European governments, NATO, the EU, and the G7 all identify China and Russia as threats; however, an analysis of threat assessments reveals a mix of unity and diversity. There is no uniform threat assessment concerning either Russia or China nor is there likely to be one. As a result, the EU, where there is no American lead to formulate a consensus threat assessment, cannot agree among its own members on whether or not to have a summit with Vladimir Putin. Regarding China, Germany is much more reluctant to come down hard on misbehavior because of the enormous importance of the Chinese market to German trade and investment, especially as foreign policy is heavily weighted to its interests as a major exporter and the engine of the European economy.
This is not likely to change when Prime Minister Angela Merkel steps down in September 2021. Her presumptive successor, Armin Laschet of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), is clearly leery of casting either Russia or China as enemies despite everything that has occurred over the last few years. Laschet told the Financial Times that, the West must establish a “sensible” relationship with Russia—as if it was up to the West alone to make Russia behave “sensibly”—and that, “ignoring Russia has served neither our nor the US interests.” Although there is no record of anyone ignoring Russia since the invasion of Crimea but much evidence of Russian obstruction, this stance will erode the unity expressed in the EU, NATO, and G7 communiques against the Russian threat. On China, Laschet, like Merkel, was even more explicit, saying,
The question is—if we’re talking about ‘restraining’ China, will that lead to a new conflict? Do we need a new adversary?” he said. “And there the European response was cautious, because, yes, China is a competitor and a systemic rival, it has a different model of society, but it’s also a partner, particularly in things like fighting climate change.”
Thus, even as Germany upbraids China for its human rights violations and enacts legislation that increasingly limits companies like Huawei, “economic relations continue to flourish and intensify.” In 2019, China was Germany’s largest trading partner for the fourth year in a row. German car manufacturers sell more vehicles in China than domestically. As one post-mortem on Merkel’s tenure observes, “her prioritization of German business interests created a permissive environment for Russian and Chinese malign influence in Germany and Europe more broadly.”
China has tried to exploit these divergent assessments by falsely claiming that President Macron and Chancellor Merkel support restoring the investment pact of 2020 that the EU had refused to ratify. Furthermore, President Xi Jinping has also appealed to Macron and Merkel on what he said was an “opportunity” created by his Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), weeks after G7 leaders agreed on forging a democratic alternative. He also called for a quadrilateral platform—China, France, Germany, Africa—to jointly develop the continent. And this came after the EU and G7 both argued for establishing an institutional counterweight to the Belt and Road Initiative.
Similarly, Vladimir Putin penned an article on the 80th anniversary of the invasion of the USSR, which, apart from being a mendacious and one-sided account of European history, represented a bald-faced attempt to portray the US as an interloper in Europe and lay the basis for the Russo-German entente that Russian leaders have sought to preserve since the 18th century, including Lenin and Stalin if not also Brezhnev and Gorbachev. Putin seems to have decided that the lure of the Russian market to Germany, German feelings of remorse over World War II (which do not extend, e.g. to Ukraine or the Baltic States or Poland), and gratitude for the unification of Germany in 1990 constitute a lasting basis for Russian probes towards Germany to detach itself from its transatlantic moorings and neutralize its effectiveness as a champion of European interests. In the Nord Stream 2 affair, Germany vigorously pursued its own energy companies’ and foreign policy interests at the expense of those of its European allies and co-members of the EU. Thus, President Biden’s decision to refrain from pressuring Germany on the Nord Stream 2 pipeline has already had unfortunate consequences. As Andrew Michta of the Marshall Center observed:
The Biden administration’s decision to drop sanctions against the Nord Stream 2 pipeline signaled that Washington is looking to Germany to lead post-Brexit Europe. The U.S. isn’t going to try to force Germany to take a tougher stance against Moscow. This decision also puts Russia back in the European power-balancing game by increasing Europe’s dependence on Russian energy.”
Biden’s summit with Putin, which had a very different tone than what French and German leaders want to say to him, is used to justify their individual or concerted approaches to Russia even though they were taken without consultation with other European governments. Lithuania and others are now calling for an EU summit of all the members with China to discuss outstanding issues lest the 1+17 format hitherto in use during bilateral negotiations be exploited by China or individual gambits like those of Germany occur again. Michta concludes that, “European NATO allies and America are unlikely to reach a consensus on the severity of the threat China poses in the near future. Nor is it probable that Russia’s continued pressure on NATO’s eastern flank will galvanize Europe to rebuild its armed forces.”
