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In early 2024, Chinese analysts assessed India’s efforts to assert greater influence in the Global South. One article evaluated India’s attempts to replace China as the leader of the Global South but argued that India ultimately lacks the influence and the strength to attain this position. Other authors focused on the development of India’s development assistance strategy to four countries in Southeast Asia—Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam—under the Modi administration, in comparison to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Turning to the BRI, another analyst explored the domestic factors that determine whether infrastructure projects can be completed smoothly, focusing on Chinese experiences in Cambodia and Myanmar. NATO Asia-Pacificization was another theme. One article argued that the eruption of the Russia–Ukraine conflict was a key turning point that reshaped the policy preferences of the United States’ European and Asia-Pacific allies, leading to more cooperation between NATO and the Asia Pacific Four. Other analysts focused on NATO’s ties with South Korea, pointing to the inauguration of Yoon Suk Yeol as a more critical event in strengthening their relationship. Finally, Chinese analysts took stock of the development of the ASEAN Community in 2023 and evaluated its prospects for 2024, arguing that ASEAN would continue to resist US efforts to persuade it to choose between the United States and China.
India’s Relations with the Global South
In Guoji Wenti Yanjiu, 2024, no. 1, Zhang Jie argues that India is positioning itself as the leader of the “Global South” to advance its political and economic objectives. India believes that advocating on behalf of the Global South can promote a more inclusive form of multilateralism and advance Indian economic development policies such as “Made in India” and “Digital India” by promoting Indian soft power. India’s desire to act as the spokesperson for the Global South builds on its historical role as the leader of the non-aligned movement. Furthermore, by acting as a bridge between the Global South and the Global North, India can both maintain its strategic autonomy and build productive relations with the developed countries of the West that will create a global environment conducive to India’s own development—a sharp distinction from the “anti-Western, anti-capitalist, and anti-globalization tendencies of the Non-Aligned Movement.”
Zhang argues that India’s Global South policy advances several specific strategic objectives. This policy supports Indian efforts to amplify its voice in matters of global governance and reform multilateral mechanisms. It also helps India to maintain strategic autonomy; Zhang argues that India fell back on its Cold War experiences with non-alignment to avoid picking sides between Russia and the United States/West in the wake of the outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine conflict. Crucially, Zhang contends, India seeks to limit China’s influence in the Global South by defining China as a “participant in great power competition” rather than a member of the Global South. In doing so, India seeks to replace China as the leader of the Global South. While Indian leaders do not always name China in public, they argue that infrastructure projects in the Global South should not become debt traps and should respect sovereignty and territorial integrity—a clear criticism of the BRI. While maintaining its strategy autonomy, India seeks closer relations with the United States, which can help India limit China’s global influence.
To improve its relationship with the Global South, India has strengthened biliteral and multilateral cooperation by hosting international conferences, such as the virtual Voice of the Global South Summit, which launched in January 2023. India has focused on countries in the Pacific, Africa, and Latin America. India has increased developmental assistance to countries in the Global South (particularly in Africa and Latin America) and is exporting digital infrastructure, which binds recipient countries more closely to India. India has also increased its defense cooperation with countries in the Global South, which advances India’s security interests and promotes India’s desire to become a “security provider” in the Western Indian Ocean. The use of Indian soft power to gain cultural influence reinforces these economic and military outreach efforts.
Despite Indian ambitions, Zhang contends, India’s Global South policy faces significant constraints. Most countries in the Global South do not want to be forced to choose between China and India and do not want to be used as a tool of India’s great power diplomacy. Furthermore, India’s close relations with the United States and the West have bred some distrust among Global South countries that are much more skeptical. Importantly, Zhang argues, India’s ability to catapult itself to greater international influence will depend on its ability to maintain the support of the Global South, raising questions about whether India can achieve its global political ambitions. Furthermore, Zhang charges, India has taken an opportunistic, “India first” approach, which has undermined its efforts to portray itself as a leader of the Global South. For example, India’s decision to ban the export of non-basmati rice to maintain lower domestic food pricing in July 2023 pushed up global rice prices. Finally, Zhang argues, India lacks the capacity to implement its ambitious policies. India cannot fund development in the Global South (the implicit comparison here is to China’s BRI). Moreover, Zhang contends, countries in the Global South will see through India’s strategy and reject its efforts to lead the Global South.
