India, Russia, and the Evolving Dynamics in the Middle East

India, Russia and the Evolving Dynamics in the Middle East

Nivedita Kapoor

Tumultuous developments in the Middle East in 2025 have occurred against the background of stirrings in great power relations, also producing ramifications for regional policies of India and Russia. Both these countries have increased their engagement with the Middle East in the past years, informed by national interests as well as the shifts underway in the region. Elements of their broader foreign policy vision are also visible in their engagement with the Middle East, including a multi-vector approach that is non-ideological and pragmatic. Their approaches have also been informed by their respective engagements with the two major world powers – the US and China. All of this has implications for how India and Russia have reacted and been impacted by the regional developments since Hamas’s October 7 attack on Israel, and how it reflects on their bilateral ties amidst uncertain times for an evolving world order.

Indian and Russian responses to the 12-day Iran-Israel war

On June 14, the “member states” of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) issued a statement strongly condemning the “military strikes carried out by Israel on the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran” the previous day, calling it a violation of international law and the UN Charter.¹ The statement also called for resolution of issues around the Iranian nuclear program through peaceful, diplomatic means; thus expressing support of Tehran that had become a full member of SCO in 2023, after almost two decades as an observer. The same day, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs issued a statement distancing itself from the SCO announcement,² despite the fact that the latter was issued on behalf of the member-states. The Indian statement noted that it had not participated in the discussions of the SCO statement and instead referred to its own, dated June 13, that clarified the Indian position. While calling for a return to diplomacy to move towards de-escalation and conveying to Iran concerns about the “turn of events,” the Indian statement did not directly name Israel as having attacked Iranian nuclear sites.³ The same pattern of not explicitly naming Israel (or the US) on this issue was followed in the 2025 BRICS declaration while “condemning military strikes” against Iran as a violation of international law and the UN Charter.⁴ Iran became a member of BRICS effective from January 1, 2024, but given that the organisation is yet to organize itself as an entity that takes collective action on political issues, the declaratory support in itself remains weak for a country facing a crisis situation. As evident in the Indian distancing from the SCO statement, members can also choose to dissent from the organizational line, depending on their national policies.

As explained below, the respective reactions of New Delhi and Moscow to the recent Iran-Israel conflict have been a function of their evolving policies towards the Middle East, demonstrating their own unique strengths and weaknesses. It also revealed specific differences in interpretation of these events in the Middle East, which hinders a common multilateral or bilateral response, despite some mutual concerns.

The balancing act that India has pursued, as reflected in the careful wording of its statements during the recent conflict, is a sign of both the evolution of its position in line with Indian interests as well as the changing regional dynamics. Its seeming reluctance to directly condemn Israel has been managed alongside its continued engagement with Iran. The leaders from both countries have held telephone talks since then, and Iran facilitated safe repatriation of Indians.⁵  However, at this time, India’s influence on Tehran has been much reduced as it ended imports of Iranian oil in 2019 due to sanctions and western pressure, which had formed the bedrock of bilateral ties.⁶ The impact of an improved defense and security relationship with Israel is also visible in India’s response.⁷

India’s statements have focused on maintaining regional peace⁸ and stability,⁹ emphasizing the friendly relations it has with both sides. The policy of maintaining a balance between a wide variety of actors in the Middle East is a longstanding one, even as it has improved its security ties with both the US and Israel over the years. India does remain worried about the consequences of proliferation or an escalation/continuation of conflict in the region. In relation to ongoing projects with Iran, a renewal of the conflict could add to the difficulties of development of the Chabahar port that has already been impacted over the years due to continued sanctions pressure. Also, rising tensions in the region and Israel’s continued neglect of the devastating humanitarian situation in Gaza could hurt the already complicated normalization effort underway between the Arab world and Israel. The much talked about possibility of a Saudi Arabia-Israel deal is already believed to not be on the agenda at present, once again challenging the Indian policy of building a broader relationship with the region.¹⁰  This is because New Delhi is seeking to build projects like the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC)¹¹ whose implementation requires “active cooperation” between Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and UAE.¹²

