Introduction

Since the turn of the century, the US government has increasingly pivoted toward Asia by seeking a new regional architecture to bolster alliances and partnerships. Japan’s response to these American concerns and its sense of urgency to engage in regional institution-building became evident during the first Abe administration, intensifying after Abe returned as prime minister. In the case of South Korea, before Yoon Suk-yeol became president participation in the broader Asian policy of US administrations was hesitant. Yoon changed that, impacting ties to Japan, trilateralism with the United States, and planning for an Indo-Pacific framework. Yet, as Trump is primed to return to the presidency, Ishiba Shigeru has yet to be tested in foreign policy, and Yoon is suspended by impeachment, agreement is in doubt.

This article reviews how the US vision for Asia aspires to establish an Indo-Pacific system, going beyond a patchwork of bilateral alliances by incorporating minilateral collaborations. Then, it examines how this vision is perceived within the region, noting the degree to which Japan and South Korea align with US expectations while highlighting the uncertainties regarding the sustainability of these efforts. With changes in the US administration and resulting challenges to US influence, it is anticipated that the US ability to shape regional order will continue to wane.

Japan has played a pivotal role in shaping the Indo-Pacific’s security architecture, responding actively to US initiatives to adapt regional frameworks to the demands of the 21st century. While some critics argue that the Indo-Pacific framework serves as a counterbalance to China, the Abe administration maintained active engagement with Beijing. Even ASEAN has released its own “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP),” reflecting the framework’s broad acceptance. Under Kishida, Japan has emphasized the rule of law and a free, open international order, particularly in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. While Japan’s approach to universal values eschews the assertiveness sometimes seen in US internationalism, it resonates with recent American diplomacy, which has adopted a more restrained posture. Japan has positioned itself as a key player in the evolving regional order by promoting the Indo-Pacific framework, advancing multilateral security partnerships, and implementing domestic reforms. While Japan remains sensitive to changes in US regional policy, its sustained efforts to guide and support American engagement reflect a shared commitment to stability and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific.

Despite the differing regional focus of Moon Jae-in and Yoon Suk-yeol, both administrations shared a common objective—to transform South Korea from a peripheral “spoke” into a significant “pillar” within the evolving Indo-Pacific framework. The Moon administration prioritized diplomatic autonomy amid the great power rivalry between the US and China, highlighting differing perceptions between South Korea and the US on South Korea’s role in the evolving Indo-Pacific system. Moon’s strained relationship with Japan complicated trilateral cooperation. Moon opted for cautious language in joint statements, managing alliance expectations while avoiding escalation. By promoting regional cooperation and economic diversification, Moon sought to enhance South Korea’s resilience and autonomy within a polarized Indo-Pacific system.

The Yoon administration redefined South Korea’s role in the Indo-Pacific, aligning it with the US and Japan and departing from traditional strategic ambiguity. Developments reflect the government’s recognition of the strategic importance of the South Korea-US-Japan triangle in stabilizing the region and strengthening its role within the evolving Indo-Pacific system. Efforts centered on “value diplomacy” and pursuit of an enhanced role regarding the Taiwan issue remain subjects of debate. Critics argue that this approach raises questions about whether it truly aligns with South Korea’s strategic interests, particularly considering the complexities of its relationship with China and the potential threats related to North Korea. Focus on flexibility reflects concern that excessive reliance on US-led initiatives could limit South Korea’s strategic options, particularly as US domestic policies increasingly prioritize national interests over those of its partners. To mitigate such risks, Yoon revitalized trilateral economic cooperation with China and Japan.

