Japanese Perceptions of China’s Response

Japanese have been closely following the response in China to the election within the LDP of Ishiba Shigeru as prime minister. Given a slew of problems in bilateral relations, accumulating further in the summer of 2024, they searched for clues on how the emergence of a new prime minister in place of Kishida Fumio would be received. Would serious economic problems lead China to take a more forward-looking attitude? Would worsening contradictions over Taiwan and other regional security matters result in sharper warnings? From the time Kishida said he would not run for re-election in mid-August for two months, we can trace how the transition in leadership was being addressed in China, as seen from Japan, and the prospects for better ties. Of course, much depended on the outcome of the Lower House elections to follow shortly. As the losses of the LDP are registering, the interval to the end of October is worth our attention.

China treats Japan differently from the United States, although both are seen as leading the resistance to its Sinocentric designs in the Indo-Pacific.¹ The differences can be summarized as four-fold: (1) “pipes” as a factor in manipulating diplomatic ties; (2) economic vulnerability as a source of pressure; (3) geographical proximity as strategic leverage; and (4) historical memory as a “card.” In the late summer of 2024 Japanese articles showcased the many tools of Chinese assertiveness. Each of these themes is covered in one of the sections below. After reporting on the Chinese response to Ishiba in his first weeks in office, I trace, topic by topic the critical issues impacting bilateral relations over the entire two-month span. The issues that drew the most attention spanned individual behavior that elicited charges of “hate Japan,” military moves that were taken as unprecedented threats, economic matters that symbolized the end of an era dating back nearly half a century, treatment of Japanese citizens and products that appeared hostile and unjustified, and perceived diplomatic slights marginalizing Japan. Left uncertain were frequent Chinese claims to seek “stable relations” with scant substantive confirmation.

China’s Response to the Onset of the Ishiba Administration

China has put Japan’s new prime minister Ishiba Shigeru on a short leash, dangling economic possibilities in front of him while indirectly threatening economic and military pressure should he not appreciate the need for “stability” in bilateral relations. While taking some satisfaction that the more right-wing LDP candidate Takaichi Sanae lost to Ishiba, albeit narrowly, Chinese are yielding scant ground on the issues deemed most sensitive in Japan. They consider Ishiba a defense hawk, a strong supporter of Taiwan’s autonomy if not independence,² and an advocate of closer ties to South Korea, in contrast to Takaichi’s inclination to raise “history” issues. They may also see in Ishiba a maverick, who has spoken of greater equality with the United States. Recent Japanese writings on China offer some signs of a “wait and see” attitude, while keeping up the pressure on Japan to change course, not alleviated by adjustment to this new transition.

Chinese took note of Ishiba’s statement at the ASEAN summit in Vientiane that “clues have been found to solve the problems in Japan-China relations.” According to China Daily, he added that “Japan is willing to work with China to strengthen high-level exchanges, conduct closer dialogue and communication at all levels, and resolve pending issues through consultation, and push for steady and long-term development of China-Japan relations based on mutually beneficial cooperation.” After insisting that “A peaceful and stable Sino-Japanese relationship not only benefits the two sides, but will also help boost development in the Asia-Pacific and beyond,” the article warned, “it is regrettable that Japan has been the vanguard of the US China-containment strategy. And if Japan fails to free itself from Washington’s China-containment strategy, it will be difficult to improve its ties with China.”³ In short, Japan must change direction, not China.

On the one hand, Chinese hammered Ishiba for his Asian NATO vision, smacking of Cold War-like confrontation and zero-sum mentality. On the other, they saw some hope in the silence that followed his start as prime minister. "Ishiba may not have expected the strong opposition to his idea. He has not talked about it since he was inaugurated on Oct 1…It looks like Ishiba is shelving the vision."⁴ Welcome too was the new foreign minister Iwaya Takeshi’s remarks at a news conference, "The most ideal form of security cooperation in the future is the one that would not exclude any country in the region or Asia as a whole.”⁵ Complicating the situation, en route to the Laos ASEAN meetings, Ishiba said the Asian NATO idea was still under discussion in the LDP, while US Ambassador to Japan Rahm Emanuel called for an economic coalition in the region, the "economic equivalent" of NATO’s Article 5—an attack on one is an attack on all.⁶