India’s relations with the Middle East have over the years been defined by the presence of a large diaspora population today numbering about 9 million, its energy import needs, and broader economic ties as well as engagement with major regional states. Overall regional stability remains important for India given the vitality of energy imports and sea lanes of communication.¹³ About 40-50% of India’s energy imports pass through the Strait of Hormuz, and any disruption would be detrimental to its economic needs. India has seen not only an increase in trade with the region but also enhanced political and investment relationships, while also building on its interests related to preventing the rise of extremism and terrorism, and military cooperation through joint exercises.

Russia too follows a multi-vector policy in the Middle East, but unlike India, its relations with Iran have grown closer since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, especially as a result of Tehran supplying Shahed drones for Moscow’s war effort in 2022-23. Since then, Russian reliance on direct supplies from Iran has declined as the production of these drones has been localized. The two sides signed a strategic partnership agreement in January 2025, and Tehran also concluded a Free Trade Agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union this year. However, in the latest crisis, while expressing support to the Iranian people¹⁴ and condemning the recent Israeli and US strikes,¹⁵ Moscow has not gone beyond political support. It must be noted that the 2025 treaty does not include a mutual defense clause, so the Russian reaction is not entirely unexpected. It remains concerned about proliferation risks and does not want Iran to abandon the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) or acquire a nuclear weapon. These worries remain heightened as it is still unclear how much the US/Israeli strikes set back the Iranian nuclear program while altering the political calculations for Tehran about remaining a threshold state. Even so, Russia’s ties to Iran are far more substantial than India’s, as is its desire to weaken the US role in the Middle East.

But the advantage for Russia accruing from a US embroiled in a Middle East conflict that could take attention away from other hotspots¹⁶ does not necessarily mean an escalation would be to its benefit. Already the 12-day war highlighted the limitations of Russian influence in a rapidly evolving military situation in the region. This does not preclude future cooperation as the 2025 Russia-Iran strategic partnership treaty contains provisions for deeper military-technical, intelligence, and regional cooperation,¹⁷ providing the basis for future engagement. However, any Iranian decision to acquire Russian weapons is unlikely to take place immediately or have an impact in the near-term;¹⁸ Moscow’s defense industry remains tied up supplying its own forces in the ongoing war with Ukraine. This and the necessity for Iran to equip its air force sooner rather than later has already led to speculation in the Russian press about Chinese J-10C fighters being considered as a viable option.¹⁹

Both India and Russia, while seeking to pursue balanced ties with Middle Eastern actors, are also dealing with their own limitations in power projection while looking at a regional order that is still evolving, especially after October 7. Their disparate reactions to the latest crisis cannot be fully understood without the perspective of the past few years that have seen major developments in the policies of all sides in the Middle East.

Evolution of Indian and Russian interests in the Middle East

Overall, Indian and Russian policies towards the Middle East echo much of their broader foreign policy approaches, but with some important nuances to factor in national capacities and regional specificities. This also makes their engagement with the two major powers – the US and China – relevant. For India, the main focus of Middle Eastern policy revolves around economic relations, defense and security cooperation, energy imports, connectivity and regional stability, leading it to build ties across the region. Unlike Russia, the US remains an important partner for New Delhi as it strengthens its engagement with regional actors, without joining alliance structures.

Russia, which has seen its relations with the US deteriorate dramatically after 2022, has also turned its attention to the region, with the earlier focus on security issues now expanding to include trade and investment direction as important areas of engagement. Unlike India, which is an energy importer, Russia engages with the energy producers through OPEC+, which makes cooperation with the regional member states vital. Moscow rebuilt its regional influence through intervention in Syria in 2015, both concerned about the threat from radical Islamism and focused on pushing back against what it deemed to be the US idea of regime change.

