County Report: Japan (December 2024)

The last third of 2024 was nothing less than a disaster for Japanese foreign policy. After the publication of memoires detailing the seedy side of the momentous decade from 2013 into 2024, as former ambassadors let fly with their resentments, the record of that era still looked impressive and likely to endure. Then, domestic turnabouts in Japan, the United States, and South Korea, month-by-month, decimated the Camp David summit trio and potentially their legacy. Japanese media criticized Ishiba Shigeru’s wish-list as way out-of-touch, Donald Trump’s triumph as likely to sow chaos, and Yoon Suk-yeol’s “own goal” and impeachment as a threat to both bilateral and trilateral relations. There was no room for optimism as the year was ending.   

On December 23, Yomiuri looked back on 2024, pointing to “America First” in the headline as the first of ten foreign events, signaling Trump’s election victory. It pointed to his demands for allies to bear their share of the burden and to agree to deals while using tariffs as a weapon. Concern is spreading that relations with allies will be in retreat. With Trump pushing personnel and policies according to his own will through Republican-controlled houses of Congress, scenes of disorder will be on the rise. This warning followed months of wary coverage of Trump’s ascent. Also of concern was the third year of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the Hamas-Israel war extending beyond one year. A weighty matter for international society, including the Trump administration, will be how to realize ceasefires in Ukraine and Gaza. Neither issue elicited any confidence that answers were in sight or that Japan would play a meaningful role in them.

Yomiuri also recalled the stabbing of a 10-year-old Japanese boy at a school in China, leaving to date the motive unclear if a Japanese was being targeted. Hope for improvement in Japan-China relations remained uncertain in light of China not clarifying the situation. Even as China seemed keen on breathing new life into bilateral relations, as seen in a visit of Japan’s foreign minister in late December, and Japan too showed signs of hedging against Trump, fundamental problems in the relationship were no closer to resolution, as optimism proved hard to detect. For Japan, what is serious is North Korea sending forces and arms to Russia, and Russia, in return, assisting the development of its nuclear weapons and missiles, damaging stability in Asia. The Yomiuri list showcased this tightening relationship without Japan having a response.

One other item listed was the disorder in South Korea when Yoon Suk-yeol declared martial law, was impeached, and faced the Constitutional Court. There is concern that this will have a bad influence on Japan-ROK relations, Yomiuri observed, following weeks of intense hand-wringing over the unforeseen developments that could negate the progress in 2023-24. Finally, the Taiwan earthquake killing 18 persons draws a mention, as Japanese send donations, recalling that Taiwan was tops in the world in donations after the eastern Japan earthquake. The promise of closer ties with Taiwan was marred, however, by alarm over China’s threats to act.

The end of the year exposed Japan’s weakness and irrelevance to global developments. It was a mere bystander as Yoon Suk-yeol committed virtual seppuku by declaring martial law in South Korea, endangering Japan’s crowning success in international relations since 2023. As Donald Trump triumphed in the US elections and cast aside tradition by running in advance of his inauguration a shadow foreign policy, Japan was not positioned to be a primary partner, as happened in 2016 when Abe beat others to Trump’s side. Instead, it had to watch nervously for policy changes at odds with its interests—whether toward Ukraine or tariffs. Moreover, global attention was diverted from the Indo-Pacific by events in the Middle East and Europe, on which Japan’s future might depend but for which it had no input. The level of unpredictability climbed beyond anything seen in decades, not excluding in Japanese politics, especially troubling for a country enamored of stability through one-party rule, a secure alliance, and regional order.

The Abe legacy had given Japan false hopes after a decade with worrisome marginalization. In the 2000s, Japan remained the world’s second economy, its alliance with the United States was never jeopardized by US unilateralism, and Japan’s position in Asia remained rather strong. For Abe, this was insufficient, wary about a lack of preparation for rising military tensions without becoming a “normal country” over security, and eager for a proactive foreign policy to assure Washington, counter Beijing, and widen security bonds with Australia, India, and ASEAN states. Through a momentous decade of transformation, Abe and Kishida (after a brief interlude with Suga on top) gave Japanese and the world confidence that Japan had reasserted its role as a great power. Yet, such optimism came crashing down by the events, domestic as well as international, at the end of 2024. Many doubted that Ishiba would have the right answers.

