The Accomplice: Japanese Threat Perceptions of Russia

A quick glance at a map suggests that Russia is a direct military threat to Japan. The closest Russian troops are deployed on Kunashir, a mere 25km from Hokkaido, which is one of the four main Japanese islands. Kunashir (known as Kunashiri to the Japanese) is part of the Southern Kurils, an archipelago that has been under Moscow’s control since 1945 but which Japan claims as its Northern Territories. Russia’s 18th Machine Gun Artillery Division, which has 3,500 troops permanently deployed on these disputed islands, operates T-80BV main battle tanks. The division is also equipped with Bastion and Bal anti-ship missiles and the S-300V4 anti-aircraft missile system. Since the range of these weapons extends several hundred kilometers and since anti-ship missiles can be used to strike ground targets, this means that almost all of Hokkaido’s land, sea, and airspace is within Russian range.   

This would matter less if the Russian government were favorably inclined towards Japan. However, the warmth of the Abe era (2012-20), when Prime Minister Abe Shinzo promoted a “new approach” to Japan-Russia relations, has long since cooled.¹ Even during that period, the Russian side never reciprocated Japan’s attempted embrace as the Kremlin saw little value in relations with Japan.² In 2022, in retaliation for Japan’s sanctions following the invasion of Ukraine, Russia has officially labelled Japan “an unfriendly country” and has cancelled talks on a peace treaty, which has yet to be signed since the end of the Second World War. Russian officials have been vehement in their criticism of the Japanese government. Maria Zakharova, official spokeswoman for the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, condemned Japan’s efforts to build up its Self-Defense Forces (SDF) as “a return to the path of unbridled militarisation.”³ Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev has put the blame on the United States, claiming that “Washington is trying to revive the spirit of Japanese militarism … to make them kamikazes again to die for the interests of others.”⁴ Meanwhile, the Russian embassy in Tokyo stated via social media that, by backing the Ukrainian government, Japan was supporting a Nazi regime for the second time in less than 100 years.⁵ Russian state media has added its voice by publishing articles asserting that “Hokkaido is not Japanese territory”; instead, Japan’s northernmost prefecture is allegedly land that was only occupied after the Japanese committed genocide against the indigenous Ainu population.⁶ 

The proximity of these Russian forces and the vehemence of Moscow’s public statements might be taken to mean that Russia has both the capabilities and intention to directly threaten Japan militarily. There are some who do take this view. An article published by Newsweek in November 2022 claimed that Russia had seriously considered launching a localized conflict against Japan in August 2021.⁷ However, such allegations lack supporting evidence. Instead, most analysts and policymakers in Japan regard Russia’s behavior as representing a major concern, but not reaching the threshold of a pressing, military threat. This is made explicit in Japan’s National Security Strategy of December 2022, which characterizes Russia in different ways depending on the geographic region of activity. Whereas Russia’s “external and military activities… are perceived as the most significant and direct threat to security in the European region,” in the “Indo-Pacific region, including Japan,” Russia’s actions are categorized as simply “a strong security concern.”⁸ This outlook is also reflected in Japan’s force deployments, which continue to be reoriented away from the northeast (i.e. Hokkaido) and towards the southwest (i.e. the vicinity of the Senkaku Islands and Taiwan). For instance, when Japan established an Amphibious Rapid Reaction Brigade in 2018, the decision was taken to base this new marine unit at Sasebo in Kyushu, a full 1,800km from the disputed islands with Russia.   

Japanese strategists therefore demonstrate a nuanced and evolving understanding of Russia. Russia is no longer regarded as a promising partner, as was the case when the previous National Security Strategy was approved in 2013.⁹ However, Japan still does not see Russia as an imminent military threat. This is an area of divergence between Japan and NATO countries, such as Poland and the Baltic States, who share similar geographical proximity to Russia but very clearly do regard their neighbor as a direct threat.  

