Introduction

In conjunction with the publication of Xi Jinping’s Quest for a Sinocentric Asia, 2013-2024, a book drawn from articles posted in The Asan Forum, this Special Forum explores three perspectives on China’s pursuit of Sinocentrism. One centers on how China is responding to the collapse of the US-led world order. A second traces the manifestations of Sinocentrism across the history of the PRC. The third perspective centers on United Front policies targeted at overseas Chinese. Together, these analyses expand the range of understanding beyond the record of intensifying Sinocentrism in Xi Jinping’s era with emphasis on strategic thinking toward neighboring areas of Asia. Posted in the journal along with these three perspectives is Daniel Tobin’s article on the global reach of Xi’s aspirations for Sinocentric power.

Suisheng Zhao, “The Collapse of the US-led World Order: China Gains Ground but Not Ready to Replace It”

Trump’s discrediting of American global leadership produced a profound crisis in the postwar order and created a power vacuum. However, China cannot step in to fill the void. Beijing watched almost in disbelief as Trump chaotically and with shocking speed withdrew the US from multilateral organizations, dismantled the US-led alliance system, imposed tariffs on US allies and foes alike, returned to the old power politics of spheres of influence and might-makes-right, and showed his myopic worldview and admiration for autocrats. Many observers believe that these actions have bestowed a strategic advantage on China to create a Sinocentric order, known as Pax Sinica, to replace Pax Americana. China is not ready to step into America’s shoes to remake the world order, not only because China remains a revisionist stakeholder but also because Beijing cannot provide alternative universal values and international public goods to fill the void of global leadership. The collapse of the US-led order created a power vacuum and disorder that is in the interests of neither the US nor China.

Trump’s skepticism about US support for Ukraine, his eagerness to impose tariffs on allies, and his threats to retake the Panama Canal, absorb Canada, and acquire Greenland make it clear that he envisions a return to nineteenth-century power politics and spheres of influence. This is a function of his longstanding aversion toward globalism, multilateralism, entangling alliances, and forever wars in distant countries. Acting on the narrowly defined US interests and disregarding the liberal norms and rules, Trump pronounced the fall of the postwar order associated with US leadership. The creators of the postwar global order believed high tariffs could destroy the global economy and fuel conflict. Trump’s tariffs marked the dawn of a coercive order in which economic intimidation replaces free trade and international cooperation as a currency of power.

China is a revisionist stakeholder. Regarding the US-led order as unfair and unreasonable enough to reflect China’s interests and values and limit its rising power ambitions, Beijing is frustrated by America’s power dominance not serving its interests and values. Xi explicitly vowed that China would lead the international community in building a more just and reasonable new world order and safeguarding international security. China previously expressed its intention to participate in the world order. Xi called on China to take the lead in improving the world order. Such a shift symbolized China’s revisionist stakeholder position.

China had made limited headway in its revisionist demands because the postwar order was resilient. Trump has gone beyond the wildest dreams China’s leaders could have had to bury the liberal international order, the cohesion of the democratic West, and the US global standing, helping China gain ground to influence rule-making in its image, pitch itself as a more reliable partner than Washington, explore the divisions among Washington and its allies, and advance its big power interests in the new Darwinist world. China does not impose its values and models on others or engage in ideological confrontation. This harks back to a Sinocentric order with all the baggage of tianxia.

China’s narratives have appealed to many countries in the “Global South” but not to democratic governments. The US withdrawal from key multinational institutions helped China avoid international criticism and increase its normative power as a rule maker in these institutions. The US now follows Beijing in imposing the same trade barriers and disregards the WTO rules, not only behaving more like China but also making China more influential in defining the rules of the international economic order. As a New York Times opinion piece suggested, rather than transforming China more like America—more democratic and open—“now for some Chinese, the United States is looking more and more like China.”

In the wake of Trump’s wrecking ball, China leveraged the widening transatlantic rift, capitalized on the US betrayal of its allies, and pitched itself as a more reliable partner than Washington to build its united front with Europe. While the US remains the top economic power, it is no longer the only power in town. Other countries can better withstand US pressure if they band together. It would be China’s dream coming true to see globalization without the US. But Sinocentrism may prevent China from taking a leadership role if it happens. Trump’s attack on the US-led alliance system has helped “Make China Great Again” and become a more reliable partner in remaking world order. Trump’s military threats to US neighbors and ignorance of international law legitimize Beijing’s efforts to dominate its neighborhoods despite the fear of Sinocentrism by China’s neighbors.

