Country Report: South Korea (November 2021)

On September 15, a flurry of events marked a watershed moment in the Indo-Pacific region. Following its earlier launch of new cruise missiles, North Korea fired short-range ballistic missiles. With its missile restrictions lifted, South Korea successfully tested a submarine-launched ballistic missile. Later on, leaders of Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States jointly announced the formation of AUKUS, a new trilateral security partnership to counter China. Despite increasing tension in the region and seven months left until the end of his term, President Moon continued to stride toward resumption of dialogue with North Korea. In his speech at the 76th UN General Assembly, President Moon proposed a declaration to formally end the Korean War on the Korean Peninsula. In response, North Korea sent conflicting signals with its missile tests and restoration of inter-Korean communication lines. With the intensifying rivalry between the US and China, the Moon administration’s exertions to end the impasse with North Korea aimed at achieving irreversible progress in the foreseeable future confront expectations of more insecurity in the Indo-Pacific region with a new arms race.

1. ROK-US Relations

Five Eyes
Early in September, the US House Committee on Armed Services reviewed the National Defense Authorization (NDAA) Bill for Fiscal Year 2022, submitted by the Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations. In its bill, the committee explicitly pointed to China and Russia as the primary source of threats and stressed the necessity of expanding the Five Eyes intelligence sharing arrangement between the United States and the countries of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. Along with Japan, India, and Germany, South Korea was proposed as one of the possible new members.

With the deadline set for May 20, 2022, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, is required to submit a report on potential benefits of expanding the Five Eyes arrangement to include these four countries. Since the bill is at an early stage in the legislative process, government officials of South Korea refrained from responding to the issue. On September 7, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Choi Jong-kun, in a plenary session of the foreign affairs and unification committee at the National Assembly, said that the government has not officially reviewed the issue of joining the Five Eyes.¹ Later on, during the joint press conference of the ROK-Australia Foreign and Defense Ministers’ meeting, Foreign Minister Chung Eui-yong said that it was too early to make a comment on the Five Eyes and South Korea has already been engaged in cooperation in various areas with the Five Eyes countries. Suh Wook, minister of National Defense, also told reporters that there was no specific discussion on the Quad-Plus or the Five Eyes in the ROK-Australia 2+2 meeting.²

The media outlets, however, interpreted the proposal as a clear sign of the US pivoting to the Indo-Pacific after its withdrawal from Afghanistan, which will put more pressure on South Korea to join in countering China. Chosun Ilbo noted that joining the Five Eyes intelligence sharing arrangement would allow South Korea to enhance its intelligence capabilities, which have mainly focused on collecting information on North Korea, and to facilitate strategic responses in diplomacy, commerce, and military affairs.³ However, as Seoul Shinmun argued, participation in the Five Eyes might result in Beijing imposing intense pressure, reminiscent of its economic retaliation in 2016 over the deployment of the US Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in South Korea.⁴ Acknowledging the pros and cons of taking part in the US efforts to contain China, Hankook Ilbo underlined the importance of ROK-US dialogue and urged the government to negotiate prudently, when it has to, under the principle of prioritizing national interests, respecting the decision of the US, but not confronting China.⁵

AUKUS
On September 15, almost a week after US President Joe Biden’s call with his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping, leaders of Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States announced the formation of a trilateral security partnership, AUKUS, which aims to sustain peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. According to the joint statement, the first initiative under AUKUS is to support Australia in its acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines by leveraging expertise from the UK and the US. In addition, cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, and additional undersea capabilities were also listed among the areas of cooperation.⁶

South Korea’s muted response was neither close to Japan welcoming the creation of AUKUS nor like China calling it “extremely irresponsible.”⁷ On September 20, during a summit with UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson in New York, President Moon Jae-in said “I hope AUKUS will contribute to regional peace and prosperity” in response to Johnson’s remark that AUKUS would not cause any regional problems.⁸ In a meeting held by the Council on Foreign Relations, repeating Moon’s remarks, Chung Eui-yong stressed the importance of US-China cooperation, rather than developing two blocs in Asia, a Chinese one and a non-Chinese one. Highlighting how important it is for South Korea to maintain stable relations both with the US and China, Chung declined to call China “assertive” when asked whether he sensed China’s increasing assertiveness in the last few years, and said it was rather “natural” because China was becoming economically more powerful.⁹