This article elucidates these contemporary Japanese threat perceptions of Russia. It is divided into three main sections. The first explains why Japanese policymakers still do not view Russia as a priority military threat. The second outlines why, despite this, Russia remains a major security concern, above all due to Moscow’s potential to play the role of accomplice to China and North Korea. A concluding section reviews Japan’s response to this security situation.   

Not a Direct Military Threat? 

In recent years, the capabilities of the armed forces of the Russian Federation in the Far East have increased significantly. Across all services, the priority has been the modernization of weapons systems that had become outdated after years of underinvestment following Soviet collapse in 1991. As of December 2021, the percentage of new equipment in the Eastern Military District had risen to 56%.¹⁰  

To take each branch in turn, the Russian ground forces in the Eastern Military District comprise 31 brigades and two divisions. Total personnel are now estimated at 80,000. Aside from the Bal and Bastion anti-ship missiles mentioned above, in recent years the ground forces in this region have been newly equipped with Iskander surface-to-surface missiles.  

The build-up of the Russian Pacific Fleet, which is split between bases at Vladivostok and on Kamchatka, has been even more pronounced. Ten new warships and auxiliary vessels were added in 2022 and 2023 alone. The latest new additions, two nuclear-powered submarines, were inaugurated by President Vladimir Putin in December 2023. Overall, the Russian Pacific Fleet now claims more than 260 vessels with a combined displacement of over 610,000 tons and total personnel of 30,000. Notable new assets include Steregushchii-class frigates equipped with Kalibr cruise missiles and Yasen-class nuclear-powered attack submarines.  

As for air capabilities, within the Eastern Military District Russia has deployed approximately 320 combat aircraft, including the latest Su-35 fighters. Strategic nuclear forces in the region have also been considerably upgraded. Russia now has five Borei-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines in the Pacific, as well as approximately 30 Tu-95 long-range bombers that operate from Ukrainka airbase in Amur Oblast. 

Having received these new assets, the Russian armed forces have not been shy in using them. The quadrennial Vostok drills, which were held in the Eastern Military District in September 2022, officially featured more than 50,000 troops and 5,000 pieces of military equipment. The Russian Pacific Fleet has also been increasingly active in the vicinity of Japan. Between January and March 2022, Russia conducted a whole fleet exercise in the Sea of Okhotsk. More than 20 naval vessels participated, and the Russians ships carried out multiple transits of the Soya Strait between Hokkaido and Sakhalin and the Tsugaru Strait between Hokkaido and Honshu. Russian Tu-95 strategic bombers also regularly conduct long-range patrols over the Sea of Japan, prompting the SDF to scramble fighters. A recent example was on April 2, 2024. Japan also claimed that a Russian helicopter violated Japanese airspace over Hokkaido on October 31, 2023. 

Additionally, Russia conducts regular military drills on the Southern Kuril Islands. Exercises conducted in June 2021 on the disputed islands featured more than 10,000 military personnel, 500 pieces of military equipment, 32 aircraft, and 12 naval vessels. In November 2021, the Russian military also used the S-300V4 system that had been deployed to the islands the previous year to simulate the shoot down of an enemy aircraft.   

The Far Eastern Military District has not been spared losses during the invasion of Ukraine. The 155th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade, which is based in Vladivostok, is believed to have suffered significant casualties, while the 40th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade, which is based on Kamchatka, has also seen action.¹¹ According to data compiled by Mediazona, total fatalities among Russian soldiers from the Far Eastern Federal District had reached 4,428 by February 15, 2024.¹² This is higher than would be expected given the sparse population of Russia’s eastern regions. Indeed, research by Alexey Bessudov finds that the Russian regions with the highest mortality rates among soldiers fighting in Ukraine are those in Siberia and the Russian Far East, while the lowest are in Moscow and St. Petersburg.¹³ Despite a total population of less than 19,000, at least two Russian soldiers from the Southern Kuril Islands are reported to have been killed in Ukraine.¹⁴   

