India and the Quad: The Potential and Pitfalls under a Trump Presidency

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The Quad Foreign Minister’s meeting convening on the sidelines of the inauguration of a new US administration under Donald Trump is significant. The meeting in the year India takes over the Quad presidency signals continuity and reassurance at a time when many countries in the Indo-Pacific are uncertain of what a second Trump presidency means for the region. In India, both inside government and within strategic circles, there seems to be a quiet confidence about New Delhi’s ability to sustain progress in India-US ties with the new administration. “We saw very strong growth in different dimensions of India-US relations. So based on our previous record and based on close contacts between President Trump and Prime Minister Modi, we are very confident that our relationship will continue to grow,” affirmed Foreign Minister Jaishankar, ahead of his participation in the inauguration ceremony.1

The optimism in New Delhi can perhaps be explained on two fronts. At the outset most of Trump s top nominees are reported to have advocated for stronger India ties.2 Notably, nominee for the post of secretary of state, Senator Marco Rubio, in July 2024 introduced a U.S.-India Defense Cooperation Act, which proposed to put India at the same level as allies like Japan, Israel, Korea, and NATO; exempt India from CAATSA sanctions, and impose sanctions on Pakistan for promoting terrorism in India.3 Meanwhile, nominee for the job of national security advisor (NSA), Mike Waltz, speaking in September 2024 said ties between India and America will "determine whether this is a century of light or a century of darkness.”4 Congressman Waltz, co-chair of the Congressional India Caucus, emphasized the need for further collaboration to maintain a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" and protect India’s sovereignty along the Line of Control, while offering an “Open Door Policy” from his team to advance US-India relations.5 Waltz was also first in the incoming administration to meet Jaishankar when he was in Washington for a state visit at the end of 2024, where both reaffirmed a commitment to deepening ties and coordinating on global issues.6 Outgoing NSA Jake Sullivan was close on  Jaishankar’s heels with a visit to India in early January 2025, reflecting the depth of the India-US partnership. However some US experts saw the visit as “fool proofing” the Biden administration legacy —technology and innovation cooperation— exemplified under the U.S.-India Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET).7 Highlighting collaborations on defense, space, and artificial intelligence, Sullivan in a speech at the Indian Institute of Technology Delhi, spoke of his last overseas trip in office : I cannot think of a better way to end my tenure in the White House—visiting India … to mark the advances we have made together.”8

Confidence in the continuation of momentum in bilateral ties also is anchored in the understanding that the administrations of Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, Barack Obama, Donald Trump, and Joe Biden have all sought to strengthen the US-India partnership.9 It could be argued that under Trump s first presidency the relationship advanced significantly, particularly in respect to the partnership in defense, counterterrorism, and regional security.10 India signed foundational agreements including one on enhanced interoperability between US and Indian forces.11 The Trump administration identified India as a leading player in the US efforts to secure the vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific.”12 As the documents outlining strategy in the Indo-Pacific put it, a strong India” “would act as a counter-balance to China.”13 The US thus needed to accelerate India s rise” as a net security provider and solidify an enduring strategic partnership with India.” The 2021 US Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific spelled out a clear roadmap of building India s capabilities as a partner working in sync with Washington to ensure that a stable security architecture emerges in the Indo-Pacific.14 The Quad was revived and a template set to ensure its operationalization subsequently under the Biden administration.15 Perhaps this evidence of bipartisan support prompted the Indian foreign minister to remark I know today a lot of countries are nervous about the US, let s be honest about that. We are not one of them.”16

Trump 1.0: Quad’s Rebirth and Operationalization

The Quad, a strategic grouping of like-minded partners –the US, Japan, India, and Australia—and described by India as a primary driver of Indo-Pacific cooperation, actually owes its revival to the first Trump presidency in 2017. Initially formed in response to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami to coordinate humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) through cooperation among the four navies, by 2006 it germinated into the idea of the confluence of the two seas,” as envisioned by Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo,17 to counter China s assertive rise. In 2007, a meeting of Quad officials on the sidelines of the ASEAN Regional Forum in the Philippines and joint military exercises among the four countries signalled the potential for deeper cooperation.18 However the group faltered due to the concerns and sensitivities of some members, including Australia, to perceived opposition from China, with which they had strong trade and economic linkages. 