Zhang concludes that India’s Global South strategy will fail because most Global South countries will be unwilling to choose between China, the United States, and India. India’s efforts to push Global South countries to choose between India and China may undermine the unity of the Global South. Instead, Zhang reaffirms China as a member of the Global South that opposes the use of the Global South as a pawn in a geopolitical competition and, falling back on a major Chinese foreign policy slogan, promises that China will cooperate with countries in the Global South to create a community with a shared future for mankind. Consequently, Zhang’s piece serves to undermine India’s claims to leadership within the Global South and reassert China’s role as its legitimate leader.
India’s Relations with the Indochinese Peninsula
In Dongnanya Yanjiu, 2024, no. 1, Wang Qiubin and Guo Zhengyang assess the motivations for India’s development assistance strategy toward four countries on the Indochinese Peninsula—Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam—and how this strategy has changed under Modi. By becoming an aid donor, India seeks to increase its influence in the Global South and advance its quest to develop into a global power. While most Indian aid goes to countries in South Asia and the Indian Ocean, India’s geostrategic interests in strong relations with Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam have made them an important destination for Indian development assistance.
During the early years of the twenty-first century, India’s aid to the region took four main forms. Indian infrastructure construction assistance focused on transportation projects (largely in Myanmar), as well as water conservation and hydropower projects and industrial and agricultural production in various countries. Capacity building focused on developing technical experience and human resources by providing scholarships for students to study in India, constructing training centers in the region, and encouraging exchanges between science and technology researchers. Military support focused on defense training courses on topics such as mine clearing, English, and submarine operations. Cultural heritage restoration funding was relatively small and focused on preserving historic Hindu and Buddhist sites.
After Modi came to power in 2014, India’s development aid strategy shifted to align with Modi’s “neighborhood first” and “Act East” policies. With the notable exception of projects in Myanmar, Indian-funded construction has shifted from expensive, large-scale, multi-year projects to rapid and inexpensive “quick impact” projects that could rapidly benefit local residents. Capacity building efforts now emphasize bringing students to India where they can gain expertise while developing an understanding of India and friendly feelings toward the country. Military aid toward Vietnam has increased and expanded beyond defense training; it now includes the construction of military facilities (such as a satellite imaging and tracking station in Hanoi that Wang and Guo pointedly note can track the Chinese navy) and provision of military equipment, such as patrol boats and anti-submarine warships. With the rise of Hindu nationalism under Modi, cultural heritage restoration projects focus more specifically on those of Hindu significance.
The Modi administration’s motivations for these adjustments, Wang and Guo contend, arise from both domestic and global factors. Although India was the first major power to establish a cooperation mechanism in the region, its efforts have since been overshadowed by the much larger development assistance provided by Japan, the United States, and China (the latter through the BRI). India is the world’s fifth largest economy, but it is far less wealthy than these three countries and faces significant economic constraints, particularly considering its increased spending on domestic infrastructure and growing defense budget. Consequently, the Modi administration tries to “spend less and do more.”
Similarly, a mix of domestic and global political factors motivate India’s continued focus on large infrastructure projects in Myanmar, which borders India’s less developed northeast: this aid promotes the economic development and security of the border region and, by increasing Indian influence in Myanmar, counters Chinese influence. Wang and Guo note that the scale of India’s military aid to Vietnam is “a bit incredible,” but argue that India is motivated by geostrategic motivations. India feels that the BRI is threatening its regional dominance and feels unsettled by recurring Sino–Indian border confrontations. Therefore, India feels that by supporting Vietnam’s position in the South China Sea, it can use Vietnam against China. This emphasis on India’s use of development assistance to Vietnam to contain China—and Vietnam’s eagerness to use India to balance China—partly contrasts with the view of Zhang Jie, who emphasizes how Indian aid to the Global South more broadly is an attempt to create strategic autonomy that will ultimately prove ineffective because recipient countries will see through India’s motivations. A final motivation for the Modi administration’s development aid policy arises from its emphasis on Hindu nationalism and its desire to increase Indian soft power. By creating a global image of India as a powerful, culturally superior civilization, Modi believes that India can increase its global influence.