As a permanent member of the UNSC, it has been a direct part of regional diplomatic processes – including the Israel-Palestine conflict and Iran nuclear deal – and continues to have aspirations to play such a role in the future. It is part of Russian positioning as a vital regional and global actor,²⁰ while highlighting its policies as different from western actors like the US, whether during its intervention in favor of the Assad government or in its criticism of US support to Israel amidst the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. This does not form part of the repertoire of the Indian approach to the region, while for Russia, undermining the US presence in the region does remain one of the goals of its policy. But given its own limited capacities and the complexities involved in dealing on regional issues with multiple Middle Eastern actors, Russian opposition to the US in the region plays out much differently than other settings like the post-Soviet space.

This is also visible in the interaction between Russia, China, and Iran where it would be expected that given their interest in weakening the US position and challenging the rules-based order, they would act as a united entity. There have indeed been regular discussions whether a China-Russia-Iran axis exists. Recent events in the Middle East have given pause to such arguments that have, in the opinion of experts, long been overblown.²¹ Even though these three states do have an interest in engaging in efforts to reduce western influence, it does not always imply a deliberate collective effort in the region. Overall, “trilateral policy coordination” remains “modest,”²² with the parties focusing on bilateral ties amidst varied national interests and power imbalances.

It is in this context that one needs to look at the impact of developments in the Middle East on India-Russia ties. While their growing alignment with two opposing major powers (India with the US and Russia with China) has raised concern about the impact on the bilateral relationship – as evident in their differing perceptions of the Indo-Pacific, Quad, managing China, role of the US, etc – the impact of divergence in the Middle East is of much less direct nature. This is a factor also of India focusing mostly on economic engagement with the region while Russia operates within its limited means in influencing regional events.

Indian Approach to the Middle East

For India, the focus has been on adhering to strategic autonomy and multi-alignment, seeking to maintain a balance that best serves its national interests. Amidst a steady rise of China and the need to accelerate domestic economic development, the role of the US has achieved greater prominence. The improved relations with the US have been visible not just in the Indo-Pacific but also reflected in its Middle East policy through I2U2 (a strategic partnership between India, Israel, the UAE, and the United States) and IMEC corridor, announced in 2021 and 2023 respectively.²³ The investment in these policies reveals the importance that the US has acquired in Indian policymaking over the past two decades, putting New Delhi in a bind as it seeks to deal with Trump’s tariff threats without blowing up the partnership.

Through IMEC, India seeks to combine its economic and strategic goals, through building ‘inter-regional’ cooperation together with the US, European, and Middle Eastern partners.²⁴ This is also a reflection of India’s growing relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries – with trade touching $178.56 billion to constitute 15.4% of India’s global trade in 2024-25²⁵ – and Israel. India’s trade with the latter currently remains limited at $4 billion, but both sides are negotiating a free trade agreement. Meanwhile, Tel Aviv has become the third largest supplier of arms to India,²⁶ with a market share of 13% and growing engagement across the defense sector.

These dynamics were also reflected in how India reacted to the Israeli war on Gaza, which has been interpreted as being different from its past stances, even though its fundamental policy of supporting the two-state solution on the Palestine issue remains unchanged. India saw the attack by Hamas through the anti-terror lens and in the past two years did abstain from some²⁷ but not all UN resolutions critical of Israel.²⁸ Most recently, while it abstained from a UNGA vote in June 2025 calling for a ceasefire in Gaza, India’s permanent representative at the UN Security Council debate has since called for an immediate ceasefire, delivery of humanitarian aid, release of hostages, and a return to dialogue and diplomacy.²⁹

