One of the notable features of Japanese foreign policy since Prime Minister Abe Shinzo returned to power in December 2012 has been its robust engagement with the countries in the Asia-Pacific region. In particular, Japan under Abe has been actively seeking to strengthen its relationship with the countries in Southeast Asia, Australia. and India. Japan’s National Security Strategy, released in December 2013, identifies the improvement of the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region as one of three national security objectives, and positions the enhancement of Japan’s relationship with “its partners within and outside the Asia-Pacific region” including expanding security cooperation, as integral to supporting such objectives.1 As US foreign policy is undergoing a great deal of change under President Donald Trump, reflecting on how Abe’s initiatives toward these regions have fared in this context is both timely and useful.
Japan’s diplomatic overtures to the countries in these regions actually have a much longer history that precedes Abe. For instance, its engagement with Southeast Asia was launched at full steam in 1977 when Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo, visiting the Philippines, announced three principles for Japan’s Southeast Asian diplomacy, commonly known as the Fukuda Doctrine.2Similarly, Japan’s efforts to establish positive relations with Australia and India predate Abe’s recent term in the office. While these are not new initiatives launched by Abe, he has certainly reenergized them. Given the uncertainty in Trump administration’s approach toward Asia, Japan’s engagement with these three areas will likely intensify.
This article first provides an overview of the major developments in Japan’s policy toward Southeast Asia, Australia, and India respectively. It then examines the context in which these developments are unfolding in 2017. It ends with some thoughts on what is driving Japanese policy in this area and what some of the challenges might be in today’s environment.
Japan-Southeast Asia Relations: toward a multi-layered relationship
Since 1977, Japan has steadily engaged with Southeast Asia, consistently supporting “ASEAN centrality” and the desire for multilateralism. But until recently, tangible support took the form of economic development assistance (Official Development Assistance or ODA), corporate investment, and people-to-people exchanges (including the dispatch of volunteers). Japan also provided a large amount of financial assistance to the region at the time of Asian Financial Crisis in 1997. Its engagement with Southeast Asia has predominantly been in the non-security area.
This trend began to shift after the Cold War as Japan cautiously tested the waters on participation in international cooperation, particularly through sending personnel to UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs). Due to Japan’s involvement as an honest broker in the peace process in Cambodia,3 this was a natural choice for Japan to send its first PKO personnel, such as national and local civilian officials, police officers, non-government volunteers, and the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) to the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) between 1992-1993. Together, they participated in a wide-range of tasks including cease-fire monitoring, election monitoring, and support for Cambodian police and infrastructure repairs.4 Japan also engaged in the UN mission in East Timor, as when it gained independence from Indonesia between 1999-2002, sending police officers, civilian government officials, non-government volunteers, and the JSDF, who provided assistance to internally displaced people, participated in election monitoring, supported local police, and repaired infrastructure.5
Humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) also grew more prominent after the Cold War. After the International Disaster Relief Law—originally enacted in 1987—was amended in 1992 to allow the JSDF to take part in international relief operations, Japan frequently participated in operations in Southeast Asia in the aftermath of large-scale natural disasters, including in Thailand (2004), Indonesia (2005, 2006, and 2009), and the Philippines (2013). Still, the nature of Japan’s engagement with Southeast Asia was largely non-military.
A notable shift in policy toward Southeast Asia began in 2000, as Japan actively engaged in both economic and political/military areas. It signed bilateral economic partnership agreements (EPA) with Singapore (2003), Malaysia (2006), Indonesia (2008), Thailand (2009), the Philippines (2009), Vietnam (2009) and Brunei (2010). Building on these, Tokyo signed a comprehensive EPA in 2013. Its HA/DR efforts evolved from providing necessary assistance to countries affected by disasters to leading capacity-building efforts to help the militaries in the region to acquire the indigenous capabilities to conduct their own HA/DR operations, including participating in ASEAN Regional Forum Disaster Relief Field Exercises (ARF-DiRex).6
Japan’s effort at capacity-building began to include security assistance, which accelerated when Japan revised its ODA Charter in February 2015 to fund the transfer of defense equipment under the mantra of “strategic use of ODA,” which was originally promoted under the Noda Yoshihiko government.7 While Japan continues to provide economic assistance to Southeast Asia, the focus of its aid has been increasingly on infrastructure development, law enforcement assistance, and support for countries to develop their own maritime security capabilities, including the transfer of Coast Guard and JSDF used equipment.