In Laos at a meeting with Ishiba Premier Li Qiang said, “China is ready to work with Japan to capitalize on their respective comparative advantages and explore more areas of cooperation in scientific and technological innovation, the digital economy and green development,” even as he raised concerns about export restrictions imposed by Japan and interference with supply chains and global free trade. The Chinese readout quoted Ishiba as saying that Japan “does not intend to decouple or sever supply chains … but rather hopes to deepen practical cooperation across various sectors.”⁷ The impression spread that Xi Jinping was taking a wait-and-see approach, emphasizing “stable” relations and limiting economic setbacks. There was some reason for hope. Japanese too reported that “the two Asian neighbors share the goal of stabilizing ties strained over a host of issues,”⁸ although it pointed to Chinese wariness of the new Japanese leader over: his defense focus, including his NATO comments, his visit to Taiwan as Kishida was stepping down, and his firm alignment with the United States on Taiwan.

Did Japanese find reason for cautious optimism from these early exchanges? Hardly. Problems in bilateral relations, much discussed over the time span, had scarcely been addressed. Ishiba’s low popularity at home and alarm over the US elections left little reason for hope. Japan’s own elections promised to be the opening salvo in a process expected to play out well into 2025.

The Troubled State of Relations in the Late Summer of 2024

Already in the Kishida era, Japanese perceptions of the China threat had greatly intensified.⁹ Further alarm draws on many sources. Diplomatic neglect, business environment, security fears, and “hate Japan” incitement pose distinctive challenges widely raised in recent press accounts.  Japanese news stories and editorials repeatedly railed against Chinese behavior in August and September 2024. Despite occasional mention of the supposed “friendship mood” forged when Kishida met Xi in November 2023 or with the Kishida-Li Qiang meeting in May 2024, coverage pointed to relations strained by China’s contradictory, hardline behavior. Some blamed it less on
local Chinese governments desperate for investment, which were said to be seeking a softer line, than on the military, intent on raising alarm in Japan over its security policies, as if there were no consistent line toward Japan.¹⁰ Others insisted the problems were endemic and top-down, cutting across security, economics, and public opinion, aroused by deliberate policies to transpose negativity due to internal economic troubles to hostility toward Japan, an easy target. When a Japanese boy was stabbed to death at a Japanese school in Shenzhen and China stayed silent on the motivation of the killer, it was assumed to be due to “hate Japan” indoctrination.¹¹

When Kamikawa Yoko met Wang Yi in late July, Wang appeared to give Japan’s foreign minister an ultimatum, “China-Japan relations are currently at a critical point: advance or be left behind." He added, “China’s policy towards Japan has always maintained stability and continuity. It is hoped that the Japanese side will establish an objective and correct perception of China and pursue a positive and rational policy towards China.” While Kamikawa countered that “it is extremely important to create an environment in which Japanese nationals and Japanese companies can operate in China with peace of mind,” there was no sign China would comply.¹²

On August 26, a Chinese Y-9 surveillance plane violated Japanese airspace off islands in Nagasaki Prefecture, the first such incident. Yomiuri on August 28 asked if China intends to threaten Japan not only by sea but by air too. Violations of sovereignty are intolerable, and the government must toughen its defenses now that violations even involve PLA craft and extend to the mainland of Japan.¹³ Other incidents of airspace provocations in which Russia was involved led to talk of collusion. On September 18, the aircraft carrier Liaoning and two other Chinese naval vessels sailed between Okinawa Prefectural islands near Taiwan, entering Japan’s contiguous zone, adjacent to its territorial waters. That came the same day as the 10-year-old boy was knifed to death in Shenzhen. Other incidents that drew headlines were a Chinese visitor to Yasukuni Shrine urinating and leaving graffiti, and a Chinese employee at the NHK foreign broadcasting service substituting Chinese propaganda for the news he was asked to read. The fact that a delegation of Japanese officials chose to visit China when emotions were running high, invited derision in portions of the Japanese media.¹⁴ Perceived failure of the visit either to secure a meeting with Xi Jinping or to resolve problems only fed further negativity.