China cannot step into America’s shoes because it cannot project values and ideals others identify with and aspire to share. For most of its history, China was either an imperial power dominating its neighbors or a victim of Western imperialist powers. The traditional Chinese tianxia hierarchy is not desirable for most countries. As June Teufel Dreyer said, “supporters of the revival of tianxia as a model for today’s world are essentially misrepresenting the past to reconfigure the future, distorting it to advance a political agenda that is at best disingenuous and at worst dangerous.” China does not possess the universal values to shape the norms of international politics. Against the backdrop of sliding democracy, China’s authoritarianism appears more attractive to non-democracies. However, this has not been accompanied by significant interest worldwide in China’s development model. Many of China’s neighbors viewed China’s power aspirations with a wary eye, worrying that China’s imperial past could produce undue pressure on its leaders to restore the old Chinese hierarchical order.

Gilbert Rozman, “Five Upsurges in the Build-up of Sinocentrism: Connecting Shifts in Chinese Foreign Policy under Mao, Deng, Jiang, Hu, and Xi”

This article argues that Sinocentrism, the essence of Chinese strategic thinking toward Asia since the founding of the PRC, has evolved in response to five challenges. In 1956-58 the challenge came from the Soviet Union, not only for leadership of the socialist bloc but also for influence in shaping regionalism across Asia. In 1987-94 Japan’s aspirations to steer regionalism in East Asia threatened the Sinocentric ambitions of China’s leadership. By 2008-10 China’s focus centered squarely on US leadership in East Asia, the biggest threat to Sinocentrism. South Korean audacity in pursuing a region-shaping role tied to resolution of North Korea’s challenge to regional security resulted in the next manifestation of Chinese pushback in defense of Sinocentrism. Most recently, Russia’s growing dependency on China because of its full-scale war in Ukraine and resulting sanctions has exposed the pursuit of Sinocentrism anew. Each of these five perceived challenges to Sinocentrism by a state intent on its own ascendency aroused a strong response from China’s leadership, reflected in ongoing Chinese publications and in the archives.

The above responses have been treated in the context of bilateral relations, not as part of a persistent worldview. Yet, there is growing recognition of an enduring mindset shaping Chinese foreign policy in Asia. The five supplicants were each determined to win China’s cooperation, only to find no common ground. The essence of Sinocentrism is refusal to share leadership in the build-up of regionalism across much of Asia. This is seen in the hardened tone toward the US “pivot to Asia” as a grave threat to the regional order and then in the reaction of China to South Korea for standing in the way of Sinocentrism despite its eagerness to work together for the resolution of the standoff on the Korean Peninsula and a regional framework. Treating Sinocentrism chronologically, this article first introduces it at the end of the nineteenth century, then turns to the landmarks of Sinocentric affirmation breaking with the Soviet Union, Japan, the US, South Korea, and Russia as aspiring leaders in Asia. It ends with generalizations about China’s enduring aspirations.

Sinocentrism has economic, infrastructure, political, diplomatic, and civilizational dimensions.
The tribute system assumed that the states offering tribute were seeking Chinese largesse with little to entice China. Lately, China’s BRI along with globalization with strings attached creates an environment of one-sided dependency on China’s economy. Through the BRI China also builds an infrastructure network through bilateral arrangements centered on China’s own network. In this web of connections China gains economic advantages as it also boosts political influence. The civilizational thrust of Chinese initiatives starts with the demand for deference to Chinese thinking on matters such as human rights. Historically, there was an assumption of sacrosanct culture, so superior it defied outside influence. Penetration of external cultural forces has increasingly been prevented after limited openness from the 1980s.

