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In mid-2024, one Chinese analyst argued that the US-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) undermines efforts to advance regional economic integration, either via APEC or by using the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) as stepping stones to a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP). Another analyst explored India’s regional and global role, asserting that the gap between India’s self-perception of itself as a global leading power and other countries’ perceptions of it as less influential leads India to engage in “selective identity switching” and promote its Hindu characteristics in ways that threaten to undermine its foreign policy. Other analysts contended that Southeast Asian countries are receptive to Modi’s increased emphasis on Southeast Asia as a component of India’s embrace of an Indo-Pacific concept, potentially increasing India’s regional influence. Turning to East Asia, one observer assessed the development of the US–Japan–South Korean trilateral cooperation mechanism, urging China to push back against the US reestablishment of Cold War era “camps.” Another analyst argued that Japan has played a key role in constructing and implementing the new US Indo-Pacific alliance structure which replaces the hub-and-spokes model with a “latticed” framework composed of overlapping bilateral and minilateral arrangements. Taken together, these articles highlighted the extensive bilateral and minilateral efforts of the Biden administration as the United States institutionalized the US Indo-Pacific Strategy first proposed by Donald Trump. Trump’s reelection and the expected return of his transactional approach to foreign policy calls into question the robustness of these mechanisms.
IPEF
In Guoji Luntan, 2024, no. 4, Zhang Tiangui assesses the implications of IPEF for Chinese efforts to increase regional free trade. Widely seen by Chinese analysts as the economic arm of the US Indo-Pacific Strategy, IPEF includes the four Quad members, plus additional partners in East Asia, Southeast Asia, and Oceania, and consists of four pillars: fair and resilient trade, supply chains, clean economy, and fair economy. The parties have reached agreements on all pillars except for trade, the sole pillar on which India has declined to participate. IPEF is moving toward further institutionalization with an agreement to establish an IPEF Council and a Joint Commission that will meet annually.
Zhang argues that US interests are significantly reflected in the unique characteristics of IPEF. The US envisions IPEF as a “new regional economic framework” that exceeds the bounds of a traditional free trade agreement (FTA), both in the scope of the issues it covers and in its emphasis on setting new standards to govern the regional economy. Furthermore, Zhang asserts, IPEF, though initiated by the Biden administration, represents an “America First” approach that emphasizes US strategic interests while declining to remove tariff barriers on many IPEF members who are dependent on US export markets, but who do not have FTAs with the United States. Reflecting the Biden administration’s emphasis on alliance relations, IPEF emphasizes the construction of a “values” alliance and compensates for the US decision to withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). In addition, IPEF emphasizes de-Sinicization of supply chains, reflecting US concerns about overdependence on Chinese-produced semiconductors.
Noting already complex efforts at Asia-Pacific regional economic integration, including APEC, the CPTPP, and RCEP, and China’s support for a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific, Zhang argues that the creation of IPEF increases institutional competition and complicates the process of regional economic integration. Zhang charges that the United States has damaged existing efforts at regional integration by undermining APEC while prioritizing IPEF, and that Japan’s commitment to the proposed FTAAP appears to be wavering. Furthermore, by reducing US incentives to join the CPTPP and potentially interfering with the implementation and expansion of RCEP—two institutions that Zhang sees as possible pathways to a FTAPP—Zhang warns that IPEF will hinder greater economic integration. In Zhang’s view, IPEF introduces “non-economic” factors that muddy Chinese efforts to pursue more narrowly focused FTAs.
Given China’s interest in advancing the proposed FTAAP and increasing regional economic integration and its concerns about the de-Sinicization efforts of IPEF, Zhang urges Chinese policymakers to promote the creation of a regional FTA through APEC, while also pursuing bilateral free trade zones with the ten IPEF members with which China does not yet have such agreements. At the same time, China should continue to promote RCEP, pursue membership in CPTPP, and emphasize both agreements as potential pathways toward a FTAAP. These policies align with China’s interests in promoting regional free trade.