One source of repeated angst was China’s boycott of Japanese marine products despite the care taken in Japan to reduce nuclear discharge from the doomed Fukushima reactors and clearance from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for their safe consumption. Over an entire year, Japanese officials had appealed for the ban to be reversed to no avail, souring the mood in thinking about China. On September 19, China finally agreed to lift, if gradually, its ban with expanded IAEA monitoring. Seeking independent inspections of its own, Beijing found Tokyo resistant.¹⁵ China’s language after the agreement still aroused distrust. Instead of appreciating this long-delayed concession, however, Japanese saw it as a grudging response to economic troubles such that China did not find benefit in letting bilateral relations further deteriorate. It may also have been a signal to influence the LDP election of the benefits ahead if policy shifted in a manner desired by China. No sign of optimism followed of a looming turnabout in relations.

“Pipes” as a Factor in Manipulating Domestic Ties

Looking beyond Kishida, Nakanishi Hiroshi explained that the remaining foreign policy challenge is dialogue with China. Since Abe’s 2018 summit in China, there has been no summit held in each other’s country, as problems have multiplied. With a change in prime minister, it may be a good time to explain to the Japanese public why deterrence alone does not suffice and dialogue with China’s powerful leader is necessary, which Kishida did not do. As the US political divide and inward-looking focus continues and Japan strategizes to restore its national power, it must proceed not just on the basis of strengthening ties beyond the indispensable US presence in the Indo-Pacific to maintain the international order.  In calling for Japan to restore “pipes” to China and summitry, Nakanishi made no mention of China’s attitude as a barrier to the relationship.¹⁶

When bilateral relations have stumbled in the past, China’s leadership has turned to the trusted mechanism of granting a meeting to a high-level Japanese politician, entrusted by Japan’s prime minister to undertake informal diplomacy, often carrying a personal letter. Under Abe, the man chosen for this role as a “pipe” was Nikai Toshihiro, a Lower House LDP member who wielded considerable weight, the LDP secretary-general who came to chair the Japan-China Friendship Parliamentarians Union. News that Nikai would lead a Diet delegation to Beijing at the end of August raised hope that China would again treat him as a “pipe,” especially as the world had recently learned that a new prime minister would be elected within the LDP a month later. The recognized test posed for Nikai‘s visit would be if he were granted a meeting with Xi Jinping.¹⁷ When Xi did not do so, Japanese media put the blame on China, not on lack of Japanese effort.

Already in the late 1990s Nonaka Hiromu in the Foreign Ministry had become a “pipe” to China, and again in 2008 he explored with Zeng Qinghong this question. When relations tanked under Koizumi Junichiro, behind-the-scenes ties to Zeng proved useful. When Abe took office, under even greater suspicion in China than had been Koizumi, magical words were needed. Calling bilateral ties “strategic” (a strategic mutually beneficial relationship, a term to then only used with the United States) was an answer, which was heard when Abe visited China in October 2006. After the pro-China tenure of Fukuda Yasuo, the basically pro-Taiwan time of Aso Taro posed new challenges. These were the circumstances when a “pipe” was desperately needed.

Under Kan Naoto, Nikai built ties to Bo Xilai, who sought investments from Japanese small and middle-sized enterprises in Chongqing. Nikai’s position strengthened after Abe returned, even during a low point of Japan-China relations, being the only Japanese besides the prime minister given direct access to Xi Jinping, in 2015, 2017, and 2019. Abe’s personal diplomacy gained prominence: to Trump, Putin, Modi, and Erdogan. He was able also to forge personal bonds with Xi, making use of Nikai; however, in the Kishida era, nobody succeeded Nikai in the role of “pipe.” Recently, as US officials have held high-level meetings in China, Japan’s presence has faded, a former ambassador observed.¹⁸ Yet, lower-level exchanges in May and July had hinted that a breakthrough visit might still be possible, which media speculated would be Nikai’s trip.