Wang and Guo criticize India’s development aid strategy, which they view as instrumentalist, egotistical, and overly focused on strategic competition. Holding up China’s development aid approach as a model, they argue that India should instead cooperate with China and other donors to create win-win results. Although their analysis acknowledges that the BRI has increased India’s sense of vulnerability and motivated the evolution of India’s development aid strategy, they (unsurprisingly) engage in no analysis of whether India’s fears are legitimate or how China’s development aid strategy might change to promote greater regional stability.
The Belt and Road Initiative in Cambodia and Myanmar
In Dongnanya Xuekan, 2024, no. 1, Liu Yuxiang explores the domestic factors that impact the success of BRI infrastructure projects, using Cambodia and Myanmar as case studies. Liu argues that the successful completion of BRI projects depends on a state’s “compliance capacity”: whether state leaders can make other elites and the broader public abide by their decision to participate in a BRI project. Compliance capacity is determined by two key variables. Elite cohesion measures whether the ruling elite can make other elites, such as the business elite and the opposition, comply with their decisions. Social mobilization encompasses the state’s ability to make the public comply with their decisions and can be measured by the state’s bureaucratic reach into rural areas and its control of civic organizations like non-governmental organizations. Liu hypothesizes that smooth implementation of BRI projects occurs only when a state has a high level of elite cohesion and strong social mobilization. By contrast, when a state has a high level of elite cohesion but cannot mobilize public support, the state must bring along the public through compensation, persuasion, or pressure (even coercion). Finally, if elites do not agree on a project, it will not move forward smoothly regardless of the level of social mobilization.
Turning to specific case studies, Liu argues that Cambodia is characterized by high elite cohesion and high social mobilization, and points to the construction of the Lower Sesan II Hydropower Station as an example of the smooth construction of a BRI project. Construction began in 2014 and the dam became operational in 2018. Although Liu intends this project to be an example of a situation in which both elite cohesion and social mobilization are strong, Liu’s description of the measures the Cambodian government took to push through the dam despite local opposition undermines this analysis. By Liu’s own account, the government overcame objections by environmental NGOs, local residents, and indigenous groups by enforcing a new Law on Associations and Non-governmental Organizations, which imposed strict government oversight, and dispatching police to prevent protests. Consequently, this dam project is less an example of social mobilization than of tight state control over civil society.
As an example of a project whose progress was challenging but which was ultimately successful, Liu points to the frequently interrupted Sino–Myanmar pipeline project, which was built during the 2010s. Under military rule, Myanmar had a high degree of elite cohesion but low levels of social mobilization. Opposition to the pipeline arose from NGOs, the media, and armed ethnic minority forces. The Myanmar government ultimately overcame this opposition through coercive measures: it dispatched its military and police to oversee security at the construction site, established a local militia, and even mined areas near pumping stations to prevent attacks. By contrast, under the National League for Democracy, military elites and pro-democracy elites competed for influence and there was no elite cohesion. Myanmar continued to lack social mobilization capacity. Consequently, the construction of the Kyaukphyu deep-sea port stagnated for many years (in late 2023, after this article was written, Myanmar’s military government approved the resumption of this project).
Liu concludes that this analysis holds important implications for China’s choice of partners when pursuing BRI projects. China must carefully examine the domestic political structure of potential host countries. If the ruling elite is stable, then China should cooperate with that ruling elite; if the ruling elite is not stable, then China should work with other important political actors. Furthermore, in countries with strong social mobilization capabilities, China should ensure that local residents experience the benefits of infrastructure projects; in countries with weak social mobilization capabilities, China should take steps to increase the support of local residents, for example, by employing locals in construction roles, including locals in decision-making processes, and distributing public goods via local elites to ensure a positive image for China.