Most recently, the conceptual framework for relations with Southeast Asia—both its economic and security dimensions—was articulated in the Vientiane Vision unveiled by Defense Minister Inada Tomomi in November 2016 at the 2nd Japan-ASEAN Defense Ministers Informal Dialogue. It defined the guiding principles for Japan’s defense diplomacy with Southeast Asia as:
- Supporting ASEAN “uphold principles of international law, especially in the field of maritime and air space”;
- Promoting maritime security by supporting ASEAN countries’ own capacity-building efforts, particularly in the areas of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) and Search and Rescue (SAR) at sea and air space; and
- Supporting ASEAN efforts to build capacity in other areas of security, including weapons of mass destruction (WMD) nonproliferation and counter-terrorism.8
It also identified areas for further defense cooperation between Japan and Southeast Asian countries, including promotion of shared understanding of international law (especially in the field of maritime security), facilitation of capacity-building cooperation in fields such as HA/DR, PKO, landmine and UXO clearance, cybersecurity and defense planning, transfer of defense equipment and technology, and promotion of personnel exchanges.9
Today, Japan considers Southeast Asia an important partner to maintain a liberal international order. Its 2013 National Security Strategy notes that the region’s economic potential and its strategic location critical for Japan’s sea lanes of communication require Japan to “further deepen and develop cooperative relations” with the countries in Southeast Asia.10 Japan supports multilateral dialogue frameworks anchored in ASEAN (the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and East Asia Summit (EAS), to name a few) as a critical part of its effort to promote a rules-based order in the Asia-Pacific region, given its strategic location for critical sea lines of communications.11 The last several years have witnessed rapid expansion of engagement, especially in the realm of maritime security, with the countries in Southeast Asia. In 2013, Abe visited all 10 ASEAN countries for the first time as a Japanese prime minister. Between 2015-2017, Japan signed several agreements with the Philippines that focus on Japan’s assistance in capacity-building for the Filipino navy and coast guard, including the transfer of its defense equipment. Japan also held its first 2+2 ministerial meeting with Indonesia in December 2015, and reached an agreement with Vietnam to assist capacity-building of its navy and coast guard, including through the provision of used Japanese patrol vessels.
Japan-Australia Relations: Strategic partners, or hedging partners?
Australia, unlike Japan’s other neighbors in the Asia-Pacific region, has been consistently positive about Japan playing a larger role in the region, even during the Cold War when there was lingering concern for Japan’s remilitarization. Since the end of the Cold War, Japan-Australia relations have steadily progressed in economic and security dimensions with bipartisan support from both countries. When prime ministers Koizumi Junichiro and John Howard jointly announced an Australia-Japan Creative Partnership in 2002, the two countries for the first time acknowledged the foundation of their bilateral relationship as “shared values of democracy, freedom, the rule of law and market-based economies.”12
In the area of security, bilateral relations received a boost when Abe and his counterpart Kevin Rudd announced Japan-Australia Joint Declaration Security Cooperation in March 2007.13 This was a watershed event as it identified areas of security cooperation, which included: law enforcement on combating transnational crime; border security; counter-terrorism; weapons of mass destruction (WMD) disarmament and counter-proliferation; peace operations; exchanges of strategic assessments and related information; maritime and aviation security; high availability and disaster recovery (HA/DR); and contingency planning (including pandemics response). The Joint Declaration directed the two governments to institutionalize bilateral 2+2 meetings between their foreign and defense ministers and also specified “regional capacity-building” as one means by which the two countries would deepen their security relationship.14