Between Quad 1.0 and its rebirth in 2017, a lot of ground had shifted. The convergence on managing the China challenge was driving the strategic calculus in all four nations. For the US, China s military modernization and assertiveness, especially in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, tech dominance, and increasing trade monopoly were growing concerns.19 Japan faced threats from China s territorial claims and economic coercion, while Australia s dependence on China as its largest trade partner heightened worries over foreign interference, supply chain control, and inroads into the Pacific. For India, managing China’s territorial provocations and trade imbalances meant diversifying and strengthening partnerships with the West, and countering Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean and its neighborhood. Thus, similar threat perceptions helped all four sides to forge overlapping ties in multiple formats (bilateral/trilateral) to ensure alignment of interests and priorities. Trilaterals like the US-India-Japan (2011) and India-Japan-Australia (2015), reinforced by the expanded 2+2 (Foreign and Defense) ministerial meetings and increasing frequency of bilateral and trilateral exercises among the Quad nations fostered strategic trust, and ensured that the groundwork for deeper strategic alignment was in place to help lay the foundation of Quad 2.0.

Trump’s first presidency’s stance towards China shifted the strategic calculus in the Indo-Pacific. His administration placed a sharp focus on competition with China, viewing Beijing not just as an economic rival but as the dominant national security challenge. In the wake of convergence on shared interests in managing China s rise, Abe proposed the "Free and Open Indo-Pacific " (FOIP) concept in 2016 and revived the Quad with US support in 2017. For Trump, the pushback against China was a major plank of his presidential campaign and his administration was quick to call out China s predatory economic and trade policies and its unilateral assertiveness in the East and South China seas and elsewhere. The US shifted its focus from the "Asia Pacific" to the “Indo-Pacific," renamed the U.S. Pacific Command to the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, and reorganized the Department of Defense to create dedicated units for Indo-Pacific allies, distinct from those focused on China-related issues. The profile of the Quad rose quickly from the first formal gathering on the sidelines of the 2017 East Asia Summit. The journey of scaling up the platform —from the level of senior officials’ meetings in 2018, foreign ministers’ meeting on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in 2019 to a leaders’ level meeting in 2021 under Biden— was unprecedented.20 There the group committed to an annual event to ensure sustained political momentum for a grouping that the four now see as critical to their interests in the region.

The Biden administration has hosted four summits, an attestation of the importance attached by the US to this framework for cooperation and coordination.21 Two decades after its first iteration, the grouping has becoming synonymous with efforts among four nations to develop a collective approach to address regional security concerns, economic growth, and stability in the Indo-Pacific region.22 Three strong pillars of cooperation have emerged: maritime security preparedness and counterterrorism efforts; economic resilience – collaborating on supply chain security and technology development and standard setting; and climate change – addressing challenges and building resilience through joint initiatives. The Quad s expanded mandate today covers everything from working together on UNSC reform, maritime domain awareness, and undersea cables to technology sharing and emerging frontiers like AI and quantum computing to mandates on health, vaccines and collaboration in space to climate resilience.23 Anchoring the effort is the political will to provide sustainable alternatives to the region and not add to the polarizing geopolitical environment of bloc- style competition.24 Arguably, the cycle of birth, burial, and resurrection of the Quad is testament enough to its significance in managing global challenges but also reflective of political maturity, and strategic clarity on the need for collective action among all four nations. It has been often described as “not pre-destined but having to overcome traditional confines and working habits.”25

While the platform prides itself on being flexible and responsive to the needs of the region, its institutionalization in the foreign policy agendas of the participating nations is also a reality. 26 Kurt Campbell, outgoing deputy secretary of state, spoke to this when he said – “the depth of engagement among each of our bureaucracies, at the Prime Minister and presidential level, foreign ministries, in other agencies of our government is profound …Those habits of cooperation are going to endure, no matter what happens politically in any of our countries. We have already seen a succession of leaders in Japan and Australia, we will have that in the US, and I am confident that whoever succeeds PM Modi will be equally invested in the Quad.”27