Liu argues that Cambodia and Myanmar are countries in which the influence of external factors is limited, enabling a focus on the impact of domestic political structures. Liu asserts that both countries have better relations with China than with the United States and Japan and both have chosen to “follow” China and support the BRI. Even if this analysis is true, however, it raises questions about how well Liu’s analysis travels to other countries where external factors are more significant. How influential are domestic political structures in countries in which the leadership is attempting to balance between China and the United States? How influential are domestic political structures in countries in which the elites lack cohesion because of competing motivations—for example, economic motivations that encourage business elites to support BRI projects and security motivations that encourage political elites to view BRI projects more skeptically. Ultimately, these factors may limit the applicability of Liu’s analysis to other countries and therefore limit its utility in helping Chinese leaders to assess the likely success of many proposed BRI projects.
NATO “Asia-Pacificization”
In Eluosi Dongou Zhongya Yanjiu, 2024, no. 2, Xiao He uses alliance theory to build a rationalist argument for why more rapid Asia-Pacificization has accompanied the Russia–Ukraine conflict. Xiao points to NATO’s July 2023 Vilnius Summit Communiqué, which asserted that China’s “stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests, security and values” and NATO’s increasing engagement with the “Asia-Pacific Four” (South Korea, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand) as evidence of NATO’s Asia-Pacificization. Xiao posits that this brisk deepening of NATO’s Asia-Pacificization poses a puzzle: why would NATO risk its relationship with China by expanding alliance relations with countries in the Asia-Pacific at a time that it was also fending off a threat from Russia?
In contrast to other analysts, who argue that NATO Asia-Pacificization is irrational or driven by domestic factors, Xiao argues that Asia-Pacificization is a rational and deliberate choice that reflects the preferences of the United States, European members of NATO, and countries in the Asia-Pacific that are informal members of the expanding alliance. After the Cold War, Xiao asserts, three objectives drove the United States’ global alliance strategy: deterring potential rivals like China and Russia; legitimizing US foreign policy; and gaining support for the US-led unipolar system. Facing China’s rise, the United States aimed to increase its Asia-Pacific allies’ autonomy in exchange for greater burden-sharing. In Europe, the United States supported NATO’s eastward expansion to better deter Russia, limit the strategic autonomy of its European allies, and promote US foreign policy outside Europe. US efforts to both gain more security from its European allies and limit their autonomy proved challenging. Ultimately, the United States sought to use its alliances to strengthen its position vis-à-vis China.
The outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine conflict in February 2022, Xiao contends, strengthened the incentives of both Asia-Pacific and European countries to participate in the Asia-Pacificization of NATO. The conflict reduced the costs to the Asia-Pacific Four of participation in NATO. With Russia bogged down in Ukraine, Russia had less capacity to retaliate against Asia-Pacific countries for participating in NATO. Furthermore, with Russia becoming increasingly dependent on China, it no longer made sense to pursue a differentiated policy toward the two countries because Russia seemed most likely to simply follow Chinese preferences. Meanwhile, the benefits of participation in NATO seemed to increase. Though NATO members were unlikely to support Asia-Pacific countries militarily, their economic and political support might prove useful in a “new cold war” (or even a hot conflict) with China. Drawing attention to the Russia–Ukraine crisis could also legitimize domestic policies; Kishida’s statement that “Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow” mobilized support for Japan’s boundary-pushing national security policy.