Zhang’s analysis, published prior to the US election, raises important questions about the future of IPEF under the second Trump administration. Although the Biden administration surprised many observers by continuing the Trump administration’s emphasis on the Indo-Pacific, its version of the US Indo-Pacific Strategy emphasized alliance relations among like-minded partners. Trump’s instrumentalist view of US relations with other countries and his general disregard for the value of alliances suggest that US support for the implementation of IPEF agreements may prove fickle.
India’s Strategic Position in the Context of China–US Competition
In Nanya Yanjiu, 2024, no. 3, Yang Xiaoping analyzes how the gap between India’s self-identity and its global image complicates its efforts to play a more significant global role and its relationship with the United States. Yang argues that India reaps “strategic dividends” from China–US competition. Unlike smaller countries that may be forced to choose sides, the United States will not require this of India because India’s large population and economy make it the leading plausible substitute for China. Meanwhile, India poses a credible challenge to China on border issues and perceives itself as having substantial soft power in the “Global South.” Given India’s strategic importance, the United States often appears to treat India as an “exception” in ways that favor India’s interests.
Indian strategic thought draws on three main sources—traditional culture, security practices during British colonial rule, and geopolitics—and emphasizes India’s strategic autonomy and non-alignment. Indian strategic thought increasingly highlights the influence of China–US competition on India and focuses on the Indo-Pacific region. Indian analysts believe that India is experiencing an extended period of strategic opportunity to develop and strengthen because China–US conflict will persist. While India saw China as a development partner in the 2000s, it now sees China as a major threat to Indian national security.
Yang argues that the gap between India’s self-image and the role the international community expects it to play has become increasingly apparent. India sees itself as a great power: while India formerly saw itself as an “Asian power,” in 2015 it began to view itself as a “global leading country.” This transition marked a rejection of a balancing role (with the United States, against China) and an unwillingness to accept a unipolar China-led Asia, as well as a new insistence that India should be a “shaper” of a new multipolar order. At the same time, Yang argues, India’s self-image is impacted by the perceptions of Indo-Pacific countries. The United States sees a stronger India as useful to support US competition with China, but also recognizes limits to India’s strength and disagreements over China. Consequently, although the United States sometimes calls India a “leading power,” it does not truly perceive it to have this status, instead viewing India as a “non-traditional” member of its alliance system. Japan values its bilateral cooperation with India and has consequently increased its development assistance, but also perceives limits to India’s security commitment to the Quad members. Australia believes that it shares strategic and economic interests with India, which help Australia to reduce its vulnerability to China. Nevertheless, neither Japan nor Australia sees India as a likely “leading country.” By contrast, ASEAN sees India as an alternative to both the United States and China, which can help it reduce its dependence on both countries.
To manage the gap between its self-identity and the perception of its Indo-Pacific neighbors, Yang asserts, India engages in “selective identity switching:” in venues in which it has influence, such as the G20 and the “Global South,” India acts as a leading power, but in venues in which it is weaker, such as the RCEP negotiations (from which it eventually withdrew), India portrayed itself variously as a “great power,” “regional power,” and “self-reliant emerging country,” confusing its global partners. At the same time, India frequently emphasizes Hindu characteristics and has portrayed itself as a “civilizational state” with practices rooted in ancient cultural traditions. However, efforts to portray itself as a Hindu civilization reflect India’s desire to become accepted as a “global leading power,” further expanding the gap between its self-perception and the perceptions of other countries. Furthermore, these efforts risk leading the United States to view India’s rise as the rise of an “other” and strengthening concerns about democratic backsliding, potentially limiting US support for a stronger global role for India.
Moreover, Yang contends that it remains unclear whether India will be able to replace China’s global economic role or whether its development will stall. Ultimately, whether India’s development can provide global opportunities—and legitimize its claim to be a “global leading country”—will depend on the size of India’s market, its ability to provide public goods to the “Global South,” and its ability to promote global governance that benefits developing countries in the context of emerging technologies. In the meantime, the gap between India’s self-identity and the perceptions of others will widen, potentially undermining India’s foreign relations.
