Country Report: South Korea (May-June 2022)

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Country Report: South Korea (May & June 2022)
Munkyoung Shin and Jung Seyoon

President Yoon Suk-yeol’s first two months in office gave a glimpse of South Korea’s shift of emphasis from “strategic ambiguity,” striking a balance between the US and China, to “peace through force,” his campaign slogan for achieving peace on the Korean Peninsula. The first Yoon-Biden summit in May, held less than two weeks after Yoon’s inauguration, left no room for doubt that Seoul was poised to increase its cooperation with Washington, expanding the scope of joint military exercises, exchanging emerging technologies, and securing resilient global supply chains. Seoul’s announcement that it would join the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) reenforced its decision to coordinate closely on economic security with the United States and other like-minded countries.

Meanwhile, North Korea’s May 25 ICBM test and the veto cast by China and Russia at the UN Security Council, which hindered further sanctions against North Korea, raised serious concerns over the consolidating ties between North Korea, China, and Russia. Despite the spread of COVID-19 in North Korea, Pyongyang showed no interest in returning to dialogue but appeared to be ready to conduct its seventh nuclear test. Given its economic dependence on China, South Korea’s tilt toward the US left a fundamental question about practical measures to counter possible repercussions from China over the further deployment of THAAD. It remained uncertain whether the leaders of South Korea and Japan would reach a breakthrough at the upcoming NATO summit, overcoming their deep-rooted historical issues.

ROK-US Relations
President Yoon Suk-yeol’s First Summit with US President Joe Biden
On May 21, Yoon Suk-yeol held his first summit meeting with President Joe Biden in Seoul. Given the significance of a ROK-US summit that marked the earliest meeting ever in a ROK president’s term in office, it covered a broad range of issues concerning North Korea’s growing nuclear threat, the US-China technology competition, and South Korea’s decision to join IPEF.

Before the summit, Pyongyang fired a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) on May 7, marking its 15th missile test this year. As North Korea’s frequent missile launches were overshadowed by Yoon’s inauguration and Biden’s visit to Seoul, whether the two leaders would disclose new measures to counter the increasing nuclear threat on the peninsula was considered one of the most important questions hovering over the Yoon-Biden summit. Kukmin Ilbo addressed Pyongyang’s frequent saber-rattling and the possibility of North Korea conducting its next nuclear test as proof of the failure of President Moon Jae-in’s peace process on the Korean Peninsula. Thus, it urged, Yoon to use his first summit with Biden as an opportunity to ensure detailed and practical measures to prevent North Korea’s reckless provocations.1 Chosun Ilbo argued that “US extended deterrence” and “maintenance of the US forces in Korea” should be mentioned in the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty, which needs to reflect the changes in the security environment.2

When Biden’s three-day visit to South Korea came to an end, the ROK-US Leaders’ Joint Statement dispelled such concerns as it affirmed agreement on further discussions to expand the scope and scale of combined military exercises and reiterated the complete denuclearization of North Korea as their common goal.3 Addressing Biden’s affirmation of the US commitment to the defense of South Korea and extended deterrence, Yoon stressed the importance of strong deterrence against North Korea and announced his willingness to undertake diplomatic endeavors to encourage North Korea to come back to dialogue.4

Foreign Minister Park Jin noted that the ROK-US alliance established a new milestone through the summit in his op-ed in Dong-a Ilbo. “The ROK-US alliance, which started from traditional military security, is now positioned as a global comprehensive strategic alliance (GCSA) that encompasses various fields such as supply chain, public health, climate change, energy, digital, and cyber,” he said.5 However, there was a divergent reaction by the political parties. Kweon Seong-dong, floor leader of the People Power Party (PPP), spoke highly of the whole scope of issues discussed in the joint statement, including ROK-US cooperation on a resilient global supply chain and IPEF. On the contrary, the main opposition Democratic Party of Korea (DPK) expressed concern over the Yoon government’s renunciation of “balanced diplomacy” and China’s possible backlash against South Korea’s pledge to join the IPEF in addition to the government’s blurred “political rhetoric” to solve the North Korean nuclear issue.6

Semiconductors as a Major Link Between Seoul and Washington
Biden’s visit to the Samsung Electronics semiconductor plant in Pyeongtaek, the first stop in his three-day visit to South Korea, shed light on the importance of semiconductors as a symbol of deepening technology cooperation between the US and South Korea. After the tour guided by Samsung Electronics Vice Chairman Lee Jae-yong, Yoon and Biden both highlighted the need to work closely with partners sharing the same values to bolster supply chain resilience. Biden noted some factors that caused a shortfall in consumer goods and higher prices of resources, including the COVID-19 pandemic and Putin’s war on Ukraine.7 Likewise, Yoon put emphasis on semiconductors as an important asset for national security, calling for further cooperation on advanced technology and supply chains to consolidate the ROK-US alliance.8

As it was unprecedented for a US president to kick off a trip by visiting a semiconductor factory, the media outlets underscored the meaning of a “semiconductor alliance.” Chosun Ilbo assessed the US efforts to link security to the economy by reconstructing supply chains with credible partners in response to a new Cold War with China.9 “The summit meeting at the Samsung Electronics Pyeongtaek Campus, the world’s largest semiconductor manufacturing base, will remain a symbolic scene that demonstrated the US’ will for a ‘semiconductor alliance’ targeting China, and confirmed our ‘semiconductor super-gap strategy,’” Hankook Ilbo said.10

