China’s Strategic Thinking toward India, 2017-2020

China–India relations from 2017 to 2020 fluctuated dramatically against a rapidly changing global environment. The period was bookended by two territorial disputes which drove bilateral relations to depressing lows: the 2017 Doklam incident and the 2020 border crisis in the Ladakh region. In between, Xi Jinping and Narendra Modi attempted to set relations on a more promising path through repeated high-level visits. As India and China struggled in their relationship, the global system underwent significant changes. Donald Trump became president in January 2017, throwing into question every prior assumption about US foreign policy. The Trump administration’s championing of a new Indo-Pacific strategy, adopting a concept first proposed by Abe Shinzo a decade earlier, fundamentally reshaped the regional environment and paved the way for the resumption of the Quadrilateral Strategic Dialogue among India, the United States, Japan, and Australia. Initial Indian doubts about the dependability of the United States under Trump gave way to closer US–India relations and the institutionalization of the Quad. The rapid spread of the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020 threw much of the world into a state of crisis.

During these eventful years, Chinese analysts of India often focused on three main themes. The first was the development of the “Indo-Pacific” concept and the evolution of the Quad. Chinese analysts studied differences in the various countries’ understandings of the “Indo-Pacific” and carefully assessed India’s support for the US Indo-Pacific strategy, closer bilateral relations with the United States, and the Quad. The second theme was the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI); China hoped for, but never received, Indian support for its regional development strategy. The final theme was India’s new assertiveness in the Indian Ocean and beyond, which increasingly brought India and China into competition for regional influence. As China pushed through Southeast Asia and into the Indian Ocean region in its attempt to build its 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, India pushed back through the Indian Ocean region into Southeast Asia.

2017

The Trump administration’s foreign policy and the development of a US Indo-Pacific strategy created an important context for China’s relations with India between 2017–2020. As Trump entered office in January 2017, his “America First” policy raised questions in India—and around the world—about whether the United States would become a less reliable partner. In his November 10 remarks at the APEC CEO Summit in Vietnam, Trump expressed US support for a “free and open Indo-Pacific,” characterized by “respect for the rule of law, individual rights, and freedom of navigation and overflight, including open shipping lanes” and “fair and reciprocal trade.”¹ That December, the US National Security Strategy more formally laid out the US perception of “a geopolitical competition between free and repressive visions of world order…taking place in the Indo-Pacific region,” defined as the area between the west coasts of India and the United States. The National Security Strategy specifically named China and North Korea as the key threats to regional security, and brought together US policy toward East Asia, Southeast Asia, and South Asia, as well as toward Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Islands region, under a unified “Indo-Pacific” umbrella.²

Against the backdrop of the new Trump administration and its emerging Indo-Pacific policy, China–India relations reached a nadir in 2017 for more local reasons. As 2017 began, bilateral relations had already been damaged by China’s successful efforts to block India from joining the Nuclear Suppliers Group in 2016.³ In April 2017, India allowed the Dalai Lama to visit the contested region of Arunachal Pradesh, which China claims as part of Tibet. But relations really hit their nadir in June, when India intervened on behalf of its close ally, Bhutan, in Bhutan’s border conflict with China. During the two-month-long Dolkam crisis, India deployed troops to block the Chinese military from building a road in territory claimed by Bhutan. Ultimately, India and China agreed to end the crisis in August and Indian troops withdrew, but the damage to their bilateral relationship had been done.⁴ In the midst of a terrible year for China–India relations, one potential bright spot was India’s entrance to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a decision that had been reached in 2015.

Chinese analysts observing China–India relations in 2017 focused on several key themes. The first was how to respond to India’s lukewarm attitude toward China’s flagship BRI. Mao Yue noted that Indian analysts assessed the BRI at three levels of analysis: at the international level, they saw the BRI as a manifestation of Sino–US hegemonic competition and as a Chinese attempt to construct an alternative regional order to that led by the United States; at the regional level, they perceived the BRI as a Chinese attempt to disguise strategic interests with economic deals in an area that India regards as its rightful sphere of influence; and at the national level, they worried that China would ask India to join the BRI while infringing on India’s national interests in the South China Sea, on the border, and regarding Pakistan. Mao argued that this analysis had led to an ongoing debate within India over how to respond to the BRI. This debate was driven significantly by India’s attempts to become a great power and its unwillingness to choose sides between China and the United States, despite dramatically warming ties with the United States under the Obama administration, as well as by a sense of weakness relative to China and a lack of political trust. Various Indian proponents of joining the BRI argued that India would gain bargaining leverage if it joined because it would have access to better information, that India was being marginalized by trade agreements, and that participating in the BRI would allow India to integrate into the global economy more fully, and that India should separately assess the merits of participating in each project. Indian opponents focused on potential strategic threats posed by the BRI or argued that BRI proposals were overly ambitious, unattractive, Sinocentric, or unlikely to succeed, and in many cases competed with India’s own proposals, including Project Mausam.⁵

This ambiguous Indian position was evident in May 2017, when India issued its first major statement on the BRI. It praised the BRI’s efforts to promote connectivity but argued that such initiatives must adhere to international norms regarding the rule of law, transparency, environmental protection, and territorial integrity.⁶ Chinese empathy for the Indian position only went so far. Mao concluded that China would be unable to improve Indian perceptions of the BRI and should focus on implementing concrete programs that would increase India’s dependence on China rather than seeking public statements of support for the BRI.⁷ Meanwhile, reflecting some truth underlying Indian opponents’ concerns, Li Hongmei argued that one way for China to respond to Indian opposition to efforts to increase China’s influence in the Indian Ocean was to strengthen economic cooperation and interdependence with littoral states through port agreements and the Maritime Silk Road—in other words, to carry out the BRI.⁸