On September 27, Yomiuri reported on the high evaluations given to Kishida’s diplomacy, as he made his final foreign trip to the UN General Assembly meeting. Especially Biden appreciated his: boost to defense spending, joint response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine; and improvement in Japan-ROK relations. He had played a leading role in globalization of the Ukraine question and in securing European recognition of the linkage of Japan’s assistance to European cooperation in restraining China. After cooperating on Ukraine, Kishida achieved what Abe could not on gaining a counterstrike capability and boosting the US alliance. Those around Kishida explain that what he did was more than a continuation of Abe’s agenda, and he went beyond Abe’s “FOIP” moves with AUKUS, the trilateral with South Korea, and the trilateral with the Philippines, realizing greater deterrence of China. As his public support fell, he accomplished a brief boost through his visit to Ukraine and the Hiroshima G7 summit. His plans for arms exports stalled, as they did for a tax to pay for the increased military budget. The next prime minister will have to develop his own foreign policy agenda while sufficiently continuing the existing, Kishida course.

A Yomiuri editorial on October 1 called for security policy that will not create disorder in the alliance, warning that what a prime minister says is different from what an individual member of the Diet says. A prime minister must prioritize the state and the national interest. Ishiba said that his mission is to raise the Japan-US alliance to the level of the US-UK one. Now he should restrain his words in order to stabilize the alliance. Only to the extent that Japan is threatened is it possible to proceed with collective defense. Constitutional revision would be required to proceed to all-around collective defense. On the legal handling of cases involving US troops in Japan, Ishiba also needs to avoid disrupting the alliance. Also care should be taken on nuclear weapons rhetoric that could raise questions about Japan’s three non-nuclear principles.  This warning followed Ishiba’s article for the Hudson institute calling for not only an Asian NATO but also “joint nuclear weapons control” inside Japan, noted in Yomiuri on September 29. On September 30 another Yomiuri editorial warned of friction in the alliance from Ishiba’s plans as detailed in his Hudson Institute article just published. It pointed to his call for revising the security treaty, sending the SDF to Guam, transforming the alliance to the level of the US-UK alliance. Quoted is Hosoya Yuichi’s remark that Japan does not have the conditions to fill the role of a NATO partner. The editorial called for Ishiba to strike a realistic balance and not cause confusion in the alliance, which could be used by China, Russia, and North Korea.

On October 4 Ishiba’s first policy speech to the Diet omitted his favorite foreign policy themes, noted Yomiuri the following day. NATO enlargement, alliance renegotiation, and a liaison office in Pyongyang were off the table due to difficulties within the LDP, it was reported. Removing Article 9 and other constitutional reforms would yield to urging further discussion. It was well understood that Ishiba had little time to prepare, but with time there was no hint of the plans.

Yamagami Shingo, retired as ambassador to Australia in 2023, wrote a book on the inferiority of Japan’s diplomacy and the path to its revival. In it he discussed the chaotic year of 2024 as well as policy issues impacting ties to Russia, China, the United States, and South Korea. Among his reasons for alarm in early 2024 were expected aggravated Taiwan-PRC relations with Lai Ching-te’s election, the growing danger of Trump winning the US elections, Xi Jinping’s warnings that a “Taiwan contingency” was only a matter of time and increasing pressure on the Senkakus, North Korea’s growing closeness to Russia as it keeps alive reunification of the peninsula, and drills by Russia and China together in Northeast Asia. As the security environment in Northeast Asia is worsening, Japan needed to wake up. Is it prepared for US fatigue over the Russo-Ukraine war and what Trump could bring to US policy? Would some former diplomats in Japan press for the revival of pacifism? Will Japan’s foreign policy be tested by Trump’s fascination with Putin and disregard of Europe, as matters in Ukraine and East Asia become linked? These are the queries.