Considering the fallout from US-China competition and the Ukraine crisis, Kukmin Ilbo argued that it was inevitable for the US and South Korea to strengthen their bilateral cooperation for economic security and technology. It remained to develop strategic balance called “an-mi-gyung-jung” (“United States for security, China for economy”) into a new framework of “strengthening the alliance with the United States and pursuing common interests with China.”11 Kyunghyang Shinmun argued that the strengthening of the ROK-US economic security alliance should not lead to a deterioration in the ROK-China relationship, urging the Yoon administration to secure the principle of balanced diplomacy that protects national interests with both the US and China.12 Highlighting the complex interconnection between the North Korean nuclear issue and ROK-US cooperation on economic security to contain China, Hankyoreh stressed the importance of Seoul’s constant effort to balance its alliance with the United States and economic relationship with China.13

South Korea to Join the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework
In his speech at the National Assembly on May 16, Yoon Suk-yeol made public that South Korea would join IPEF, the US-led initiative aimed at establishing a resilient supply chain with partners in the region.14 When Biden launched the IPEF in Tokyo, Yoon virtually attended the summit launching and said that South Korea would share its experience and work together with a dozen partners in all fields covered by IPEF, particularly in strengthening supply chains, digital transformation, clean energy, and decarbonization.15 Hours before the launching, Yoon told reporters that IPEF was not a trade negotiation like an FTA that includes certain contents, but a process of setting a wide range of rules related to economics and trade in the Indo-Pacific region. Thus, he said, “It is only natural to join the process,” and “If we excluded ourselves from the process to set the rules, it would cause enormous harm to our national interests.”16 With respect to potential blowback from China, Yoon noted that there was no need to view the government’s decision to join IPEF and ROK-China relations as zero-sum.17

Seoul’s alignment with the US elicited expectations and concerns from both the conservative and progressive media outlets. Highlighting the importance of the ROK-US alliance in Seoul’s value-based diplomacy, Joongang Ilbo welcomed the decision to reduce South Korea’s economic dependence on China and rebuild a resilient supply chain with the US and other liberal democracies.18 However, Hankook Ilbo raised the question of whether IPEF would be able to reconstruct a supply chain that excludes China as the US intended and argued that the government should not be drawn into the US-China geopolitical competition.19

Nonetheless, considering possible economic retaliation from China, Chosun Ilbo argued that the government and enterprises should prepare for the worst.20 With Seoul’s strategic ambiguity coming to an end, Kukmin Ilbo called for the government’s efforts to communicate with China and explain South Korea’s position to join IPEF in an effort to support free trade.21 Kyunghyang Shinmun urged the Yoon administration to strive to minimize the so-called “China risk” by using the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) as an effective channel to maintain close communication.22

North Korea
Explosive Outbreak of COVID-19 in North Korea
Early in May, North Korea appeared to gain momentum for its seventh nuclear test, especially when it launched an SLBM on May 7, following North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s remarks that the country’s nuclear weapons were not for just deterrence. Thus, less than a week later, it came as a surprise when Pyongyang admitted the massive outbreak of COVID-19 and declared the “gravest national emergency” after a long period of national lockdown.23

In his speech at the National Assembly, Yoon stressed the need for humanitarian aid and said the government would “spare no effort to provide the necessary support, including COVID-19 vaccines, medicines, medical equipment, and health personnel if the North responds.”24 Even when North Korea did not respond to the South’s offer, Unification Minister Kwon Young-se noted that indirect support through international organizations or the private sector could be considered.25 However, it seemed unlikely that Pyongyang would accept as a delegation of Chinese medical experts traveled to North Korea to advise on its response to COVID-19.26

The fact that North Korea, which had claimed to have no confirmed COVID-19 cases, publicly acknowledged its massive outbreak shows the gravity of the situation, Seoul Shinmun said.27 Given the lack of vaccinations in North Korea and its fragile healthcare system, Hankyoreh argued that Pyongyang should take a step forward to accept international aid to prevent a humanitarian crisis and facilitate cooperation with Seoul.28 Kukmin Ilbo also hoped that the Yoon administration’s pledge to provide humanitarian aid to North Korea would create a window of opportunity in inter-Korean relations.29

On the other hand, the media outlets also condemned North Korea for firing three short-range ballistic missiles on the same day as Kim Jong-un ordered a “maximum emergency epidemic prevention system.” Calling it Pyongyang’s “duplicity,” Hankook Ilbo argued that North Korea should accept the truth that the spread of COVID-19 was inevitable and join in with the international community.30 Highlighting the limit of lockdown measures, Kyunghyang Shinmun urged the government to provide a detailed list of support measures, including vaccines, medicines, and masks, and North Korea to accept it so that both sides could prime the pump to improve inter-Korean relations.31