India has continued to engage with Iran on issues related to connectivity and Afghanistan, even after the loss of bilateral oil trade due to western pressure that has left China as the dominant buyer, importing almost 90% of Iran’s oil today. On connectivity, the efforts have been focused on the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and the Chabahar port, with a proposal to connect the two projects. On the latter front, the two sides signed a ten-year deal where India would invest $120 million in the Shahid Behesti terminal at the Chabahar port in 2024 and also extend a $250 million line of credit to Iran to further develop the terminal.³⁰ This agreement came amidst ongoing Israel-Iran tensions as well as disagreement on the issue with the US. In the past, the US was seen as willing to exempt the Chabahar port from sanctions while its troops were in Afghanistan, but that is no longer the case.³¹ The project remains important for New Delhi as it allows access to Afghanistan and Central Asia bypassing Pakistan. It also lies less than 200 kilometers from Gwadar port in Pakistan that China is developing as part of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which India opposes. After the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, which had benefitted Indian outreach, New Delhi recognizes an increased Russian presence and seeks to engage in regular dialogue with Moscow while China also attempts to strengthen a foothold there. Notably, these efforts do not take place at the SCO level, which has a contact group on Afghanistan, but rather through bilateral means or through other mechanisms like the Moscow format.

The broader regional cooperative trends have been seen as a net positive in India that has long had to walk a tightrope in its relations with all key regional actors – Arabs, Iran, and Israel. The Abraham Accords and Saudi-Iran normalization, amidst disquiet about US regional commitments to its allies and the rise of China, symbolized a new direction in the region. Even though it was the US and China that mediated these developments, with India not an actor in these regional processes at present, the announcement of I2U2 and IMEC point to the benefits it can reap as a result.

India’s connectivity push also comes against the backdrop of China’s advances in the region through BRI as well as its less than successful initiative of International North South Transport Corridor (INSTC). Conceptualized in a three-sided agreement between India, Iran, and Russia in 2000, the project has since expanded to include Central Asia and the Caucasus, linking them through this trade route and onwards to Europe. The project since its initial years has been impeded by lack of adequate infrastructure, low trade volumes, and non-aligned customs procedures. Sanctions on Iran further delayed the project. Currently, the project operates on the Russia-Azerbaijan and Russia-Iran routes, with trial runs having been conducted along the entire route in the past. After 2022, Moscow has focused more on this project and in 2025, it signed an agreement with Iran to complete the Rasht-Astara railway.³² This part of INSTC has remained unfinished and its completion is necessary for container traffic to be able to reach the Bandar Abbas port.³³ The parties do see benefits from INSTC becoming operational across its full length but challenges in its realization remain even now, including those related to profitability and transport volumes that India and Russia are yet to address.³⁴

As China has expanded BRI, India has felt the need to strengthen its own connectivity networks, even involving actors like Saudi Arabia and UAE, who are participants both in IMEC and the Chinese initiative. As the US has witnessed a relative decline and expressed its readiness to pivot to the Indo-Pacific, China has found an opening among regional states who are looking to manage the great power competition amidst their own changing economic priorities. While the US remains a valued security partner, the Middle Eastern states are interested in engaging with China especially in economic areas, with technology, infrastructure, and renewable energy gaining ground.³⁵  India remains interested in the broader American presence in the Middle East to maintain a balance wherein without it, regional states could become more willing to strike deals with China or accede to its demands. It also does not want to be left out of the diversification in which Middle Eastern states are engaging, including on security issues.³⁶ Beijing has expanded its economic ties across the Middle East, surpassing the US in trade volume by 2014,³⁷ built BRI linkages, and has become a source of arms sales even to some American allies, especially in cases where US restrictions have prevented such deliveries.³⁸

India in its policymaking has taken steps to ensure it does not cause tensions with its Middle Eastern partners while seeking to manage China, especially as New Delhi also benefits from the regional reconciliation efforts. These have been the result of the willingness of the Arab states to build relations with Israel, their focus on economic development to move away from energy-export led growth as well as concerns around the Iranian nuclear program.³⁹ In fact, India took into consideration the concerns of other Middle Eastern states around the Iran nuclear issue during JCPOA negotiations and given that it was building closer ties to the US, it eventually stopped oil imports from Iran that had at one time made Tehran the third largest supplier to New Delhi.⁴⁰ The western sanctions also made payments for purchases almost impossible, but India had hoped to restart supplies once sanctions ease with the nuclear deal coming into force. But with the US withdrawing from the nuclear deal under the first Trump administration, India’s hopes on this front were not realized.