There are also indications that some military assets have been transferred from the Far Eastern Military District. One month after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, Japan’s SDF tracked four Russian naval vessels transiting the Tsugaru Strait. The deck of one of the ships, the Alligator IV-class Nikolai Vilkov, was packed with 17 military trucks. Reports suggest that the military cargo was being shipped from Kamchatka to Vladivostok, from where it could be transferred towards Ukraine via the Trans-Siberian Railway.¹⁵ Additional analysis of satellite data by Koizumi Yu indicates that units of the S-300V4 missile system that were deployed to the disputed islands in 2020 may have been removed after the start of the invasion. Koizumi also suggests that some older tanks and artillery pieces have been redeployed to Ukraine from southern Sakhalin.¹⁶ Separately, a close look at the number of Japanese SDF scrambles provoked by approaching Russian aircraft reveals a decline in 2022. Between 2013 and 2021, the number of these scrambles was never lower than 258; it was as high as 473 in 2014. However, the figure fell to just 150 in 2022, suggesting a drop off in activity as Russian aircraft were needed elsewhere.¹⁷ Furthermore, when launched in April 2023, Russia’s newest minesweeper, the Lev Chernavin, which had been scheduled for deployment with the Pacific Fleet, was reassigned to Russia’s Baltic Fleet.¹⁸ 

These losses and redeployments may slow the pace of modernization of Russian military forces in the Far East. However, they are not large enough to change the overall picture. It remains the case that Russia retains substantial military forces in the vicinity of Japan and that these capabilities have increased markedly over the last two decades. Why then does Japan not see Russia as more of a direct military threat?  

Part of the explanation is bandwidth. Japanese experts emphasize that Japan is facing security challenges on three “fronts,” meaning China, North Korea, and Russia.¹⁹ Yet, the scale of the problem posed by each neighbor is not equal. China actively contests Japan’s sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands, and Beijing’s refusal to rule out a forceful reunification with Taiwan raises the prospect of a regional war into which Japan would almost certainly be drawn. Meanwhile, North Korea has an expanding arsenal of nuclear weapons and regularly fires ballistic missiles towards, or even over, Japan. Japanese security officials are busy managing these existential threats, leaving little time to consider Russia.  

Yet, even if serious tensions with China and North Korea did not exist, there would still be good reasons for Japan to be moderately relaxed about the challenge directly posed by Russia. First, despite the increase in capacity of recent decades, the size of the Russian armed forces in the Far East is still well below its Cold War peak when Japan’s SDF had to be ready to repulse a potential Soviet invasion of Hokkaido.  

The type of capabilities recently deployed also suggests that Russia is not preparing for aggressive operations. If Russia had any intention of attacking Hokkaido, investments would have been made in the resources needed to conduct a large-scale amphibious assault. Instead, Russia’s emphasis has been on enhancing air-defense and anti-ship capabilities around the Sea of Okhotsk. Aside from the Bal and Bastion anti-ship missiles and S-300V4 anti-aircraft missiles deployed to the Southern Kurils since 2016, Russia deployed an S-400 anti-aircraft system and Bastion anti-ship missile system to Southern Sakhalin in 2021. Additional Bastion units were deployed to Matua Island in the central Kurils in 2021 and Paramushir in the northern Kurils in 2022. Furthermore, Russian military drills on the Kuril Islands have simulated repelling landings by hostile forces, rather than practicing offensive operations. 

The implication is that Russia’s priority is to deny access to the Sea of Okhotsk, especially to the forces of the US Navy. This is because the Sea of Okhotsk plays a key role in Russia’s nuclear strategy. Almost entirely surrounded by Russian territory, the Sea of Okhotsk provides a relatively safe haven for the ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) of Russia’s Pacific Fleet, which operate from the Kamchatka peninsula. In the event of major conflict with a peer rival, Russian forces would use their anti-access/area denial (A2AD) capabilities to prevent adversaries’ surface ships and submarines from entering the Sea of Okhotsk. This would provide Russia’s SSBNs with a secure bastion from which to launch their nuclear missiles. The Kuril chain is therefore regarded by Russia, not as a launchpad for offensive operations, but as a protective screen for the Sea of Okhotsk. Deputy chair of the Russian Security Council Dmitry Medvedev has suggested that the archipelago will continue to be developed in this way. Writing on January 30, 2024, Medvedev stated: “The Kurils Islands will be actively developed, and, at the same time, their strategic role will grow, including with the deployment of new weapons there.”²⁰   