North Korea’s ICBM Launch Following the ROK-US Summit
As soon as Biden’s Asia trip came to an end, North Korea fired three ballistic missiles toward the East Sea on May 25. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) confirmed the launches from the Sunan area in Pyongyang and said the first missile, deemed to be a Hwasong-17 ICBM, flew 360 kilometers at a top altitude of 540 km. The second and third missiles were thought to be short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) that reached altitudes of 20 km and 60 km respectively.32 In response, Yoon Suk-yeol presided over an emergency meeting of the National Security Council (NSC) and ordered strengthened extended deterrence capabilities and the ROK-US combined defense posture. In addition, the Presidential Office announced a statement, condemning North Korea’s violation of UN Security Council resolutions and its threat to peace on the Korean Peninsula and the international community.33 For the first time since July 2017, the US and South Korea held combined live-fire drills to counter North Korea’s sustained provocations, launching the US Army Tactical Missile System (ATCMS) and the South’s Hyunmoo-2.34

According to Joongang Ilbo, North Korea raised the level of provocation by firing an ICBM, thought to be Hwasong-17 that could target the US homeland, and two SRBMs, suspected KN-23 that could reach the US military bases in South Korea and Japan.35 Hankook Ilbo noted that the North intended to parade its capability to carry out preemptive strikes that target not only the US but also South Korea and Japan.36 On the other hand, Kyunghyang Shinmun saw it as a response to the outcome of the ROK-US summit, especially strengthening the missile defense capabilities and reaffirming the US commitment to deploy strategic military assets.37

Segye Ilbo expressed regret over Pyongyang’s tenacious insistence on possessing nuclear weapons even in a situation where tens of thousands of people suffered from COVID-19 in the country.38 Kukmin Ilbo expressed disappointment as North Korea’s missile launch meant it turned down offers from the US and South Korea to provide vaccines to fight against the health crisis.39 Chosun Ilbo underscored the implications of North Korea’s missile launches in the context of the new Cold War. With Pyongyang tightening its relations with Beijing and Moscow, it is highly likely that Seoul will face a serious security threat when North Korea uses nuclear weapons and China uses trade as leverage to put pressure on South Korea.40

North Korea Moving Closer to Seventh Nuclear Test
From May onwards, news media in the US and South Korea reported the commercial satellite evidence of new activities at North Korea’s Pyunggye-ri underground nuclear test site, which they said hinted at a seventh nuclear test.41 Rafael Grossi, director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), mentioned during the meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors on June 7 that the agency was alarmingly monitoring the recent activities near tunnel entrances at the Pyunggye-ri site and the resumed operation of a five-megawatt reactor at Yongbyon.42

Yonhap News Agency editorialized that amid the increasing signs of a seventh nuclear test, it became more important for South Korea, the United States, and Japan to closely consult on shoring up the US extended deterrence, preparing unilateral economic sanctions given the slim chance of passing a resolution at the UN Security Council due to veto-wielding China and Russia. The newspaper also highlighted the importance of the trilateral cooperation by drawing a lesson from the situation in Ukraine, which it said reaffirmed the importance of strong military, alliances, and diplomacy in deterring war.43

North Korea’s Presidency of UN Conference on Disarmament
On June 3, North Korea assumed the rotating presidency of the UN Conference on Disarmament, the only permanent and multilateral body for negotiating nuclear arms reduction. North Korea’s assumption of leadership at the forum elicited outcries from many member states; Australia stated on behalf of a coalition of countries that they “remain gravely concerned about DPRK’s reckless actions, which continued to seriously undermine the very value of the Conference on Disarmament,” while US State Department spokesman Ned Price said the development “does call into question [the conference] when you have a regime like DPRK in a senior leadership post.”44

A few newspapers in South Korea also criticized North Korea for chairing the conference. The conservative Hankook Ilbo editorialized that it was preposterous for a country like North Korea, which conducted a series of missiles and is hinting at its seventh nuclear test, to take the helm of the UN conference on disarmament, despite the presidency being rotated among members every month. The newspaper warned that the North should recognize that conducting another nuclear test will only isolate it further.45 Maeil Kyungjae also echoed the view saying that it was comical that North Korea assumed the presidency at a time when it wholly discarded a self-imposed moratorium on nuclear and missile tests by firing a salvo of missiles and gearing up for a seventh nuclear test.46 Donga Ilbo, citing a warning of the world awash in nuclear weapons through a nuclear domino effect from IAEA director, editorialized that North Korea’s nuclear test will open the door to hellish nuclear wars and give many countries in East Asia and the Middle East free reign to develop and possess nuclear weapons.47

North Korean Missile Test on June 5
On June 5, North Korea test-fired eight rounds of short-range ballistic missiles from four sites toward the East Sea, which traveled 110 to 670 kilometers at altitudes of 25 to 90 kilometers. The missile launches, which came after the South Korea and US combined forces’ naval exercises involving a US aircraft carrier on June 4, were the eighteenth such tests since January and the third since the inauguration of the new South Korean government in May. In a rare stern show of force, the South Korean and US militaries fired eight rounds of ground-to-ground tactical missiles toward the East Sea a day later on June 6. On the same day, which coincidently marked Memorial Day in South Korea, Yoon delivered a speech that not only cast the Korean War as perpetrated by “the communist invasion forces” but emphasized his government’s continuous pursuit of a “fundamental and practical security capability” against the North’s nuclear and missile threats.”48