The US-led Indo-Pacific system faces unresolved challenges and persistent burdens that highlight the inherent limitations of US leadership in both the security and economic domains. The primary limitation is the US inability to create an inclusive and cooperative regional system that aligns with the diverse priorities of its partners. This shortcoming has significantly undermined US credibility as a leader, e.g., undermining ASEAN centrality and its principle of neutrality—key components of the region’s identity. Japan’s historical baggage complicates its credibility as a regional leader, while varying security priorities across the region further exacerbate the challenge. Japan remains primarily focused on countering China’s influence, whereas South Korea prioritizes the North Korean threat, making alignment of their security strategies difficult. Creating friction with key allies and partners, both the Trump and Biden administrations have demonstrated an inward-looking approach to economic policy, prioritizing domestic industry over international trade integration. The strong US emphasis on democracy and human rights is sometimes seen as inconsistent with ASEAN’s principle of non-interference. This perception complicates US efforts to build a broad regional coalition and further widens the gap between its aspirations and regional realities. Should the US fail to effectively fulfill its leadership role, regional countries may increasingly pursue self-oriented and assertive behavior to safeguard their strategic interests. This fragmentation would result in greater instability, further undermining the coherence of the Indo-Pacific system. The challenges discussed in this article underscore the inherent limitations of US leadership within the Indo-Pacific system, particularly in the security and economic sectors.

Gilbert Rozman, “Chinese and Russian Designs for the Latticework of Eurasia”

Both Beijing and Moscow are proposing new frameworks for the international order, starting with the regional order in Asia. It is important to differentiate what they advocate jointly and what each seeks in the regional order. Together, they propose a non-Western order, excluding the United States and its alliance partners. Separately, China pursues Sinocentrism and Russia Eurasianism. If Moscow would welcome alliances, including one with China to advertise itself as an equal of one of today’s two main powers, Beijing is opposed to them, only affirming a legacy one with North Korea, which is more benevolence than actual alliance. Chinese call US alliances unequal and manifestations of hegemonism. As seen in the BRI, China displays Sinocentrism in bilateral ties to countries, different from a hub-and-spokes approach by virtue of its priority on economic and cultural dependency on the stronger power. An alliance with Russia would imply an equality not actually recognized by China and lead to possible entrapment as well. 

Their pursuit of a newly conceptualized regional order began in earnest only in 2012-2013. Looking back, we can discern four stages: (1) clashing visions though 2013, starting the search for new regionalism after divergence in the Cold War era and even in the decade of the 2000s, manifest in the Six-Party Talks, the SCO, and East Asia Summit (EAS); (2) parallel tracks to 2017, mostly focused on narrow spheres of influence; (3) broader and intersecting regional designs to 2021; and (4) agreement on far-reaching realignment with sharply divergent approaches to key countries in the aftermath of Russia’s full-scale war in Ukraine impacting the regional as well as the international order. Beijing and Moscow have found common ground but still struggled to reconcile differences over multipolarity and relative influence in each of the subregions of Asia.

Stage 1: The Legacy of the Cold War as the Search for New Regionalism Was Beginning

Over the Cold War era three hot wars were fought over contending spheres of influence in the minds of leaders in Washington and Moscow: The Korean War in Northeast Asia, the Vietnam War in Southeast Asia, and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in South Asia. In addition to the continuous split between the superpowers, Beijing and Moscow competed. In the 1970s-80s Beijing branded Soviet military activities in the north (including Mongolia), in Southeast Asia (Vietnam), and in South Asia (Afghanistan) the three obstacles to normalization of relations—a rejection of Moscow’s framework for regionalism. The two communist giants demonized the other’s thinking about Central Asia and were at loggerheads over India, when China fought a border war against it. While both supported North Korea and rejected South Korea, they were competitors, allowing Pyongyang to play off one versus the other. Frameworks for Asia clashed.

Many assumed that rivalry over spheres of influence in Asia as well as the border dispute left no opening for a rapprochement. Citing such lingering divisions, observers in the 1990s were quick to dismiss signs of a strengthening partnership. Their cooperation in Central Asia seemed to be limited to anti-terrorist, anti-separatist, and anti-Western pursuits, managing distrust but not reflecting a shared vision. Russians felt excluded from Asia, while not counting on China to help.

The 2000s saw the two work together in three new organizations: the SCO, the Six-Party Talks, and the EAS. They found some common ground: opposing US alliances and US approaches to each of these formats. At the SCO, despite lip-service to a division of labor in Central Asia, they disagreed on China’s Free Trade Agreement (FTA) designs, among other differences. In the Six-Party Talks, both leaned sharply to North Korea, but Beijing counted on its own centrality as the organizer and Moscow planned for a new regional security framework with no designated head. In the EAS, China increasingly only paid lip service to ASEAN centrality as bilateral ties grew, while Russia counted on a strong ASEAN to balance multiple outside powers. By the end of the decade, prospects for these formats faded, as Sino-Russian regional ties were uncertain.