In his book on the degradation of Japanese diplomacy and the path to its revival, Yamagami set forth his reflections and suggestions. He had already published books on both his Australian frontline experience and China’s “wolf warrior” diplomacy. Arguing that despite the severity of the problems the foreign ministry is facing, the spirit there has been degraded, as top officials understate the challenges. In 2024, opening with the election of Lai Ching-te in Taiwan and China’s tough responses, indicating that it is not a matter of whether but of when China will use force as it intensifies its salami tactics. With the election of Donald Trump, whose return is proving nerve-racking for diplomats, Japanese must look back candidly on policy misjudgments in recent years, says Yamagami. It must awaken to the deterioration of the security environment in Northeast Asia, caused by China, Russia, and North Korea. Also of concern are comments Trump has made, casting doubt on US staying power on Ukraine and the naivete of some who came from the foreign ministry who advocate an immediate ceasefire. As some speak of not provoking China, Yamagami says Japan must not be a bystander, it must be an actor. Given Trump’s past with Kim Jong-un, as in his meeting with him at Panmunjom following the 2019 G7 summit in Hiroshima, Japan must be prepared. Yet, the book warns that the foreign ministry is unprepared, as the cases exposed by him provocatively reveal.

The first of five cases covered is Japan’s policy toward Russia under Abe Shinzo. Saying that the evaluation of Abe’s diplomacy remains unsettled in Japan while there is continued talk in favor of defending his legacy, Yamagami finds that the informed community has thus far not had sufficient and calm two-sided analysis. His greatest accomplishment, compared to Nakasone’s, was to raise Japan’s international standing, praised abroad more than at home. Also worthy of praise was his role in TPP, saving it and putting Great Britain on a path to joining, appreciated by many in the United States too. In the face of those who did not want to provoke China, Abe’s regional initiatives, including a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” was another success. However, his policy toward Russia naturally alienated many informed Japanese, including those who had supported his other foreign policies. Listing reasons why Abe pursued Putin, Yamagami finds them flawed, as in the notion that Japan could drive a wedge between Russia and China, which many allies of Japan found to be no more than wishful thinking. The article blames Japan’s foreign ministry for views such as that only Putin can resolve the territorial question, as if the Russian public would follow. The Russian school as well as some foreign ministry “old boys” sometimes poured cold water on such optimism, but others fed it. Similarly, Abe’s plans for talks with North Korea exceeded realistic advice. Abe made one-sided concessions on a two-island deal, which Russia pocketed with lasting damage to Japan’s position, and the foreign ministry was largely silent. Plans for pilot projects for joint economic activities on the islands advanced, e.g., joint farming of marine products, greenhouse vegetables, tourism, wind power, and waste disposal, but relevant firms took no interest, seeing them economically unviable. The response was a classic case symbolic of the degradation of the foreign ministry. Japan now needs to wait patiently, as did the Baltic states after they were annexed by the Soviet Union. Yamagami recalls his own role giving intelligence briefings to overly optimistic officials, who may have misjudged the costs of the concessions being sought. Under Suga and Kishida there was no reckoning, just excusing the abrupt change of course in 2022 as due to totally new circumstances, overlooking the continuities in Russia during its 2008 aggression in Georgia and in Ukraine in 2014. 

Yamagami’s second case was softness in the China school within the Japanese foreign ministry toward China. Excessive sympathy toward China as a backward country and victim of aggression had been widespread in the China school. Then the next generation was one-sided in concern for China saving face, not Japan, prioritizing avoiding arousing China while sustaining good relations. When it came to the Senkaku issue, the focus was on preventing it from harming the relationship, not doing anything to affirm Japan’s sovereignty. Bending to China’s will, Japan reached a climax in 2010 with the handling of a Chinese fishing boat captain who repeatedly, intentionally rammed a Japanese maritime cruiser only to be released under Chinese pressure to a hero’s welcome back home. Politics trumped the law, and Japan’s international image was sullied, as seen in the reaction of foreign ambassadors. Foreign ministry officials and Minshuto leaders were stained. Not only the China school, but the foreign ministry as a whole, had a low consciousness of danger, seeking to avoid trouble, as in the case of visits to the Yasukuni Shrine by the prime minister and cabinet members. This stimulated China to play the “history card.” In 2003-04, when China protected its semi-conductor industry causing great losses to Japanese companies, Japan unlike the United States did not defend its firms and demand bilateral talks with the prospect of taking the case to the WTO. Speaking of the North America department head, the China department head said that while that person works for the United States, he works for China, not that work for Japan, as he should have. There was worry about the effect of taking action on the forthcoming visit of Japan’s foreign minister to China. Yamagami explains that the younger generation in the China school are now more realistic, no longer refusing to treat China as a threat and a security challenge, as reflected in the 2022 national security strategy. He adds that Japan’s key partners were guilty too of being excessively cautious. The China school was not the only cause. In 2023 on the Fukushima water discharge issue, instead of taking it to the WTO, defeatism prevailed. Other issues raised by Yamagami are “saying no” to the United States and the departure from Kabul.