Likewise, Xiao asserts, the Russia–Ukraine conflict altered European countries’ cost-benefit analysis of Asia-Pacificization, shifting their judgment from “not worth the cost” to “worth a try.” In the years prior to the outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine conflict, European countries were not as opposed to China as their words (chosen to appease the United States) might indicate and were actively seeking greater economic interdependence. At the same time, some Western European countries, particularly Germany and France, were pursuing closer relations with Russia. The outbreak of conflict in February 2022 changed these assessments of Russia and China, and, consequently, European views of NATO Asia-Pacificization. Facing a serious threat from Russia, European countries felt they must trade their autonomy for greater security, making them more receptive to what Xiao characterizes as a US push for NATO Asia-Pacificization. European countries even became more dependent for their security on Asia-Pacific countries themselves; in 2023, South Korea indirectly provided 300,000 shells to Ukraine, in addition to significant non-lethal aid. In addition, China became inextricably linked to the Russia threat because China’s diplomatic and economic support of Russia helps Russia tolerate Western sanctions. Consequently, weakening Chinese support for Russia—for example, by pressuring China through support for NATO Asia-Pacificization—came to look like a better strategy. Furthermore, European countries became increasingly concerned that a Taiwan crisis could distract the United States and shift US resources away from Europe. By deterring a Taiwan crisis, NATO Asia-Pacificization can promote European countries’ interest in keeping US attention and resources focused on Europe and the Russia threat.
Taking a longer-term view, Xiao asserts that the Russia–Ukraine conflict created an opportunity for the United States to overcome some of the tensions in its alliance strategy by shifting the preferences of Asia-Pacific and European allies to better align with US preferences regarding NATO Asia-Pacificization. After the outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine conflict, the United States shifted away from attempts to play off Russia against China by pursuing compromise with Russia and instead began to focus on weakening Russia to contain China. Somewhat counterintuitively, Xiao argues that by promoting closer relations between China and Russia rather than taking a “divide and conquer” approach, the United States can better achieve its security objectives: because European countries view Russia as a threat, the closer China is to Russia, the more European countries will see China as a potential threat as well. Moreover, by using the prospect of NATO Asia-Pacificiziation to provoke China, the United States can prompt harsher Chinese criticism of NATO, which will further increase European NATO members’ perception of a Chinese threat.
Xiao concludes that the Russia–Ukraine conflict has been critical in both deepening the participation of the Asia-Pacific Four in NATO and increasing tensions between the Asia-Pacific Four and Russia and between the United States’ European allies and China. More significant than the conflict’s impact on NATO Asia-Pacificization, however, Xiao argues that US strategy has shifted from a question of whether to focus on Russia or China to a unified alliance strategy that contains both Russia and China. US efforts to unify its allies against China create a worsening environment for Chinese development and require high-level Chinese attention.
NATO’s Relations with South Korea
In Dongbeiya Xuekan, 2024, no. 2, Ma Jianying and Zhao Minyao evaluate the deepening of the NATO–South Korea relationship since then-South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon first spoke at NATO in 2005. In 2008, NATO and South Korea established regular director-level meetings, which led to the institutionalization of their security cooperation. South Korea and NATO agreed on an Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme (IPCP) in 2012, which accelerated the development of their relationship. Soon after the eruption of the Russia–Ukraine conflict, South Korea’s foreign minister first attended the NATO foreign ministers’ meeting. However, while Xiao He pinpoints the February 2022 outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine conflict as a critical juncture that reshaped the incentives of countries in the Asia-Pacific and Europe regarding the Asia-Pacificization of NATO, Ma and Zhao place more emphasis on the May 2022 inauguration of South Korean president Yoon Suk Yeol as a key development in the gradual evolution of the relationship.
Yoon was the first Korean president to be invited to a NATO summit, and, reflecting the importance he places on NATO, chose the June 2022 NATO summit in Madrid as the destination for his first foreign visit. Under Yoon, Ma and Zhao argue, NATO–South Korea security cooperation has deepened and expanded, extending to cybersecurity, the issuance of mutually accepted military aircraft airworthiness certificates, security dialogues regarding North Korea, cooperation in emerging technologies like artificial intelligence and aerospace, and economic security. At the same time, the two parties have constructed more robust security cooperation mechanisms, upgrading their negotiations from the ministerial level to heads of state. In 2022, South Korea established a Diplomatic Mission to NATO. In 2023, NATO and South Korea agreed on an Individually Tailored Partnership Plan, an upgrade over the 2012 IPCP, which deepened cooperation in 11 areas. South Korea also increased military intelligence sharing with NATO by joining NATO’s Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation System. In addition, South Korea has expanded its security cooperation with individual NATO members, such as the UK, France, and Germany. Since the outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine conflict, South Korea has become an important exporter of military weapons and equipment. Ma and Zhao assert that these exports serve three goals: they indirectly support Ukraine, promote the interests of South Korea’s domestic arms industry, and build warmer security relations with NATO members.