In 2012-13, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping launched initiatives to transform regional architecture. First, Putin announced Russia’s “Turn to the East,” after putting part of Central Asia in the EEU. Xi followed by proclaiming in successive strokes the “Silk Road Economic Belt” and the “21st Century Maritime Silk Road” (combined as the BRI). The Russian and Chinese moves were not coordinated, raising doubts about whether they clashed with each other. If no contradiction was acknowledged openly, they posited parallel frameworks with no indication of convergence.

Putin and Xi had reason to distrust each other’s initiatives. Putin was welcoming multilateral investment in the Russian Far East, engaging in upbeat diplomacy with new leaders in Japan and South Korea, and proposing multipolarity in a manner at odds with Sinocentrism. In turn, Xi flaunted his economic belt in Astana, as if in defiance of Russia’s refusal to accept economic openness in Central Asia in the SCO format, while the BRI clearly defied Putin’s aspirations for dual regional leadership and encompassed infrastructure that seemed to bypass Russia.

Stage 2: 2014-2017

Choosing to seize Crimea and assault the Donbas and Luhansk, Putin at the same time changed his strategy toward the “Turn to the East.” On the surface, he accommodated Xi’s Silk Road Economic Belt, agreeing to dock the EEU with it through coordinated infrastructure projects, while decisively prioritizing China in his “Turn to the East,” clearly shifting his interpretation of multipolarity as he took a harder line toward Japan and South Korea. Xi and he joined hands in establishing BRICS at a summit in 2014. Sino-Russian cooperation advanced rapidly at this time.

The two presented a bold façade of jointly constructing a new regional architecture in Asia. At the first BRI forum in May 2017 Putin was the guest of honor, while boasting that an expanded SCO (adding India and Pakistan), BRICS, and the EEU in association with one vector of the BRI offered a vision for the reorganization of Asia. They pledged close coordination on North Korea.

Troubles in Stage 2 belied the rosy face Chinese and Russians put on their relationship in Asia. Putin made his dissatisfaction with the BRI known by proposing a more broadly encompassing framework: the GEP to include the SCO, ASEAN, and the BRI. Xi’s response did not go beyond paying lip service to this concept. The “docking” so loudly showcased in 2014-15 proved deeply dissatisfying to Russia, which saw little investment in its infrastructure as new routes appeared.

Two sources of tension over regionalism only appeared to be managed successfully. India is a high priority for Russia, and Pakistan a high priority for China as well as a centerpiece of the BRI. Compromising on their joint entry into the SCO did not signify agreement on how to respond to their abiding rivalry. North Korea is a high priority for both Moscow and Beijing, which they had both supported to a degree in the face of US pressure after the collapse of the Six-Party Talks In 2014-17 they had diverged, as Putin wooed Kim Jong-un, seeking to become his main partner, while Xi, in spite of providing the bulk of economic support, was pressuring Kim both to reform and to denuclearize. Sino-North Korean ties were chilly after Kim murdered his uncle, who had been the go-between to China. Hoping to win concessions from Donald Trump, Xi decided to join in support for tough, new Security Council sanctions in response to provocative nuclear and missile tests. Putin reluctantly agreed, but that did not signify a joint approach to the North. In 2017 Moscow and Beijing were also unsure of each other’s response to Trump’s deal-making.

Behind the façade of joint pursuit of new Asian regionalism Beijing and Moscow advanced plans on parallel tracks. Beijing pitched Sinocentrism, adjusted to realities in different subregions. In Northeast Asia, the BRI found no takers, and North Korea was aloof, as Russia hesitated to open its Far East or Northern Sea Route as desired by China. While South Korea had been targeted to drive a wedge between it and the United States as well as to widen its split with Japan, China showed its fury when the South defied it over missile defense ties to the US. Sinocentrism proceeded further in Southeast Asia, centered on aggressive moves in the South China Sea. In South Asia it was reflected in pressure on India, and in Central Asia in inroads at Russia’s expense. Incapable of open resistance, Russia countered with narrow steps in each subregion and with the broader framework of the GEP, trying to override China’s specific designs. 