Seen as siding with China, Chung’s remarks were met with harsh criticism from conservative media outlets. Chosun Ilbo said that Chung’s comments on China’s assertiveness showed his unrealistic view of political and cultural threats posed by China, especially in its Northeast Project, disputes over the origin of kimchi, and economic retaliation for the deployment of THAAD.¹⁰ Donga Ilbo criticized Chung’s rhetoric on “the mentality of Cold War” as a replication of China’s political wording, which is often used to criticize the US-led alliances.¹¹

With regard to the impact of AUKUS in the Indo-Pacific region, Hankyoreh said that AUKUS, intertwined with the US-China competition and North Korea’s nuclear issues, would intensify an arms race in the region. Thus, as Hankyoreh argued, it is inevitable and necessary to strengthen national defense, but the government should not fall into a vicious circle of worsening inter-Korean relations and increasing national defense expenditure without limit.¹² This voice was echoed by Moon Chung-in from Sejong Institute. In his column titled “Four Shadows of AUKUS,” Moon expressed concern over its long-term impact in the region and said its “four shadows” – emerging hierarchy among the US allies, exclusive support for Australia’s development of nuclear-powered submarines, increasing possibilities of an arms race and nuclear proliferation in the region, and increasing uncertainty in regional security – were an ominous signal as AUKUS would accelerate the emergence of a new Cold War with China rather than block it.¹³

Quad Leaders’ Summit
On September 24, Biden hosted the leaders of the three other members of the Quad (the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue), Prime Minister Scott Morrison of Australia, Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India, and Prime Minister Suga Yoshihide of Japan at the White House. With broadened areas of cooperation in space, 5G, cyber threats, infrastructure, the possibility of further expansion in its membership received attention in South Korea.

On October 13, asked whether Washington had asked Seoul to join the Quad, South Korea’s ambassador to the US Lee Soo-hyuck said that the US did not intend to expand the Quad. During a parliamentary audit of the South Korean embassy in Washington, Lee mentioned that it was premature to discuss whether to join the Quad or not without the Quad leaders’ pledge to invite new members to its strategic dialogue.¹⁴ Even so, as the leaders of South Korea and the US acknowledged “the importance of open, transparent, and inclusive regional multilateralism including the Quad” at the bilateral summit in May, Hankook Ilbo argued that Seoul should not rule out the possibility of receiving an invitation from the Quad.¹⁵ Joongang Ilbo also underscored the similarities between bilateral cooperation of the US and South Korea, and the Quad. As the Quad contains China without mentioning the word “China,” by emphasizing “shared democratic values” and evolving partnerships in technology and supply chain resilience, Joongang Ilbo noted that South Korea naturally falls within the Quad orbit.¹⁶

1. North Korea

North Korea’s Test Firing of New Long-range Cruise Missile
September was a busy month for North Korea’s missile launches. The first tests were conducted on September 11 and 12 ahead of the trilateral meeting between the top nuclear envoys of South Korea, the United States, and Japan. On September 13, Rodong Sinmun, the official newspaper of the Workers’ Party, reported that the Academy of Defence Science successfully test-fired a new type of long-range cruise missile. The Korean Central News Agency said the missiles hit targets 1,500km away after 7,580 seconds of traveling along an oval and pattern 8-flight orbits in the air.¹⁷

As the South Korean government remained silent and the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not disclose further details about the tests, media outlets expressed concern over continued advances in North Korea’s weapons program and criticized Seoul’s muted response. Donga Ilbo noted that by testing the long-range cruise missiles, North Korea was able to explore the possibility of future dialogue with Seoul and Washington without violating UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions barring ballistic missile tests.¹⁸ Concerning the absence of a response from South Korea’s military, Hankook Ilbo presented two possibilities. It said although cruise missiles fly at a low altitude of less than 500m, if the military failed to detect them, it requires an overall investigation into the ROK-US missile defense system. On the other hand, if the military had detected the missiles, then it should be clarified why the military did not disclose the details.¹⁹