Conservative newspapers largely praised the firm response shown by the South Korean and US militaries after the change of government in May while progressive ones worried that a tit-for-tat measure could make the security situation on the Korean Peninsula spiral out of control. Joongang Ilbo editorialized that as South Korea and the US made evident their firm stance against the North, North Korea should forswear its obsession with nuclear weapons and choose the path of diplomacy and dialogue.49 Segye Ilbo editorialized that Yoon had accurately appraised the nature of military threats posed by the North, calling on his government to further increase the scope of sanctions and regularly host military drills with the US50 AsiaToday editorialized that South Korea should work closely with fellow democracies to give stern warnings to North Korea and take the further step of securing the capabilities and tools to adequately respond to the North’s nuclear threats, adding that possessing nuclear submarines and nuclear reprocessing rights would be the meaningful first step.51

The progressive Hankyoreh, on the other hand,questioned whether such live-fire exercises as a countermeasure have any deterrent effect on the North Korean regime, calling on the South Korean government instead to put more serious efforts into resuming dialogue.52 Kyunghyang Shinmun echoed that view, saying that a military countermeasure could aggravate the situation, urging the South Korean government to take a more cautious approach.53 The conservative center-right Hankook Ilbo editorialized that while the Yoon administration’s tougher language and firm response toward North Korea literally quenched the thirst of the public desiring a sterner response to North Korea, the government should nevertheless guard against the possibility that a seemingly proportional countermeasure could accidently lead to escalation..54

Kim Jong-un’s Stress of “Power to Power” Contest in Party Meeting
From June 8 to 10, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un presided over the plenary meeting of the Eighth Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, the designated gathering during which the country’s major policies have been determined in the intervening years between party congresses. Citing “an aggravating security situation,” Kim called for strengthening national defense and enunciated the principle of “power to power, head-on contest” in “the struggle against the enemy” and justified the development of nuclear weapons and delivery systems as his country’s sovereign right.55

On the news, conservative newspapers envisaged a further increase in tension and called for increasing cooperation with the US and Japan while moderate and progressive ones noted that the North’s appointment of career diplomat Choe Son-hui as its foreign minister could signal a break in Pyongyang’s policies. Donga Ilbo editorialized that the South Korean government should resume military drills between South Korea, the United States, and Japan, which had been suspended since 2018 and consult the US through the bilateral Extended Deterrence and Strategy Consultation Group.56 The center-right Hankook Ilbo editorialized that it was notable that North Korea refrained from criticizing the US and South Korea and called on the North to stop nuclear provocations and seek a diplomatic solution.57 The progressive Kyunghyang Shinmun noted that appointing Choe, considered a US expert in party circles, as foreign minister and refraining from criticism of the US could signal interest in dialogue in the future.58

ROK-China Relations
China’s Response to South Korea’s Participation in IPEF
On May 16, Foreign Minister Park Jin held a virtual meeting with China’s State Councilor and Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi. Celebrating the 30th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties between the two countries, both sides agreed on the importance of common efforts to manage the situation on the Korean Peninsula and the need for cooperation to provide humanitarian aid for North Korea fighting against the spread of COVID-19.59 On the same day at the National Assembly, Yoon Suk-yeol pledged to discuss South Korea’s participation in IPEF with Biden. As a result, Wang Yi’s remarks on the future of ROK-China relations came into the spotlight as a response to Seoul turning away from Beijing.

Addressing the “four strengthens,” major fields for future cooperation between South Korea and China, Wang Yi argued that both sides should “oppose the negative tendency of decoupling and cutting off chains,” and “maintain the stability and smoothness of the global industrial and supply chains.”60 His remarks were taken as opposition to Seoul’s changing trajectory, especially its participation in the US efforts to isolate China. However, as Segye Ilbo noted, it was not something unexpected as China’s Vice President Wang Qishan had stressed that both sides should work together to “safeguard multilateralism” during his visit to Seoul for Yoon’s inauguration.61

Meanwhile, with the rising criticism from China’s state-owned media, calling IPEF US-led clique politics that countries “don’t easily buy,” 62 major media outlets stressed the need for countermeasures in case of economic retaliation from China. Maeil Kyungjae strongly criticized China’s viewpoint, insisting that South Korea’s announcement to join IPEF was an independent decision based on its national interest of establishing a stable supply chain with countries that share the values of liberal democracy.63 Hankook Kyungjae claimed that it was no longer feasible to pursue strategic ambiguity since a country’s national security was intertwined with its economy. Thus, it said, IPEF would serve as a basis for reestablishing the ROK-China relationship based on mutual respect.64 Recalling the memory of China’s economic coercion during the THAAD dispute, Hankyoreh insisted that the government continue to communicate closely with China and send a clear message about its position.65

China and Russia Veto UN Sanctions on North Korea
Following North Korea’s flurry of missile launches this year, including the ICBM launched on May 25, the UN Security Council voted on a draft resolution aimed at strengthening sanctions against North Korea. The US-drafted resolution included reducing the amount of oil supplied to North Korea and banning the export of tobacco to North Korea. However, as China and Russia used their veto, the Security Council failed to adopt the draft a draft resolution for the first time since North Korea’s first nuclear test in 2006.66