A second key theme was India’s more assertive goals in the Indian Ocean and the concerns this shift raised for greater competition with China, particularly given India’s growing ties to the United States. Chinese analysts did not question the legitimacy of the Chinese position. As Li Hongmei asserted, China’s growing regional interests required it to undertake “modest operations” in the region. China’s interest in the Indian Ocean was motivated by its desire to ensure the stability of its sea lines of communication (SLOCs) and the viability of the BRI, as well as by its efforts to become a sea power.⁹ Chinese analysts saw Chinese interests as fundamentally at odds with Indian efforts to translate growing Indian economic power into greater influence over the Indian Ocean as part of their “Great Power dream.”¹⁰ To this end, Rong Ying argued, India sought to build India-centric multilateral mechanisms that would increase its control over the Indian Ocean and promote its image as a “‘provider’ of regional security.”¹¹ Li went further: India was pursuing a “Monroe Doctrine” in the Indian Ocean to ensure control of what it believed should be within its “sphere of influence.” Li argued that India could decrease India’s strategic concerns by acknowledging its regional contributions, without recognizing an Indian right to dominate the Indian Ocean.¹² These Indian concerns, however, were unlikely to be assuaged by the formal opening of China’s naval base in Djibouti in August.

A third theme was India’s relations with the United States, as well as with Japan and Australia. Chinese observers widely viewed the United States as a declining power. Although they believed that the United States wanted to maintain its regional influence, they doubted its capacity and its will to commit to these efforts and noted US efforts to shift the costs of checking Chinese influence to other actors, such as India.¹³ While some believed that India was continuing its long-standing efforts to avoid picking sides between China and the United States, others argued that Modi’s distrust of China was leading him to pursue closer relations with the United States and Japan.¹⁴ Though in early-mid 2017, Chinese analysts were not yet talking about the Quad, they recognized the significance of increased maritime cooperation between India, the United States, Australia, and Japan, and specifically of the Malabar exercises (involving Japan, the United States, and India).¹⁵ They also noted the growing military budgets, ambitious military modernization plans, and largely compatible interests among India, Japan, and Australia. Although Japan and Australia each had their own interests—Japan seeking to normalize and Australia seeking to increase its strategic autonomy—they shared a concern about whether the United States would continue to protect the SLOCs.¹⁶ The November 12, 2017 talks between the United States, India, Australia, and Japan at the ASEAN summit in Manila, now recognized as the restart of the Quad, brought some definition to this discussion.

Overall, Chinese analysts were pessimistic about the direction of China–India relations in 2017, seeing the two countries as potential competitors, with limited mutual trust.¹⁷ Even when they showed occasional understanding of India’s perspective, they did not question the legitimacy of China’s goals. For example, as Ma Jiali analyzed the summer 2017 Doklam dispute, Ma recognized India’s fears: concern about encirclement by China, worry that the BRI might be an excuse for Chinese force projection into South Asia and the Indian Ocean, and a sense of threat deriving from the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor. Yet, Ma still blamed the Indian media for stirring up popular sentiments, which, together with the government’s decision to arm up, had created a “crisis.” Parroting the official government line, Ma attributed the Indian response to a misperception of China’s strategic intentions, which Ma insisted were clearly benign.¹⁸ Given long-term geopolitical trends and the sudden shock of the Doklam incident, Chinese observers were not optimistic about China’s relationship with India.

2018

As 2018 began, the Chinese and Indian leadership sought to bring the bilateral relationship back from the brink. Modi made two trips to China. The first, an April visit to Wuhan for a two-day “informal summit” with Xi, demonstrated the two leaders’ efforts to revive the bilateral relationship. In June, Modi traveled back to China, where he met with Xi on the sidelines of the SCO summit in Qingdao. Meetings of the top leadership continued throughout the year, with Modi and Xi meeting on the sidelines of the August BRICS leaders’ summit in South Africa and the November–December G20 summit in Argentina. Signaling the two countries’ attempts to restore a more positive relationship, in late December Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi travelled to New Delhi for the first meeting of the China–India High-Level People-to-People Exchanges Mechanism.¹⁹

These efforts to warm up the bilateral relationship took place against the backdrop of the pivotal November 2017 decision to resume the Quad dialogue. In January, the four Quad countries’ naval chiefs met on the sidelines of the Raisana Dialogue, indicating the strong maritime dimension of their countries’ strategic partnership.²⁰ In June, senior-level diplomats from the four countries held consultations in Singapore, where they expressed their support for a rules-based free and open Indo-Pacific region; discussed their shared goals, including regional and maritime cooperation, development and connectivity, and good governance; and affirmed the importance of ASEAN centrality.²¹ Later that summer, reflecting the Trump administration’s greater focus on the “Indo-Pacific,” the United States announced plans to invest $113 million in infrastructure funding and $300 million in security funding in the Indo-Pacific region.²² Meanwhile, bilateral relations between the United States and India also continued to strengthen, with the much postponed 2+2 talks between the United States and India finally kicking off in September in New Delhi.