In many ways, Yang’s analysis reflects a general Chinese resistance to viewing India as a legitimate great power on par with China. By highlighting a gap between India’s self-image as a “global leading country” and the perceptions of others in the region, Yang suggests that Indian ambitions do not match reality, and that China’s skepticism about India’s potential is matched by that of the other members of the Quad. At the same time, Yang agrees with Chinese analysts who believe that India is choosing “multi-alignment” over siding with the United States against China, arguing that India’s strategic position gives it some leverage it its relations with the United States, while remaining pessimistic about the future of China–India relations.
India’s Southeast Asia Policy
In Guoji Luntan, 2024, no. 4, Wu Xiangjun and Yang Lu argue that Modi’s embrace of the Indo-Pacific concept intensifies India’s interest in Southeast Asia, strengthening the potency of Modi’s “Act East” policy. Wu and Yang argue that India’s version of the Indo-Pacific concept balances a “commitment to other countries in the Indo-Pacific region” (stressing inclusiveness, ASEAN centrality, and trade liberalization) with adherence to the understanding of the concept shared by Quad members (stressing rules-based order, connectivity, and a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” with unimpeded access to land and sea). India has shifted its strategic focus from land to sea and sees its region of maritime strategic interest as cascading out in concentric semicircles. Consequently, India views Southeast Asian countries as important partners in constructing a “free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific order,” as indicated by efforts such as the 2019 Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI). At the same time, Wu and Yang argue, India sees Southeast Asia as a crucial region for containing China and achieving India’s great power dream. India fears that China’s growing capabilities will threaten Indian interests in South Asia and the Indian Ocean—regions it perceives as its sphere of influence—which are necessary to support its efforts to become a “global leading country.” Unable to contain China alone, India views the Indo-Pacific concept as a useful opportunity to cooperate with the United States and other partners to contain China. Consequently, the Indo-Pacific strategy has imbued Modi’s earlier “Act East” policy with a more anti-China flavor.
Since Modi’s second term began in 2019, India has emphasized the relationship between ASEAN and the “Indo-Pacific” by highlighting that ASEAN centrality is a crucial aspect of India’s Indo-Pacific concept and exploring points of compatibility between India’s strategic priorities and the ASEAN Indo-Pacific Outlook. India has strengthened maritime strategic cooperation with ASEAN, with the two countries issuing an important 2023 joint statement highlighting areas for cooperation. At the same time, India has pursued stronger economic relations through greater cooperation in the “blue economy,” which promotes the sustainable use of maritime resources. India has also enhanced its military ties with Southeast Asian countries, emphasizing maritime security through military exercises in the Andaman Sea and bilateral military cooperation with countries like Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Brunei.
Wu and Yang anticipate that India’s pursuit of great power status will color its Southeast Asia policy, leading it to strengthen both coordination with the United States and the West and competition with China. They predict that India will act more aggressively in Southeast Asia, reflecting the continued power of the BJP (despite losing its majority in India’s lower house in the spring 2024 elections) and confidence gained during Modi’s second term from Modi’s successful efforts to promote maritime security and military cooperation with ASEAN and its member states. Wu and Yang argue that the institutionalization of the US Indo-Pacific Strategy under the Biden administration has created more space for India to pursue its interests in Southeast Asia by giving India status and access as a member of the Quad and more experience in a range of issue areas. In addition, Wu and Yang contend that India will use its support for the “Global South” as a means to expand its cooperation with Southeast Asia, highlighting India’s creation of the Voice of the Global South Summit and its strengthened ties with the Non-Aligned Movement. India’s efforts to portray itself as the leader of the “Global South” have been effective, with Southeast Asian countries welcoming India’s increased regional presence as an antidote to continued China–US competition.