Now, the second Trump administration is demanding that India stop oil imports, this time from Russia. The imposed tariffs are being seen as a pressure tactic in the ongoing bilateral trade talks and discontent around failure to achieve a quick peace deal in Ukraine, but the move has raised tensions in the bilateral relationship. Here, it is unlikely that India has forgotten the lesson it learnt in the Iran case and is much more unlikely to want to jettison its relations with Russia, given its own interests. It is not that over time, India could not reduce the volume of Russian imports from its current high of 35% market share, especially if the discount rates narrow. India is already importing more from the US, taking its share from three to eight percent in crude oil imports⁴¹ with the Middle Eastern countries making up just over 50% of the market share⁴² (Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, Oman and Qatar) that can be increased if necessary. But it would oppose and resist any disruption of the energy market given its resultant impact on price and the cascading negative impact for the economy of a country that imports almost all of its energy needs.

Also, the Indian foreign policy ethos means that it is not about to abandon its strategic partnership with Russia or clash with it over Middle Eastern issues amidst the uncertainties that the Trump administration has created, even as it recognizes the essential nature of relations with the US today. Apart from the legacy of arms imports and now significant energy imports, New Delhi could hardly afford to neglect its relations with Moscow, especially with steady Sino-Russian rapprochement that has only intensified since 2022. Just as India partners with the US to prevent a unipolar Asia from emerging, it also seeks to prevent any possible Russia-China alliance/quasi-alliance from emerging in Eurasia. While it is evident that India’s developmental needs cannot be met by Russia and that the latter’s asymmetrical ties with China are a cause of concern, the solution is not sought in alienating an important partner. Instead, a more long-term approach is adopted, where it is argued that a significantly stronger China would eventually prompt Russia to develop a more balanced approach through engagement with other players like India. Following the same logic, it has been considered both unwise and strategically shortsighted to cede initiative in non-western institutions like the BRICS and SCO to China.

This has been India’s way of coping with a highly uneven multipolarity⁴³ wherein the rest of the powers (India, Russia, Japan etc.) remain much behind the US and China in their overall power projection capacities but do possess the ability to capitalize on specific developments in specific regional settings. This also allows for more cooperation by powers other than the US and China in regional settings to achieve their common interests. However, as developments in the Middle East have shown, the presence of multiple middle/emerging powers can also pose significant challenges in driving policy for countries like India and Russia where their capacities are limited, especially in rapidly changing situations. The power gap with the two leading ones poses its own challenges, whether in dealing with Trump’s pressure tactics or in the need for India to reduce tensions with China despite continued border issues and the Sino-Pakistani axis. The logic of the uncertainties surrounding the ongoing changes to the international system means India is unlikely to abandon its multi-alignment approach.

Russian Approach to the Middle East
Russia’s policy in the region has over the years been described as both “situational” and “conditional”⁴⁴ to achieve Russian interests through following what some call a non-allied, non-ideological, and pragmatic approach⁴⁵ to interact with a variety of regional actors. The aim has been to pursue a multi-vector approach with experts advising being more ‘adaptive and flexible’ as a desirable goal.⁴⁶ Moscow seeks to establish itself as an important actor in regional affairs whose vision is distinct from that of the western powers, primarily the US. Its narrative comprising elements like criticism of the liberal world order and support for traditional values has a receptive audience in the region. It also draws on Soviet legacy, including on the Palestine issue, where Russia has consistently maintained its position on a two-state solution.