Not surprisingly, Chinese analysts devoted significant attention to unpacking the meaning of the “Indo-Pacific” concept and the significance of the resumption of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. The concept of the “Indo-Pacific,” first raised by Australians and proposed by Japan, had been gradually embraced by all four countries. Although its meaning could be vague and the scope of its geographic boundaries varied, Lin Minwang argued that, compared to the concept of the “Asia Pacific,” it better captured the interaction between the increasing naval ambitions of China and India and the strategic interests of East Asian states in the Indian Ocean as a pathway for their energy imports. To Lin, the goals of the concept were clear: to restrain China’s naval ambitions and prevent it from gaining influence in the Indian Ocean, to maintain the dominant US role, and to increase Indian capabilities.²³ Yet even as the Trump administration actively embraced a new “Indo-Pacific” policy, its commitment to this policy remained in question. Chen Jimin contended that a strategy that relied on stronger cooperation with allies and regional partners was fundamentally inconsistent with the dual principles of “Make America Great Again” and “America First” that lay at the heart of Trump’s foreign policy.²⁴  Trump had already demonstrated a willingness to walk away from deals, such as the TPP, that he did not believe served US interests, raising questions among regional partners about the depth of US commitment to the region and the integrity of its promises.

Furthermore, as Chinese analysts noted, each country had a different understanding of the “Indo-Pacific.” In an important June 2018 speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue, Modi argued that the Indo-Pacific was a “natural region,” but not a “geographical” one. In his view, the Indo-Pacific “stands for a free, open, inclusive region, which embraces us all in common pursuit of progress and prosperity.” It required a “rules-based order,” “equal access, as a right under the international law, to the use of common spaces on the sea and in the area,” and connectivity. In many ways, this vision aligned with that of the United States; in his remarks, Modi averred that the US–India global strategic partnership “has assumed new significance in the changing world, and an important pillar of this partnership is our shared vision of an open, stable, secure and prosperous Indo-Pacific region.” Yet Modi also insisted that the Indo-Pacific region was not “directed against any country” (an obvious, but unstated, reference to China) and reaffirmed India’s policy of non-alignment.²⁵

The formal resumption of the Quad arose from this complicated mix. If an “Indo-Pacific region” did in fact exist and had strategic importance, as the four countries seemed to agree was the case, then it made sense to organize talks about it.²⁶ But Chinese analysts detected differing levels of enthusiasm for the Quad. Zhang Jie argued that the push for the resumption of the Quad came from Japan and Australia, which worried that the Trump administration’s abandonment of Obama’s “Asia-Pacific” rebalance, combined with China’s recent success in implementing the BRI and creating the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), would give them no choice but to accept a new Chinese-created regional order and hoped that the revival of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue would keep the United States involved in the Indo-Pacific.²⁷ Lin Minwang, by contrast, saw the United States and Japan as the most enthusiastic supporters of the dialogue mechanism.²⁸ Underlying Chinese analysis of the renewed focus on the “Indo-Pacific” and the resumption of the Quad were the assumptions that the United States was a declining power, that China was a rising power, and that the policies of the United States, Japan, Australia, and India were all a response to that reality.

India’s views on the Quad, in particular, were a giant question mark. In Zhang Jie’s view, India was happy to cooperate with the United States, Japan, and Australia because the quadrilateral dialogue aligned with its interests vis-à-vis China and supported its pursuit of a bigger regional and international role.²⁹ By contrast, Lin Minwang argued that India harbored more doubts: unlike the other three states, India’s public statements about quadrilateral cooperation did not refer to shared values, a commitment to international law and global norms, or a desire to deepen the dialogue, and India seemed more interested in economic cooperation than in security cooperation. Furthermore, Lin argued, India opposed the inclusion of China in the “Indo-Pacific” because it did not want to legitimize its presence in the Indian Ocean.³⁰ Hu Juan saw India’s strengthened relations with the countries of the Quad as an example of its broader effort at “soft balancing” China: perceiving China as a threat and recognizing the power gap between India and China, India chose to align with powerful actors to protect its national interests.³¹ Picking up on this theme, Wang Jingchao argued that India and Japan had grown closer over their shared worries about China and their maritime security concerns, but contended that India’s cautiousness about triggering China and its own desire to maintain autonomy would limit the extent and durability of their economic and security cooperation.³² In Modi’s June 2018 remarks at the Shangri-La Dialogue, Modi indirectly referenced the Quad, arguing that “it is normal to have partnerships on the basis of shared values and interests” and that India would work with these partnerships “individually or in formats of three or more, for a stable and peaceful region.” Nevertheless, Modi emphasized, “our friendships are not alliances of containment.”³³

As Chinese analysts thought about China–India relations in the context of the renewed emphasis on the Indo-Pacific region and the formal resumption of the Quad, the strategic importance of the two countries’ competition in the Indian Ocean continued to draw their attention. In March 2018, India held its biennial Milan naval exercises at Port Blair, in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands in the Bay of Bengal, which emphasized naval interoperability among the 17 participant countries.³⁴ Similarly, Chinese analysts argued that India’s attempt to strengthen relations with the members of the Quad was part of a broader effort to strengthen India’s position in the Indian Ocean.³⁵ Shi Hongyuan contended that Modi’s more assertive Indian Ocean policy was driven by his desire to create a maritime environment that would support India’s rise, improve India’s global status and position as a powerful country, and maximize India’s national interests.³⁶ Underlying Chinese assessments of Indian interests in the Indian Ocean, but not always explicitly stated, was the understanding that India’s focus on enhanced naval capabilities and strengthened ties with other concerned states was likely to conflict with China’s increasingly expansive naval objectives.³⁷