Trump 2.0 Continuity and Change: Implications for the Indo-Pacific and Quad

While a convincing case of bipartisan support for the US commitment to the Indo-Pacific and Quad has been made, it is speculated that Trump 2.0’s Indo-Pacific policy would adopt an even more confrontational approach towards China with consequences for US partners in the Quad.28 Though  the incoming Trump team in the National Security Council is said to be armed with China hawks,  the outgoing administration has hinted of concern over a huge debate within Trump’s new line “that will reflect very different perspectives on the way to deal with China.”29 So, while Trump has threatened China with tariffs and his team has spoken of bolstering deterrence for Taiwan, the business interests, including Elon Musk who has huge investments in China, will remain a factor.30 Recent controversies in the US over House Republicans dropping a provision from the spending bill that aimed to toughen restrictions on US investment in China or Trump asking the Supreme Court to drop the ban on TikTok are fanning concern.31 The TikTok issue exemplifies the worries over the flip flop over China.32 A 2024 decision by Congress had proposed a ban on the app due to concerns over Chinese government pressure on the app’s parent company, ByteDance, to hand over data on US users. The law had given ByteDance the option to divest its stake in TikTok, but it did not. Previously, during his presidency in 2020, Trump had sought to either ban TikTok or force ByteDance to sell its US operations. Now, his legal team argues that shutting down TikTok would violate free speech rights. Waltz, tipped to be Trump’s NSA, noted, The President-elect firmly believes we can avoid conflict with the Chinese Communist Party because they need our markets. We are going to use the leverage in a way that s aligned with our national security while we still can.”33

Translating this broadly, Trump 2.0 may use tariffs to wrestle a better deal out of China and get it to the negotiating table while pushing for strategic decoupling, advocating for the re-shoring of critical industries to Southeast Asia or India, while encouraging regional partners to reduce their reliance on Chinese trade and technology.34 Specifically on the technology front, Trump 2.0 will intensify restrictions on China s access to high-tech innovations, particularly in semiconductors, AI, and 5G, aligning with his previous term s policies, and Biden’s measures including the CHIPS and Science Act and the Inflation Reduction Act to support US manufacturing but with the caveat of less rigidity on export curbs, as made clear on the campaign trail. An upswing in manufacturing will require access to upstream manufacturing inputs and downstream processing capacities that are still not completely free from Chinese control. Indo-Pacific nations would remember that Trump s America First” policy in his first presidency led to the US withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership. So, apprehension remains over Trump’s insistence on bilateral deals and how they could undermine efforts for broader regional cooperation, particularly in areas like trade liberalization, emerging security architecture, and regional alliances more broadly. While the Trump team has promised continuity on approaching China as a strategic challenge and the centrality of platforms like Quad, AUKUS, and trilaterals with Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines for building deterrence, the expectation of greater burden-sharing from allies and partners in the region will not come as a surprise.35Apart from pushing partners or lucrative arm sales for defense acquisitions, Trump 2.0 will look towards solidifying the US presence in the region with expectations of support from allies and partners. While US support for Taiwan s deterrence is expected to grow, it will not happen without putting Taiwan in the crosshairs with China while simultaneously increasing its dependency on US defense acquisitions. It is also likely that as part of the larger US policy towards China, the Indo-Pacific, Quad, and AUKUS will be reviewed in a more transactional manner. Trump 2.0 may push for greater security cooperation within the Quad, including increased military integration and joint naval operations, which partners like India may not be willing to do in the near future, and those are challenges that both New Delhi and Washington will have to carefully navigate.

India and The Quad: Managing Expectations, Redefining the Security Agenda

For those tracking the Indo-Pacific and the Quad, repeated assertions by leadership in Quad nations rejecting China’s vilification of the grouping as an “Asian NATO” are routine. Yet in October 2024, India’s explicit rejection of the concept of an "Asian NATO" proposed by Japan’s new Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru stood out, when its foreign minister clarified that “We don’t have that kind of strategic architecture in mind.”36 However, the criticism that the Quad needs a clear security mandate is not new, neither is the accusation that India is the roadblock to the securitization of the Quad.37

