Introduction

After Kishida Fumio announced his decision not to run again for the presidency of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Ishiba Shigeru triumphed in the in-party elections, two far-reaching events raised deep uncertainties over the course of Japan’s foreign policy. First, the LDP lost its hold, along with Komeito, over the Lower House of the Diet, and was forced to bargain for some coalition to stay in power. Second, Donald Trump won the US election for president, raising grave doubts about the continuity of US foreign policy. Within Asia, three questions drew the bulk of attention. What would happen to the only recently improved, but still fragile, Japan-ROK relationship? How would China respond to Japan, after the relationship had barely begun to rebound from a recent troubling time? Finally, how would Southeast Asian states respond to Japan, as it seeks both to piggy-back on US moves to limit China’s hegemonic plans and to pursue autonomous actions?

Three authors respectively address these questions. They draw on Japanese publications in the summer and fall of 2024, looking at how others are viewing Japan’s leadership transition, while also offering a perspective on thinking outside Japan. The articles were written before the impact of Trump’s return to power could be considered but tell us about challenges Ishiba was facing. 

Nishino Junya, “Managing Relations with South Korea”

In his Diet policy speech in, Ishiba expressed a strong commitment to advancing relations with South Korea, taking the trust forged between Kishida and Yoon as a cornerstone and putting Japan-ROK bilateral cooperation on an even more solid and wide-reaching foundation. Yet, the ruling coalition’s loss of a majority in the Lower House has made it more difficult to exercise his leadership in Japan-South Korea relations. Moreover, public sentiment in both countries (notably in South Korea where demands for Japan’s “sincere response” remain strong) has not fully caught up with the progress in relations. Yet, Ishiba is seen in South Korea as having empathy toward South Korea’s perspective on historical issues, having stated, “without understanding how annexation, which deprived a nation of its culture, language, institutions, and military, damaged the pride and identity of the people of the annexed country, it is impossible to build genuine trust between Japan and South Korea.” Ishiba will find it hard to meet South Korea’s expectations. The domestic political situation does not seem to offer ample opportunities to advance relations.

The Yoon administration faces similar domestic political challenges. Even if Yoon continues to push for improved relations additional efforts will be needed to gain broader public support. Both sides should take more proactive leadership that allows both Japanese and South Korean citizens to feel the tangible benefits of improving relations. Also, to further advance US-Japan-South Korea cooperation, three points should be considered: (1) to pursue close consultation on policies toward North Korea, e.g., by establishing a high-level official consultative body on North Korean to address not only deterrence measures against North Korea’s military threat but also diplomacy and negotiation strategies toward North Korea; (2) to further promote trilateral cooperation not only concerning North Korea but also in the context of broader Indo-Pacific strategy, given the increasing importance of the “Global South,” such as ASEAN and Pacific Island countries, Japan with long experience in supporting and cooperating with those countries, needs to take the lead in working with South Korea and the US to implement the Indo-Pacific strategies in the region; and (3) to solidify trilateral cooperation by strengthening the relatively weak Japan-South Korea bilateral ties, taking advantage of improved bilateral ties to collaborate closely in promoting the US’s proactive and constructive role in the region.

Despite the desirability of a new joint declaration beyond the 1998 one, the Japanese side is cautious. A new declaration would need to include more forward-looking language on historical issues, as requested by the South Korean side; concern exists that a change of administration in Seoul could lead to setbacks in relations; and some hold that efforts should focus on implementing measures that both countries’ citizens can enjoy directly. Given that Japan-South Korea relations have again become a domestic political issue, strong political leadership would be required to issue a new declaration. At least until the Upper House election in July 2025, there is a lot of uncertainty in Japanese politics, raising questions about how much effort Ishiba will devote to advancing Japan-South Korea relations. Another issue likely to need careful management in Japan-South Korea relations is the bilateral Continental Shelf Agreement due to expire in 2028. Japan and South Korea are expected to hold differing positions on whether it should be renewed. A difficult decision might be required by Japan, which would prefer to end the agreement.

Gilbert Rozman, “Japanese Perceptions of China’s Response”

Japanese have been closely following the response in China to the election within the LDP of Ishiba as prime minister. Given a slew of problems in bilateral relations, accumulating further in the summer of 2024, they searched for clues on how the emergence of a new prime minister in place of Kishida Fumio would be received. From the time Kishida said he would not run for re-election in mid-August for two months, we can trace how the transition in leadership was being addressed in China, as seen from Japan, and the prospects for better ties.

China treats Japan differently from the United States, although both are seen as leading the resistance to its Sinocentric designs in the Indo-Pacific. The differences can be summarized as four-fold: (1) “pipes” as a factor in manipulating diplomatic ties; (2) economic vulnerability as a source of pressure; (3) geographical proximity as strategic leverage; and (4) historical memory as a “card.” In the late summer of 2024 Japanese articles showcased the many tools of Chinese assertiveness, but they also left uncertain how to respond to a softening Chinese posture.

Issues that drew the most wariness spanned individual behavior that elicited charges of “hate Japan,” military moves that were taken as unprecedented threats, economic matters that symbolized the end of an era dating back nearly half a century, treatment of Japanese citizens and products that appeared hostile and unjustified, and perceived diplomatic slights marginalizing Japan. Left uncertain were frequent Chinese claims to seek “stable relations” with little substantive confirmation. China has put Japan’s new prime minister Ishiba on a short leash, dangling economic possibilities in front of him while indirectly threatening economic and military pressure should he not appreciate the need for “stability” in bilateral relations. They yielded scant ground on the issues deemed most sensitive in Japan, seeing Ishiba as a defense hawk, a strong supporter of Taiwan’s autonomy, and an advocate of closer ties to South Korea.