Three markers of success were aired by the Japanese media in advance of the visit: an in-person meeting with Xi; lifting of the import ban on scallops and sea cucumbers as well as other marine products; and a resumption of short-term visa exemptions of Japanese traveling to China. Newly heightened concern about violations of Japanese air and maritime boundaries abruptly made the list.¹⁹ Indeed, the provocative territorial violation on the eve of the visit together with the absence of a meeting with Xi cast a pall on a visit aimed to jumpstart the transition ahead.²⁰

From 2013 to 2019 Nikai was the “pipe” to China, delivering Abe’s letters, meeting with Xi, and achieving results despite the cold state of relations. The August 2024 visit was different. While Xi met at that time with US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, he had no reason to meet a Japanese, reportedly no longer seen as worthy.²¹ Only a meeting with Xi seemed to matter in resolving bilateral issues, given his concentration of power. Nikai’s access in May 2015, at a low point in relations, served as a template. He had led a 3000-person delegation and been feted at a banquet. Yet, the fact that Xi met with Sullivan spoke to Japan’s lowered status, seen as no more than an “accessory” to its ally.²² Some had warned that the trip was a mistake. Sending a pro-China (shinchuha) person not received by Xi sent the wrong signal in the face of repeated provocations. Approval for student travel to China was a paltry return, when Japan received an aircraft carrier sail-by in return. Serious problems failed to be addressed. Talk of negotiating with “samurai spirit,” as occurred 150 years ago with China to resolve problems, is misplaced, since Japan’s reduced military power does not permit that, as demonstrated the day before the visit when a Chinese military aircraft first encroached on Japan’s airspace. Given the backlash across Europe and the US against China, a visit by a Japanese bigwig was deemed important to China, according to this critique of the Nikai visit.

Economic Vulnerability as a Source of Pressure

As Japan put a higher premium on economic security, coordinating with the United States on new measures directed at China, alarm grew over how China might retaliate. Dependency on Chinese imports, such as rare earth metals, and on the Chinese market left Japanese in doubt. Japan, it was feared, could face severe costs if it cooperated with the US in further suppressing China’s semiconductor sector if China reacted by cutting access to critical minerals essential for automotive production. Chinese charged that US pressure on exports of advanced technology to China is nothing less than hegemonic intervention in global trade, against the principles of the market economy. Compounding the sense of insecurity was the loss of confidence in a safe environment for conducting business or that Chinese leaders were listening to Japan’s concerns.

Loss of a symbol of economic cooperation for half a century also raised uneasiness. In August Nippon Steel (Nittetsu) announced it was ending its joint venture with Baoshan Iron and Steel, which had been supplying steel sheets for automobiles in its latest iteration. Having served Japanese carmakers inside China, the sharp falloff in car sales had dealt a final blow, as did the improved quality of Chinese steel, the reduced need in China for Japanese technology and investment, and the popularity of Chinese-made vehicles. This decision was seen as a telling marker of a much-transformed bilateral relationship, less cooperative or complementary.²³

In August 2024, Japanese were already noticing a slight change in China’s attitude toward Japan even as they waited for a signal that marine exports to China would be allowed. It was assumed that Xi’s need for economic restructuring made investments from Japan more important, as did halting the accelerating “leave China” attitude of Japanese firms. Stability was emphasized.²⁴ The number of companies in China in June 2024 was 13,034, down 9.4% from the peak in 2012. The number of Japanese, including exchange students, had fallen 30% to 101,786 in October 2023. In 2023 Japanese investment dropped 15%. On economic matters, hopes were lifted. After appealing for a year to China to lift its import ban on Japanese seafood imposed after a Japanese company began discharging radioactive water, the decision in September was a plus.

At the reception held by the Chinese embassy to celebrate the 75th anniversary of the founding of the PRC on October 1, a Japanese spokesperson for the Japan-China Economic Association warned that the most critical issue is a safe and secure business environment, which Japanese media has repeatedly warned is no longer the case inside China, particularly since the anti-espionage law took effect in July 2023, soon snagging a leading Japanese businessman, an official of Astellas Pharmaceuticals. Charges were hidden, making him a focus of consternation.