For India the lens on the Quad is very different. In the prescriptive sense – as Indian Prime Minister Modi has often pointed out, the “Quad is a force of good,” which translates to India and its partners in the Quad finding practical ways to challenge unilateralism in the region but also to provide tangible alternatives.38The breadth and scope of various initiatives from vaccines to health and critical tech tells you why India looks at the Quad as integral to its ability to showcase its leadership in the region. As the G20 showed us, the support of like-minded partners is essential to scale local templates made in India globally, and there is value in bolstering that capability. Thus, for India the Quad serves a “higher purpose,” it is “not just about a security agenda,” it has “a global contribution” and “does many things.”39 For India- the Quad is key to its national interests, it reflects the transformation of its ties with the US, Japan, and Australia. It is also one of the leading platforms to build on common agendas set over bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral forums.40 The exposure of working groups, bureaucracies, militaries, industry, tech eco systems, etc., is reinforcing habits of cooperation that will be able to withstand election cycles and build long-term convergences. The Quad for New Delhi is key to being present in operationalizing standards and principles, especially in the technology domain. A look at the work done by the Quad on setting standards and principles on cybersecurity and critical infrastructure, critical and emerging technology standards, connectivity, space, etc. is revealing of the groundwork being done to build interoperability of systems and common Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) in a region where until a few years ago Chinese standards had, to an extent, become the default.

The reasoning behind India’s approach to the Quad, reflects the fact that India no longer is content with being in the room, it is actively shaping the agenda. India s ownership of the grouping as its most important platform for delivering cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, especially on maritime security and global commons is now a common reference in the articulation of its vision. But the emphasis on collective security cooperation for New Delhi is anchored in capability building in the region and not being part of alliance mandates. Simply put, India does not shy away from discussing ways to manage China’s growing influence within the Quad, but its emphasis is not to provoke China into a confrontation but rather to build the capacity and resilience of Quad nations and the region to deter any attempts at coercion or revisionism by China.41 Arguably, what is happening quietly and more effectively is building on multiple lines of effort, to adapt forms of security cooperation and resilience, which are seemingly non-threatening but effective in case of escalation.42 If the mandate is quest for a peaceful and stable Indo-Pacific then building resilience for deterrence remains key.

The Quad s emphasis on joint training and capacity-building reflects the convergence of bilateral and trilateral agendas within the 2+2 foreign and security dialogues, aiming to enhance interoperability and readiness among member nations. This is evident in initiatives such as INDUS X, ICET, logistical agreements, refueling arrangements, and expanded joint military exercises, which have aligned and synergized defense ecosystems. A key example is the Malabar exercises, which now focus on enhancing interoperability, advanced tactical training, maritime domain awareness, and joint operational planning. These exercises also foster a deeper understanding of each nation s naval doctrines, promote technology integration, and improve coordination, which have seen tangible results.

The Quad is also prioritizing resilience against maritime threats. At the 2024 Foreign Ministers Meeting and the Leaders Summit, the Quad reaffirmed its commitment to collective deterrence, opposing actions that alter the status quo through force or coercion. Key outcomes included the expansion of the Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness initiative to the Indian Ocean, helping to check grey-zone tactics with more situational awareness of the maritime theater. By integrating advanced satellite systems and maritime surveillance technologies, the Quad enhances real-time monitoring and response coordination, particularly against illegal and unreported and unregulated fishing and other aggressive maneuvers by China. The Quad s new Maritime Legal Dialogue is designed to support a rules-based maritime order, providing vulnerable partners with expertise on international law, especially as China seeks to alter maritime norms in the SCS. Notably the Malabar 2024 s focus on anti-submarine warfare highlights concerns over China s underwater capabilities. The Quad nations, including India, the US, and Australia, are boosting reconnaissance coordination, particularly with advanced sonobuoy acquisitions. Efforts to ensure cybersecurity resilience through joint investments in subsea cables also reflect the Quad s holistic approach to deterrence.

A lot is being done. Redefining security, both in the economic and strategic realm in the provision of public goods, has found a lot of traction in the Indo-Pacific. But as a former US DoD expert has said, the scope of India-US cooperation is not limitless and needs to be managed both in the tempering of expectations and awareness of sensitivities and perceptions.

Going Forward, New Delhi Will Prepare for Uncertainty

The Indo-US relationship under Trump 2.0 is expected to deepen, as India will seek to leverage Modi’s favorable relationship with the incoming US president to sustain the momentum in ties. While their personal bond may support a positive working relationship, Trump s policies in conjunction with shifting geopolitical dynamics, especially concerning China, trade imbalances, and defense cooperation, could reshape the partnership.