Ma and Zhao contend that South Korea’s motivations for seeking closer ties to NATO arise from both geopolitical and strategic factors. In the context of global geopolitical competition, Yoon has “picked sides” by aligning South Korea with the West. Yoon believes that closer ties with NATO will support his efforts to turn South Korea into a “global pivotal country.” Furthermore, by supporting US strategic priorities, South Korea can balance China. The Yoon administration also sees a stronger relationship with NATO as helpful for gaining international support regarding the North Korean nuclear issue. Meanwhile, NATO sees a stronger partnership with South Korea as a way to achieve its goal of “global NATO.” South Korea’s geographic position, its democratic values, and its strong semiconductor industry make it a valuable partner. Cooperation with South Korea promotes NATO’s broader goal of Asia-Pacificization, which Ma and Zhao sharply criticize as an effort to meddle in the Asia-Pacific and amplify great power conflict. Not surprisingly, they charge that NATO seeks to contain China and uphold US hegemony. In addition, they identify the Russia–Ukraine conflict as an important turning point demarking the end of the post-cold war era, which motivated NATO to link pan-Atlantic and pan-Pacific security.
Ma and Zhao lament what they see as the uniformly negative effects of closer NATO–South Korea relations. They argue that this relationship supports NATO Asia-Pacificization, which they lambast as a US effort to introduce its European allies to the Asia-Pacific and bring its Asia-Pacific allies to Europe, enabling the United States to engage in the “double suppression” of China and Russia by hemming in Eurasia from both sides. They also blame Yoon’s cooperation with NATO for a North Korean backlash that has worsened tensions on the peninsula. They contend that closer NATO–South Korea relations create a worsening security environment for China by supporting US efforts to build a NATO-like arrangement in the Asia-Pacific and various US mini-lateral initiatives. They also charge that Yoon’s “values-based” approach to foreign policy, which underlies his outreach to NATO, pulls it closer to Europe and damages bilateral South Korea–China relations.
Ma and Zhao urge Chinese policymakers to mitigate these negative effects by closely monitoring the relations between the Asia Pacific Four and NATO and resisting the development of Cold War-style camps. They encourage China to build a better global public image by promoting “win-win” security cooperation, and they advocate for expanded people-to-people exchanges with South Korea. Finally, Ma and Zhao advise China to combat US and Western containment of China by uniting with ASEAN and other partners to challenge NATO Asia-Pacificization. Unfortunately, they do not elaborate on this policy recommendation or consider its feasibility.
ASEAN
In Dongnanya Zongheng, 2024, no. 3, Liao Hongrui and Luo Shengrong take stock of ASEAN’s efforts to promote the ASEAN Community in 2023 through the theme, selected by Indonesia, of “ASEAN Matters: Epicentrum of Growth.” Under Indonesia’s guidance, they argue, the political-security community and economic community pillars strengthened, while the development of the socio-cultural community did not experience significant improvement. Assessing the political-security community pillar, they note that Cambodia and Thailand experienced peaceful transfers of power, although ASEAN efforts to ameliorate the worsening conflict in northern Myanmar fell short. Meanwhile, ASEAN significantly advanced the principles of ASEAN centrality and the “ASEAN Way.” Despite a challenging geopolitical context and pressure from great powers (China and the United States) to “take sides,” ASEAN sought to maintain its centrality by reaffirming the crucial role of cooperation among ASEAN defense ministers at the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting in November and by pursuing shared regional governance and leadership through the first joint military exercises, held in September, and the December 2023 ASEAN Maritime Outlook. Liao and Luo contend that ASEAN has consistently rejected US efforts to persuade ASEAN to side with the United States against China.