On September 13, after the ROK-Australia 2+2 talks, Chung Eui-yong told reporters that North Korea’s resumption of nuclear missile activities shows the urgency of dialogue and engagement with North Korea.²⁰ Refuting Chung’s interpretation, Joongang Ilbo insisted that the South Korean government abandon the illusion of “North Korea’s willingness to denuclearize.”²¹ In contrast, Kyunghyang Shinmun underlined the fact that Kim Jong-un did not attend the test, which could be seen as Pyongyang’s reluctance to provoke neighboring countries.²² On September 14, as the US nuclear envoy Sung Kim remarked in Tokyo that the US was prepared to work with North Korea to address its humanitarian concerns “regardless of its progress on denuclearization,” Kyunghyang Shinmun saw the ball passed back to Pyongyang again but urged the US and South Korea to constantly seek creative ways to induce a response from North Korea.²³

North Korea’s Short-range Ballistic Missile Launch
On September 15, North Korea fired two short-range ballistic missiles off its east coast in violation of UNSC resolutions. This time the National Security Council held an emergency meeting and expressed its deep regret at “North Korea’s series of missile launches, which took place at a time when political stability was very critical.”²⁴ On the same day, Moon Jae-in attended an underwater test-launch of a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) and announced that South Korea became the seventh country in the world with SLBMs. Although saying the test was not in response to North Korea’s latest missile launches, he noted that increasing South Korea’s missile capabilities can be a sure deterrent against its provocations.²⁵

Widely seen as a “self-defeating” move, North Korea’s ballistic missile launches were interpreted in various ways. Hankyoreh editorialized that North Korea’s repeated missile launches were aimed at strengthening its defense capabilities while indicating that it would not engage in dialogue without lifting sanctions.²⁶ However, Kyunghyang Shinmun argued that the launch of ballistic missiles in violation of UN resolutions is unlikely to be an appealing message in the sense that it might not only cause public criticism in the US but also perplex Wang Yi, who had expressed support for Seoul’s effort at the resumption of dialogue with Pyongyang.²⁷

Conservative media outlets emphasized that the restart of the Yongbyon nuclear reactor, confirmed by the International Atomic Agency (IAEA), was followed by the latest missile launches. Chosun Ilbo expressed concern over the North Korean nuclear issues being relegated to a lower priority in Washington due to other urgent issues such as the aftermath of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, the US-China competition, and the COVID-19 pandemic. It said that North Korea would take advantage to increase its nuclear and missile capabilities.²⁸ Segye Ilbo argued that the government should not be bound by the possibility of dialogue with North Korea and underestimate the threat North Korea posed on the Korean Peninsula.²⁹

Moon Jae-in’s Call for “End of War Declaration”
In a speech at the 76th Session of the UN General Assembly, Moon Jae-in once again called for a declaration to end the Korean War. Urging the resumption of dialogue between the two Koreas and between the United States and North Korea, Moon proposed that the “three parties of the two Koreas and the US, or the four parties of the two Koreas, the US, and China declare that the war on the Korean Peninsula is over.”³⁰

Two days later, North Korea seemed to adopt a conciliatory gesture when Kim Yo-jong, the deputy department director of the Publicity and Information Department of the Workers’ Party, called Moon’s proposal “an interesting and admirable idea.”³¹ In another statement released on September 25, she implied that the issues of reinstallation of the inter-Korean liaison office and an inter-Korean summit could be discussed on condition of maintaining mutual respect between the two Koreas, and abandoning a double standard and hostile policy against North Korea.³²

However, as North Korea test-fired a hypersonic missile on September 28, it became clear that North Korea was following a two-pronged strategy. Kyunghyang Shinmun, which initially saw Moon’s proposal to formally end the Korean War as helpful to break the impasse in inter-Korean relations,³³ expressed regret over North Korea’s lack of consistency.³⁴