Tariffs and Transactionalism: While New Delhi might anticipate a reprieve from the new Trump administration on its relationship with Russia, its experience with Trump 1.0 on the economic front will make it cautious about his transactional tendencies. During Trump s first term, US–India trade faced friction over tariffs, the revocation of India s GSP status, and US pressure on IP protections and trade barriers. His restrictive immigration policies also impacted the Indian tech workforce. Trump frequently highlighted the high tariffs on Harley-Davidson motorcycles, using the brand as a symbol of what he saw as an unfair trade relationship with India. During his current campaign he described India as a "very big abuser" of tariffs, while praising Modi as a fantastic man.”43A second term, many Indian observers worry, could reinstate these policies, reshaping trade dynamics and IT sector ties, and forcing India to enforce top-down measures to ensure domestic talent development and seek more favorable visa terms. In the fiscal year 2023–2024, India had a trade surplus of $35.3–$36.8 billion, making the US its largest trade partner and export destination.44 To sustain and build on these gains Indian officials are reportedly already thinking aloud on a possible trade deal to incentivize Trump. Media reports that during Trump s first term, his administration sought a trade deal focused on data and digital policy, with a five-point agenda and a planned negotiation date. However, the pandemic delayed talks. India now anticipates a similar, but broader, trade-technology agreement to be proposed and would likely be open to discussion on it.45

Access to Technology: The legacy of the Biden administration to India-US ties was defined by technology collaboration in defense, supply chains, and critical technologies both bilaterally and via the Quad. Despite growing defense cooperation, there are worries that under the new administration India could encounter delays in securing cutting- edge technologies like AI, 5G, and advanced fighter jets, and face roadblocks in pursuit of advanced US technologies in defense and cybersecurity due to Trump s protectionist stance. Defense cooperation despite the convergence on China will be strained if New Delhi is pushed towards arms sales without a stronger commitment to demands of increased military technology transfers from the U.S and addressing ongoing supply issues, (like the delivery of GE F-404 IN engines for the Tejas Mk-1A).46 Additionally, India will continue to seek more robust supply arrangements and urge US manufacturers to establish production facilities on Indian soil.47

This worry has stirred some introspection in Delhi, with defense experts highlighting the need for equitable, long-term, and mutually beneficial technology collaboration. It has been argued that “collaboration in critical, emerging and innovative technologies through initiatives like DTTI, ICET and INDUS-X has been more or less a one-way approach with the US defense forces collaborating with Indian start-ups, academia, and innovators. Real long-term technology collaboration would require Indian defense forces to establish reciprocal collaborations with US start-ups and innovators.”48 In essence, India will have to re-imagine its stakeholders and require its defense forces to establish dedicated R&D units, similar to the US AFRL, ONR, Army Innovation Command, and Army Futures Command, to drive, guide, and lead technology development in collaboration with international partners.49

Burden Sharing while Respecting India’s Strategic Autonomy: As the US-China rivalry intensifies, India will continue to strike a delicate balance between aligning with the US and managing a confrontational approach to China. This dynamic will come into focus in multilateral forums like the Quad and AUKUS. While India would be happy to do more in its primary theater of interest, the Indian Ocean, managing expectations about India’s unwillingness to have a direct role in contingencies for conflict in the South China Sea or the Taiwan Strait will become imperative. This should not take away from New Delhi’s willingness to showcase itself as a leading power in the Indo-Pacific willing to burden share just as Trump 1.0 had demanded. India’s repertoire today is as a credible security partner in the region through bilateral and multilateral exercises, building capabilities in maritime security cooperation, HADR, and Counter Terrorism efforts, spearheading initiatives like the White Shipping Information Exchange, and providing hydrographic survey support to countries in the Indian Ocean. All are efforts to showcase India’s capacity to rise to regional and global challenges.  India will seek US support to bolster its capacity to be a leading actor in the Indo-Pacific, while preserving flexibility in its strategic ties, particularly with Russia. It will also advocate for continuity in Quad initiatives, defense modernization, and tech cooperation, while resisting demands for alignment that may restrict its autonomy— all of these may not align with Trump s cost-benefit approach to alliances and partnerships. However, the US must remember for many nations in the Indo Pacific including India, containment of China is not the goal. The goal is a multipolar Asia that accelerates the end goal of a multipolar global order. So having India in the room, as a member of the Quad, with a capacity to build bridges with ASEAN, the “Global South” and West Asia is of value in a volatile global order. If Trump’s NSA nominee is to be believed, India is “a critical partner for the future.”50