In the ongoing war in Gaza, Russia has been openly critical of Israel for the high civilian casualties and worsening humanitarian condition. While Russian President Vladimir Putin has condemned the October 7 attack, the overall position has been seen as less even-handed than before, as reflected in a UNSC resolution it submitted that condemned violence against civilians without mentioning Hamas.⁴⁷ But after initial trading of harsh statements, both sides have continued their working relationship, where Israel remains interested in a Russian presence in Syria. Tel Aviv did not join western sanctions on Russia after 2022, also arguably due to practical considerations regarding cooperation in Syria.⁴⁸ Apart from a large Russian Jewish diaspora population in Israel, Russia continues to see itself as an important player in talks around issues important for Tel Aviv – including the Palestine issue and the Iran nuclear question. Russia has repeatedly made offers to act as a mediator in the Israeli-Iran conflict to prevent its escalation.⁴⁹ Overall, Russia has managed regional contradictions⁵⁰ and has sought to achieve a balance that has allowed it to maintain ties with Israel.

The balancing act between Israel and Iran has not been an easy one, especially as Israeli actions after October 7 have weakened Iran as well as its proxies in Hamas and Hezbollah, and the US has continued to back Tel Aviv. Russia’s Syrian intervention had already led to coordination with Iran – which was not without its differences – particularly in the military-to-military domain. The preservation of the Assad government through Russian intervention also aided Iranian efforts to strengthen its regional proxies, with Syria serving as a critical node. Both sides have cooperated on security issues related to Afghanistan, the Caspian Sea, and Central Asia. Russia also facilitated the approval of Iran’s application for membership in the SCO in 2021,⁵¹ with the latter becoming a full member in 2023. It has been credited with having played a positive role during the JCPOA negotiations, and as a major nuclear power, Russia remains involved in the question. Most recently, the Russian deputy foreign minister Sergei Ryabkov⁵² announced that Moscow was ready to remove highly enriched uranium from Iran to turn it into civilian reactor fuel as a way of facilitating differences between Washington and Tehran on the issue. It remains interested in its role as an actor in the diplomatic process. Russia operates the Bushehr nuclear power plant in Iran and after the recent Israeli/American strikes, Rosatom head Alexey Likhachev even offered to help repair peaceful nuclear facilities.⁵³

But as the Iranian position was revealed to be weak in its latest clashes with Israel, Russia did not do much to help its regional partner, nor was there a specific Russia-China joint response to aid Tehran in material terms. Even in late 2024, as the Assad government fell, Moscow once again did not intervene,⁵⁴ acknowledging the failure of the Syrian government in carrying out necessary reforms. The overall picture did reveal a setback for the Russian position, which had been seen as revitalized in the Middle East after the 2015 Syrian intervention that preserved the Assad government and demonstrated the effectiveness of Russian policy at a manageable cost for the Kremlin. This was accompanied by coordination with a variety of regional actors to manage the Syrian situation, including Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Turkey, and Israel. For instance, Russia and Turkey were part of the Astana peace process with Iran, and there was coordination with Saudi Arabia over opposition forces. Russia and Israel coordinated on deconfliction in Syria, and Moscow did not interfere with Israeli operations on Syrian territory when related to issues of “national security.”⁵⁵ Thus, Russia managed to work with these varied actors, which further gave it an opportunity to enhance its regional profile, but the ousting of Bashar al-Assad has obliged it to deal with the setback that has reduced its influence in the country.

This does not mean that Moscow has lost its ability to continue its engagement with major regional actors in the region, even reaching out to the new Syrian government and continuing to engage with it. Yet, the debacle is undeniable with the coming to power of a former al-Qaeda member Ahmad al-Sharaa whose foreign policy differs markedly from the previous powerholders. The development also underscored a broader point about Moscow’s limited leverage in the region where it is not a leading power given the size of its “economic and financial base.”⁵⁶

The same challenge of uneven multipolarity that India faces also has to be dealt with by Russia in the Middle East. Its attempts to do so can be seen in pursuit of a multi-vector policy, including through building ties with Gulf Arab states with whom it has had cordial relations including in the areas of trade and defense, with the management of international oil markets as partners in OPEC+ being especially important where Saudi Arabia and Russia are the leading actors. The GCC countries have also emerged as an important source of investment to Moscow after 2022. The two sides have also found common cause in criticizing the ongoing war in Gaza and calling for an immediate ceasefire,⁵⁷ which also aligns Russia’s stance with the broader “Global South” – an important part of its positioning since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Russia is now planning to host an Arab summit in October 2025, adding to its efforts to reach out to the non-western countries.