Putin and Xi Jinping expect that there are opportunities to divide European leaders, to split the Transatlantic alliance, and to advance the interests of their countries. Yet their views fail to take account of the deleterious impact that their own diplomacy, whether “wolf warriors” in China’s case or Russia’s bristling refusal to make any concessions, has on their success. Based on genuine cleavages among European governments in their threat assessments, Moscow and Beijing will not stop probing despite their unwillingness to yield any ground.
Eastern and Central European Views
The threat assessment picture for much of the West remains clouded. On the one hand, Chinese and Russian conduct is fostering a certain gravitation towards the US view, while US pressure and regenerated leadership of NATO and better ties with the EU are having an effect. The Wall Street Journal reports that, “Some European countries are starting to block Chinese investment in their economies, drawing closer to positions advocated by the U.S. amid growing anxiety in Europe over China’s increasingly aggressive geopolitical posture.” Others add:
While there remain plenty of Central European officials happy or even eager to welcome Chinese investment, the reaction against perceived China Great Power bullying has been relatively swift. In 2021, for example, Latvia’s foreign minister and a leading Bulgarian liberal politician both described the Three Seas Initiative as a potential defense against suspect Russian and Chinese influence alike and welcomed the US role in Three Seas aa counterweight against both.”
Still others have noted this trend as well as European resistance to certain Chinese exports:
Eastern European countries have also increasingly begun pushing back on PRC participation in major infrastructure projects. Romania, for example, chose to exclude Chinese companies from participation in key physical infrastructure projects over a lack of EU-style credentials indicating their ability to successfully perform the project work.”
A more mellifluous diplomacy might erode Transatlantic unity and European alliances and obtain more benefits for China and Russia, given the pervasive evidence of discord in Europe. Many European governments, not just Germany, are closely tied economically to China or seek its support against Russia. This reluctance to criticize China is the case, as shown below, with regard to Belarus and Ukraine, and possibly to Georgia as well. Turkey too, which plays an ever-increasing role as a power in the Middle East and the Caucasus and has major European interests at stake in the Balkans, has also been suborned by the fear of losing trade and Chinese support, stifling condemnation of the genocide of the Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang.
At the same time, there is abundant evidence that the bloom is off the rose on Russo-Turkish relations. During 2020 Russian and Turkish proxies clashed violently in Syria and Libya. In Nagorno-Karabakh, Turkey clawed itself into a prominent position in the Caucasus as a result of the Armenian-Azeri war, much to the discomfort of Russian analysts. Finally, Turkey’s open support for Ukraine and willingness to support it regarding Crimea and transfer its weapons and technology to Ukraine have clearly rattled Russian leaders.
Even in Central and Eastern Europe we encounter diverse opinions regarding both Russia and China—assessments constantly in flux due to the dynamic quality of contemporary international relations. Analysis of China’s economic presence in two such disparate economies as those of the UK and Serbia helps to explain how diverging perspectives arise. While public opinion may believe in the lure of big Chinese investment and trade, and China wants this, its presence and power is substantially overestimated. For instance, in Serbia, the elites and the public want to believe that they are the beneficiaries of Chinese largesse. In the British case too, China endeavors to forge a mindset that, “Chinese investment is large, essential to the UK’s future economic well-being and contingent upon wider British cooperation with CCP aims. It is a picture not confirmed by reality.” As a recent report by Charles Parton for “The Strong Britain Initiative” stated, the UK must understand that Xi Jinping’s doctrine of greater self-reliance means excluding foreigners, non-tariff and other trade barriers as well as restrictive clauses in investment will continue, no free trade area is forthcoming, and win-win is a slogan to conceal the reality of struggle, i.e., ambition for one-sided victory.
Defying the CCP is never without pain, whose infliction is an integral part of. Its diplomacy. But that is no reason for exaggerating its potency. CCP action falls well short of its bellicose statements. Business people will still do business, investors invest, students study, and tourists tour as long as prices, quality, and conditions are right.”
Nobody in authoritative French or German circles is writing like this.