Another problem for Japanese was skepticism about China’s economy and how its trouble could be manifest in both economic challenges and distraction through heightened nationalism. Ka Ryu, Takaguchi Kota, and Yasuda Minetoshi in the June Bungei Shunju warned that the real estate bubble in China would be worse than Japan’s bubble in causing social unrest. This is tied to governance contrasts, local corruption, deeper “my home” attachments in China related to women refusing to marry men without separate housing, and the broader sweep of the impact in China. The situation does not justify calling this the “Japanification of China.” In Japan, no unrest occurred due to deposit insurance by the government and trust in the system. Social welfare will be affected. After praising the fact China was growing stronger a few years ago, Chinese are losing hope, following the Zero-COVID disaster, when neighborhood surveillance resembled Mao’s Red Guards and dashed 2023 revival expectations. Now Chinese intellectuals and well-off citizens are leaving, greatly altering the society of Chinese in Japan. Many have studied abroad or learned Japanese. Xi turns people off with his cult of Mao and anti-spy law. Dependent on China’s market, Japan will be affected by China’s economic crash. Supply chains are leaving China is a final point made in this pessimistic article about China’s path ahead.²⁵

No longer focusing on China’s economy dominating the world, some raised the prospect of China repeating Japan’s prolonged “stagnation” and lashing out to divert public discontent. Familiar with population decline and its economic implications, Japanese reported that China’s population was on track to drop by 160 million from 2023 to 2050 and, along with other risk factors such as “state advances, people retreat” and innovation stagnation, reducing the chance of doing better than pulling even with the US economy, as young women defy the state’s aims.²⁶ Coverage of the problems of youth employment also pointed to long-term difficulties ahead.²⁷ The fact of the postponement of the Third Plenum as well as its results raised skepticism.²⁸

Geographical Proximity as Strategic Leverage

Sino-Russian military cooperation, intensifying as Sino-US trade tensions deepen, are seen as posing an extra risk for Japan because of its proximity to both countries as well as to North Korea. Fearing further deterioration in Sino-US relations and alignment of Beijing and Moscow, Japanese closely followed Chinese statements on Russia and Sino-Russian moves nearby.²⁹

An August 31 article insisted that Japan “must learn from the lessons of history, take concrete actions to completely forgo militarism, and avoid losing credibility with neighboring Asian countries and the international community.” Japan is provoking China on the South China Sea issue, the Taiwan question, and the Diaoyu Island issue, creating tension and shifting the blame to China for increasing its defense budget. The continuous increase in its defense budget is said to reflect the militarism resurgence of the country, which has committed serious humanitarian crimes in the past, and dangerous ambition that warrants global vigilance and should be jointly stopped by the international community.³⁰

Chinese are well aware that on August 14, when Kishida announced he was stepping down, Ishiba was in Taiwan, discussing among other things combined defense capabilities. About two weeks after Ishiba’s Taiwan visit, China stepped up its military moves in the skies above Japan and nearby seas. China has been alarmed by Japanese moves over Taiwan, suggesting the Chinese military aircraft’s violation of Japanese airspace was not a mistake. Ishiba’s visit was timed to show conservatives that he would stand with Taiwan if he became prime minister. In furtherance of that message, Japan sailed a naval vessel through the Taiwan Strait in late September in a departure from a longstanding policy of not directly challenging China. During a live debate held by Japan’s Fuji News Network on September 22, Ishiba said it is time to allow Japan’s Self-Defense Forces to fire warning shots at foreign forces intruding into Japan’s territorial airspaces and waters.

Headlines on September 26 showcased the deteriorating security ties between Japan and China, as China announced it had fired an ICBM into the Pacific (not notifying Japan, even as it notified others) and Japan sent its first naval vessel into the Taiwan Strait in response to Chinese pressure tactics, drawing a warning it was a violation of Chinese sovereignty in support of Taiwan independence.³¹ The Taiwan issue remained central.

Ishiba’s appointment of security experts to key posts in his cabinet and in the LDP indicates that he intends to continue boosting Japan’s deterrence capabilities, a prospect that causes alarm in China. Former defense ministers Iwaya Takeshi and Nakatani Gen are the foreign and defense ministers, Onodera Itsunori, who also was in that post, heads the LDP Policy Research Council. Linkages between some of these figures and Taiwan were not without concern to China too.

Ishiba’s proposed “Asian NATO” is anathema to China, but it is not a serious possibility at this stage, despite Ishiba’s late September article for the Hudson Institute advocating it.³² Possible members included India, South Korea, and Great Britain, as well as the obvious candidates. The upshot would be sharing US nuclear weapons and bringing them easily into states. Naturally, Chinese warned that this containment would destabilize the region, while India was quick to reject the idea, reaffirming “strategic autonomy” as its guiding principle. Ishiba himself made clear that to maintain peace he wanted China to join, enfeebling his own construct. The idea had not sparked agreement but a wave of rejection and criticism, putting the burden back on Japan to strengthen its own defense forces with concrete policies, including deterrence.