Briefly after the hypersonic missile launch, Kim Song, the North Korean Ambassador to the United Nations, said that the root cause of aggravation of tension and confrontation lies in the hostile policy from the US. Calling Kim Song’s remarks “illogical,” Joongang Ilbo underlined the importance of the ROK-US joint military exercises as a deterrent against Pyongyang’s provocations and misjudgment, and urged the government to resolutely respond to North Korea’s unreasonable demands.³⁵ Segye Ilbo editorialized that with around seven months left in office, there was little that could be done by the Moon administration. Therefore, the priority in inter-Korean relations should be to review North Korea policy and prevent escalating tension.³⁶

Restoration of Inter-Korean Communications Line
On September 30, Kim Jong-un at the Supreme People’s Assembly vowed to restore the communications line with South Korea, which was briefly restored in July but cut again in early August after South Korea and the US held an annual joint military exercise. Five days later, North Korea restored the line. Commentaries were markedly different along political lines; the conservative papers suspected that it was part of the North’s strategy to drive a wedge between Seoul and Washington and gain concessions while the progressive papers considered it a positive development that could bring another opportunity to restore strained inter-Korean relations.

The conservative Chosun Ilbo speculated that the move could likely be part of a premediated scenario agreed upon by the North and South Korean governments wherein the latter would restrain from speaking out against North Korean missile tests in return for having another inter-Korean summit.³⁷ Donga Ilbo commented that North Korea likely restored the hotline because it judged that it had succeeded in taming the South Korean government to be compliant to its demands and called on the government not to be unduly swayed by the North’s conflicting messages of a series of missile tests and outreach.³⁸

The moderate and progressive newspapers, despite the North’s whimsical and unpredictable behavior, were, overall, positive about developments. The moderate Hankook Ilbo editorialized that despite some misgivings about unilateral acts in the last several months, it welcomed the restoration of the line in order to reduce the risk of contingencies or miscalculations.³⁹ The moderate Kookmin Ilbo commented that although the two Koreas will not likely make any headway in reconciling their conflicting demands, they are advised to resume dialogue on such items as a virtual inter-Korean summit and joint participation in the Beijing Winter Olympics slated for February 2021.⁴⁰ The progressive Hankyoreh editorialized that the restoration can provide an impetus for improving the strained inter-Korean relations, calling on the North to return to talks and the US to detail specific incentives for the North to do so.⁴¹ The progressive Kyunghyang Shinmun urged the South Korean government to seize the opportunity to create a stable basis for dialogue with the North.⁴²

North Korea’s SLBM Test
On October 19, North Korea test-fired what it described as a new type of submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) off its eastern coast. Following the test, the Korea Central News Agency claimed that the test was part of its normal activities carried out according to its long-term defense modernization plan and was not aimed at any specific country. Both conservative and progressive papers denounced the North for conducting the test in contravention of the UN Security Council resolutions with the conservatives further criticizing an allegedly toned-down response of the Seoul government.

The conservative Donga Ilbo commented that the test approached a red-line threshold as the North apparently abnegated on its promise to halt nuclear and long-range missile tests as agreed at the 2018 U.S.-DPRK summit. Citing the Seoul government’s softening of tone against the test, the newspaper warned that being pushed around by the North would only embolden it in the future.⁴³ The conservative Joongang Ilbo noted that as the North’s nuclear-tipped SLBM would be qualitatively different from the South’s conventional SLBM, the Seoul government should accurately diagnose the North’s intent behind the test and seek realistic measures to restrain the North from engaging in any further provocations.⁴⁴ The conservative Chosun Ilbo levelled criticisms at the South Korean foreign and defense ministers, who at the National Assembly’s audit sessions refused to describe the SLBM test as a “provocation” or “strategic threat,” charging that the current government’s officials practice self-censorship to curry favor with the North in the hope of holding another summit.⁴⁵ The conservative Segye Ilbo similarly criticized the Seoul government for not demanding that the North halt its missile tests and continuing to walk on eggshells around the North in hope of an inter-Korean summit.⁴⁶ The conservative Seoul Kyungjae echoed the view that the Seoul government tinkers with the end-of-war declaration and sanction relief in exchange for holding an inter-Korean summit, warning that signing the end-of-war declaration prematurely might lead to a situation where North Korea could be recognized as a nuclear power.⁴⁷