The most intense recent criticism of Japanese diplomacy has centered on the “comfort women” issue, remarks Yamagami. Due to the poor handling of this and weak lobbying power of the foreign ministry, there are now more than 100 “comfort women” statues around the world. The goalposts keep being moved, he says, wondering why Japan cannot just stick to its message that, legally, all financial issues were settled in 1965. Even if other countries do not apologize for their past conduct, Japan must keep doing so to keep the moral high ground, officials have said. Weakness leads to continued apologies, which then lead to “history wars” and anti-Japanese attacks, which foreign ministry officials do not seem to understand. In Australia, resolutions were aired and “comfort women” statues erected. In the US the Korean community is larger than the Japanese community, and Chinese raise the same issue too. A vigorous Japanese information campaign is needed. Kishida and Yoon agreed that the issue is resolved once and for all and irreversibly. Now we will see if the foreign ministry can stick to that, but its past behavior raises doubt. The statues leave an image of Japanese barbarity, thus sullying the country’s image.

Noting that Ishiba had taken office amid rising international tensions, Yomiuri on September 28 pointed to the urgency of strengthening alliances against China and Russia. At his first news conference as prime minister on September 27, Ishiba touted his long-run experience in dealing with security and stressed the urgency of responding to new aggressive moves by these two countries. In calling for an “Asian NATO,” Ishiba had in mind joining the Japan-US alliance with the US-ROK and US-Philippines alliance, and other frameworks, but this appears unrealistic. At the same time, Ishiba seeks to lighten the burden on Okinawa, risking change in the structure of the US-Japan alliance. When the US has a new president after the November elections it will be critical for Ishiba to build a close relationship, the article warns.

Yomiuri on November 13 editorialized about US protectionism and Trump’s tariff policy. It warned that if they went forward the world economy would suffer a sharp blow. China, Europe, and others would retaliate, and the reignition of a trade war could not be avoided. The US as the world’s largest economy has been the center of support for free trade. Manufacturing was hollowed out by globalization, and a strong reaction came from workers, made worse as low-income persons suffered from price hikes. Yet, protectionist policies will not suffice to bring back jobs; on the contrary they will reheat inflation, which will only fall heavily on the supporters of Trump. Policies should be based on realism. As for Japan, there is concern for the impact on auto producers. The United States is the biggest export destination with about 1.5 million cars a year. Trump is counting on a deal, using tariffs to increase production inside the United States. As of the end of 2023, Japan had directly invested in the United States about $780 billion, tops among countries five years running. Japan’s automakers created a lot of jobs there, which the government should tenaciously explain. It is regrettable that Trump disparages multilateralism, having abandoned TPP and negatively reacted to the Biden administration’s IPEF. The greatest danger for the United States is China, and a multilateral framework joining with Japan, Europe, and others would be most effective in correcting the unfair trade situation, readers are told.

On November 21, Yomiuri editorialized about Trump’s “unchecked” power and those he planned to appoint, warning of an especially great impact on Japan and on the world of his foreign and security policy. It could mean, readers were told, a worsening of Japan’s security environment due to excessive tension in US-China relations. The paper called on Japan to urge restraint and improve relations with both countries. In facing Trump’s policies, including the return of “America first” and “dealing,” Japan must pursue its own national interests. It must weigh both alliance and international cooperation values, considering such things as increased imports from the United States of LNG as part of energy security at a crossroads and a strengthened system of cooperation with related countries, not concentrating on only one side of its possibilities.