Chinese analysts continued to draw particular attention to the implications of India’s more active emphasis on sea power in the Indian Ocean for China’s BRI. Shi Hongyuan, for example, argued that Modi’s Indian Ocean strategy posed a potential threat to the BRI. Given India’s important position on the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, its reluctance to participate in the BRI could constrain China’s plans and might induce other states in the region to similarly withhold their support. As a result, Shi urged China to improve its relations with India and the other countries bordering the Indian Ocean.³⁸ Lending credence to Shi’s concerns, in June 2018, India was the only SCO member not to express support for the BRI. At the SCO summit, Modi stated that “connectivity with SCO and neighbours is a priority for India” but also reiterated the need to “respect sovereignty” when implementing infrastructure projects, reflecting Indian concern over the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, which transits through Kashmir.³⁹

Furthermore, Chinese analysts worried that the popularization of an “Indo-Pacific” concept and the resumption of the Quad would impede their implementation of the BRI.⁴⁰ Zhang Jie argued that the inclusion of India in the Quad shifted the area of cooperation from the Asia-Pacific to the broader Indo-Pacific, and specifically to a geographic area that overlapped with areas that China had already identified as part of its BRI, increasing the likelihood of competition. She was suspicious of the four countries’ efforts to increase cooperation, especially as it pertains to regional infrastructure, by providing capital and technical support, even though they portrayed this as an “alternative” to the BRI, rather than as a “rival.” Nevertheless, Zhang was optimistic that the BRI and the Quad’s infrastructure proposals could be mutually compatible.⁴¹

Although the South China Sea was not a topic that had drawn much attention among Chinese analysts focused on India in the mid-2010s, it started to draw more attention in the later years of the decade. In 2017, Lin Minwang had argued that India had miscalculated in its decision to take a more active role in the South China Sea disputes, in which it sided with the United States, Japan, and Vietnam against China, by overestimating its influence over the issue.⁴² In 2018, the role of the South China Sea became more prominent in Chinese analysis of India. Lin Minwang noted that the popularization of an Indo-Pacific concept among India, Japan, Australia and the United States, despite internal tensions over its meaning, had the potential to motivate greater quadrilateral cooperation and harm Chinese interests in the South China Sea.⁴³ Similarly, Liu Lei noted that a key 2015 Modi administration report laying out its maritime strategy had classified the South China Sea and the East China Sea as “secondary areas” for Indian maritime interests; the fact that the Indian government saw these regions as within their interests at all was a reason for concern.⁴⁴ Hu Juan pointed to India’s increased security cooperation with Vietnam, which, much to China’s dismay, had brought India into the South China Sea, as an example of India’s soft balancing of China at the regional level.⁴⁵ This analysis reflected the ways in which India’s more expansive maritime policy and its deepening cooperation with the Quad had expanded its areas of concern.

2019

India’s spring 2019 elections set the tone for its relations with China and for its Indo-Pacific policy more broadly. Modi was re-elected as prime minister and appointed as his minister of external affairs Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, who had formerly served as ambassador to both China and the United States. After being sworn in at the end of May, both Modi and Jaishankar engaged in a flurry of diplomatic visits with leaders from South Asia. In June, Modi chose the Maldives and Sri Lanka as the destinations for his first overseas visits after his re-election; that same month, Jaishankar visited Bhutan (Modi made his own visit to Bhutan in August).⁴⁶
Meanwhile, South Asian leaders made their own visits to India. Nepal’s prime minister attended Modi’s swearing in ceremony; the prime minister of Bangladesh visited India in October, and the president of Sri Lanka visited in November.⁴⁷ In the context of the growing India–China rivalry, these visits could be seen by Chinese observers as evidence of India’s efforts to shore up its relations with its South Asian neighbors, many of whose governments were also targets of Chinese diplomatic outreach.

Direct visits between top Chinese and Indian leaders also continued in an effort to further improve bilateral relations after the 2018 reset. Jaishankar visited China for the first time as external affairs minister on August 11–13, 2019. A key purpose was to co-chair, with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, the second India–China High Level Mechanism on Cultural and People-to-People Exchanges meeting.⁴⁸ Two months later, Xi arrived in Chennai for a second informal summit with Modi. Although the two sides did not release a joint statement, they agreed to establish a High-Level Economic and Trade Dialogue mechanism and to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations by making 2020 the “Year of China–India Cultural and People-to-People Exchange.” Although they did not make concrete progress on border issues, they affirmed the importance of ongoing work by their respective special representatives.⁴⁹ In December, Wang Yi visited India for border talks with Indian National Security Adviser Ajit Doval, amid increasing tensions over border issues and the disappointment over India’s November decision to withdraw from negotiations on the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).⁵⁰