On May 27, South Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs published a commentary expressing its deep regret that the new Security Council resolution was not adopted despite the approval of the majority of Member States. “As it seriously undermines the international community’s trust in the Security Council, Member States should play a responsible role in responding to the DPRK’s violations of the Security Council resolutions and achieving denuclearization,” the commentary argued.67

The media outlets expressed disappointment, condemning China for exonerating North Korea from responsibility. Joongang Ilbo criticized China for opening a “back door” to the sanctions on North Korea to undermine international efforts to deter North Korea’s nuclear and missile development.68 In addition, it expressed regret over China’s permanent representative to the UN Zhang Jun’s remarks in which he addressed the US’ Indo-Pacific strategy as a cause of the “latest developments on the peninsula.”69 In consideration of the fact that China and Russia had been passive but had previously voted in favor of the sanctions against North Korea, Hankook Ilbo said the opposition from China and Russia this time was unconvincing. It added, that the “blind alliance” of North Korea, China, and Russia would only lead to diplomatic isolation in the end.70

ROK-Japan Relations
Japan’s New Policy Guideline on Defense Spending
On June 7, the Japanese cabinet approved its annual basic economic and fiscal policy guidelines, which would seek to drastically strengthen defense capabilities and set a target of boosting military spending to 2 percent of gross domestic product, amounting to nearly 10 trillion yen ($80 billion), within the next five years.71 The conservative Donga Ilbo editorialized that the implications of the defense budget hike, which would make Japan the third largest military spender and could potentially trigger an arms race in the region, were alarming and noted that Japan should not try to justify a larger defense budget by citing the Ukraine war, the North Korean threats, and the Taiwan Strait but also sound out neighboring countries with which it has continued rows over historical issues.72

Korea-Japan Summit on the Sidelines of NATO Summit
On June 8, South Korean media reported that Yoon would attend the NATO Summit to be held from June 29 to 30 in Madrid, Spain and potentially hold the first in-person summit with his Japanese counterpart Prime Minister Kishida who was reportedly mulling attending the summit. On the news, the conservative Hankook Ilbo editorialized that the South Korean government should diplomatically solve the dispute over the 2018 South Korean court ruling that called for freezing and liquidating assets held by Japanese companies whose forerunners during the WWII were involved in exploiting Korean victims of forcible labor.73 Hankook Kyungjae editorialized that Yoon’s attendance would create an opening for normalizing relations with Japan, which it says would be conducive to solving the North Korean nuclear issue and coping with the disruptions in the supply chain.74

Revival of Intelligence-Sharing Pact between Korea and Japan
On June 13, Park Jin held a joint press conference with US counterpart Anthony Blinken following the first bilateral meeting since his appointment in May. The South Korean foreign minister was asked whether he envisaged a US role in reviving the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) between South Korea and Japan, which allowed the two countries to share information on North Korean military threats. The agreement took effect in 2016, but had been suspended in 2019 amid tit-for-tat moves over the 2018 South Korean Supreme Court ruling, which ordered the seizure of assets of Nikkei Steel and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries to compensate four Korean plaintiffs who were forced to labor during World War II. At the time, Japan imposed export restrictions on over 1,100 items shipped to South Korea and South Korea, in turn, terminated the extension of GSOMIA. The South Korean foreign minister said he wanted “GSOMIA to be normalized as soon as possible” on the basis that South Korea, the US, and Japan need policy coordination and information sharing.75

The conservative Donga Ilbo editorialized that although South Korea and Japan hold grudges against each other, they should show goodwill and create an atmosphere conducive to revival of the intelligence-sharing pact by retracting their respective retaliatory measures.76 The centrist Financial News editorialized that South Korea should seek to catch the “two rabbits” of South Korea-US-Japan trilateral cooperation and normalization of Korea-Japan relations by reviving GSOMIA, which it said would be crucial to dealing with North Korean nuclear issues.77 The conservative Seoul Shinmun editorialized that it welcomed the South Korean government’s plan to establish a body dedicated to resolving ongoing rows with Japan over the wartime labor case and hoped it would find a satisfactory solution.78



1. “北, SLBM 발사에 핵실험 징후… 실질적 억지력 필요,” Kukmin Ilbo, May 9, 2022, http://news.kmib.co.kr/article/view.asp?arcid=0924244389&code=11171111&sid1=opi.

2. “韓美, ‘핵우산 명문화’와 함께 실질적 군사 대비도 논의하길,” Chosun Ilbo, May 17, 2022, https://www.chosun.com/opinion/editorial/2022/05/17/K3QXSC6CQ5C2RG6KHC7TFZGPBE/.

3. “United States-Republic of Korea Leaders’ Joint Statement,” The White House, May 21, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/21/united-states-republic-of-korea-leaders-joint-statement/.

4. “윤석열 대통령 한미 정상회담 공동기자회견 모두발언,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 22, 2022, https://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_24806/view.do?seq=5&page=1.

5. “한미동맹의 격상과 글로벌 중추국가,” Dong-a Ilbo, May 23, 2022, https://www.donga.com/news/Opinion/article/all/20220522/113557845/1.

6. “한미정상회담에 엇갈린 평가…국민의힘 ‘동맹 진화’ 민주·정의 ‘성과 불명확’,” Kyunghyang Shinmun, May 22, 2022, https://www.khan.co.kr/politics/assembly/article/202205221527001.