Stage 3: 2018-2021

Despite differences over regionalism, Xi and Putin had revitalized the SCO, forged the BRICS, and avoided open clashes over sensitive regional issues by the end of 2017. While they had built momentum in these agreements and by censoring criticism of differences of perspective, they had yet to forge a foundation for a joint regional architecture. Trump would give them reason to draw closer. His trade war and the language of his administration toward China brightened the hopes of Putin that Xi would agree that a New Cold War was beginning. The breakdown of the Hanoi Summit in early 2019 saw Xi and Putin both blame the United States. As leaders in Seoul and Tokyo responded differently, polarization was gaining ground.

Just as the Agreed Framework of 1994 had left Russia marginalized on the Korean Peninsula, in defiance of its sense of entitlement based on history and geography, the diplomacy of 2018-19 thwarted a resurgence of confidence that it had restored its voice in dealings with the North. In hosting Kim Jong-un soon after the failure of the Hanoi summit, Putin prepared to reassert his influence. Barely half a year later, the pandemic interfered. Yet, the deterioration of Russia’s relations with Japan and South Korea and the relaxation of Chinese sanctions enforcement against the North strengthened the case for pursuing Kim Jong-un. Putin was poised to act.

Differences over regionalism were largely brought under control in Stage 3, but there was one, big problem India. Sino-US tensions in the South China Sea did not pose a problem for Putin; Vietnam had edged closer to the United States but still valued ties with Russia, especially arms sales. In trying to avoid taking sides, most of ASEAN found Russia to be a useful partner too. As China’s relations with South Korea and Japan grew tenser by 2021, Russia saw more prospects for coordination, as seen in joint military exercises. Yet, Moscow was flummoxed by the border skirmish between China and India. It complicated the GEP, damaged the SCO and BRICS, drove India closer to the United States and its allies, and flew in the face of the great power troika at the core of Russian conceptualizations of Eurasia from the late 1990s. Putin must have felt that an increasingly asymmetrical Sino-Russian relationship gave China license to ignore his agenda.

Biden’s pushback against China’s expansionism proved heartening to Russia, giving it reason to expect that China needed Russia more and would welcome a more aggressive policy toward the United States in the European arena. It was important to demonstrate that Russia merits being seen as a leg in a triangle with China and the United State and can make a stronger case for Eurasianism by expanding its boundaries. The combination of feeling emboldened by troubled Sino-US relations and marginalized in Asia by rising Sinocentrism left Putin ready to strike out.

Stage 4: 2022-20224

The Russian invasion of Ukraine is widely recognized in Beijing as well as Moscow as driving a far-reaching realignment of the world order, which both were already debating in the years just before the 2022 assault. While the vast “Global South” is in the anticipated architecture of the new order, the focus clearly centers on Eurasia, including Northeast Asia, Central Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, and, sometimes, Iran as well as the Pacific Islands. In the aftermath of the invasion and resultant sanctions, Chinese and Russian sources take this subject seriously.

The concept of “indivisible security” is a smokescreen for spheres of interest and an assault on the US-led, international order based on equality of states, sovereignty, and universal values. It serves as a starting point for an entirely different order, recognizing civilizational diversity aloof from shared values and unassailable great power rights over surrounding states. NATO’s march to the east as well as US alliances in Asia arouse anger as infringements on Russian and Chinese great power prerogatives. Ukraine came to symbolize Russia’s rights, while China mainly argued it was just pursuing reunification or traditional boundaries, as in Taiwan or the South China Sea, when its narratives left no doubt about Sinocentric ambitions, notably on the Korean Peninsula.