Imperial China viewed the world through at least five fundamental prisms: middle kingdom (Zhongguo), all under heaven (tianxia), mandate of heaven (tianming), civilizational superiority (wenming versus barbarians), and tributary system (chaogongtizhi). Middle kingdom presupposes centrality, while demanding that others follow China in proportion to their distance from the heartland. All under heaven is likewise a vision of the world order, radiating out in concentric circles. The mandate of heaven bestows absolute power on China’s leader, regardless of any national borders. Civilizational superiority is a cornerstone of perceptions and relationships, demanding ritualized deference with no deference to other civilizations, assuming a single dominant civilization insistent on subservience from other states, not just those within some designated sphere. Finally, the tributary system saw other states send emissaries to China to pay tribute to the emperor and kowtow. In turn, the emperor granted the foreign ruler the status of vassal, offering economic benefits and, in some circumstances, China’s protection. This combination of prisms reflected China’s preeminence and situated others within a hierarchical order, promising stability on the basis of respecting China’s superior status—a negation of the equality of states and respect for cultural diversity. In the PRC, the Sinocentric legacy is obscured by casting blame on all other aspirants to regional leadership (shared or otherwise) for nefarious motives.

As Khrushchev opted for “peaceful coexistence” when Mao sought to pressure the US, Taiwan took center stage. What may be overlooked was Mao’s impatience to get going on a Sinocentric agenda, which would not be possible if a G2 Moscow-Washington understanding was reached on managing the world in order to maintain peace. This could be seen as blocking revolutionary movements, the best hope of Mao, and as leading to a competition for countries such as India, which occupied land Mao would soon make clear he wanted for China. Such a deal would solidify Russia’s control over China’s foreign policy, when China had only regained the strength to set its own course. Having sacrificed heavily to save North Korea and resentful of Moscow’s limited support and assumption of a leading role afterwards, Mao was in no mood to accept enduring passivity.

Sinocentrism collapsed with European pressure in the south, Russian pressure in the north and west, followed by Japanese pressure from the east, and overall US pressure centered on an “open door.” Resistance focused on all of these, lingering as the “century of humiliation.” Most resented for defying the “natural order” was Korea, acting before Japan’s annexation moves. This did not mean that Chinese gave much scrutiny to what was problematic about their own record of unequal treatment of neighboring nations. Rather, talk of the injustice of Japanese colonialism and of “unequal treaties” put the focus on what China had lost. The communist movement centered on how China could extend its reach again beyond its borders, despite the shift in vocabulary to states rising up against unequal treatment from imperialist countries.

The Beijing Olympics saw a surge of Sinocentric assertiveness. The authoritarian, xenophobic elements of Confucianism became pronounced as leaders took a more hierarchical approach to regional relations. Japan’s multilateral and inclusive approach, respecting universal values, brought it in the crosshairs as a long-term dissenter from Sinocentrism and threat to Chinese national identity, only months after the Hu Yaobang visit there had raised hopes of mutual respect for cultural traditions. South Korea was the target of “culture wars.” Evident was the sharpening dividing line between ascendant Eastern civilization equated with China and disparaged US (Western) civilization. In conflating cultural and political identity, it was assumed that the Chinese state has the moral authority to define and transmit the civilization, as regional stability rested on hierarchical relations respecting China’s “natural” and “core” interests.

Surging praise for tianxia meant equating Sinocentrism with the natural order of regionalism. In blaming the geopolitical and geo-cultural aggressiveness of other states for setbacks to the bilateral relationship, Chinese invariably diverted attention from Sinocentrism. This was easy to do in the late 1950s, when Moscow crushed rebellious East European nations, even as it sought to reassure Beijing that more preferential treatment was in store. It found some resonance at the end of the 1980s in claims that visits to the Yasukuni Shrine and signs of not accepting full responsibility for wartime outrages were harbingers of the revival of militarism. In the atmosphere of US unipolar overconfidence early in the 2000s, Chinese narrative gained traction that Washington sought to spread a single, civilizational model. No country tried harder to accept China as it was than South Korea, only to discover that China aspired to what it had lost from the past. Even if other states were not always blameless, we should recognize the persistent pattern at play. Instead of agreeing that other states had nefarious motives, we should focus on why China could not accept their overtures or interests in Asia as it revived its own design for a Sinocentric regional order.

Audrye Wong, “How Beijing Thinks About Overseas Chinese and Foreign Influence: Principles and Tactics of United Front Policies”

Beijing’s interactions with overseas Chinese communities have increasingly come under scrutiny. There are frequent reports of PRC espionage as well as attempts at transnational repression of political dissidents, Hong Kong democracy activists, advocates of Taiwanese and Tibetan independence, Uyghur refugees, and other critics of the Chinese Communist Party. These coercive approaches go hand-in-hand with positive attempts to co-opt the broader Chinese diaspora population. Beijing’s diaspora policies remain far-reaching in their ambition, scale, and scope.