7. “Remarks by President Biden After Touring Samsung Electronics Pyeongtaek Campus,” The White House, May 20, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/05/20/remarks-by-president-biden-after-touring-samsung-electronics-pyeongtaek-campus/.

8. “尹대통령 삼성전자 평택캠퍼스 연설문,” Chosun Ilbo, May 20, 2022, https://biz.chosun.com/policy/politics/2022/05/20/JFIKJ6AZPNFY3GXDYKPQTCL4AI/.

9. “반도체 공장서 첫 만남 韓美 정상, 동맹의 진화·도전 상징,” Chosun Ilbo, May 21, 2022, https://www.chosun.com/opinion/editorial/2022/05/21/TLTYNUONVREXLBQYLNTDNBJQIU/.

10. “한미 ‘반도체 동맹’ 시동… 尹·바이든, 삼성 공장 시찰,” Hankook Ilbo, May 21, 2022, https://www.hankookilbo.com/News/Read/A2022052020540003152.

11. “경제안보와 기술동맹 시대 선언한 한·미 정상 공동성명,” Kukmin Ilbo, May 23, 2022, https://news.kmib.co.kr/article/view.asp?arcid=0924246728&code=11171111&sid1=opi.

12. “기술동맹 더한 한·미동맹 강화, 균형외교 훼손 안 된다,” Kyunghyang Shinmun, May 20, 2022, https://www.khan.co.kr/opinion/editorial/article/202205202052015.

13. “반도체 공장에서 ‘경제안보 동맹’ 선언한 한·미 정상,” Hankyoreh, May 20, 2022, https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/opinion/editorial/1043735.html.

14. “윤석열 대통령 국회 시정연설문,” 대한민국정책브리핑, May 16, 2022, https://www.korea.kr/news/policyNewsView.do?newsId=148901624.

15. “인도·태평양 경제프레임워크(IPEF) 출범 정상회의 기조연설,” 대한민국정책브리핑, May 23, 2022, https://www.korea.kr/news/presidentView.do?newsId=148902020.

16. “IPEF 출범회의 윤 대통령 ‘팬데믹·공급망 복합위기…경험 나눌 것,’” Hankyoreh, May 23, 2022, https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/politics_general/1044007.html.

17. “윤 대통령 ‘IPEF 중국 반발, 제로섬으로 볼 필요 없다,’” Hankyoreh, May 20, 2022, https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/politics_general/1043644.html.

18. “윤-바이든 정상회담, 한·미동맹 확장 계기돼야,” Joongang Ilbo, May 21, 2022, https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25072943#home.

19. “IPEF 참여 공식화… 새 정부 외교 시험대 올랐다,” Hankook Ilbo, May 17, 2022, https://www.hankookilbo.com/News/Read/A2022051616460005364.

20. “‘安美經中 이후’ 정부와 기업이 함께 대비해야,” Chosun Ilbo, May 19, 2022, https://www.chosun.com/opinion/editorial/2022/05/19/3SKUPOMI7JCBJFXTTEMBZ7C3PM/.

21. “IPEF 참여는 국익 위한 선택, 주변국 설득 계속하라,” Kukmin Ilbo, May 19, 2022, https://news.kmib.co.kr/article/view.asp?arcid=0924246181&code=11171111&sid1=opi.

22. “‘미국과의 동행’ 선택한 한국, 과제로 부상한 ‘중국 리스크,’” Kyunghyang Shinmun, May 22, 2022, https://www.khan.co.kr/opinion/editorial/article/202205222055005.

23. “북한, 코로나 확진자 발생 첫 인정…‘국가 최중대 비상사건,’” Hankyoreh, May 12, 2022, https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/defense/1042531.html.

24. “윤석열 대통령 ‘北 백신·인력 지원 아끼지 않겠다,’” Hankook Kyungjae, May 16, 2022, https://www.hankyung.com/politics/article/2022051695051.

25. “권영세 ‘北코로나 직접 지원 안 되면 국제기구 통한 지원도 생각 중,’” Dong-a Ilbo, May 17, 2022, https://www.donga.com/news/Politics/article/all/20220517/113444399/2.

26. “‘北, 중국 방역지원 받기로’… 윤석열 정부, ‘코로나 남북대화’ 탐색전 돌입,” Hankook Ilbo, May 16, 2022, https://www.hankookilbo.com/News/Read/A2022051517220002020.

27. “코로나 발생한 北에 인도적 방역지원 손 내밀어야,” Seoul Shinmun, May 12, 2022, https://www.seoul.co.kr/news/newsView.php?id=20220513027025.

28. “정부 ‘코로나 방역 지원’ 제안 구체화하고 북한은 받아들여야,” Hankyoreh, May 13, 2022, https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/opinion/editorial/1042803.html.

29. “코로나 인도적 지원, 남북관계 물꼬 트길,” Kukmin Ilbo, May 14, 2022, https://news.kmib.co.kr/article/view.asp?arcid=0924245468&code=11171111&sid1=opi.

30. “코로나 뚫리고도 미사일 도발한 北의 이중적 행태,” Hankook Ilbo, May 13, 2022, https://www.hankookilbo.com/News/Read/A2022051213320003243.