A Sankei editorial on November 12 warned that it would be a big mistake if interest were lost in diplomatic security, which is a life-or-death matter for the United States and alliance relations. The paper said that Ishiba must recognize the urgency of strengthening the alliance through early direct talks with Trump. In the face of direct threats from China, North Korea, and Russia, Japan must solidify US involvement in Japan’s defense, a Taiwan contingency, or a contingency on the Korean Peninsula. Ishiba’s most important duty is to draw Trump’s interest to Japan and Northeast Asia and the Indo-Pacific. The urgency of forging personal relations was well noted.

Russia

On October 1, Yomiuri reported that Russia’s military budget would rise by 25% in 2025, reaching 6.3% of the GDP and, together with security, will comprise 41% of state expenses. The danger in Asia as well as Europe from Russia’s militarization had become a frequent theme. As talk intensified of 2025 negotiations to end the Russia-Ukraine war, Japan’s role proved difficult to predict. Would it assume a leadership role in rebuilding Ukraine, as assumed in 2023 by some Japanese optimists? Would it work closely with NATO countries, succeeding in getting them to reciprocate for Japan’s help on Ukraine with growing cooperation in the Indo-Pacific? Or would Japan somehow rebuild ties with Russia, no longer isolated by its aggressive war?

A former director-general of the European Affairs Bureau of the foreign ministry, Nishimura Mutsuyoshi, called for the third approach through a “New Pax Eurasiana.” Anticipating a post-Putin Russia, he appealed for countering Trump’s pursuit of unrestricted power, vengeance, and cracks in the liberal democratic coalition of nations by joining with European countries to bring Russia into the liberal camp. Reviving the theme that Japan can benefit from big investments in Siberian energy resources, Nishimura hinted at a pact with European states to constrain Trump, using an anticipated about-face in Russia as the instrument to forge Eurasianism, not along the lines of a Russia-China axis, but through revitalization of the liberal, democratic order. Writing in the Global Forum of Japan commentary in May, Nishimura challenged conventional thinking.

Mifune Emi was a voice warning of the challenge from China and Russia to the order centered on the United States, explaining that Russia’s assault on Ukraine and claims of the “indivisibility of security” justified a hegemonic strategy shared with China. In the joint declaration of Russia and China during Putin’s May visit to China, one subject was the navigation of Chinese ships on the Tumen River joining the two countries and North Korea, as well as the Arctic route marked by the growing presence of Chinese ships in the Tsugaru Strait. Yet, China is discomforted by the new Russia-North Korea bonds, concerned that it will draw Japan, the ROK, and US even closer together. Through BRICS and the SCO China seeks closer ties to states in the Middle East. Its slogan “community of common destiny” is a call to challenge the US-led international order and replace it with a China-led order opposed to the values behind the existing order. Countries in the West would not forget if the US abandons Ukraine, as China will conduct a psychological war toward Taiwan that the US will not stand with it to the end either, thus ceding leadership to China. In Yomiuri on July 5 this message is conveyed, intended as a warning of Trump’s impact.

Japanese sources took close notice of the Sino-Russian-North Korean nexus and the absence of means to stop it from tightening, as covered in Yomiuri on August 13.  Looking to leadership change in Washington and Tokyo, there was uncertainty on how to strengthen linkages that worked to maintain the international order.  The pessimistic mood preceded the fall events.

Asada Masafumi in the September Chuo Koron reviewed perception bias in regard to the Japan-USSR war of 1945, noting that Putin has been drawing attention to the war in references to North Korea, China, and Mongolia, distorting its nature. Neither Russians nor Japanese know much about it, the former mixing it up with the 1904-05 Russo-Japanese war, but coverage is being added in Russian textbooks, and on September 3 victory remembrances were held across the Russian Far East. The war left problems unresolved to the present, contributing to a divided Korea, communist victory in China, and Japan’s loss of land. Japanese had misjudged Soviet aims in April to August 1945, as if Moscow could be an intermediary to achieve peace and failing to recognize that Soviet war aims differed from US ones, including territorial expansion and abuse through un-humanitarian behavior of Japanese caught under Soviet control. Japanese observers who call for a temporary ceasefire in Ukraine are likewise misjudging Russian aims and behavior. Asada asks if this type of perception bias and wishful thinking is not a pattern of the Japanese.

