봉쇄해야,” Seoul Kyungjae, March 11, 2022, https://www.sedaily.com/NewsVIew/263DIEDRV3.

10. “러시아, 유엔의 철군요구 결의 외면말고 전쟁 중단해야,” Yonhap News Agency, March 3, 2022, https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20220303125000022?section=search.

11. “푸틴, 유엔긴급특별총회 결의 즉각 따르라,” Kukmin Ilbo, March 4, 2022, http://m.kmib.co.kr/view.asp?arcid=0924234401.

12. “푸틴의 비인도적 민간인 살상, ‘전범’으로 책임 물어야,” Segye Ilbo, March 3, 2022, http://www.segye.com/newsView/20220303517460.

13. “푸틴의 반인도적 민간인 살상, 전 세계가 함께 단죄해야,” Dong-A Ilbo, March 3, 2022, https://www.donga.com/news/Opinion/article/all/20220302/112124860/1.

14. “푸틴은 전쟁범죄인 민간인 살상을 당장 중단하라,” Kukmin Ilbo, March 8, 2022, http://news.kmib.co.kr/article/view.asp?arcid=0924234778&code=11171111&sid1=al.

15. “침략전쟁에 ‘反러 동맹’으로 맞선 초연결 세계,” Hankook Kyungjae, March 3, 2022, https://www.hankyung.com/opinion/article/2022030296281.

16. “푸틴이 촉발한 세계질서 혼란, 더욱 절실한 평화·연대,” Hankyoreh, March 2, 2022, https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/opinion/editorial/1033247.html.

17. “[사설] 러, 국가디폴트 위기까지…‘연쇄 부도 사슬’ 대책은 있나,” Seoul Kyungjae, March 4, 2022, https://www.sedaily.com/NewsVIew/263ADILM39.

18. “우크라 사태 물가 초비상, 전시행정 아닌 서민대책 절실,” Hankook Ilbo, March 5, 2022, https://m.hankookilbo.com/News/Read/A2022030414570003492.

19. “러군의 우크라 민간인 집단학살, 용납 안 될 전쟁범죄다,” Kyunghyang Shinmun, April 4, 2022, https://www.khan.co.kr/opinion/editorial/article/202204042100005.

20. “러시아군 ‘부차 학살’ 의혹, ‘야만의 시대’ 이대로 둘텐가,” Hankyoreh, April 4, 2022, https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/opinion/editorial/1037481.html.

21. “UN General Assembly votes to suspend Russia from the Human Rights Council,” United Nations, April 7, 2022, https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/04/1115782.

22. “러 민간인 학살에 인권이사회 퇴출로 응징한 유엔,” Hankook Ilbo, April 9, 2022, https://www.hankookilbo.com/News/Read/A2022040811450003929.

23. “‘러 학살’ 감싼 北中, 그들과 한편 섰던 韓 외교 방향 틀어야,” Chosun Ilbo, April 9, 2022, https://www.chosun.com/opinion/editorial/2022/04/09/C65JOWHIB5DF5GET2TILZGK3OI/.

24. “Speech by the President of Ukraine in the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea,” The Presidential Office of Ukraine, April 11, 2022, https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/promova-prezidenta-ukrayini-v-nacionalnij-asambleyi-respubli-74257.

25. “한국, 우크라이나 대공미사일 지원 요청 거절,” Hankyoreh, April 11, 2022, https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/defense/1038373.html.

26. “우크라이나 매체 ‘러시아 국방장관, 북한 방문해 군사 지원 요청’ 주장,” SPN, April 7, 2022, https://www.spnews.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=50990.

27. “‘우크라이나 도와달라’ 호소한 젤렌스키 국회 연설,” Hankook Ilbo, April 12, 2022, https://www.hankookilbo.com/News/Read/A2022041115230003353.

28. “젤렌스키 절박한 호소… 정부는 능동적인 대응책 찾기를,” Kukmin Ilbo, April 12, 2022, http://news.kmib.co.kr/article/view.asp?arcid=0924240204&code=11171111&sid1=sp.