31. “정부는 코로나 지원책 구체적 제시하고, 북한은 적극 응하길,” Kyunghyang Shinmun, May 13, 2022, https://www.khan.co.kr/opinion/editorial/article/202205132039005.

32. “북, ICBM 화성-17형 등 3발 섞어쐈다…한미, 미사일 대응사격,” Yonhap News Agency, May 25, 2022, https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20220525069051504.

33. “정부 성명 ‘北 도발, 강력한 한미연합 억제력으로 귀결’,” 대한민국정책브리핑, May 25, 2022, https://www.korea.kr/news/policyNewsView.do?newsId=148901953.

34. “바이든 美착륙 2시간전에… 北, ICBM 1발-SRBM 2발 섞어 쐈다,” Dong-a Ilbo, May 26, 2022, https://www.donga.com/news/Politics/article/all/20220526/113624008/1.

35. “강화된 한·미 태세, 북한은 도발 말고 주민에 신경써야,” Joongang Ilbo, May 26, 2022, https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25074281#home.

36. “北 ICBM 발사와 중러 도발, 격랑에 빠진 한반도 정세,” Hankook Ilbo, May 26, 2022, https://www.hankookilbo.com/News/Read/A2022052514550004743.

37. “바이든 순방 귀국 중 ICBM 쏜 북, 대응 수위 높인 한·미,” Kyunghyang Shinmun, May 25, 2022, https://www.khan.co.kr/opinion/editorial/article/202205252032005.

38. “북·중·러 도발과 무력시위, 안보 대응에 빈틈 없어야,” Segye Ilbo, May 25, 2022, https://www.segye.com/newsView/20220525521139.

39. “북한의 ICBM과 핵 도발은 고립만 자초한다,” Kukmin Ilbo, May 26, 2022, https://news.kmib.co.kr/article/view.asp?arcid=0924247318&code=11171111&sid1=opi.

40. “ICBM 도발, 방공식별구역 침범, 더 거세질 北·中·러 동시 위협,” Chosun Ilbo, May 26, 2022, https://www.chosun.com/opinion/editorial/2022/05/26/6N7F77QZGBDVFKBGXD7XLBPZ3Y/.

41. “New Activity at Punggye-ri Tunnel No.4,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 15, 2022, https://beyondparallel.csis.org/new-activity-at-punggye-ri-tunnel-no-4/; “New satellite images may show North Korea is prepping another nuclear test, report says” CNBC, June 16, 2022, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/06/16/new-satellite-images-may-show-north-korea-is-prepping-another-nuclear-test-report-says.html.; “전문가들 ‘북한, 4번갱도 핵실험에 몇 달 걸릴 것…7차 핵실험 시기엔 정치적·기술적 고려’” VOA, June 21, 2022, https://www.voakorea.com/a/6625608.html.

42. “IAEA Chief: N. Korea May be Preparing for Nuclear Test at Punggye-ri,” KBS, June 7, 2022, http://world.kbs.co.kr/service/news_view.htm?lang=e&Seq_Code=170133.

43. “한미일 빈틈없는 공조로 北핵실험 오판 막아야,” Yonhap News, June 3, 2022, https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20220603125000022.

44. “North Korea assumes leadership of top disarmament group,” BBC News, June 3, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-61679432.

45. “북한이 유엔 군축회의 의장국이라니, 황당하다,” Hankook Ilbo, June 4, 2022, https://www.hankookilbo.com/News/Read/A2022060314360005663.

46. “한 번에 미사일 8발 쏜 北이 ‘군축회의 의장국’이라니 가당찮다,” Maeil Kyungjae, June 6, 2022, https://www.mk.co.kr/opinion/editorial/view/2022/06/494998/.

47. “‘세계 핵질서 중대 변화 직면’ IAEA의 ‘北核 도미노’ 경고,” Donga Ilbo, June 20, 2022, https://www.donga.com/news/Opinion/article/all/20220619/114006168/1.

48. “Yoon Suk-yeol talks tough to North at Memorial Day ceremony,” Joongang Ilbo, June 6, 2022, https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25077129#home.

49. “북 도발에 지대지미사일 8발로 즉각 대응한 군,” Joongang Ilbo, June 7, 2022, https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25077129#home.

50. “미사일 ‘강대강’ 대치, 단호한 대응으로 北 오판 막아야,” Segye Ilbo, June 6, 2022, https://www.segye.com/newsView/20220606512483.

51. “북핵을 무력화시킬 ‘실질적 능력’ 확보해야,” AsiaToday, June 8, 2022, https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/view.php?key=20220608010003879.

52. “미사일 8발 쏜 북에 8발 대응, ‘강대강’ 악순환 우려한다,” Hankyoreh, June 6, 2022, https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/opinion/editorial/1045905.html.

53. “북 도발 엄정 대처” 밝힌 윤 대통령, 냉정하고 신중하길,” Kyunghyang Shinmun, June 6, 2022, https://www.khan.co.kr/opinion/editorial/article/202206062057005.

54. “北 도발에 ‘비례 사격’… 단호하면서도 유연한 대응 필요,” Hankook Ilbo, June 7, 2022, https://m.hankookilbo.com/News/Read/A2022060616040005345.