The Quad stands at the juncture of Chinese and Japanese designs for regionalism, owing to the presence of India, also a member of the SCO and BRICS. As Ishiba replaced Kishida just days after the Kishida joined the leaders of the United States, Australia, and India in the September 2024 Quad summit, Japanese emphasized the importance of maintaining this cooperative organization supporting maritime security, the rule of law, and freedom of navigation. This meeting signaled out Chinese pressure and threatening conduct toward the Philippines. Pointing also to the Pacific Islands, the Quad warned that as China’s influence expands, it destabilizes the region. While Kishida was abroad, Russia violated Japan’s airspace, as China had done not long before, along with joint drills testing Japan.³³ Much as Japanese saw battlelines being drawn, so too did Chinese, continuing to attack the Quad and Ishiba’s “Asian NATO” idea. They saw enhancing defense ties with Quad members as an attempt to break from post-WWII military restrictions, taking advantage of the US’ "Indo-Pacific Strategy" meant to contain China.

Japan felt a strong sense of crisis after repeated airspace violations by the Chinese military and after it sent an aircraft carrier between two Japanese islands near Taiwan for the first time. In August, As noted above, a Chinese spy plane flew inside Japan’s airspace, prompting Tokyo to condemn the incursion as "utterly unacceptable" and a "serious violation of sovereignty. After taking office, the new Japanese foreign minister Iwaya Takeshi proceeded to warn that Japan needs to balance dialogue and deterrence in dealing with China because of its increasingly assertive military actions and territorial claims.

In an October 2 article, a Chinese author asserted that Ishiba faces a window of opportunity to repair relations, bringing them back on the right track after one-sidedly leaning to the US policy of containment.³⁴ In order to reverse a slowing economy and rebuild domestic trust, two key goals articulated by Ishiba, he must choose, readers are told, between a lopsided foreign policy and China’s goodwill. Others are blunter on the negative economic fallout of sticking to Kishida’s US orientation, holding out a bit of hope that Ishiba favors a more autonomous approach to Asia. Having started his career linked to Tanaka Kakuei, who normalized relations with China and reportedly sought more autonomy from the United States, Ishiba boasts a pedigree with some promise.

Chinese find Japan’s projected role in AUKUS provocative, not defensive, and warn that it damages both strategic autonomy and regional trust. They call Japan a “pawn” in the US geopolitical strategy, leading to a new cold war and warn it is becoming the front line for a counterattack, perhaps a nuclear conflict. This is meant to play on the “nuclear allergy” of Japanese and fear of any war.

The fact that Ishiba has called for reviewing Tokyo’s agreement with Washington on the status of US forces in Japan may encourage China to look for a gap to emerge in Japan-US relations. Is Ishiba’s quest for a more equal security alliance having an impact, Chinese will ask, especially if Donald Trump presses for one-sided Japanese concessions, premised on an unequal alliance.  The US political campaign (seen as inward-looking with rising populism) has alienated some in Japan, as has US support for Israel (Japan’s vote at the UN split with the US) and loss of influence in the “Global South.” Mimaki Seiko warned that just following the US does not allow Japan to be a bridge with the “Global South,” and, as a “peace country” and “Asian country,” Japan is not the same as the rest of the G7. Her advice is for Ishiba to accentuate autonomous diplomacy.³⁵ For Chinese, such talk raises intriguing possibilities worthy of further exploration.

On October 15 China again criticized Ishiba’s “Asian NATO” idea, urging Tokyo to "stop engaging in exclusive military alliances" and "be cautious in its words and deeds" in the field of security.³⁶ Defense Ministry spokesman Wu Qian said Japan has "hyped up the non-existent ‘China threat’ in an attempt to divert the international community’s attention" from its own military expansion. He also claimed Tokyo has "continuously exceeded" restrictions under its pacifist Constitution and exclusively defense-oriented policy in recent years and significantly expanded its arms, triggering vigilance among its Asian neighbors and the international community.