Finally, in countries whose interest in drawing nearer to China is heightened by virtue of proximity to Russian power and a desire to balance it or minimize it like Belarus and Ukraine, China has been able to use its power to get its way but its contribution to these countries’ growth and security is once again vastly exaggerated. Thus, in Ukraine the government retracted its signature on a multilateral appeal to the UN to give its human rights chairman and other independent observers unfettered access to Xinjiang to investigate the genocide. It did so because China threatened to withhold a planned shipment of at least 500,000 doses of Sinovac Covid-19 vaccine to Ukraine, even though it is relatively unproven compared to UK and US vaccines. Obviously Kyiv is playing with fire here since not only are these vaccines undertested, this kind of policy may backfire against it in Washington. Belarus has also drawn closer to China not only out of political affinity but also because for some time it has sought economic investment and trade with no strings attached that would not come from Russia. But recent findings show quite clearly that here again the myth of China’s commitment to assistance and investment is more a figment of politicians’ visions that China encourages but which remains unfounded in reality.
The Differing Nature of the Russian and Chinese Threats
Beyond the disparate responses to Moscow and Beijing and the diverging threat assessments lies the fact that the threats those regimes pose to Europe are quite different. Nobody expects a Chinese military threat in Europe though there is much concern about Chinese power projection into the Indian Ocean and Africa, especially after China has inquired about a naval base on the Atlantic coast of Africa. On the other hand, the threat of Russian military power is all too real. The deployment of 100-120,000 soldiers, seamen, and airmen plus their weapons platforms in Crimea, Russia, and the Black Sea earlier this year as well as Russian overflights, submarine probes, and concurrent buildups in the Baltic and Arctic are graphic evidence of real military threats. For the last seven years if not more, Moscow has not refrained from brandishing its conventional and nuclear assets in menacing ways against European governments. Its diplomatic behavior bristles with threats, aggressiveness, grievances, and insults, for instance of the EU’s foreign minister Josip Borrell, reflecting adamant refusal to negotiate in good faith with Europe or its security institutions. Borrell’s visit may be seen as an example of the disunity of the EU.
Though Moscow may call for negotiations on “an equal basis” with Washington and Europe, in fact it demands that Europe surrender to its viewpoint, expecting the EU to restore the earlier EU-Russian summits without having to change any of its policies. This is seen in Russia’s stance vis-à-vis France’s repeated initiatives to revive a lasting dialogue. A recent study of Macron’s interaction with Russia observed that,
This has largely been due to the arrogant and aggressive attitude of Moscow, which has never intended to make any political, economic or security concessions in order to achieve normalization. In the face of Macron’s initiatives, it has adopted a rather passive and reactive stance, waiting for French proposals to become more specific, and above all, to see their potential impact on the West’s policy. But the lack of consensus on this issue within the EU and NATO, as well as the attitude of the US and other major Western countries, have been a constraining factor here. At the same time, however, Moscow has hoped that it will provide an opportunity to take advantage of the differences between the US and EU’s positions, and also within the EU.”
Xi Jinping and his government’s statements indicate China is equally truculent and aggressive.
So, while Europe remains a political nullity and, pace Bismarck, a purely geographical notion, it is unable to move forward or backward regarding these two states. The only factors that appear to be able to generate any cohesive response are either strong American pressure or the excessive truculence of Chinese and Russian diplomacy. The European Round Table for Industry, a trade lobby comprised of almost 60 CEOs and chairpersons of major Europe-based multinationals, has just called on EU leaders to push for better business terms with China and not turn away due to US pressure, despite the fact that China will almost certainly not improve terms for foreign business. This attests to the efficacy of Sino-Russian pressure in achieving the decoupling of Europe from the US. Fortunately for the West, China’s “Wolf Warriors” and Russia’s aggression have hardened opposition to their demands in most European capitals, revealing growing European disaffection with both states, even as the divisions are there for a more supple diplomacy to exploit.
Official Statements and Individual Dissent
Despite the statements by NATO, the EU, and the G7, France and Germany will go their own way unless there is firm domestic and/or US pressure to adopt a tougher threat assessment. Macron has evidently formulated a coherent assessment necessitating a more nuanced approach to Russia and China that does not convince either government of France’s true solidarity with its allies and other EU members. The official statements at the recent summits focus on China’s mercantilist economic warfare, denial of human rights, particularly in Hong Kong and Xinjiang, but they also single out its aggressive military behavior in the East and China seas. However, NATO’s communique goes even farther, citing China’s growing global influence and capacity to impact NATO on pressing international problems:
China’s growing influence and international policies can present challenges that we need to address together as an Alliance. We will engage China with a view to defending the security interests of the Alliance. We are increasingly confronted by cyber, hybrid, and other asymmetric threats, including disinformation campaigns, and by the malicious use of ever-more sophisticated emerging and disruptive technologies.