While India’s influence in Southeast Asia still pales compared to that of the United States and China, Wu and Yang argue that Chinese analysts should not ignore India’s growing significance. By emphasizing the compatibility of ASEAN centrality and the Indo-Pacific concept, India has strengthened its coordination with the US Indo-Pacific Strategy, as both India and the United States seek to woo Southeast Asia away from China. Arguing that China must respond with “caution,” Wu and Yang reflect the ambivalence of many Chinese observers of India. On the one hand, they warn that Southeast Asia’s enthusiastic support for India’s regional participation may threaten Chinese influence and interests. At the same time, however, this warning is gentle, perhaps reflecting an inability to see India as a substantial threat given its significantly smaller material capabilities compared to China.
US–South Korea–Japan Trilateral Security Cooperation
In Dongbeiya Xuekan, 2024, no. 4, Man Yan assesses US efforts to strengthen trilateral security cooperation between the United States, South Korea, and Japan. Man charges that US actions have intensified the formation of regional “camps,” with the United States, South Korea, and Japan aligned against China, North Korea, and Russia, harkening a return to Cold War era paradigms. While notably aimed against China, Man argues, this trilateral security cooperation has also contributed to ongoing instability on the Korean peninsula, with all parties using the North Korean nuclear issue as an excuse to increase their defense cooperation; this greater military cooperation then further destabilizes peninsular tensions. Furthermore, by expanding the scope of trilateral cooperation to encompass the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea and promoting the de-Sinicization of global supply chains, the United States harms Chinese strategic interests.
Although stronger trilateral security cooperation enhances the global status of Japan and South Korea and advances their strategic interests, Man contends, a variety of constraints will prevent trilateral cooperation from advancing beyond a “quasi-alliance” for the foreseeable future. Some of these constraints relate to the underlying relationships among the three countries. The United States, Japan, and South Korea have a fundamentally unequal relationship; the United States aims to use Japan and South Korea to advance its Indo-Pacific Strategy and contain China. South Korea–Japan relations remain unstable, despite recent warming. Other constraints relate to the three parties’ interests. The three countries have different views on key issues like Taiwan and the South China Sea, with Japan and the United States more aligned. Meanwhile, South Korea’s economic dependence on China is greater than that of the United States or Japan. Furthermore, foreseeing the possibility of Trump’s reelection, Man highlights the likelihood of a return to US isolationism, demands for cost-sharing, and heightened US–China tensions. Despite Biden’s efforts to protect the trilateral mechanism against changes in leadership in the three countries, Man contends that its future success will depend on the actions of the two camps, the Yoon administration’s ability to improve relations with Japan despite domestic opposition, and whether South Korea is willing to accept Japan’s potential use of offensive capabilities for self-defense reasons or against North Korean targets.
Looking ahead, Man expects trilateral military cooperation to continue to expand in concrete ways, such as increased joint exercises and improved intelligence sharing, with both Japan and South Korea planning to increase defense budgets. Man expects Japanese and South Korean cooperation with NATO to increase, reflecting the “Asia-Pacificization” of NATO. Furthermore, Man anticipates that the three parties will work together to suppress high-tech Chinese industries, particularly semi-conductors. Faced with these challenges, Man argues that China should take action to avoid the development of “camp confrontation.” China should continue to strengthen its own manufacturing capabilities (which will undermine South Korea’s belief that it can limit China’s industrial upgrading by cooperating with the United States to suppress it) and enhance military deterrence. China should also improve its relations with other partners, such as the European Union, ASEAN, Middle Eastern countries, and Russia. The resumption of the China–Japan–South Korea Trilateral Summit in May 2024 (on hiatus since December 2019) is a positive sign for China, pointing to the potential for greater trilateral economic cooperation and South Korea’s willingness to balance its relations with the United States against stable ties with China.