National unification continues to be a fundamental goal in line with the CCP’s stated core interests of national sovereignty and territorial integrity. Overseas Chinese are called upon to counter so-called separatists from Taiwan and Tibet. Especially since the reform era, overseas Chinese have been cultivated as a resource – sources of much-needed capital and skills – to promote economic development and modernization in China. But in the last decade or so, the CCP has shifted from consolidating material support for internal matters—namely economic modernization and national unification—to managing the diaspora as a geopolitical means of expanding China’s overseas influence and promoting China’s interests abroad. It is no longer merely about inculcating patriotism and promoting unification but also about cultivating a positive image of China abroad and shaping the international environment in China’s favor. Overseas Chinese communities are seen as having an important role in achieving national strategic goals articulated during the Xi era—namely, the “China Dream” and “telling China’s story well.” Under Xi, overseas Chinese are supposed to “better integrate into local society” to serve as a “bridge” for others to understand China and build a “community for the shared future of mankind.” Chinese students studying abroad have also become more explicitly part of diaspora-focused policies.

The reorganization of diaspora institutions in China reflects the CCP’s shift from seeing overseas Chinese mainly as a resource for domestic economic growth (as sources of capital and investment) to capitalizing on these diaspora communities to achieve Beijing’s foreign policy goals. Analysts have described United Front and qiaowu activities as based on Marxist-Leninist mass line tactics and strategies. Indeed, a large number of the writings on the United Front and diaspora affairs are by Chinese authors based at Marxist institutes. Overseas Chinese individuals and organizations can be co-opted via a mix of economic and political incentives, and operate semi-autonomously, with a “guiding hand” from the Chinese government. Beijing intentionally homogenizes and instrumentalizes overseas Chinese communities by blurring the lines between Chinese nationals living overseas and those of ethnic Chinese descent who are citizens of other countries. Xi introduced the concept of “root, soul, dream” as a guiding principle – that unification of the Chinese nation serves as a common root for those living outside PRC borders, Chinese culture constitutes the shared soul, and realizing the grand rejuvenation of the Chinese nation is the shared dream. The “new era” of overseas Chinese affairs should harness such emotional, spiritual, and motivational connections.

Chinese elites have long assumed inherent links between culture, ethnic identity, national identity, and political support – sometimes in a very simplistic way. The fusion of the concepts of being Chinese and being part of the nation is reflected in the common use of grand phrases such as Zhonghua minzu gongtongti, or “Chinese national community.” Chinese culture and ethnicity are treated as inherently political. Through a process of (state-led) political socialization, culture helps individuals internalize the idea of loyalty to the Chinese nation. This zero-sum and politicized approach to Chinese identity leaves little room for ethnic Chinese abroad, whether of PRC nationality or not, to maintain complex and hybrid identities, as is often the case for diaspora populations.

Many Chinese-language sources highlight education, media, and grassroots organizations as the three main prongs of outreach and cooptation. Overseas Chinese and ethnic Chinese populations have often been caught between a rock and a hard place. They are under pressure from Beijing’s thumb yet face heightened suspicion and scrutiny by the countries they live in. Because of the deeply-ingrained sweeping notion of the essentialness of Chinese identity, Chinese writings have by and large failed to adequately address the political sensitivities underlying Beijing’s engagement with overseas Chinese communities. Being respectful of the nationality and national loyalty of overseas Chinese who have settled and are citizens of other countries is challenged by broad proclamations that equate ethnicity, culture, and national identity, and push assumptions of innate loyalty to the Chinese nation. Alongside lip service discussions of integrating into local society are exhortations for overseas Chinese to keep the motherland dear and promote China’s interests.

To the extent that Chinese-language writings grapple with global concerns over overseas Chinese as a tool of foreign influence, they vehemently attribute any negative external responses to racism and what they describe as “China threat theory.” much of United Front influence comes not necessarily through overt coercion but implicit co-optation and amplification of voices supportive of the CCP through economic, political, and social means. The strategic positioning of United Front-affiliated and grassroots organizations as public goods providers and defenders of ethnic Chinese identity and interests in host countries—coupled with the ample resources of the Chinese state that facilitate its domination of this landscape—creates a much more sustainable and potent foundation for long-term influence—the ability to mobilize ethnic Chinese communities around local issues as well as foreign policy issues that Beijing cares most about.