Since then, Japan’s relationship with Australia has institutionalized at a faster pace than any other of its bilateral relationships. The two launched the 2+2 meetings months after the adoption of the Japan-Australia Joint Declaration. In 2008, they issued another joint declaration on Comprehensive and Strategic, Security and Economic Partnership, demonstrating a willingness to elevate relations to a level very close to their respective relationships with the United States.15 They proceeded to sign the Acquisition and Cross-Service Agreement (ACSA) in 2010 and General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) in 2012. Today, Japan regards Australia as “an important regional partner that shares not only universal values but also strategic interests with Japan.”16 The relationship is called a “special strategic partnership,” which was reaffirmed during Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull’s first visit to Japan in 2015 as newly elected prime minister.17
Enhancement of US-Japan-Australia trilateral relations—the most robust “minilateral”18 security cooperative relationship in the Asia-Pacific region—has been a shared goal of Japan and Australia. In their 2008 Comprehensive and Strategic, Security and Economic Partnership, the two governments emphasized the importance of the “continuing presence and engagement of the United States in the region” as the context for stronger Japan-Australia cooperation and US-Japan-Australia trilateral cooperation. Indeed, in light of questions about US “staying power” as a predominant security guarantor in the region given its persistent involvement in the Middle East, Japan as well as Australia regards US-Japan-Australia security cooperation as a framework to ensure US engagement in the region. In fact, when Abe met with Turnbull in January 2017 on the eve of the inauguration of the Trump administration, they reconfirmed that the implementation of TPP is the priority for their respective countries. They also reconfirmed that their country’s respective alliances with the United States are “the cornerstones of Australia and Japan’s peace and security, and underpin regional stability and prosperity.”19
Japan-India Relations: Same bed, different dreams?
Japan and India have historically enjoyed positive perceptions of each other, despite their geographic distance. For example, Japan’s support for Suhas Chandra Bose, a key figure in the Indian independence movement, has been widely appreciated in India, while Justice Radha Binot Pal’s dissent at the Military Tribunal for the Far East (commonly referred to as the Tokyo Trials) has been similarly appreciated in Japan. India was one of few countries that waived wartime reparations before signing a peace treaty with Japan in 1952, and Japan and India signed a cultural agreement as early as 1957, paving the way for further interactions. However, such positive perceptions did not lead the two to a deep bilateral relationship in the years that followed.
Despite Japan and India having signed a peace treaty (1952), aviation treaty (1956), cultural treaty (1957), trade and commerce treaty (1958) and tax treaty (1960), it was not until 1980 that they began to engage at the senior level of government with Foreign Minister Ito’s visit to India. India’s nuclear test in 1998 made it difficult for Japan, as a pledged non-nuclear state, to extend diplomatic overtures to India for a more robust bilateral relationship.20 An opportunity for Japan to revitalize its relationship with India came in 2000 after President Bill Clinton visited India when Prime Minister Mori Yoshiro visited it in August 2000 and agreed with his Indian counterpart to seek a global partnership. Koizumi visited India in 2005, leading to mutual exchanges of prime ministers’ visits every year, in addition to visits by their cabinet ministers.21 When Prime Minister Singh visited Japan in December 2006, the two agreed to build the Japan-India relationship into a “strategic global partnership.”
Today, Japan considers India geopolitically important given its location. Given India’s potential as a market as well as a place for human resources, Japan seeks to strengthen the relationship in economic as well as political-military areas, especially in maritime security.22 The two countries have signed a comprehensive economic partnership (CEPA), which went into force in 2011. Since 2014, the Japan-India relationship is described as a “special, strategic, global partnership.” In the Tokyo Declaration that was released after Indian Prime Minister Modi’s meeting with Prime Minister Abe in September 2014, the two leaders pledged to optimize the potential for the Japan-India relationship. They also agreed on elevating the defense relationship between Japan and India, and pledged to lead the countries’ efforts to work with like-minded countries to “preserve the integrity and inviolability of these global commons.”23 Institutionalization of Japan-India defense relations continues, with an agreement for defense equipment and technology cooperation, a GSOMIA in 2015, and a Japan-India bilateral agreement on cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy in 2016.