This balancing act among various regional players led Russia to welcome the normalization of relations between Gulf Arab states and Tehran,⁵⁸ even if it was China that successfully mediated the deal. But it has also been a sign of a reduction of its influence on regional issues, including the Arab-Israeli conflict. This led Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov to issue an implicit critique of the Abraham Accords, arguing that they sidelined the 2002 Arab Initiative⁵⁹ that linked normalization between Israel and the Arab world to the establishment of a state of Palestine. However, Moscow has refrained from openly criticizing the accords given the sensitivities of its Arab partners as well as Israel.⁶⁰ The cooperative trends in the region are not necessarily negative for Russia’s regional policies, despite these having been achieved by actors other than Russia. 

Conclusion

Overall, both India and Russia follow a multi-vector policy in building relations with Middle Eastern states, balancing their varied interests amidst limited influence on major regional issues. While it is the US and China that have mediated cooperative tendencies in the region, both New Delhi and Moscow have used the opportunities thus offered to strengthen their already existing relations with the regional actors where possible. The recent events in the Middle East have also shown how difficult managing a multipolar world will be for India and Russia in its current uneven setting, especially in regions where their influence and leverage is limited amidst the presence of multiple strong actors. This has promoted cooperation with as many regional states as possible, while also limiting opportunities for directly challenging the leading powers in the region.

It is also evident that there are differences in how Indian and Russian ambitions and approaches pan out in the Middle East, even if they share a common interest in regional stability. However, these do not spill over into their bilateral engagement given that the regional policies proceed largely on parallel tracks with each side pursuing its own interests that do not directly come into conflict with each other. This is a by-product of their multi-vector regional approaches, which mean there are multiple relationships to consider while responding to any development.

The attempt to avoid any clash is also visible in multilateral domains like BRICS and SCO that determinedly stay away from taking any overt collective action, even or especially when their members are directly involved in an issue. The result is that while BRICS and SCO issue several statements expressing their common concerns about various Middle Eastern issues (strikes on Iran, Palestine, Lebanon, Syria), they do not need to organize policy on the ground. While on the one hand this reduces the effectiveness of these institutions in presenting alternative policy choices, on the other it avoids potential conflicts between the leading states – including China, India and Russia – on regional issues where their approaches might differ. The expansion of BRICS to include Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, UAE, and Saudi Arabia (yet to confirm) also complicates decision-making in an organization that operates on consensus, making the above-mentioned approach more desirable for the moment.

While an expansion of non-western multilateral organisations represents the desire of middle powers to hedge in an unstable international system, it does not turn them into a bloc that works unitedly across all issues facing the “Global South.” This can be expected to be repeated at the upcoming SCO summit in China, where the presence of Iran as a full member should not be expected to translate into a policy beyond political support. While the engagement of Russia, India, and China will attract attention as well, especially given the ongoing American pressure on all of them, it must be remembered that the earlier iterations of the troika remained a good platform for discussion but did not translate into a broader alignment, largely on account of India-China divergence. The cost of upending bilateral India-Russia ties over external issues in the present situation of a “world between orders”⁶¹ is considered too high while the benefits of multi-alignment are evident in the Middle East, even if there is a broader tilt towards one major power or other in the overall foreign policy dimension. In an uneven multipolar world, India and Russia see benefits in remaining engaged with each other and with other regional powers, especially in the Middle East.