It is also worth remembering that Russia has few incentives and plenty of disincentives when it comes to a possible military attack on Japan. The Putin regime is certainly aggressive, but it is not indiscriminately so. In former Soviet territories, the Kremlin has shown itself willing to sacrifice tens of thousands of lives, including those of its own citizens, to maintain a Russian sphere of influence and, in its telling, to protect the rights of Russian “compatriots.” The same considerations do not apply in East Asia. There is all the difference in the world between the Donbas and Hokkaido. No matter what a few hot-headed nationalists may say, the Russian government has no ambitions to conquer the Japanese island, which has never been under Russia’s control and has a Japanese population of over 5 million. With no Russian-speaking minority on Hokkaido, the Putin regime would lack any pretext for such an attack.  

As for disincentives, were Russia to attack Japan, it would have to contend, not only with the significant capabilities of Japan’s SDF, but with those of US Forces Japan. Although some politicians in the West are inclined to be dismissive of US-led alliances, Putin evidently understands their importance. It is not happenstance that Russia has invaded Georgia and Ukraine but has been deterred from doing so against the Baltic States, the only former Soviet territories to have joined the NATO alliance. Indeed, Putin regards a country’s alliance relations with the United States as so meaningful that he was willing to launch a disastrous war, in part, to prevent Ukraine pursuing such a course. In short, Japan’s alliance with the United States is another factor that makes a direct Russian military attack against Japanese territory extremely unlikely.  

An Indirect Danger 

For the above reasons, the Japanese government is correct not to classify Russia as a direct military threat. However, Russia still raises serious security concerns for Japan due to its potential to serve as an accomplice to states that are regarded as direct military threats; namely, China and North Korea.  

Russia as an accomplice to China

 Russia-China military cooperation is nothing new. Russia has exported weapons systems to China since the 1990s, including fighter jets and submarines. The countries’ first joint military exercises were held in 2005. However, bilateral military ties became considerably closer after 2014, when Russia’s annexation of Crimea left it isolated from the West. From this date, Moscow became willing to sell China even its most advanced military hardware, including the S-400 surface-to-air missile system and Su-35 fighter jet. This technology had previously been held back, partly because of concerns that Russia and China might one day clash again militarily, as they did in 1969, but also because of worries that China would steal the technology and use it to boost its own arms exports.   

Of greatest alarm for Japan was the commencement in 2019 of joint air patrols by Russian and Chinese strategic bombers. These are now held regularly, including on December 14, 2023, when Russian Tu-95s and Chinese H-6Ks conducted a joint patrol over the Sea of Japan. On that occasion, Japanese experts were left baffled by the fact that one of the accompanying Su-35 fighters was a jet from the Russian Knights, the aerobatics team of the Russian Air Force, and therefore an aircraft not usually used for operational activities.²¹    

Russia and China have also engaged in provocative naval activities in the vicinity of Japan. One example was in July and August 2023 when Russian and Chinese naval vessels held three weeks of joint drills, including conducting a near-complete circuit of the Japanese archipelago. The Russian and Chinese warships also made joint transits through the Soya Strait between Hokkaido and Sakhalin and the Miyako Strait between Okinawa and Miyako-jima. The official Defense of Japan white paper interprets these joint military actions as “intended to be demonstrative behavior against Japan” and labels them “a significant concern from the perspective of the security of Japan and the region.”²² 

There is no sense that Russia is eager to become entangled in China’s many disputes with regional neighbors. However, Russia may not be entirely free to set its own course. This is because the bilateral relationship has become so unbalanced in China’s favor, meaning that, in the event of a regional crisis, Beijing may use its extensive leverage to force Moscow into becoming an accomplice in the service of China’s regional ambitions. 