55. “North Korean Leader Reaffirms Arms Buildup in Party Meeting,” VOA, June 11, 2022, https://www.voanews.com/a/north-korean-leader-reaffirms-arms-buildup-in-party-meeting-/6613025.html.; “N. Korean leader urges stronger national defense; no new direct message toward U.S., S. Korea,” Yonhap NewsAgency, June 11, 2022, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20220611000452325.

56. “김정은 “대적투쟁” 위협… 한미일 북핵 공조 더 강화할 때,” Donga Ilbo, June 13, 2022, https://www.donga.com/news/Opinion/article/all/20220612/113900899/1.

57. “핵실험 언급 없이 ‘강대강 투쟁’ 공언한 김정은,” Hankook Ilbo, June 13, 2022, https://www.hankookilbo.com/News/Read/A2022061215400005470.

58. “강경 기조 속 핵 언급 않고, 미국통 최선희 외무상 기용한 북,” Kyunghang Shinmun, June 12, 2022, https://www.khan.co.kr/opinion/editorial/article/202206122057005.

59. “한중 외교장관 화상통화(5.16) 결과,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 16, 2022, https://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4080/view.do?seq=372313&page=11.

60. “Wang Yi Holds Virtual Meeting with ROK’s New Foreign Minister Park Jin,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, May 16, 2022, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/wjbz_663308/activities_663312/202205/t20220517_10687073.html

61. “IPEF 참여 공식화… 中 반발 후폭풍 대응전략 절실하다,” Segye Ilbo, May 17, 2022, https://www.segye.com/newsView/20220517520265.

62. Zhang Hui, “US envoy reveals Biden’s true purpose of targeting China by Asia visit, but experts say ‘countries don’t easily buy it,’” Global Times, May 17, 2022, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202205/1265898.shtml.

63. “IPEF 참여문제 중국이 이러쿵저러쿵 할일 아니다,” Maeil Kyungjae, May 18, 2022, https://www.mk.co.kr/opinion/editorial/view/2022/05/436539/.

64. “IPEF 참여 선언, 對中 굴종외교 끝내는 계기 삼아라,” Hankook Kyungjae, May 17, 2022, https://www.hankyung.com/opinion/article/2022051724751.

65. “한국 IPEF 가입, ‘중국 디커플링’ 우려는 불식해야,” Hankyoreh, May 18, 2022, https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/opinion/editorial/1043423.html.

66. “DPRK (North Korea): Yesterday’s Vote on a Sanctions Resolution,” Security Council Report, May 27, 2022, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2022/05/dprk-north-korea-yesterdays-vote-on-a-sanctions-resolution.php.

67. “안보리 대북제재 결의안 부결 관련 대변인 논평,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 27, 2022, https://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4080/view.do?seq=372344&page=1.

68. “유엔 중국대사의 ‘전쟁’ 발언 유감스럽다,” Joongang Ilbo, May 30, 2022, https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25075206#home.

69. “Explanation of Vote by Ambassador Zhang Jun on the UN Security Council Draft Resolution on the DPRK,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, May 26, 2022, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zwjg_665342/zwbd_665378/202205/t20220527_10693344.html.

70. “‘北 ICBM’ 안보리 제재 막은 중·러, 핵 터뜨려도 이럴 건가,” Chosun Ilbo, May 28, 2022, https://www.chosun.com/opinion/editorial/2022/05/28/LGN4WUOJHVA6XLZMDPTUJMRGYE/.

71. “Japan pushes to include defense budget hike in key policy guidelines,” The Japan Times, June 4, 2022, https://www.donga.com/news/Opinion/article/all/20220607/113831120/1; “Japan calls for defence spending hike in policy paper, notes threats to Taiwan,” Reuters, June 7, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/japan-calls-defence-spending-hike-policy-paper-notes-threats-taiwan-2022-06-07/.

72. “日 방위비 5년 내 2배로… 노골적 군사대국화 경계한다,” Donga Ilbo, June 8, 2022, https://www.donga.com/news/Opinion/article/all/20220607/113831120/1.

73. “한일 정상회담 추진, 첫 단추 잘 꿰야,” Hankook Ilbo, June 10, 2022, https://www.hankookilbo.com/News/Read/A2022060916290004778.

74. “NATO회의에 참석하는 윤 대통령…’현안 정리 韓日 회담’ 적기다,” Hankook Kyungaje, June 13, 2022, https://www.hankyung.com/opinion/article/2022061249811.

75. “Secretary Anthony J. Blinken and Republic of Korea Foreign Minister Park Jin at a Joint Press Availability,” U.S. Department of State, June 13, 2022, https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-and-republic-of-korea-foreign-minister-park-jin-at-a-joint-press-availability/.

76. “지소미아 조기 정상화하되 日 수출규제도 함께 풀어야,” Donga Ilbo, June 15, 2022, https://www.donga.com/news/Opinion/article/all/20220614/113934601/1.

77. “북핵 대비 한일 지소미아 정상화 결단 필요,” Financial News, June 15, 2022, https://www.fnnews.com/news/202206151828188001.

78. “곧 출범할 ‘강제동원’ 기구에 징용 해법 기대한다,” Seoul Shinmun, June 20, 2022, https://www.seoul.co.kr/news/newsView.php?id=20220621031024.

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