In 2025, when India rolls out the red carpet for Trump for the scheduled Quad summit, it will be hopeful the relationship endures and thrives given the work done over two decades to build “a structural soundness in the India-US relationship.”51 According to a report in The Wall Street Journal, advisors to Trump have said that he has reached out to President Xi Jinping regarding a potential visit to China and is also very interested in visiting India as early as April.52 Talks to this end were initiated in December during Foreign Minister Jaishankar’s visit, and further discussions followed when Jaishankar partook in the inauguration at the foreign minister-level talks of the Quad. Observers highlight that “China and India are evidently in a different basket requiring Trump’s purported deal-making skills to achieve a better trade outcome to offset their surplus with greater US exports.”53 All of these developments indicate, that while India may not be in the immediate crossfire of indiscriminate policy shots by Team Trump, issues on tariffs and immigration will stay and will require patience and preparation. Another contentious issue in US-India relations was undoubtedly the allegations of the involvement of an Indian government official in a failed assassination plot of a Khalistani separatist in 2023. While relations were managed publicly, tensions peaked, and India undertook an investigation and followed through with judicial action on the issue. The outgoing US ambassador in New Delhi called it a “positive initial step" but emphasized the need for “ongoing investigation, systemic reform, and accountability.”54 Trump’s team has nominated Harmeet Dhillon to be assistant attorney general for civil rights. Dhillon after the incident reportedly accused India of using "death squads " —so New Delhi will have to make peace with the fact that chapter has not been closed yet and be ready for turbulence.55

As a seasoned Indian observer warned Indian strategic circles, India needs to be prepared with a hard agenda to negotiate with Trump instead of just looking at pro-India hands in Trump’s cabinet.56 As ultimately, the trajectory of India-US relationship bilaterally and in platforms like the Quad will  boil down to the value and utility that both sides place on each other in terms of their respective strategic calculus and the enduring buy in to the fundamental value of the partnership across political cycles, bureaucratic, technology, and the defense industry ecosystem.



1. “Jaishankar expresses confidence in continued growth of US-India relation,” Business Standard, Jan 14, 2025, https://www.business-standard.com/external-affairs-defence-security/news/jaishankar-expresses-confidence-in-continued-growth-of-us-india-relations-125011400043_1.html.

2. “Trump taps Marco Rubio & Michael Waltz, known to be pro-India and tough on China, for top jobs,” The Indian Express, November 13, 2024, https://indianexpress.com/article/india/trump-taps-rubio-waltz-known-to-be-pro-india-and-tough-on-china-for-top-jobs-9666828/

3. Ibid and See “Senator Marco Rubio introduces U.S.-India Defense Cooperation Act, The Hindu, July 26, 2024, https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/senator-marco-rubio-introduces-us-india-defense-cooperation-act/article68448798.ece

4. “What Trump’s NSA Nominee Said On India’s Pivotal Role In The 21st Century” NDTV, November 13, 2024, https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/what-donald-trumps-nsa-nominee-mike-waltz-said-on-indias-pivotal-role-in-the-21st-century-7010548

5. Ibid.

6. “EAM Jaishankar meets Trump s NSA nominee Michael Waltz to strengthen India-US ties,” MoneyControl.com, December 28, 2024, https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/india/eam-jaishankar-meets-trump-s-nsa-nominee-michael-waltz-to-strengthen-india-us-ties-12899189.html

7. Michael Kugelman, “The Biden Administration Pursues Last-Minute Diplomacy With India,” Foreign Policy, January 08, 2025, https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/01/08/india-us-sullivan-trip-diplomacy-biden-trump-modi/

8. Remarks of National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan A New Frontier for the U.S.-India Partnership, January 06, 2025, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2025/01/06/remarks-of-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivan-a-new-frontier-for-the-u-s-india-partnership/

9. India-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress June 16, 2023, Congressional Research Service, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47597

10. Richard M. Rossow, “U.S.-India under Trump 2.0: A Return to Reciprocity,” CSIS, November 12, 2024 , https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-india-under-trump-20-return-reciprocity and see “ India-US Bilateral Relations – A Brief,” Ministry of External Affairs, GoI, Sep 09, 2024, https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Ind-US-Brief.pdf

11. Ibid.

12. See the Pentagon s Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, June 1, 2019, https://go.usa.gov/xuxXH

13. For more see Strategic Framework for the Indo Pacific,”January 15, 2021, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/IPS-Final-Declass.pdf