The greatest worry is Russia’s potential role in a Taiwan crisis. Russia adheres to the One China Policy, considers Taiwan an inseparable part of China, and is opposed to any form of independence. This was stance was explicitly reiterated by Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs after Taiwan’s presidential election in January 2024.²³ Taiwan’s own Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned these comments, stating that “Russia has willingly become an accomplice of the Chinese Communist Party regime.”²⁴ Furthermore, Russia supports China’s anti-secession law, which was adopted by Beijing in 2005. This authorizes China’s use of non-peaceful means to prevent Taiwanese independence.   

If China does invade Taiwan, Beijing may lean on Moscow to assist in several ways. This would certainly include diplomatic support at the United Nations. Russia may also be called upon to help China evade Western sanctions. In the military realm, it remains unlikely that Russian forces would directly participate in the attack. After all, Russia and China are not full-fledged military allies. Nonetheless, the Russian armed forces could still assist China by means of coordinated action. For instance, if, just ahead of the Chinese invasion, the Russian Pacific Fleet were to carry out provocative maneuvers to the north of Japan, such as large-scale live-fire drills or violations of Japanese territorial waters and air space, this would force the SDF to divert resources to this area. This would benefit China since, in the event of conflict over Taiwan that involves the United States, it is highly probable that Japan would also be drawn into the fighting. By reducing the availability of Japanese forces in the vicinity of Taiwan, China would increase its chances of victory.²⁵ Intriguingly, Putin has hinted at the possibility of Russia’s involvement in such regional conflicts. On April 14, 2023, during a visit to Moscow by then Chinese defense minister Li Shangfu, the Russian president stated that “the forces of the [Pacific] Fleet in its individual components can certainly be used in conflicts in any direction.”²⁶ Also notable is that Taiwan was a topic of discussion when Putin held a phone conversation with General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Xi Jinping on February 8.²⁷ 

Russia as an accomplice to North Korea 

In the case of North Korea, the most notable development was Russia’s hosting of Kim Jong-un in September 2023. The North Korean leader had visited Russia before; he held a summit with Putin in Vladivostok in 2019. However, the 2023 visit was of a different magnitude, lasting a whole week and involving a trip of thousands of kilometers across the territory of the Russian Far East. It also featured a greater show of bonhomie between the two leaders, with Putin gratefully accepting Kim’s invitation to make a reciprocal visit to North Korea. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov has indicated that Putin’s visit is likely to occur after Russia’s presidential elections, which were held in March 2024.²⁸ 

Western media have focused on the military assistance that North Korea is now providing to Russia’s war effort in Ukraine. In October 2023, satellite imagery showed an unusual volume of railway traffic between North Korea and Russia. More than 70 freight cars were photographed at the Tumangang Railway Station in Rason, a North Korean city near the Russian border. This was analyzed as representing the start of North Korean arms deliveries that had been agreed during Kim’s visit to Russia in September.²⁹ In February 2024, South Korea’s Defense Ministry added their assessment that North Korea had already supplied Russia with more than three million artillery shells, as well as short-range ballistic missiles, anti-tank missiles, portable anti-air missiles, and both rifles and rocket launchers.³⁰ Moreover, Russia is believed to have used around 50 North Korean ballistic missiles in attacks on Ukrainian targets. This also benefits the North Korean side since the Russian military feeds back data on the missiles’ performance, enabling Pyeongyang to understand how its weaponry performs in conditions of warfare and to make adjustments to enhance precision.³¹  

Japan’s government certainly shares Western concerns that North Korean arms deliveries are exacerbating the conflict in Ukraine. However, of even greater worry in Tokyo is what Russia may give North Korea in return. On January 23, Foreign Minister Kamikawa Yoko stated that, “regarding the possibility of Russian military support for North Korea, we are concerned and are closely monitoring the situation.”³²

Indications of what Russia could supply were communicated by the choice of locations during Kim Jong-un’s visit to Russia. The highlight of the trip was the North Korean leader’s meeting with Putin at the Vostochnyi Cosmodrome in Russia’s Amur region. The decision to meet at the spaceport seemed designed to send the message that, in spite of UN Security Council resolutions, Russia is willing to assist North Korea with its rocket and satellite programs. This is alarming for countries that regard North Korea as a threat since the technology for launching satellites and ballistic missiles is essentially the same.  