China’s stated ambitions and assertive behavior present systemic challenges to the rules-based international order and to areas relevant to Alliance security. We are concerned by those coercive policies which stand in contrast to the fundamental values enshrined in the Washington Treaty. China is rapidly expanding its nuclear arsenal with more warheads and a larger number of sophisticated delivery systems to establish a nuclear triad. It is opaque in implementing its military modernization and its publicly declared military-civil fusion strategy. It is also cooperating militarily with Russia, including through participation in Russian exercises in the Euro-Atlantic area. We remain concerned with China’s frequent lack of transparency and use of disinformation. We call on China to uphold its international commitments and to act responsibly in the international system, including in the space, cyber, and maritime domains, in keeping with its role as a major power.”
This unprecedented statement, even though it is followed by a call for partnership with China where possible, underscores three major aspects of NATO and Europe’s threat assessment of China. First, it shows the power of the US to forge a consensus in NATO on issues of not only hard security but values and soft security—such as disinformation. Second, the summit communique also reflects the growing unease of European states regarding Chinese policy even without American leadership. For example, a recent interview with the chief of staff of the French Navy, Admiral Pierre Vandier, demonstrates France’s determination to register its unease with those policies and the happiness with which states like India, Japan, and Australia welcome the French naval presence in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Vandier listed French interests,
“France is a riparian country of the Indo-Pacific with half of its maritime resources located in this area and which has two million of its nationals who are physically present in the Indo-Pacific zone. It’s good to go and visit them, to show that we are present for the safety of the French people, for the defense of the interests of the country, for the surveillance of our exclusive economic zone. And then many partners ask us to be at their side whether it is the Indians whether it is the Australians whether it is the Japanese or the Americans, who, in a period of increasing tensions, are happy to have partners who bring security to the area.”
Vandier added that China is both a major trading partner and a competitor here because, “China shows behaviors, in particular close to its borders in the South China Sea, to which France does not adhere. Therefore, France participates in the effort of Western countries, countries in the region, to demonstrate the importance of respecting the rules of free navigation, which are the harmless transit, the passage, free use of the high seas, and therefore to fight against the territorialization of international maritime areas.” Likewise, the Royal Navy is now committed to a greater Indo-Pacific presence and released a new strategy document calling for a shift to this region and explicitly naming China as a competitor while retaining the view that Russia is a threat.
Thus, we see in the political and maritime military spheres a willingness on the part of Europe’s major maritime powers to postulate China as a rival, competitor, or challenge, albeit not a threat–a strategic posture unprecedented for both them and NATO and a sign of the success of US pressure, but it also indicates that when that pressure is absent, as in the EU, an awakening to the implications of aggressive Sino-Russian behavior does not necessarily lead to unity.
When dealing with China’s more purely political and/or economic policies, e.g. human rights violations, mercantilist or non-market economic policies, cyber and disinformation operations, and more recently “vaccine diplomacy,” we see a more clouded European picture. Those states which still remember their Communist experience as members of the Warsaw Pact and their internal dictatorships are loath to cooperate with Beijing or Moscow. Romania exemplifies this:
For Romania, within Eastern Europe, the political relationship with the PRC has been complex, with governments both courting it as an economic partner, while also pushing back. Romania’s consciousness of the long-term threat from the PRC is arguably fueled by its own experience with dominance by an external Communist government, the nation’s forced integration into a foreign economic system, and the suppression of discourse during the Communist period. As with other parts of Eastern Europe, that historical experience arguably has facilitated Romania’s recognition of subtle PRC pressures, including the decision by Romanian President Klaus Iohannis not to personally attend the 2021 17+1 summit, despite considerable PRC pressures to do so.”
This experience reinforces states like Poland and Romania’s orientation to Washington, and the fact that the two and the Baltic states host US and NATO installations on their territory adds to their apprehension of the Russian threat and the Chinese threat of cyber warfare or of economic-political leverage which, given the Sino-Russian alliance, could be used against them for not only China but also Russia’s benefit. In contrast, states whose leaders have taken a much more positive line towards China and/or Russia are either those who have not recovered completely form their Soviet or socialist experience or have yet to integrate into the rest of Europe like Serbia, Belarus, and Hungary. President Zeman of the Czech Republic who has relied on Russian money to win his elections, and Germany, whose export markets are a paramount foreign policy consideration, are more positive too. As R. Evan Ellis concludes, “In general, the nature of PRC influence in non-Western Europe resembles that of Latin America, driven by hopes for Chinese loans, investment projects, or hooking up with a Chinese partner to do business in the region.”