The progressive papers criticized the North and urged its return to dialogue. Expressing concern that the SLBM test would pour cold water on the intensifying diplomatic efforts of the US and South Korea to resume dialogue, the progressive Hankyoreh called on the North to stop raising tensions and return to dialogue.⁴⁸ The progressive Kyunghyang Shinmun likewise criticized that the North demanded that South Korea and the US withdraw their double standard and hostile policy as absurd and self-contradictory when it continued to violate UN resolutions through missile tests.⁴⁹

1. ROK-China Relations

China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s Visit to Seoul
On September 15, Wang Yi met with Moon Jae-in and Chung Eui-yong in Seoul. As the meetings were held after North Korea’s cruise missile launch and the three-way talks between South Korea, Japan, and the United States in Tokyo, considerable attention was given to the bilateral cooperation between Seoul and Beijing to engage in dialogue with North Korea. However, a series of events before and after Wang Yi’s visit overshadowed the Moon administration’s exertions to break the stalemate with North Korea.

Firstly, following its earlier cruise missile launch, North Korea fired two short-range ballistic missiles on the day of Wang Yi’s meeting with Chung Eui-yong. Asked about North Korea’s cruise missile launch, Wang Yi said, “not only North Korea but also other countries engage in military acts.” Even after North Korea’s short-range ballistic missile launches, Wang Yi urged restraint by all sides to prevent unilateral military action from resulting in a vicious circle on the Korean Peninsula. Wang Yi’s remarks were seen as defending North Korea in spite of its possible violation of UNSC resolutions. In response, Donga Ilbo raised doubts about China’s influence and role on the North Korean nuclear issue and argued that China does not have any right to “teach South Korea a lesson.”⁵⁰

Secondly, a week ahead of Wang Yi’s visit to Seoul, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) announced that North Korea would be banned from the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics. Despite the IOC executive board’s decision, Moon told Wang Yi that he hoped the Olympics would be another turning point in improving inter-Korean relations and contributing to peace in Northeast Asia and the world. According to the Blue House spokesperson Park Kyung-mi, Wang Yi replied that China would try to make the Beijing Olympics an opportunity to improve inter-Korean relations. However, with the end of Moon’s term in office drawing near, Segye Ilbo saw it as highly unlikely to happen and argued that the conversation only showed the government’s obsession with dialogue with North Korea.⁵¹

Lastly, Wang Yi’s comments on the Five Eyes caught media attention. After his meeting with Chung Eui-yong, he told reporters that the Five Eyes were completely a “byproduct of the Cold War era” and already outdated. Kyunghyang Shinmun interpreted this as strong opposition to the US-led alliance to contain China.⁵² Joongang Ilbo underlined the difference between the announcements from Seoul and Beijing on the outcome of Wang Yi’s two-day visit to South Korea. Unlike China’s Foreign Ministry, it was not mentioned in the Blue House’s briefing that “China firmly supports both Koreas in overcoming difficulties and steering clear of disruptions to improve relations.”⁵³ It is because “steering clear of disruptions” reflects not only an underling tension between the US and China but also an intention to separate ROK-US relations from inter-Korean relations.⁵⁴

China’s Release of Australian Coal from Bonded Storage
On October 5, it was reported that to fight an unfolding power crunch, China had started unloading Australian coal shipments, which had remained in bonded storage for about a year after the country had imposed unofficial import bans on the fuel amid the diplomatic tensions over the origin of the coronavirus. Describing the news as a win for Australia, the conservative Seoul Kyungjae editorialized that the case has great implications for South Korea, which the newspaper said similarly faced China’s pressures and retaliatory measures over the deployment of THAAD batteries on its territory. The newspaper called on South Korea to adopt a hedgehog strategy through which it pairs defending its sovereign rights with reducing dependence on Chinese trade and investment and maintaining a technological edge in such fields as semiconductors and batteries.⁵⁵ The conservative AsiaToday likewise commented that South Korea should learn from the Australian case and stand up to China when it comes to sovereignty in the realms of economy and security.⁵⁶

1. ROK-Japan Relations

Inauguration of the Kishida Cabinet
On October 4, Kishida Fumio, a former foreign minister, was officially elected as the 100th prime minister of Japan in the country’s bicameral parliament. Eleven days after the inauguration, on October 15, Moon Jae-In held his first telephone call with Kishida, mentioning differing interpretations of the scope of the 1965 Basic Treaty, and suggesting accelerating the search for a diplomatic solution to the forced labor and “comfort women” issues, which have caused bilateral relations since 2019 to fall to their lowest point.