Later in the trip, Kim was given a tour of aviation facilities in Komsomolsk-on-Amur, where Russia assembles the Su-35 and Su-57 fighter jets. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu also showed Kim around military facilities near Vladivostok, where the North Korean leader inspected the Kinzhal, Russia’s new hypersonic missile. Even the presents given to Kim suggested that Russia is now willing to supply North Korea with military equipment. The North Korean leader was gifted a rifle, lightweight body armor for assault operations, as well as five “kamikaze” attack drones and one Geranium-25 reconnaissance drone.³³   

Two months after Kim’s visit to Russia, North Korea successfully launched the Malligyong-1, the country’s first spy satellite. Two previous attempts – in May and August 2023 – had both failed. Analysts speculated that North Korea’s sudden success was due to Russian technological assistance. Cha Du-hyeong told the media that “Russian engineers provided instructions on the know-how of assembling rocket components, and they provided support on the software end.” Koda Yoji, a retired vice admiral with Japan’s SDF, claimed that “They [the Russians] gave advice on stage separation.”³⁴  

Russia is also attempting to shield North Korea’s nuclear and missile program from international observers. On 28 March, Russia’s delegation to the United Nations Security Council wielded the country’s veto to block renewal of the panel of experts tasked with monitoring enforcement of UN sanctions against North Korea’s weapons programs. South Korea’s UN ambassador Joonkook Hwang suggested that Moscow was seeking to avoid evidence being recorded of Russia’s illegal assistance to North Korea, stating “This is almost comparable to destroying a CCTV to avoid being caught red-handed.”³⁵

Russia may also be helping North Korea evade financial sanctions. US-allied intelligence officials claim that the Russian authorities have permitted North Korea access to $9 million of previously frozen funds within Russia. A North Korean front company has also been allowed to open a bank account with a Russian bank in South Ossetia, a breakaway Georgian region that is under Russia’s control.³⁶ These could be steps to facilitate North Korean payments for Russian military equipment.  

It is not yet certain that Russia is willing to provide North Korea with game-changing military technology. There is still little trust between Moscow and Pyongyang. The Russian side may also fear upsetting Beijing, which will not welcome the destabilizing effect of North Korea obtaining technology that multiplies its military capabilities. As such, it is possible that Moscow is deliberately misleading Pyongyang. The itinerary of Kim’s visit could have been designed to convey the idea that Russia is willing to supply its best equipment, and thus to persuade North Korea to deliver the needed artillery shells. And yet, all the while, Moscow may intend to furnish North Korea with nothing more than oil, food, and diplomatic engagement.   

Japanese security experts may hope for this more favorable scenario, but they must plan for the worst. A more pessimistic assessment would suggest that Russia, whose armed forces have invaded a sovereign neighbor and committed multiple war crimes, has cast aside any pretense of abiding by international law and would have no hesitation in further violating UN Security Council resolutions by providing North Korea with missile, satellite, and submarine technology. Added to this, the Kremlin may even welcome instability on the Korean Peninsula as it would create another international crisis to distract the United States and its allies from Russia’s war in Ukraine.   

Another worry is that Russia’s support may embolden North Korea. Buoyed by Russian diplomatic support and benefitting from a boost in military technology, the North Korean leadership could become even more aggressive. This prospect has been raised in the Japanese media where it has been argued that Kim Jong-un’s abandonment of the goal of unification of the Korean Peninsula and designation of South Korea as the “principal enemy” was a sign of new confidence due to Russian support.³⁷ Robert Carlin and Siegfried Hecker also mention closer ties with Russia in their article of January 2024, which argues that an emboldened North Korea may be considering a surprise attack on South Korea. Their alarming conclusion is that “The situation on the Korean Peninsula is more dangerous than it has been at any time since early June 1950.”³⁸ 

How to Respond?