Turning to the ASEAN Economic Community, Liao and Luo note that ASEAN countries’ economic recovery has been slower than predicted. Nevertheless, ASEAN has strong foreign direct investment (FDI); the largest sources in 2022 were the United States ($37 billion, largely in banking, finance, and manufacturing), Japan ($26 billion, concentrated in transportation and storage), and China ($16 billion, in manufacturing, electric vehicles, the digital economy, and real estate). Furthermore, ASEAN has excelled in developing its digital economy, including areas such as big data, e-commerce, and artificial intelligence. Regional economic cooperation continues to grow, with ASEAN–China Free Trade Area 3.0 Upgrade Negotiations kicking off in February 2023, the Philippines officially joining the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), and continued collaboration on sustainable economic development.
By contrast, Liao and Luo assert that there were no significant achievements in the development of the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community in 2023. Cross-border smog continues to plague ASEAN countries, and countries have found it difficult to reach any binding agreements. Furthermore, ASEAN countries face increasing cybersecurity threats. Turning to ASEAN diplomacy in 2023, Liao and Luo argue that China and ASEAN strengthened their bilateral relations. The two parties increased political mutual trust by expanding cooperation, upgrading Lancang-Mekong sub-regional cooperation, and building relations between China and individual ASEAN countries. In addition, economic and trade relations continued to flourish; each party is the other’s largest trading partner, and their supply chains are tightly interconnected. People-to-people exchanges continue to grow in fields such as poverty reduction and education.
Meanwhile, Liao and Luo assert, ASEAN adopted a “positive yet cautious” approach to the United States. ASEAN countries have supported Biden’s Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, which they see as a way to reduce their economic dependence on China. Cooperation between the United States and individual ASEAN member states, such as Vietnam and the Philippines, has gone further. Nevertheless, ASEAN resists what Liao and Luo see as US efforts to persuade ASEAN to pick sides and insists on maintaining strategic autonomy. ASEAN’s relations with two key US allies, Japan and South Korea, also deepened in 2023. Japan seeks to adopt more of a security role in Southeast Asia, as evident by its efforts to build maritime security cooperation with ASEAN and with individual member states. South Korea has also sought to develop both economic and security relations with ASEAN and its member states in the context of South Korea’s Indo-Pacific strategy and attempt to position itself as a “global pivotal state.” By contrast, ASEAN’s relations with the EU in 2023 focused on trade. ASEAN also sought out new partners, such as the Gulf states and South Africa.
Looking ahead to 2024, Liao and Luo note the volatility caused by both extra-regional geopolitical challenges (such as the Russia–Ukraine conflict and the Israel–Palestine conflict) and by internal regional flashpoints (such as the South China Sea and Taiwan), which, combined with the low level of institutionalization within ASEAN, pose challenges to ASEAN centrality and unity. The reliance of the ASEAN Way on consensus makes cooperation difficult, especially given the disparate development levels and interests of ASEAN member states. Furthermore, Liao and Luo charge, the United States has been trying to convince ASEAN member states to side with the United States against China. The South China Sea dispute threatens to divide ASEAN member states (especially given what they view as the Philippines’ provocative stance) and the ongoing Myanmar crisis hinders ASEAN regional political and security cooperation. Nevertheless, with the exception of Myanmar, the domestic political situations of the ASEAN member states are stable, and Liao and Luo do not expect significant changes in their policy positions to occur. Instead, ASEAN member states will continue to focus on post-pandemic economic recovery, balance among major powers, and maintain autonomy by focusing on multilateral mechanisms like RCEP. With Laos, a relatively less powerful state, serving as the rotating chair of ASEAN in 2024, Liao and Luo do not expect ASEAN to make any breakthroughs on Myanmar. Instead, they expect Laos to focus on connectivity and post-pandemic economic recovery, maintaining ASEAN centrality in the context of great power competition, and easing tensions over the South China Sea and Taiwan.
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