The conservative Segye Ilbo commented that both Korea and Japan ought to recognize the necessity of dialogue and consultations in resolving the history issues, particularly given the changing security landscape in Asia marked by the continued North Korea nuclear issue and China. Noting that Kishida sent his first ritual offering to the Yasukuni Shrine after taking office, the newspaper pointed out that improving strained relations would require a fundamental shift in Japan’s attitudes toward its wartime behavior.⁵⁷ The conservative Seoul Shinmun echoed this view, saying that it is undesirable for relations to remain at a deadlock for more than two years over trade disputes amid a host of foreign and security issues in the region, including territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Citing the Seoul government’s efforts to mend its ties with Japan, including deliberate inaction toward complying with the court’s order to sell the local assets of Japanese firms to pay remuneration to the Korean victims of wartime forced labor, the newspaper called on the Japanese government to reciprocate by coming to talks to improve the strained relationship.⁵⁸

The progressive Kyunghyang Shinmun commented that although it was regrettable that Kishida seemed to have purposely left out mentioning South Korea in his first press conference, it was hoped that he would engage with Seoul after a lower house election slated to take place in late October.⁵⁹ The progressive Hankyoreh commented that although Kishida seemed to value continuity in foreign and defense policies as evidenced by retaining the foreign and defense ministers, it had hope that he could recognize the need for a closer relationship, given the changing environment in Asia and would enter talks with Seoul without preconditions.⁶⁰

1. Climate Change

Nuclear Phase-out Policy
In October, in a seeming reversal of course, European countries looked anew at nuclear energy as a solution to decarbonize their economies and achieve net zero carbon emissions. On October 10, sixteen ministers from ten European Union member states published opinion articles in leading European newspapers arguing that Europe needs nuclear energy, which they claimed to be a clean, safe, independent, and competitive source of energy. In a separate but related move, on October 12, French President Emmanuel Macron unveiled “France 2030,” a 30 billion-euro ($47 billion) investment plan, to make France a leader in green and nuclear energy by building small, modular nuclear reactors and factories for producing green hydrogen.

Conservative newspapers used the news to criticize Moon’s nuclear energy phase-out policy. Chosun Ilbo editorialized that the Seoul government would likely harm energy security and greenhouse gas reduction mandates by pushing to replace competitive nuclear energy with unreliable wind and solar energy.⁶¹ Segye Ilbo editorialized that among countries, South Korea is unique in being fixated on phasing out nuclear energy, adding that energy policy should be informed by science not by politics or ideologies.⁶² Joongang Ilbo also commented that it would be increasingly hard for the government to build a public consensus on its nuclear phase-out policy and that the administration to be elected next year should review the desirability of continuing the policy.⁶³ Hankook Kyungjae went further to charge that “going against the global trend of increasing the share of nuclear energy without warrant would amount to a crime,” calling on the government to “acknowledge it had erred and start restoring nuclear industry and supporting the export of nuclear technologies.”⁶⁴ Seoul Kyungjae commented that the Seoul government should break out of its illusion that it can achieve net zero carbon emissions through increasing wind and solar energy in the total energy mix in the short term.⁶⁵ Maeil Kyungjae noted that the joint opinion articles published by the European ministers signified that nuclear power would be needed to fulfil national energy demands.⁶⁶ AsiaToday also commented that there is growing support for the view that to achieve net zero carbon emissions and stave off potential long-term economic depression due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the country should promote exporting nuclear energy technology and strengthen a partnership with the US in the nuclear energy market.⁶⁷