The annual Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok seemed more ominous in 2024 than in the 2010s when Abe Shinzo joined with upbeat talk of improving Japan-Russia relations. Malaysia’s Anwar Ibrahim met with Putin there on September 5, expressing a desire to join the BRICS, as Putin continued to show interest in broadening the “non-Europe-US” framework with ASEAN members. Thailand had already expressed its desire to join BRICS. In preparation for the Kazan BRICS summit of October 22-24, invitations had gone out to 36 leaders, not all in BRICS. This was reported on September 5 in Yomiuri. Later, Japanese media followed the BRICS summit.

On September 27, Yomiuri noted that Foreign Minister Lavrov asserted that talk of North Korean denuclearization is meaningless, reflecting the new state of Russia-North Korea relations. The Russian official cited the deep threat posed by the renewed militarized path taken in the US-ROK alliance with Japan now added. Moreover, Lavrov expressed understanding for the position of North Korea on nuclear weapons and missiles in its defense.

China

All countries, large and small, must be treated equally, and one-sided coercion to alter the status quo is unacceptable, were the mantra of those opposing the Sino-Russian challenge to the world order. This was the July 7 message in Yomiuri as well as in other coverage.

As Beijing as well as Moscow intensified their appeal for countries to join their groupings for non-Western countries, attention on the other side turned to states in Europe “leaving China” or as Japanese put it (datsu Chugoku). When Chancellor Scholz met with Kishida on July 12, agreement on economic security was heralded in Japan as Germany taking a step to leave its dependency on China, despite its limited nature, as reported on July 14 in Yomiuri.

On September 25, Yomiuri noted the unease among Americans and Europeans regarding the lack of safety for foreigners in China after the stabbing incident involving a Japanese boy and the lack of clarity from China on its causes. Previously, foreigners had felt safe in China, but now the feeling has changed. Is patriotism fueling hatred of foreigners? Koreans too are echoing these concerns. The Japanese ambassador to China spoke of Japanese firms in China now facing a big crossroads, as Japanese schools there adopt new measures to protect the security of students.

Yomiuri also reported on a foreign ministers’ meeting in New York, where Japan called for restraining anti-Japanese media in China that lead to actions such as the stabbing to death of a Japanese boy as well as clarity on the investigation under way. As for the restrictions on Japan’s maritime products, Kawakami called for their early removal. On the stabbing, Wang Yi was reported to have responded that the Japan should avoid politicizing the issue.  

Global South

The struggle over the “Global South” drew repeated attention. As the Gaza war proceeded, it was said that anti-colonialist feelings were strong, especially in Islamic countries, charging the US with a “double standard.” Some states straddled two camps. India both joined BRICS and the SCO and participated in the Quad. Southeast Asia had become the principal arena for the US-China clash. Malaysia belonged to CPTPP and applied to BRICS. The Philippines was an ally of the United States, had become a “quasi-ally” of Japan, and was developing with them the “Luzon economic corridor” project. A US ally, Thailand sought entry into BRICS. While Vietnam joined with China in affirming a strategic community of shared destiny, it belonged to CPTPP and was thinking of joining BRICS. Important for Japan, one article explained, was to understand the situation in the “Global South,” not force a choice, and forge long-term, stable relations of trust with self-restraint. As China and Russia pursued an alternative order, restraint was required, as explained in Yomiuri on August 18, likely wary of US handling of the “Global South.”

South Korea

On September 21, Yomiuri covered the fierce criticism in South Korea directed at Yoon’s policy of cooperation with Japan. Yoon is called a traitor, his policy seen as humiliating, and impeachment talk can be heard. The article warns that next year on the 60th anniversary of normalization, one can expect intensification of the anti-Japan movement. Unlike the boycott movement during the Moon Jae-in era, this movement is not aimed at Japanese firms and the Japanese government, but at the Yoon administration. In August a focus was Yoon’s handling of the Sado Island gold mine issue with UNESCO. Yoon is called a “chinilpa spy” (pro-Japan spy). Given these views and the thinking of the opposition leader in South Korea, the article is pessimistic on the future.