Historical Memory as a “Card”

When a 10-year-old Japanese pupil was stabbed to death in Shenzhen on September 18, just months after another knifing in Suzhou, Jiangsu Province, for which a Chinese women gave her life to protect a Japanese child, “hate Japan” alarm spiked in Japan. Reports of 20-25,000 phone calls a day to the Japanese embassy and consulates in China, mostly hate-filled, riled readers.³⁷ In response, China refused access to the assailants and denied that “hate” propaganda could be a factor. Japanese widely assume that China continues to use the “history card” as a means of gaining advantage, while arousing patriotic memories to confuse today’s Japan with that of the war era.

Chinese look down on Japanese, insisting that they have not apologized or paid compensation. While they are often reminded of the fact that Japan invaded China, they are kept ignorant of the realities of postwar Japan, leading many to hate Japan.³⁸ Whereas substantial tourism by Chinese had deceptively encouraged Japanese just a short time before to expect a positive turn in Chinese public opinion, a different reality has sunk in, especially through the summer of 2024.

Given the recent uptick in anti-Japanese behavior, as reported in Japan, there is no sign of a soft line from China in response to a new prime minister. Whether related to the territorial issue or historical memory, Chinese citizens are intensifying their anti-Japan behavior. Many instances of bashing of late have been recounted, attributed to designs of China’s government, in boosting nationalism to capitalize on historical realities for current aggressive intentions.³⁹

Japan kept asking China to ensure the safety of Japanese nationals in China, clarify the suspect’s motives, and tighten controls over social media posts targeting Japan. Japanese perceived: anti-Japanese emotions fanned by the Chinese government and media were manifest in hate speech and violence, notably the September 18 stabbing on the anniversary of Japan’s 1931 assault into Manchuria, the start of the 14-year war. Chinese authorities, however, suppressed news on the motivation of the murderer. If suppression of evidence serves to keep investments flowing into China, it is not a corrective to misleading historical education about Japan today, intensified to divert criticism from China’s own domestic problems, Japanese argue.⁴⁰ Right after the stabbing, Chinese authorities rushed to reassure Japanese companies amidst growing alarm, but this did not do a lot of good when evidence was suppressed of why the perpetrator had chosen to act.

Chinese recognize that Japan sees itself as a bridge to the “Global South” by virtue of its values and identity, leading to a softer approach than that of the United States and more popularity. In the struggle to win adherents there, China strives to discredit Japan, as if it is just doing the US bidding, even asJapanese stress the distinctive role their country plays in this battlefield. As an example, Kitaoka Shinichi, who led JICA from 2015 to 2022, affirmed Japan’s bridging role for the developing countries. Kitaoka acknowledged the declining military and economic influence of the G7 and other democracies in the “Global South” and that concern is necessary despite the advanced countries’ push for freedom, democracy, and the rule of law. Taking into account regional and other differences, this requires a flexible approach. He contrasts approaches from the top-down style of Europe and the United States to the JICA tradition of starting with how the recipient states think. Although Japan has lost economic clout due to its relative economic decline, he argued that the Abe cabinet had raised its influence by stressing freedom of navigation and the rule of law in the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” concept while strengthening its security policy. Referring to his new book, Kitaoka argues that developing countries are eager to know how Japan modernized so rapidly, while forging a free country with prosperity and peace. Japan needs to explain its history with confidence, given the great role it has to fill in reconstructing a stable international order. There is no option but for advanced and developing countries to cooperate. Having friendly relations with the majority of powerful states in the “Global South,” Japan alone can play the role of a bridge to both sides, the Kitaoka article concluded. This puts Japan in the forefront of Chinese pushback to gain exclusive leadership among these states.

Conclusion 

As Beijing anticipates either Kamala Harris or Donald Trump as the next US president, it must decide how to respond to a new prime minister in Japan. Should it strive harder to drive a wedge between Tokyo and Washington, softening its stance toward Japan’s leadership? Should it make a lesson of Japan, by hardening its policy, sending a clear warning to the United States? In 2024 both approaches have been in evidence at times, the CJK summit in Seoul reflecting an economics-oriented posture, and the fierce rhetoric about Japan’s discharge of the treated water from the Fukushima nuclear plant testifying to a sustained hard line. In August to October the duality continued, a measure of wait-and-see for Ishiba and warnings about him.