Accounting for much of the ambivalence about China in Europe is the fact that hopes for investments are balanced by fear of excessive influence. But we must consider examples like Ukraine and Belarus where China is also seen as a counter or balance against Russian threats, real or implicit. Moreover, despite the departure of the Trump administration, there is considerable, even if less- articulated fear now about America’s reliability or enduring interest in Europe. This combined apprehension clearly shapes Macron’s thinking:
It can be inferred from the statements made by the French president and his special envoy for the architecture of security and trust with Russia, Ambassador Pierre Vimont, that the starting point is a diagnosis of crisis within the Western community (especially transatlantic relations and NATO, which is experiencing a ‘brain death’) on the one hand, and the rise of non‐Western powers that are pursuing assertive policies, particularly China and Russia, on the other. Macron believes that the United States is strategically disengaging from Europe, and that its policies are becoming more of a challenge than an asset for the EU. In this situation, he has proclaimed the need to develop Europe’s self‐reliance (‘strategic autonomy’), primarily in the area of security and defense as well as technology, so that it does not become an object of geopolitical struggle between the US on the one hand and China & Russia on the other. Dialogue and cooperation with Russia are supposed to be a part of this policy, especially with regard to international crises and conflicts where Moscow’s stance is crucial (such as in Syria, Libya and other African states, Iran, and Ukraine), and where common interests should be sought (e.g. in the fight against terrorism, energy and climate policy, space research, digital technologies, and in the Arctic).”
However, neither Russia nor China views matters in this way. Neither will allow Europe the luxury of abstaining from world politics in order to make money. The famous French revolutionary, Louis Saint-Just acidly noted at Louis XVI’s trial that “one cannot rule guiltlessly.” While that hardly justifies the kind of crimes we have seen Putin, Xi, and their governments commit—genocide, poisonings, and return of the Gulag—it also cannot justify standing aside in world politics while expecting that these powers will suddenly engage in genuine dialogue with an EU that is too weak and divided to defend its own interests and values.
1. Nikos Chrysoloras and John Ainger, “Summit to Highlight EU Split on Several Fronts: Brussels Edition,” Bloomberg, June 24, 2021, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2021-06-24/summit-to-highlight-eu-split-on-several-fronts-brussels-edition
2. Guy Chazan and Roula Khalaf, “Germany’s Armin Laschet Warns Against Cold War With China,” Financial Times, June 21, 2021, https://www.ft.com/content/c3a321e9-f85c-42f7-b02c-0644f7fd7c75.
4. “Germany-China relationship status: It’s complicated,” DW, April 28, 2021, https://www.dw.com/en/germany-china-relationship-status-its-complicated/a-57362540.
5. Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Carisa Nietsche, “The Stakes Are High,” International Politik Quarterly, June 30, 2021, https://ip-quarterly.com/en/stakes-are-high.
6. Michael E. Miller, “China Says Macron and Merkel Support Reviving E.U.-China Investment Pact. Not So Fast,” July 6, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/07/06/china-europe-investment-uyghurs/
7. Ibid. See also Sudesna Singh, “China Pitches ‘Africa Quad’ With Germany, France Ahead Of Indo-Pacific Business Summit,” Republic World, July 7, 2021, https://www.republicworld.com/world-news/china/china-pitches-africa-quad-with-germany-france-ahead-of-indo-pacific-business-summit.html
8. “Article by Vladimir Putin, ‘Being Open, Despite the Past,’” President of Russia, June 22, 2021, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/65899
9. Kirsten Westphal, “Nord Stream 2 – Germany’s Dilemma,” SWP Comment, No. 32, April 2021, https://www.swp-berlin.org/publications/products/comments/2021C32_NordStream2.pdf
10. Andrew Michta, “NATO Is an Alliance Divided,” Wall Street Journal, July 7, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/knqzFdTjocTIPxxcDAy6-WSJNewsPaper-7-7-2021.pdf
11. Stuart Lau, “Lithuania Pushes for EU Summit with China,” Politico, July 2, 2021, https://www.politico.eu/article/lithuania-pushes-eu-summit-with-china/
12. Andrew Michta, “NATO Is an Alliance Divided.”
13. Daniel Michaels and Valentina Pop, “China Faces European Obstacles as Some Countries Heed U.S. Pressure,” Wall Street Journal, February 23, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-faces-european-obstacles-as-some-countries-heed-u-s-pressure-11614088843.