29. “북한, 한미훈련 개시일에 ‘분주탕 피운다’ 비난,” Dong-a Ilbo, April 18, 2022, https://www.donga.com/news/Politics/article/all/20220418/112942265/1.

30. “오늘부터 28일까지 한미연합 훈련…북 조선인민혁명군 창건일 맞물려,” Hankyoreh, April 18, 2022, https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/defense/1039357.html.

31. “성김 대북특별대표 방한…‘北정세 한미간 긴밀한 조율 계속’,” Joongang Ilbo, April 18, 2022, https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25064219#home.

32. “한미 북핵수석대표 ‘대북 관여 지속, 북과 조건없이 만날 준비’,” Hankyoreh, April 18, 2022, https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/diplomacy/1039427.html.

33. “정의용 외교장관, 성 김 美 대북특별대표 접견,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 19, 2022, https://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4080/view.do?seq=372262&page=1.

34. “‘5년 평화 쇼’ 가짜 본색 드러내며 솟구친 북 ICBM,” Chosun Ilbo, March 25, 2022, https://www.chosun.com/opinion/editorial/2022/03/25/E45CLW222RAWRG5OONGOIUEMGU/.

35. “끝내 ‘괴물 ICBM’ 도발한 北, 5년 전과는 다른 응징 각오해야,” Dong-a Ilbo, March 25, 2022, https://www.donga.com/news/Opinion/article/all/20220324/112521725/1.

36. “ICBM 발사로 결국 레드라인 넘고야 만 북한,” Seoul Shinmun, March 24, 2022, https://www.seoul.co.kr/news/newsView.php?id=20220325031011.

37. “미 본토 타격 ICBM(대륙간탄도미사일) 발사로 끝내 레드라인 넘은 북한,” Joongang Ilbo, March 25, 2022, https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25058194#home.

38. “北 결국 레드라인 넘었다…신형 ‘괴물’ ICBM 발사,” Hankuk Ilbo, March 25, 2022, https://www.hankookilbo.com/News/Read/A2022032415220001056.

39. “北 ICBM 규탄 언론 성명조차 채택 못 하는 안보리,” Yonhap News Agency, March 27, 2022, https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20220327024200022.

40. “북 ICBM 발사, 미·중·러가 긴장완화 해법 내놔야,” Hankyoreh, March 27, 2022, https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/opinion/editorial/1036431.html.

41. “북 ICBM 규탄 반대 시진핑, 사드 추가 배치도 반대 말라,” Chosun Ilbo, March 28, 2022, https://www.chosun.com/opinion/editorial/2022/03/28/D7LOIAPAXNE3XIVRW5X57EM7SM/.

42. “北 감싸는 중-러에 맞설 신냉전시대 한미동맹 플랜 짜라,” Dong-a Ilbo, March 28, 2022, https://www.donga.com/news/Opinion/article/all/20220327/112556754/1.

43. “김여정, 서욱 ‘선제타격’ 발언에… ‘심각한 위협 직면할수도’,” Chosun Ilbo, April 3, 2022, https://www.chosun.com/politics/north_korea/2022/04/03/CSM2PPRTVRF67FD2JZG7BATXPQ/.

44. “북한 김여정, ‘선제타격 발언’ 한국에 비난 담화…남북 대결 구도 치달을 가능성,” VOA, April 2, 2022, https://www.voakorea.com/a/6514053.html.

45. “김여정 “남에 총포탄 쏘지 않겠다”…‘희망 수신처’는 어디?” Hankyoreh, April 5, 2022, https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/defense/1037545.html.

46. “통일부 ‘北 ‘핵보유국’ 거론 엄중히 인식…한반도 상황 유동적’,” Yonhap News Agency, April 5, 2022, https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20220405072451504.