Modi’s re-election ensured the continuation of India’s interest in the Indo-Pacific and in a more assertive position in the Indian Ocean. In April 2019, shortly before the elections concluded, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs had formed a Division for the Indo-Pacific, which the ministry said was motivated by “the increasing salience of the Indo-Pacific concept in global discourse” and by a desire to implement the vision of the Indo-Pacific shared by Modi in his June 2018 Shangri-La Dialogue speech.⁵¹ This important development institutionalized the government’s commitment to the concept of the “Indo-Pacific” in its diplomatic bureaucracy. To further implement this vision, at the East Asia Summit in Bangkok that November, the Indian government initiated the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI), which envisioned regional cooperation around seven pillars largely relating to maritime security and affairs.⁵² On December 13, India hosted the Indian Ocean Rim Association’s (IORA) 6th Indian Ocean Dialogue, which brought together academics and officials for a Track 1.5 conversation entitled “Indo-Pacific: Re-imagining the Indian Ocean through an Expanded Geography.”⁵³ The next day, India hosted the 11th Delhi Dialogue, a second Track 1.5 meeting, which facilitated conversation between India and ASEAN member states on “Advancing Partnership in the Indo-Pacific.”⁵⁴ These developments supported the Chinese view that India was seeking to shore up its relations with ASEAN.⁵⁵

The Modi administration’s focus on the Indo-Pacific was consistent with its increasingly assertive foreign policy position. In a November 2019 speech, Jaishankar laid out three main foreign policy objectives, which came to be summarized as “security, welfare, and prestige.”⁵⁶ “Security” referred to peace and stability in India’s neighborhood; “welfare” referred to economic prosperity; and “prestige” referred to a greater global status consistent with India’s “Great Power dream.”⁵⁷ These objectives inevitably brought India into increasing competition with China. Despite earlier concerns about the Trump administration’s commitment to the region, India’s shift toward the United States was becoming clearer. Shortly before being sworn in as minister of external affairs, Jaishankar had called for “cultivating the United States” and “managing China.”⁵⁸ In November, India and the United States held their first joint tri-service military exercise.⁵⁹ That December, the United States and India held their second 2+2 dialogue in Washington, DC, where they highlighted their bilateral cooperation in the Indian Ocean.⁶⁰

The re-election of Modi and recommitment to his foreign policy approach, combined with growing concerns about China, offered increasing Indian support for the Quad. On May 31, 2019, senior officials from the four countries met in Bangkok to discuss their shared commitment to a rules-based Indo-Pacific and their support for ASEAN and other regional actors.⁶¹ In late September, the four countries upgraded their dialogue to the foreign minister level, meeting in New York on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly meeting.⁶² Senior officials met once more in Bangkok on November 4, and affirmed the four countries’ plans to hold “regular consultations” at various levels, including the ministerial level.⁶³ That same day, the United States, Japan, and Australia announced the formation of the “Blue Dot Network,” an effort to fund the high quality construction of infrastructure projects in the Indo-Pacific.⁶⁴ This initiative was widely seen as an attempt to give India, and other countries, an alternative to the BRI.⁶⁵ In late November, the Quad held its first counter-terrorism exercise in New Delhi.⁶⁶

With Modi advancing a more assertive Indian foreign policy and the Quad dialogue quickly picking up its pace, Chinese analysts writing in 2019 highlighted the potential for regional competition between China and India. They focused not only on India’s increasing assertiveness in the Indian Ocean, but, importantly, on the ways in which India’s growing push through the Indian Ocean toward the South China Sea brought it into increasing competition with China’s push from the South China Sea toward the Indian Ocean. This expansion of Indian maritime ambition brought China and India into competition for the same partners in Southeast Asia. Liu Lei and Yu Tingting argued that the Modi administration’s mounting concerns with India’s maritime security were rooted in India’s dependence on shipping for its continued economic growth. As a result, India had pursued greater maritime cooperation with many Southeast Asian states by expanding its presence and influence in the region through its navy and by emphasizing the establishment of high-level maritime security cooperation mechanisms. Southeast Asian states were receptive to these Indian overtures, partly because of the compatibility of their economic interests (many of these countries had the natural resources and energy supplies that India sought) and their shared Buddhist or Hindu traditions, but also because of their shared perception of a “China threat.” Ultimately, Lin and Yu were nervous about the impact of Indian–Southeast Asian cooperation on Chinese interests. They saw Indian involvement in Southeast Asian affairs as a “warning shot” to China: if China intervened in South Asia, traditionally India’s “backyard,” then India could respond through its relations with Southeast Asia, traditionally China’s “neighborhood.” Nevertheless, they felt that China should not be overly alarmed given the many challenges limiting deeper cooperation between India and Southeast Asia.⁶⁷

Shao Jianping highlighted many of the same themes, with a particular focus on the deepening maritime cooperation between India and Vietnam. Shao argued that India was seeking closer relations with ASEAN countries and to create an image of India as a “security provider” because it wanted to limit the expansion of Chinese power and influence in the Indian Ocean. Given Vietnam’s regional political position and its longstanding tensions with China over territorial and maritime claims, Shao reasoned, Vietnam had gradually become a key target of India’s “Act East” policy as India sought to take advantage of a perceived opportunity to expand its maritime policy in the South China Sea and develop the so-called “necklace of diamonds.” By pursuing closer ties with countries like Vietnam, India sought to prevent China from dominating the South China Sea and using this dominance as a springboard for greater influence in the Indian Ocean, where India hoped to maintain its own exclusive dominance.⁶⁸ The June 2019 release of the “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific” underscored ASEAN’s acceptance of the notion of an “Indo-Pacific” region, but also its interest in defining the nature of relations within such a region.⁶⁹