14. Daniel Fried, Georgette Mosbacher, Ian Brzezinski, “Fried, Mosbacher, Brzezinski: What Is the Three Seas Initiative? From Vision to Action,” Trojmoze, https://trimarium.pl/en/fried-mosbacher-brzezinski-what-is-the-three-seas-initiative-from-vision-to-action/.
15. R. Evan Ellis, “Chinese Engagement in Latin America and Europe: Comparisons and Interdependencies,” Peruvian Army Center for Strategic Studies, pp. 12-13, https://ceeep.mil.pe/2021/07/06/el-compromiso-chino-en-america-latina-y-europa-comparaciones-e-interdependencias/?lang=en
16. Yatharth Kachiar, “How Turkey Succumbed to China on the Uighur issue?” Vivekananda International Foundation, October 6, 2020, https://www.vifindia.org/article/2020/october/06/how-turkey-succumbed-to-china-on-the-uighur-issue
18. Veerle Nuwens and Emily Ferris, “Sino-Russian Interests in Serbia: Competitive, Coordinated or Complementary?” RUSI Occasional Paper, 2020, pp. 20-23.
20. Charles Parton, “Empty Threats? Policymaking Amidst Chinese Pressure, Strong Britain Initiative,” Council on Geostrategy, p. 52, https://www.geostrategy.org.uk/strong-britain-initiative/
21. Ibid., p. 73.
22. Ibid., p. 74.
23. Anders Corr, “If Ukraine Wants Help Against Russia, Kyiv Must Stand Up Against China,” The Epoch Times, July 1, 2021, https://www.theepochtimes.com/if-ukraine-wants-help-against-russia-kiev-must-stand-against-china_3877494.html
24. Jakub Jakobowski and Kamil Klysinski, “The Non-Strategic Partnership: Belarus-China Relations,” Center for Eastern Studies, Report No. 1, 2021, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-studies/2021-01-25/non-strategic-partnership; Edward Lucas, “The Belarus-China ‘Iron Brotherhood’ Begins to Rust,” Center for European Policy Analysis, July 4, 2021, https://cepa.org/the-belarus-china-iron-brotherhood-begins-to-rust/.
25. Lolita C. Baldor, “China Is Looking to Increase Its Navy’s Access to the Atlantic, Top US Commander in Africa Says,” Business Insider, May 6, 2021, https://www.businessinsider.com/china-wants-navy-access-africa-west-coast-africom-commander-says-2021-5
26. Jon Henley, “EU Chief’s Moscow Humiliation Is Sign Of Bloc Disunity On Russia, Say Experts,” The Guardian, February 11, 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/feb/11/eu-chiefs-moscow-humiliation-is-sign-of-bloc-disunity-on-russia-say-experts
27. “Russia Expects EU To Restore Russia-EU Summits,” TASS, July 4, 2021, https://tass.com/politics/1309689.
28. Marek Menkiszak, “Tell Me More: Russia on Macron’s Détente Initiatives,”
Center For Eastern Studies, 2021, p. 48, https://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/PV_Tell-me-more_net.pdf.
29. “Xi Jinping Speech Transcript for the CCP’s 100th Anniversary,” MSN News, July 1, 2021, https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/xi-jinping-speech-transcript-for-the-ccps-100th-anniversary/ar-AALFVNt
30. Daniel Michaels, “European Business Leaders Want a Stronger Hand with China, Not Decoupling,” Wall Street Journal, July 4, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/european-business-leaders-want-a-stronger-hand-with-china-not-decoupling-11625454000.
31. The White House, “Carbis Bay G7 Summit Communique,” June 13, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/06/13/carbis-bay-g7-summit-communique/.
33. “Brussels Summit Communiqué Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels 14 June 2021,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_185000.htm?selectedLocale=en
35. “Video Interview: The French Navy in The Indo-Pacific,” Naval News, May 24, 2021, https://www.navalnews.com/interviews/2021/05/video-interview-the-french-navy-in-the-indo-pacific/
37. Mallory Shelbourne, “Royal Navy Head: U.K. Committed to Operate More in Indo-Pacific with U.S., Allies,” USNI News, May 5, 2021, https://news.usni.org/2021/05/05/royal-navy-head-u-k-committed-to-operate-more-in-indo-pacific-with-u-s-allies
38. R. Evan Ellis, “Chinese Engagement in Latin America and Europe,” p. 20.
40. Ibid., p. 17.
42. Marek Menkiszak, “Tell Me More Menkiszak,” p. 9.
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