14. Ibid.

15. “The Quad”: Cooperation Among the United States, Japan, India, and Australia,” Congressional Research Service Report, Jan 30, 2023, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11678

16. “Jaishankar: A lot of countries are nervous about US, we are not one of them,” The Indian Express, November 11, 2024,
https://indianexpress.com/article/india/a-lot-of-countries-are-nervous-about-us-we-are-not-one-of-them-says-jaishankar-9663466/

17. Remarks by EAM, Dr. S. Jaishankar at the Inaugural Quad Think Tank Forum, February 24, 2024
https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/37659/Remarks_by_EAM_Dr_S_Jaishankar_at_the_Inaugural_Quad_Think_Tank_Forum

18. See Patrick Gerard Buchan and Benjamin Rimland, “Defining the Diamond: The Past, Present, and Future of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue,” CSIS Briefs, March 16, 2020,   https://www.csis.org/analysis/defining-diamond-past-present-and-future-quadrilateral-security-dialogue ,

19. Ibid.

20. See note 17.

21. See Patrick Gerard Buchan and Benjamin Rimland, “Defining the Diamond: The Past, Present, and Future of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue” , CSIS Briefs, March 16, 2020,   https://www.csis.org/analysis/defining-diamond-past-present-and-future-quadrilateral-security-dialogue , “The Quad”: Cooperation Among the United States, Japan, India, and Australia,” Congressional Research Service Report, Jan 30, 2023, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11678 and Tanvi Madan and Adrianna Pita, “ What does the Quad summit signal for U.S. engagement in the Indo-Pacific?, Brookings, March 16, 2021,  https://www.brookings.edu/articles/what-does-quad-summit-signal-for-u-s-engagement-in-the-indo-pacific/

22. Joint Statement from the Quad Foreign Ministers Commemorating the 20th Anniversary of Quad Cooperation,  December 31, 2024, Ministry of External Affairs, GoI, https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/38875/Joint+Statement+from+the+Quad+Foreign+Ministers+Commemorating+the+20th+Anniversary+of+Quad+Cooperation#:~:text=Ministry%20of%20External%20Affairs%20Government%20of%20India&text=Twenty%20years%20ago%2C%20in%20response,now%20known%20as%20the%20Quad 

23. Ibid.

24. Shruti Pandalai , “The Quad has a plan and it s not all about China,” Channel News Asia, April 06, 2021,  https://www.channelnewsasia.com/commentary/quad-china-us-india-japan-australia-vaccines-progress-196386

25. Pandalai, S. 2022. “The Indo-Pacific Consensus: The Past, Present and Future of India s Vision for the Region,” India Quarterly, 78(2), 189-209. https://doi.org/10.1177/09749284221090717

26. See “India connects G7, Indo-Pacific, drives Quad: Kurt Campbell,” Hindustan Times, Oct 05, 2024,  :https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/interview-india-connects-g7-indo-pacific-global-south-drives-quad-kurt-campbell-101728111738871.html

27. Ibid.

28. See “White House core security team packed with China hawks,” Hindustan Times, Jan 13, 2025,   :https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/white-house-core-security-team-packed-with-china-hawks-101736706015732.html

29. Ibid and see “US unreliability will cause countries to hedge on China: Sullivan to Trump team,” Hindustan Times, Jan 10, 2025, https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/us-unreliability-will-cause-countries-to-hedge-on-china-sullivan-warns-trump-team-101736533005221.html

30. “Trump threatens sweeping new tariffs on Mexico, Canada and China on first day in office,” The Hindu, November 26, 2024, https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/trump-threatens-sweeping-new-tariffs-on-mexico-canada-and-china-on-first-day-in-office/article68912746.ece

31. Michael Schuman, “No More Mr. Tough Guy on China,” The Atlantic, January 15, 2025, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2025/01/trump-musk-soft-china/681313/

32. “Trump asks Supreme Court to pause law that could ban TikTok” Reuters, December 28, 2024,  https://www.reuters.com/legal/trump-asks-supreme-court-pause-law-that-could-ban-tiktok-2024-12-27/

33. “Sullivan and Waltz agree: China as threat, India as partner,” Hindustan Times, January 15, 2025,   https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/sullivan-and-waltz-agree-china-as-threat-india-as-partner-101736958332290.html