Drivers behind Japan’s Recent Moves
An overview of Japan’s approach to Southeast Asia, Australia, and India demonstrates certain trends in common. The most noticeable trend is Japan’s move toward cooperation in security. From capacity-building, provision of assistance in HA/DR, or willingness to transfer its defense technology and equipment, Japan has elevated its interest in connecting with these areas. All are critical to its essential security interests. If the sea lines of communication were disrupted in this region, it would inflict major damage not only on Japan’s national security, but also on its economy. If Japan is serious about doing its part in ensuring a stable security environment in the Asia-Pacific region that is based on the existing international order and values such as the rule of law, freedom of passage (maritime and airspace), and refraining from changing the status quo by force, it needs partners beyond the United States to ensure such an environment—and more urgently so, given the increasingly ominous signs of China’s assertiveness and uncertainties arising from the Trump administration’s commitment to the region.
Some may conclude that the sole motive behind Japan’s recent moves is simply to attempt to hedge against China’s growing influence and assertiveness in the Asia-Pacific region. Japan is no longer the economic powerhouse it once was. Although it is the world’s third largest economy, three decades without any real economic revitalization have impacted Japan’s ability, for example, to sustain the size of its ODA, a main vehicle through which it had engaged Southeast Asia. Especially since 2011, Japan has demonstrated increasing wariness with what it considers the growing assertiveness of China, especially by its coast guard, maritime research vessels, and fishing boats in the East China Sea.
The recent acceleration of engagement with Southeast Asia, Australia, and India in security, particularly Japan’s effort to export defense equipment to them, can certainly be attributed to countering increasing China’s influence in the region. Japan has considered some recent economic initiatives by China in the Asia-Pacific region such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as attempts to present alternative multinational economic frameworks, in which China has the leading role, to existing ones such as the Asia Development Bank (ADB). Despite strong domestic opposition, Noda’s decision to consider Japan’s participation in negotiations to conclude Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), followed by Abe’s decision to have Japan participate in it, was motivated by the strong sense that the TPP is not just another multilateral trade pact, but rather, it aligns with Japan’s strategic interest to preserve an open, fair, and free multilateral trade framework and ensures US economic engagement in the Asia-Pacific region.
However, Japan’s intensifying effort to buttress engagement with these areas also parallels a prolonged period of US “preoccupation” with the Middle East since the 9/11 terrorist attack at the cost of strategic focus on the Asia-Pacific region. Witnessing its only ally, the United States, diverted by its global war on terrorism, Japan saw a need to enhance security ties with US allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific region to ensure that the existing international order can be upheld without depending solely on the US presence in the region.
In the evolution of Japan’s relationships with Southeast Asia, India, and Australia, two tendencies were consistent, particularly in recent years. The first is the increasing focus on cooperation in security-related areas, such as defense equipment and technology transfer, which accelerated since the Abe government revised the guidelines for Japan’s arms exports and established the Three Principles for the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology in April 2014. Following the revision of its ODA Charter to allow assistance to developing countries for their national security needs, Japan can now try to leverage export of its defense equipment and technology as one means to enhance its relationship with these areas. The other trend is Tokyo’s seeming interest in “dual hedging” between countering an increasing Chinese influence and trying to mitigate the reduced presence of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region. One major driver behind the evolution of Japan-Australia security relations seems to be shared interest in ensuring solid US engagement, in security and economy, in the Asia Pacific region.
Given these trends, there are two major challenges for Japan, as it continues to formulate its approach toward Australia, India, and Southeast Asia. First and foremost, US engagement in the Indo-Pacific region now looks uncertain under the Trump administration. Trump’s decisions to withdraw from multinational agreements critical in shaping the international environment for the future, such as TPP and the Paris Climate Accord, is a major blow for Japan, which has advocated these multinational frameworks. In addition, the fall in US “soft power” is a worrisome trend for Japan, whose foreign policy principles are anchored in upholding a liberal international order, in creating which the United States played a central role after the World War II. With the Trump administration resorting to “tit-for-tat” transactional diplomacy with very little regard for the historical responsibility of the United States as a security guarantor for the post-WWII liberal international order, Japan is faced with a prospect of having to seek deeper engagement with its regional partners, so that such relationships will last, either with or without a predominant US presence in the region.