47. “거칠어지는 4월 한반도 격랑, 당사국 모두 냉정 유지해야,” Kyunghyang Shinmun, April 3, 2022, https://www.khan.co.kr/opinion/editorial/article/202204032050025.

48. “김여정 협박 발언, 핵실험 도발 명분쌓기 경계해야,” Hankook Ilbo, April 4, 2022, https://www.hankookilbo.com/News/Read/A2022040314360002431.

49. “김여정 대남 널뛰기, 核 협박하며 ‘동족’ 내세우는 뻔한 술책,” Dong-a Ilbo, April 6, 2022, https://www.donga.com/news/Opinion/article/all/20220405/112714521/1.

50. “성 김, 北 핵실험 경고 ‘4월 15일 김일성 생일에 도발 가능성’,” Joongang Ilbo, April 7, 2022, https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25061692#home.

51. “셔먼 부장관 ‘북한에 확실한 억지력 보여줄 조치 필요…중국도 협력해야’,” VOA, April 7, 2022, https://www.voakorea.com/a/6518216.html.

52. “북한 미사일 발사에 문 대통령 ‘철저하게 상황 관리’… NSC 소집,” Hankook Ilbo, April 17, 2022, https://www.hankookilbo.com/News/Read/A2022041709400004810.

53. “北 보도 뒤에야 ‘전술핵 운용’ 미사일 발사 공개한 軍,” Dong-a Ilbo, April 18, 2022, https://www.donga.com/news/Opinion/article/all/20220417/112934900/1.

54. “정권 교체기 안보 공백 우려스럽다,” Joongang Ilbo, April 19, 2022, https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25064473#home.

55. “北 전술핵 미사일까지, 실질 군사 대비 않는 건 안보 포기,” Chosun Ilbo, April 19, 2022, https://www.chosun.com/opinion/editorial/2022/04/19/HAQKDXHLGBAMVJQMNQILNLU6UM/.

56. Cheong Seong-chang, “윤석열 정부의 대북정책 과제: 초당적 대북정책과 북핵 대응,” The Sejong Institute, April 4, 2022, https://www.sejong.org/web/boad/1/egoread.php?bd=2&itm=&txt=&pg=1&seq=6440.

57. Hwang Ildo, “북한의 ICBM 발사 재개: 핵억제 관점에서 본 목적과 전망,” IFANS FOCUS, Mar 28, 2022.

58. “공동부유 외치는 中도 감세로…한국에 시사점 크다,” Hankook Kyungjae, March 7, 2022, https://www.hankyung.com/opinion/article/2022030675031.

59. “中 31년來 최저 성장 목표, ‘차이나 리스크’ 대책은 있나” Seoul Kyungjae, March 7, 2022, https://www.sedaily.com/NewsVIew/263BNE0ZVQ.

60. “[연합시론] 미래지향적 한일관계 원한다면 역사 왜곡부터 중단해야,” Yonhap News Agency, March 29, 2022, https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20220329155800022?section=search.

61. “한·일관계 개선 기대감에 찬물 끼얹은 日 역사교과서 왜곡,” Segye Ilbo, March 30, 2022, http://www.segye.com/newsView/20220330517536.

62. “日 교과서 ‘강제연행’ 삭제… 이러면서 ‘미래지향’ 말하나,” Dong-a Ilbo, March 31, 2022, https://www.donga.com/news/Opinion/article/all/20220330/112618644/1.

63. Ibid.

64. “일본은 역사 왜곡 당장 멈추라,” Kukmin Ilbo, March 31, 2022, http://news.kmib.co.kr/article/view.asp?arcid=0924238461&code=11171111&cp=na.

65. “‘종군위안부·강제연행’ 삭제한 일본, 어떻게 미래 말할 건가,” Kyunghyang Shinmun, March 30, 2022, https://www.khan.co.kr/opinion/editorial/article/202203302039005.

66. “위안부·강제동원 ‘진실’ 지운 일본, 관계 악화 원하는가,” Hankyoreh, March 29, 2022, https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/opinion/editorial/1036743.html.

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