This article has argued that Russia poses little direct military threat to Japan and that Russian forces north of Hokkaido are primarily deployed to deny foreign access to the Sea of Okhotsk. And yet, it has been shown that, as an accomplice to both China and North Korea, Russia still represents a serious security concern for Japan, especially due to its potential to exacerbate regional crises over Taiwan and Korea. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has also weakened the norm against changing the international status quo by force. If Russia can win its war and if the economic and political consequences for Moscow appear manageable, Beijing and Pyongyang could judge that it is worth making a similarly aggressive gamble.   

The Japanese government has already attempted one solution to this situation. Recognizing the danger of Russia making common cause with regional neighbors, the administration of Abe Shinzo tried to neutralize the threat by engaging intensively with Moscow. Undeterred by Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, Abe promoted his “new approach” to relations with Russia that featured a charm offensive directed at Putin himself and economic incentives structured around an 8-point economic cooperation plan. The primary goal was to encourage Moscow to distance itself from Beijing by creating alternative partnership opportunities for Russia within the region.³⁹ 

Long before 2022, this strategy had failed. Above all, despite Abe’s active engagement, “Russian wariness remained remarkably resistant to change, in part because no positive narrative of the future Russo-Japanese partnership or Japan’s place in Asia had been presented to Russians.”⁴⁰ Moreover, the Russian government regards Japan as only a semi-autonomous actor, or, in the words of Secretary of the Security Council Nikolai Patrushev, “a vassal” of the United States.⁴¹ As such, the Russian leadership feels that Japan does not represents an alternative partner in East Asia since, when push comes to shove, Tokyo will always side with the United States. For this reason, Abe’s “new approach” achieved no results. Indeed, it was counterproductive. Although intended as a mechanism to divide Russia from China, it was exploited by Russia to encourage Japan to distance itself from G7 partners. By dangling the vague prospect of a territorial deal to resolve the status of the disputed Southern Kuril Islands, the Russian leadership persuaded the Abe administration to avoid following Western partners in introducing tough sanctions on Russia in 2014. Abe was also induced to ignore US President Barack Obama’s advice not to visit Russia in 2016.⁴²

The inadvertent merit of Abe’s “new approach” is that its failure to drive a wedge between Russia and China or to achieve any progress towards a territorial resolution was so obvious that no Japanese leader in the foreseeable future will be inclined to repeat the error. Prime Minister Kishida Fumio, who was Abe’s foreign minister during much of the “new approach,” has learned the lesson.  
       
After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Kishida administration has joined Western partners in introducing meaningful sanctions against Russia, including against Putin himself. Japan’s government has also pledged 7.52 billion euros of financial support for Ukraine.⁴³ Additionally, Japan has stretched previous regulations to permit the transfer of military equipment to Ukraine. Although this still does not include weaponry, Japan has revised its rules to allow Japanese-made Patriot missiles to be sent to the United States. This will free up US units of the air-defense system for transfer to Ukraine.⁴⁴ Furthermore, on February 19, 2024, Japan hosted the Japan-Ukraine Conference for Promotion of Economic Reconstruction in Tokyo, thereby demonstrating its long-term commitment to supporting Ukraine.  

This strategy is built on the understanding that, even though Russia does not pose a pressing military threat to Japan directly, preventing Russian victory in Ukraine remains extremely important to Japan’s own security. As Kishida has said repeatedly, Ukraine today could be Asia tomorrow.⁴⁵ In other words, if undeterred, China or North Korea could act similarly in East Asia. Accordingly, the Japanese government wants to send a clear message that international aggression will not succeed, and the perpetrator will incur extremely high costs. The additional hope for Tokyo is that, if the Putin regime fails to achieve its goals in Ukraine, a weakened Russia will represent a less valuable accomplice to the regimes in Beijing and Pyongyang. The challenge for Tokyo will be whether these efforts can be maintained if the United States’ support for Ukraine comes to an end under a new presidential administration.