Japan seems to be doing well tackling this challenge so far. Anticipating the uncertainty of the policy approaches taken by the Trump administration, Japan has tried to ensure that the United States remains committed to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region by proactively reaching out to the Trump administration. Abe was the first foreign leader to congratulate Trump after the presidential election in 2016, and met with President-elect Trump a few weeks after the election. When Abe visited the United States in February 2017, he successfully received assurances from Trump of the US commitment to defend Japan “and all areas under its administrative control.” Since then, the two leaders have met on the sidelines of the G7 and G20 meetings. Since provocations by North Korea have escalated, the two leaders have also spoken on the phone several times.
Most recently, at the US-Japan 2+2 meeting held in Washington DC, the Joint Statement reiterated “the Alliance’s commitment to the security of Japan through the full range of capabilities, including U.S. nuclear forces.”24 The Joint Statement also called out China’s assertive behavior in the East and South China seas as the two countries’ shared concern, and reaffirmed their commitment to continue to make an effort to support shared principles, including freedom of navigations and no-use of unilateral action to change the status quo.25
As Japan moves to strengthen its defense ties with Washington, its effort to deepen ties with Australia, Southeast Asia, and India also continue. In August 2016, Abe launched a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy” as Japan’s new foreign policy principle, in which engagement with Australia, Southeast Asia, and India is critical. Parallel to Japan’s effort to actively engage the United States, Japan’s effort to promote this new foreign policy strategy intensified in 2017 with Tokyo doubling down on strengthening its relations with Southeast Asia, India, and Australia. Abe visited Vietnam, Indonesia and Australia just weeks prior to the inauguration of the Trump administration in January 2017, emphasizing capacity- and society-building elements of its engagement with these areas. Japan and Australia also held a 2+2 meeting in Tokyo on April 20, 2017, when the foreign and defense ministers of the two countries agreed on “the importance of ensuring a stable, free and open rules-based order across the Indo-Pacific region and beyond…of ensuring free and open sea-lanes as well as enhancing regional connectivity, including through infrastructure.”26 Not only did they reaffirm the importance of their countries’ respective alliance with the United States and their trilateral cooperation, they also indicated their intention to pursue Japan-Australia-India trilateral cooperation.27 Abe met with Modi most recently in July 2017 on the sidelines of the G20 summit, and the two agreed to buttress “a new era in Japan-India relations” by leveraging the opportunity to cooperate on a wide range of policy issues from economics to defense relations.28
Most recently, Foreign Minister Kono Taro visited the Philippines in August 2017 primarily to attend the ASEAN Regional Forum meetings, but he also held bilateral foreign ministers’ meetings with counterparts from the Philippines and Indonesia. In the former, there was an agreement on further strengthening the relationship. Kono reiterated Japan’s commitment to investing in infrastructure and other projects in the Philippines that have direct impact on Filipinos, as well as to assist the country in its efforts to sustain the stabilization of the Mindanao region.29 In the latter, an agreement was reached on enhancing their strategic partnership and on consultations between the two countries to reach an agreement on accelerated defense equipment transfers.30
The other challenge for Japan is more difficult to tackle. While some of Japan’s recent security policy decisions are driven by Tokyo’s desire to counter China’s growing influence in the region, Japan will need to frame its policies in a context that is not solely about “countering China” in order to make its approaches sustainable. Australia, India, and the countries in Southeast Asia all have their own unique and complex relationships with China, particularly in trade and investment. Despite some wariness with China’s increasingly aggressive posture in the South China Sea, for example, most countries do not want to directly confront China. If Japan’s attempts to engage them are always presented as “countering China,” the sustainability of this approach, let alone success, will be in question. The “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy” that was launched by Abe last year, is its first step toward such recalibration. If successfully implemented through the combination of defense cooperation, capacity-building in security and targeted long-term investment and economic cooperation, this new foreign policy principle will offer a real opportunity for Japan to optimize its relationships with Australia, Southeast Asia, and India—all of which are important partners for Japan’s national security interests—in a more durable manner.