This focus on India’s push toward Southeast Asia further raised the salience of the South China Sea in Chinese analysis of Indian policy. Liu Lei and Yu Tingting argued that many Southeast Asian states were receptive to Indian overtures because of their territorial or maritime disputes with China in the South China Sea. They feared that India was using these countries as pawns in its attempt to balance against China and cautioned that this Indian strategy would make the resolution of these disputes more complex.⁷⁰ Shao Jianping asserted that South China Sea concerns had become an important part of Modi’s “Act East” policy, but charged that India’s lofty rhetoric about protecting freedom of navigation and respect for international law masked its true regional geopolitical objectives. Although India’s position on the South China Sea was increasingly in line with those of the United States, Australia, and Japan, and undergirded its closer maritime cooperation with Vietnam, Shao argued that India’s primary strategic interest lay in the Indian Ocean, not the South China Sea. Consequently, while Indian interference in the South China Sea might complicate Chinese foreign policy, Shao concluded that India had no strategic interest in the eruption of a conflict with China in the South China Sea.⁷¹

A second key theme was the nature of bilateral China–India relations in the context of the greater institutionalization of the Quad and India’s own domestic political environment. Assessing the two countries’ efforts to “restart” their bilateral relationship in the aftermath of the 2017 Doklam crisis, Lin Minwang was optimistic about the short-term prospects, but more cautious about the long-term. On the positive side, Lin claimed, the April 2018 Wuhan summit had successfully redirected bilateral relations by emphasizing mutual understanding over concrete results, which created the conditions necessary for a restart by fostering a constructive relationship between the two countries’ leaders, advancing mutual trust, and enabling the two countries to envision how to link their respective development plans. Chinese and Indian officials continued to meet regularly, and the two countries had restarted several working-level cooperation mechanisms. In Lin’s view, these efforts, further supported by increased military exchanges and cooperation on internal security and anti-terrorism efforts, were gradually easing mistrust among government officials.⁷² In this sense, bilateral relations were significantly improved from the nadir of 2017.

Yet the prospects for long-term relations remained more uncertain. Lin Minwang cautioned that a fundamental weakness in the two countries’ mutual trust persisted and that the two countries lacked shared strategic interests. Even more glaringly, the two countries were competing for influence at the regional level. Lin urged Chinese policymakers to remember that India was also a rapidly rising great power, albeit a less powerful one than China. China’s expanding economic and political influence in South Asia and its military presence and infrastructure projects in the Indian Ocean were arousing Indian alarm.⁷³ Moreover, the two countries’ respective relationships with Pakistan remained an ongoing challenge for their bilateral relationship. Wang Shida argued that Indian observers were keenly aware of the close relationship between China and Pakistan, which they saw as harming Indian national interests. They worried, for example, that the development of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor would spur rapid economic development in Pakistan and were nervous that China was encouraging closer relations between Pakistan and Russia. These concerns limited India’s appetite for closer relations with China.⁷⁴ Furthermore, Lin argued, a quiet competition was emerging as China and India both sought to shape the post-American world order.⁷⁵ These trends were pushing China and India into a more competitive position.

Consequently, Chinese analysts believed that India was becoming more receptive to the US Indo-Pacific Strategy championed by the Trump administration. Wang Shida argued that greater cooperation between the United States, Japan, and India, as well as greater US investment in the Indo-Pacific, weakened Indian support for the trilateral India–China–Russia mechanism, although he also believed this mechanism would persist. Closer coordination with the United States would allow India to better counter China’s rise.⁷⁶ Likewise, Chen Jimin contended that US support for India decreased India’s incentive to participate in the BRI, which, in turn, threatened the construction of the Bangladesh–China–India–Myanmar Corridor.⁷⁷ Nevertheless, Chinese analysts disagreed about whether India was “tilting to one side.” Some analysts argued that India would continue to balance between China, on the one hand, and the United States and Japan, on the other.⁷⁸

As in prior years, the implications of China–India relations for the successful implementation of the BRI was a persistent theme in Chinese analysis. Chinese observers recognized that Indian alarm over the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road was a significant driver of India’s participation in the Quad and its outreach to neighbors in South Asia and Southeast Asia. For example, Liu Lin and Yu Tingting noted that concerns about the BRI, along with concerns about the new Djibouti base, the Gwadar port, and the 99-year lease of the Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka, were a key factor motivating closer cooperation between India and Southeast Asian states.⁷⁹ Likewise, Lin Minwang argued that China’s pursuit of BRI projects in countries such as Nepal, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka had caused India to worry that the smaller countries of South Asia would tilt away from India and toward China, giving China increasing influence over regional affairs in a region India had long considered to be within its sphere of influence. Consequently, Lin asserted, India had tried to persuade small countries in South Asia not to participate in the BRI and had attempted to create alternative regional mechanisms.⁸⁰ Chinese analysts worried that Indian success in limiting China’s influence in the Indian Ocean would hamper China’s ability to implement the BRI.⁸¹

Analysts split on their view of India’s willingness to participate in the BRI. Writing in late 2019, Lin Minwang struck an optimistic note, pointing to the two countries’ strengthened cooperation on regional and economic affairs as evidence that India’s attitude toward the BRI has changed in practice, even if the official position remained the same. Lin argued that Chinese officials recognized that, given political concerns, India could not directly support the BRI, and had consequently focused on achieving concrete results, rather than pushing for explicit statements of support.⁸² Chen Jimin was less optimistic, writing in early 2019 that US support had decreased India’s incentive to participate in the BRI, a position that was further supported by the announcement of the “Blue Dot Network” later that year.⁸³ Given the centrality of the BRI to China’s regional policy, China was eager for India to join and wary of its efforts to counter the BRI through closer cooperation with the members of the Quad.