Japan’s Role in the US Indo-Pacific Strategy
In Riben Xuekan, 2024, no. 4, Zhao Minghao evaluates changes in the US–Japan alliance and Japan’s key role in supporting the US Indo-Pacific Strategy. Zhao highlights Abe Shinzo’s key role in providing the concepts that underlie current US strategy, including the “Indo-Pacific,” the Quad (a “democratic security diamond”), and a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” Japan has collaborated with the United States to shift the US Indo-Pacific alliance system from the hub-and-spokes model to a more layered, interwoven framework by supporting US efforts to balance China through minilateralism (for example, through the Quad and the South Korea–Japan–US and Australia–US–Japan trilateral frameworks), strengthening bilateral relations with US allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific (such as South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and India), and strengthening linkages between the Indo-Pacific and Europe (for example, through closer ties with NATO and European countries).
Japan’s security role in the new US Indo-Pacific alliance system is that of “deputy sheriff”: Japan has used the US pursuit of “integrated deterrence” as an opportunity to expand its own military capabilities beyond post-Second World War limits while also increasing its coordination with the United States. Moreover, Japan has participated in trilateral security mechanisms with the United States: South Korea–Japan–US, Philippines–Japan–US, and Australia–Japan–US. Although not a member of AUKUS (Australia, UK, and the United States), Japan has reached bilateral defense agreements with each of its members and is pursuing defense collaboration with the partnership, with some Japanese and US observers floating the possibility of an expansion to “JAUKUS.” Furthermore, Japan has promoted the development of the Quad, supporting the Malabar military exercises and strengthening its bilateral relations with India, one of the weak links in the mechanism.
Japan has also supported US efforts to contain China through economic means. To this end, Zhao argues, Japan has exaggerated threats to its “economic security” to justify actions aimed at China. Japan has joined the United States in de-Sinicizing supply chains and increasing supply chain cooperation with Indo-Pacific allies (for example, through the 2021 Supply Chain Resilience Initiative between Japan, Australia, and India). Japan supports US efforts to reduce dependence on China for key minerals, like lithium, cobalt, and rare earths, through programs such as the Minerals Security Partnership. Japan has been a strong supporter of IPEF; as the second largest economy in Asia, its involvement influences other countries to join. Japan has also supported US efforts to counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative by creating new infrastructure programs. These projects build on Japan’s long-standing role as a major provider of official development assistance.
In addition, Zhao contends, Japan has taken a leading role in supporting US efforts to contain China through a “democratic technology alliance.” Japan supports US efforts to compete with China on semi-conductors. It has increased its cooperation with the United States and US allies in the fields of clean energy and artificial intelligence, while also promoting data security.
Zhao concludes that US decline and the emergence of the “America First” approach have impeded the United States’ ability to build alliance relations, leading the United States to ask Japan to play a more significant role. Japan has eagerly contributed the concepts underlying the US reshaping of its regional alliance relations and supported the institutionalization of this new alliance framework. Ultimately, the new US alliance architecture in the Indo-Pacific advances Japan’s objectives by allowing it to take a more significant global role and expand its military capabilities. However, echoing Man Yan, Zhao cautions that the construction of this new Indo-Pacific alliance system risks “camp confrontation” as small- and medium-sized countries feel pressure to pick sides, while also weakening ASEAN centrality.
Nevertheless, Zhao sees obstacles to US and Japanese efforts to reshape the Indo-Pacific alliance system. Domestic opposition in Japan persists, both to increased military spending and to siding with the United States against China. Many countries in the region are reluctant to pick sides and are not convinced that Japan can be a leading regional power (mirroring Yang Xiaoping’s argument about the disjuncture between India’s view of itself and the perceptions of its regional neighbors). The future of South Korea–Japan relations remains uncertain and is likely subject to the vagaries of who holds the highest office. Furthermore, China’s shear economic size hampers US and Japanese efforts to create supply chains and infrastructure programs that sideline it. Trump’s re-election introduces a new challenge to those listed by Zhao: given Trump’s transactional approach to alliance relations, the United States is likely to support the US–Japan alliance only to the extent that Trump believes the United States directly benefits, increasing the pressure for Japan to absorb the costs of its defense, and likely undermining many of the minilateral arrangements that the Biden administration has constructed.
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