1. Government of Japan, National Security Strategy, December 17, 2013, 5, http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/131217anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf
2. The Fukuda Doctrine includes: 1) Japan’s non-militarization, 2) establishment of “heart-to-heart” relations between Japan and ASEAN, and 3) Japan will work with ASEAN as an equal partner.
3. Kono Masaharu, Wahei Kosaku: Kanbojia gaiko no shogen (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1999).
4. Cabinet Office International Peacekeeping Cooperation Headquarters, “International Peace Cooperation Assignment in Cambodia,” http://www.pko.go.jp/pko_e/result/cambo/cambo02.html
5. Cabinet Office International Peacekeeping Cooperation Headquarters, “International Peace Cooperation Assignments for East Timorese Displaced Persons,” http://www.pko.go.jp/pko_e/result/e_timor/e_timor05.html; “International Peace Cooperation Assignments in East Timor,” http://www.pko.go.jp/pko_e/result/e_timor/e_timor06.html; “International Peace Cooperation Activities for East Timorese Election Observation,” http://www.pko.go.jp/pko_e/result/e_timor/e_timor08.html
6. Futori Hideshi, “Japan’s Disaster Relief Diplomacy: Fostering Military Cooperation in Asia,” Asia-Pacific Bulletin, no. 213, May 13, 2013, http://www.eastwestcenter.org/sites/default/files/private/apb213.pdf
7. Ken Jimbo, “Japan-Southeast Asia relations: Implications of US Rebalance to Asia-Pacific Region,” in Yuki Tatsumi, ed., Japan’s Foreign Policy Challenges in East Asia: Views from the Next Generation (Washington, DC: The Stimson Center, 2014), 53-58.
8. Ministry of Defense Japan, “Vientiane Vision: Japan’s Defense Cooperation Initiative with ASEAN,” http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/exc/vientianevision/index.html
10. Government of Japan, National Security Strategy, December 17, 2013, 24, http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/131217anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf
11. Government of Japan, National Security Strategy, 24.
12. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Joint Press Statement by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and Prime Minister John Howard Australia-Japan Creative Partnership,”May 2002, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0204/joint.html
13. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation,” March 2007, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/australia/joint0703.html
15. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Joint Statement by Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda of Japan and Prime Minister Kevin Rudd of Australia on ‘Comprehensive, Strategic, Security and Economic Partnership,’”June 12, 2008, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/australia/joint0806.html
16. Government of Japan, National Security Strategy.
17. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Prime Minister Abe and Prime Minister Turnbell Joint Statement ‘Next Steps of the Special Strategic Partnership: Asia, Pacific and Beyond,’”December 18, 2015, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000120557.pdf
18. Minilateralism is defined as an ad hoc and flexible arrangement that involves more than two but less than five countries that comprise member states with common interests but are not formal treaty allies. See William T. Tow, “The Trilateral Strategic Dialogue: Minilateralism, and Asia-Pacific Order Building,” in Yuki Tatsumi, ed., US-Japan-Australia Security Cooperation: Prospects and Challenges (Washington, DC: The Stimson Center, 2015), 23-35.
20. Takaaki Asano, “Japan-India Relations: Toward a Special Strategic Partnership,” in Yuki Tatsumi, ed., Japan’s Global Diplomacy: Views from Next Generation (Washington, DC: The Stimson Center, 2015), 33-41.
21. For a chronology of cabinet level visits, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Indo (Kiso Data) (India: Basic Data), http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/india/data.html#section5
22. Government of Japan, National Security Strategy, 24.
24. Ministry of Defense Japan, “Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee,” August 17, 2017, http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/anpo/kyougi/pdf/js20170817_e.pdf
28. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Japan-India Summit meeting,”July 7, 2017, http://www.mofa.go.jp/s_sa/sw/in/page3e_000696.html.
29. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan, “Japan-Philippines Foreign Ministers Meeting,”August 8, 2017, http://www.mofa.go.jp/s_sa/sea2/ph/page3e_000705.html