2020

Despite the emergence of the novel coronavirus, 2020 began with the usual sorts of diplomatic visits and meetings. From January 7–10, an official Indian Army delegation visited China.⁸⁴ A few days later, India hosted the fifth Raisana Dialogue, at which Jaishankar laid out a vision for the “India way.” In his vision, India would “bring its capacities to bear on the international system for the global good,” act as a “decider or a shaper rather than an abstainer,” serve as a “just power” that represented the Global South, and shape global discourse and culture through “Brand India.” Speaking specifically about China, Jaishankar argued that it was essential for the two countries to figure out how to get along. He noted that it was highly unusual for two neighboring countries to have “gone up in the international order” nearly simultaneously and that both China and India needed to figure out how to understand their relationship with each other and with the world.⁸⁵

India’s diplomatic exchanges with foreign officials reflected its continuing engagement in South Asia and beyond. In February 2020, Jaishankar met with a Bangladeshi envoy ahead of a planned March visit by Modi (later scrapped due to the pandemic).⁸⁶ That same month, Modi met with Sri Lankan Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa in New Delhi.⁸⁷ Meanwhile, India co-hosted the fourth East Asian Maritime Security Conference, along with Australia and Indonesia, an event it had held since 2015.⁸⁸ Rounding out a busy month, Trump made a late February visit to India, where he and Modi issued a joint statement entitled “Vision and Principles for the United States–India Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership.” The statement affirmed their commitment to “deepen defense and security cooperation” and the US belief that “a strong and capable Indian military supports peace, stability, and a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific.” The statement also restated the two countries’ commitment to various strategic consultation mechanisms, include the Quad.⁸⁹ Although the two countries were not able to announce a trade deal, the establishment of a new US International Development Finance Corporation office in India indicated US support for regional infrastructure projects and its efforts to provide an alternative to the BRI.⁹⁰

Nevertheless, the specter of Covid-19 was looming. On January 30, India had reported its first case.⁹¹ On March 20, India participated in a “Quad plus” call, including the four Quad countries and New Zealand, South Korea, and Vietnam, to discuss the Covid-19 response.⁹² Four days later, India entered a lockdown; it did not begin to gradually open up until June 1.⁹³ On May 11, India participated in what some observers portrayed as another “Quad-plus” videoconference on the Covid-19 response, this time including the four Quad countries in addition to Brazil, Israel, and South Korea.⁹⁴

Yet as much of the world was distracted by the massive upheavals of the early Covid-19 pandemic, skirmishes erupted between India and China in the Ladakh region beginning in early May in response to India’s decision to eliminate the semi-autonomous status of Jammu and Kashmir in 2019 and to build up its roads along the border as China had already done. As the two countries rushed thousands of troops to the border, brawls in mid-June resulted in the deaths of 20 Indian soldiers and four Chinese soldiers, the first fatalities since 1975. Although the two sides began to draw down troops over the summer, shots were fired along the border for the first time in decades that September. Chinese and Indian officials continued to talk: in September, the two countries’ defense ministers met on the sidelines of the SCO meeting in Moscow, followed shortly by a meeting between the foreign ministers. Later that month, the two countries held a meeting of the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India–China Border Affairs.⁹⁵ Ultimately, however, the crisis lasted into January 2021 and halted any progress toward rebuilding the bilateral relationship after the 2017 Doklam dispute.⁹⁶

As India’s relationship with China deteriorated rapidly, India continued to strengthen its relationships with members of the Quad. On June 4, 2020, India and Australia upgraded their relationship to a “comprehensive strategic partnership” and elevated their 2+2 talks to the ministerial level.⁹⁷ The United States and India held a joint naval exercise in the Indian Ocean in July and their strategic partnership forum in late August.⁹⁸ On September 25, senior officials held a virtual Quad meeting ahead of the second ministerial-level meeting on October 6 in Tokyo.⁹⁹ In November, Australia rejoined the Malabar naval exercise, marking the first time all four Quad members had participated since 2007.¹⁰⁰ Senior officials held another virtual Quad meeting on December 18. The frequency of the Quad meetings—and the decision to regularize meetings at the foreign minister level—marked a significant institutionalization of the Quad framework.¹⁰¹

As in previous years, Chinese analysis of India in 2020 focused significantly on the BRI. Chinese observers agreed that despite the existence of some positive voices in India, particularly within business and trade-oriented circles, the negative perspectives of those within strategic circles dominated among Indian policymakers.¹⁰² Chinese analysts argued that India’s skepticism toward the BRI was fundamentally driven by a lack of mutual trust between China and India, with India viewing China as a competitor and convinced that China’s motivations for the BRI were dominance of the Indian Ocean region and the supplanting of India’s influence in its own traditional neighborhood, rather than the shared regional prosperity China claimed to pursue.