International order-building is the core of the stated concepts of Russian-Chinese multilateral cooperation, to which all other concepts are ultimately subordinate, but the two are not on the same page. Xi Jinping at the BRICS summit reaffirmed economic globalization and appealed for solidarity within the “Global South” but avoidance of a new Cold War. Economic themes were foremost in his approach, but unlike Russia’s call for a separate, exclusive order, it was about boosting a competitive alternative. For Putin BRICS loomed as the salvation for a country excluded from the US-led order to build anew. Political and infrastructure themes showcased a more far-reaching agenda for regionalism. Russian aspirations for BRICS surpass Chinese thinking. BRICS is tasked with nothing short of uniting the world around a continental network, ending the reign of the West, and bypassing it ahead. Ideally, its core great powers of India, China, and Russia would join in leading the way to this new order, but tensions between India and China limit their cooperation, as Russia plays the key role in initiating unification, capitalizing on a vision and geography bridging East and West. This Russian perspective frames BRICS as a more transformative force for forging a new order.

Russians are prone to see the struggle for Ukraine and its impact as a turning point in world history, even more significant than the transformation at the end of the 1980s and start of the 1990s. After all, just as the collapse of colonialism in the 1940s-50s only led to what they call “neocolonialism,” the end of the socialist bloc only brought further domination by the United States and the collective West. What is different at present is the emergence of a new world order not centered on the West–a change as dramatic as anything since the early 20th century. This time, however, the result will not be two blocs but the consolidation of an alternative to the old order, which the BRICS is primed to unite. Russia leads in this change, having launched its “Turn to the East” as a strong driver for diplomatic, economic, security, and cultural change. Chinese are more reluctant to accept global polarization or a new cold war. Without referring directly to Sinocentrism, they prioritize the BRI, leaving the SCO as secondary and treating multipolarity as more global.

We start with the celebration of the 10th anniversary of the BRI in China, where Xi Jinping gave a keynote address focusing on connectivity. The essence of his appeal was to open boundaries by developing economic corridors, broadening transportation linkages, and forging a framework for crossing borders to achieve joint development. Xi warned that countries must not consider a rise in economic interdependence a risk (or consider decoupling and supply chain disruption) but integrate without reservations. The July SCO summit refocused attention on Sino-Russian cooperation in a regional context. What had begun with a narrow Central Asian focus, primarily to resolve border disputes and maintain political stability without acrimony between Moscow and Beijing, had expanded into a far-reaching organization to include 29 members with uncertain aspirations mixing economics, security, and transformation of the international order.

Chinese accuse Russians (called “extremely pro-West”) of emphasizing the need for “de-Sinicization” in Russia’s “Turn to the East,” treated as wariness of extending the BRI to Russia and eagerness to balance China with other states. Second, Chinese see Russia welcoming disorder and chaos, while China has never had the strategic impulse to demolish the current order and start over with a new one. The Russian mindset isn’t hard to understand China has greater potential and say on economic subjects, so letting the SCO agenda tilt away from security toward economic fields would mean Russia ceding leadership to China.

BRICS has much wider scope than the SCO, having added five members just since the assault by Russia into Ukraine in 2022. Putin treats it as club aligned with Russia in opposition to the West. It represents the rise of the non-Western world, as if it could become the voice of the “Global South.” In contrast to the distinct Chinese and Indian efforts to leadership over this amorphous entity, Russia asserts not only its membership but also its mediating leadership between the other two powers. The tone from China at the BRICS summit was more temperate than from Russia. Immersed in a hot war and intent on showing that isolation from the collective West is about to be compensated by a new Eurasian order forged largely by Moscow, Russians rest their hopes on BRICS more than the SCO or Sino-Russian relations. The mainstream puts high hopes on not only infrastructure integration, but also a political orientation in opposition to the collective West. In Russia, however, some join with Chinese in drawing a more cautionary note or pointing to India’s reluctance to embrace Moscow’s dreams. Chinese regard BRICS as important for changing the international order but put more stock on economic appeals to states wary of unsettling the existing order and are less prone to grandiose designs for change. The Sino-Russian latticework, centering on Eurasia, turns out to be a mismatch of discordant aspirations. An impatient Russia oversells the prospects and the Sino-Russian consensus, while a wary China sees value in the process but doubts Russia’s claims and agenda. There is no likelihood of coordination with other states, whose ties vary to Moscow or Beijing, to forge regionalism.