34. Ibid ans See note 28.

35. Ibid,

36. “India does not endorse Japanese PM Ishiba’s Asian NATO vision, asserts Jaishankar,” MoneyControl.com, October 02, 2024,  https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/india/india-does-not-endorse-japanese-pm-ishibas-asian-nato-vision-asserts-jaishankar-12833942.html

37. For more see  Dhruva Jaishankar and Tanvi Madan , “The Quad Needs a Harder Edge,” Foreign Affairs, May 19, 2022, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2022-05-19/quad-needs-harder-edge , Chet Lee,  “India: The Quad s Weakest Link,” The Diplomat, October 19, 2021,  https://thediplomat.com/2021/10/india-the-quads-weakest-link/

38. Prime Minister attends the sixth Quad Leaders Summit in Wilmington, Delaware, Press Information Bureau, September 22, 2024, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=2057443

39. Transcript of External Affairs Minister, Dr. S. Jaishankar’s interaction with the Indian Community in Brisbane (November 04, 2024), Ministry of external affairs, GoI,  https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/38489/Transcript_of_External_Affairs_Minister_Dr_S_Jaishankars_interaction_with_the_Indian_Community_in_Brisbane_November_04_2024

40. See note 17.

41. Shruti Pandalai, “The Quad Is Quietly Adapting Methods of Security Cooperation,” The Diplomat, October 12, 2024, https://thediplomat.com/2024/10/the-quad-is-quietly-adapting-methods-of-security-cooperation/

42. Ibid.

43. “Two reasons India might be cautious of the Trump presidency,” Economic Times, November 06, 2024, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/foreign-trade/two-reasons-india-might-be-cautious-of-the-trump-presidency/articleshow/115017995.cms?from=mdr

44. Ibid.

45. Pramit Pal Chaudhuri, “The year ahead: How India stands to lose, gain in Trump presidency,” The Hindustan Times, December 31, 2024, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/the-year-ahead-how-india-stands-to-lose-gain-in-trump-presidency-101735669014151.html

46. Jet engines to munitions: “Rajnath Singh meets US NSA Jake Sullivan, India and US to speed up co-production,” The Indian Express, August 25, 2024, https://indianexpress.com/article/india/rajnath-meets-us-nsa-jake-sullivan-discusses-defence-projects-9530808/

47. “Raksha Mantri Shri Rajnath Singh & US Secretary of Defense Mr Lloyd Austin hold bilateral talks in Washington DC, Discuss defence cooperation, industrial collaboration & regional security,” Press Information Bureau, August 23, 2024, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2048377

48. “Discussion with Colleague and Senior Defence Expert, Gp Capt R K Narang VM (Retd.) PhD, Senior Fellow,” MP-IDSA, January 14, 2025.

49. Ibid.

50. See note 33.

51. ”There Is Structural Soundness In India-US Relationship: S Jaishankar,” NDTV, December 05, 2023, https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/there-is-structural-soundness-in-india-us-relationship-s-jaishankar-4634214

52. “Trump Told Advisers He Wants to Visit China as President,” The Wall Street Journal, January 18, 20205, https://www.wsj.com/us-news/trump-china-xi-jinping-visit-e9141794

53. “Moving speedily, Trump plans early visits to China and India,” Times of India, January 19, 2025, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/us/moving-speedily-trump-plans-early-visits-to-china-and-india/articleshowprint/117375304.cms

54. “India must cut tariffs to stay competitive: US ambassador,” Bloomberg, January 17, 2025, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-01-17/india-must-cut-tariffs-if-it-wants-to-compete-ambassador-says

55. Seema Sirohi, “Trump 2.0: Why keeping Indo-US partnership on track will remain a tough job,” Economic Times, December 18, 2024,  https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/opinion/et-commentary/trump-2-0-why-keeping-indo-us-partnership-on-track-will-remain-a-tough-job/printarticle/116409434.cms

56. Indrani Bagchi, “Play smart, India, not smug: Chuffed for being liked by Trump Inc should give way to a hard-headed agenda,” Economic Times, November 13, 2024.  https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/opinion/et-commentary/play-smart-india-not-smug-chuffed-for-being-liked-by-trump-inc-should-give-way-to-a-hard-headed-agenda/articleshow/115265104.cms?from=mdr

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