Moreover, they saw Indian policymakers as afraid that, given China’s greater comprehensive strength, linking India’s “Act East” policy with the BRI would undermine India’s “Great Power dream” and pursuit of regional dominance.¹⁰³ Guo Bingyun and Zhuo Xuchun, for example, argued that India’s avoidance of the BRI was driven by its “weak country mentality.”¹⁰⁴ Others pointed out that aspects of the BRI touched on fundamental questions of Indian sovereignty. Zhang Li, for example, noted that India strongly opposed the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor because it would pass through Pakistan-controlled Kashmir.¹⁰⁵ Due to these concerns, India’s response to China’s efforts to coordinate the two countries’ development initiatives was inconsistent, focused only on functional cooperation, and prone to balancing and hedging.¹⁰⁶ Wu Lin contended that India was using the US implementation of its Indo-Pacific strategy as an opportunity to push back against the BRI and improve relations with smaller regional states, for example, through high-level visits and the promotion of the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) as an alternative to the BRI.¹⁰⁷ Wang Rui and Shi Yuangang criticized India’s disinterest in coordinating the two countries’ development strategies for neglecting “long-term considerations,” seeming not to consider that, in contrast to the Chinese position, Indian policymakers might have concluded that coordinating the policies was not, in fact, in their strategic interests.¹⁰⁸

While Chinese observers continued to note that India’s lack of support hampered Chinese efforts to implement the BRI, Zhang Li argued that the implementation of the BRI had worsened the China–India security dilemma.¹⁰⁹ Zhang idealistically proposed that China and India should build a “community of common destiny” modeled on the European Union (EU) and ASEAN, marrying official Chinese policy language with the constructivist notion of a security community.¹¹⁰ (Ironically, while Wang Rui and Shi Yuangang criticized India’s approach to linking Chinese and Indian development strategies for focusing only on functional cooperation, neofunctionalist arguments would argue that such cooperation might have positive spillover effects and result in greater regional integration, as occurred in the evolution of the European Coal and Steel Community into the EU.)¹¹¹ Zhang asserted that the two countries’ shared identities—both were ancient civilizations, which had been oppressed by colonial powers, and were now developing societies and rising economies—and shared interests made the development of a community of common destiny feasible. The sharp deterioration in China–India relations after the border clashes of May 2020 clearly made Zhang’s proposal, unusually optimistic even as he wrote it, unrealistic.

The US Indo-Pacific strategy continued to loom large in China’s perceptions of India. Chen Jimin and Feng Zhennan argued that the strategy, driven by US efforts to remain on the “strategic offense” while undergoing “tactical contractions” necessitated by declining US hegemony, had moved through three stages: proposal, in 2017; clarification, in 2018; and implementation, beginning in 2019. They urged Chinese policymakers to invest in regional relations with India, as well as with Japan and ASEAN, to undercut US efforts to unify these actors against China. To this end, they viewed the BRI as part of a global response to US strategy, rather than a regional effort.¹¹² Nevertheless, even as Chinese analysts saw India as embracing an Indo-Pacific, they noted that the Indian conception of the “Indo-Pacific” was not identical to that of the United States. Wu Lin argued that Indian officials were promoting a more expansive geographical understanding of the Indo-Pacific, encompassing the entire Indian Ocean and including West Asia, than were US officials.¹¹³ India’s interest and influence in defining the “Indo-Pacific” demonstrated how important this concept had become to it.

Against this backdrop, Chinese analysts continued to debate whether India was maintaining its traditional non-alignment or tilting toward the United States. Zhang Li expressed concern that India might be fundamentally altering its traditional policy of non-alignment and forming an alliance with the United States to manage the perceived threat from China.¹¹⁴ Wu Lin took a more moderate position. On the one hand, Wu argued that Jaishankar’s April 2019 speech indicated a shift away from the Singh administration’s “Non-Alignment 2.0” strategy, under which India balanced between China and the United States.¹¹⁵ However, Wu also argued that India’s efforts to maintain “strategic independence” would prevent it from completely aligning with the United States.¹¹⁶ Meanwhile, Wang Rui and Shi Yuangang contended that India would continue to pursue “non-alignment” and refrain from picking sides between China and the United States.¹¹⁷ Since India was the weakest link in the Quad, the extent of India’s willingness to draw close to the United States was of perennial interest to Chinese observers.

Key Takeaways

China–India relations underwent significant changes between 2017–2020. Despite high-level efforts to salvage the bilateral relationship after the 2017 Doklam crisis, the eruption of border skirmishes in 2020 undid any progress. Meanwhile, India moved closer to the United States and, despite its initial hesitation, became increasingly supportive of the Quad. These shifts were driven by Indian concerns about China, both because of longstanding issues such as the border disputes, and by newer fears that China was intruding on India’s traditional sphere of influence. As two large and rapidly developing neighboring states, China and India were increasingly jostling against each other, with China continuously more interested in expanding its influence beyond the Pacific and India reaching outside South Asia to build stronger relations with the three most powerful Pacific democracies.

During these busy years, Chinese analysts assessed the spread of the “Indo-Pacific” concept and India’s growing support for the Quad. They questioned whether India would stand by its traditional policy of non-alignment or whether its fears of China would ultimately push it closer to the United States. Strong proponents of China’s BRI, which they portrayed (following the official line) as an outgrowth of China’s desire for a peaceful and prosperous region, they worried that India’s unwillingness to join the BRI or link the BRI with its own “Act East” policy would undermine China’s ability to implement its 21st Century Maritime Silk Road and other BRI projects. Chinese observers warily eyed India’s increased assertiveness in the Indian Ocean and beyond under Modi’s leadership. Ultimately, they worried that India’s pursuit of its “Great Power dream” would bring it into increasing competition with China.