At a meeting with Ishiba, Premier Li Qiang said, “China is ready to work with Japan to capitalize on their respective comparative advantages and explore more areas of cooperation in scientific and technological innovation, the digital economy and green development,” even as he raised concerns about export restrictions imposed by Japan and interference with supply chains and global free trade. The impression spread that Xi Jinping was taking a wait-and-see approach, emphasizing “stable” relations and limiting economic setbacks. Did Japanese find reason for cautious optimism from these early exchanges? Problems in bilateral relations had scarcely been addressed. Ishiba’s low popularity and alarm over the US elections left little reason for hope.

Already in the Kishida era, Japanese perceptions of the China threat had hardened. Further alarm drew on many sources. Diplomatic neglect, business environment, security fears, and “hate Japan” incitement pose distinctive challenges widely raised in recent press accounts. Japanese news stories and editorials repeatedly railed against Chinese behavior in August and September 2024. Despite occasional mention of the supposed “friendship mood” forged when Kishida met Xi in November 2023 or with the Kishida-Li Qiang meeting in May 2024, coverage pointed to relations strained by China’s contradictory, hardline behavior. As Beijing anticipates Donald Trump as the next US president, it must decide how to respond to a new prime minister in Japan. Should it strive harder to drive a wedge between Tokyo and Washington, softening its stance toward Japan’s leadership? Should it make a lesson of Japan, by hardening its policy, sending a clear warning to the United States? In 2024 both approaches have been in evidence at times, the CJK summit in Seoul reflecting an economics-oriented posture, and the fierce rhetoric about Japan’s discharge of the treated water from the Fukushima nuclear plant testifying to a sustained hard line until relenting. The duality continued, a measure of wait-and-see for Ishiba.

Koga Kei, “Southeast Asia and Japan’s New Leadership”

Successive administrations led by Suga and Kishida adopted FOIP as a core diplomatic agenda rather than abandoning the FOIP narrative. Ishiba followed suit, incorporating the concept into his first policy speech on October 4, 2024, stating that Japan would uphold its FOIP vision and the rules-based international order. However, given the ambiguity of the FOIP concept, it remains unclear what the FOIP means to Ishiba and whether continuity or change will prevail in Japan’s foreign policy under the Ishiba administration. Southeast Asian states may cast decisive votes on the success of Japan’s FOIP. Although Southeast Asia is highly diverse in political systems, strategic orientations, and levels of economic development, the region is located at the heart of the Indo-Pacific region, and it holds vital sea-lines of communication between these oceans and from north to south through the South China Sea. In addition, ASEAN has served as the core of East Asian multilateralism in East Asia and the Asia Pacific since the end of the Cold War. 

Southeast Asia’s responses to Japan’s new prime minister have been relatively muted. First, Ishiba’s foreign policy stance toward Southeast Asia remains unclear. Although he has expertise in defense policy, his focus has primarily been on managing the US-Japan alliance. The establishment of an “Asian NATO,” has sparked controversy in Southeast Asia and beyond. Ishiba strongly believes that Russia’s aggression toward Ukraine was due to Ukraine not being a NATO member, reinforcing his conviction that a concrete collective self-defense mechanism is necessary to deter China effectively. He envisions the institutionalization of the Quad as part of this mechanism. Yet, significant questions remain about how Japan navigate its constitutional limits on the use of force and which state would join such a defense framework. Many in Singapore suggested that Southeast Asia is unlikely to support the idea, while the Jakarta Post in Indonesia strongly criticized it. It remains uncertain whether he understands the complex regional dynamics and the broader security architecture in East Asia. Given ASEAN emphasis on “inclusivity” and “cooperation” under its institutional principle of ASEAN centrality, which grants it chairpersonship and agenda setting power in East Asia’s multilateral framework, a new collective defense system could significantly undermine this ASEAN centrality.

Second, Japan is still grappling with significant political uncertainty. Ishiba is likely to stay as prime minister given the opposition’s lack of unity to propose an alternative. Also, the conservative factions within the LDP have seen a decline in political influence, reducing their ability to challenge. Japan’s political environment is likely to be less stable than during previous LDP administrations, adding uncertainty to its foreign policy direction. Southeast Asian states are adopting a “wait-and-see” posture toward Japan’s new leadership. Obviously, if any abrupt changes in Japanese foreign policy were to harm ASEAN’s regional interests, such as undermining ASEAN centrality and disrupting ASEAN unity, ASEAN member states would likely express their disapproval. However, in absence of such shifts, Southeast Asia is expected to continue quietly monitoring Japan’s foreign policy direction.

Three key perceptions have stabilized Japan’s position in Southeast Asia: Japan’s trustworthiness; its alternative strategic role; and its political and security posture. First, Japan has consistently been regarded as the most trustworthy state among major regional actors; its diplomatic stance and messaging toward Southeast Asia are considered well-managed in the region. Second, Japan remains the top choice as a third-party actor under the US-China strategic rivalry. If economic and financial decoupling between the United States and China were to occur, Southeast Asia might look to the EU and Japan as viable alternatives. This is also because, although both are strong US allies and partners, their approaches differ from that of the United States. For instance, Japan has adopted a softer approach toward Myanmar and Cambodia, maintaining engagement despite their non-democratic status. While Japan’s economic significance in Southeast Asia is understandable, its strategic importance may be less obvious. Japan has provided maritime law-enforcement assets and defense equipment, such as patrol ships and radars systems.