China’s Relations with Asia’s Southern Tier

Four themes characterized Chinese analysis of India during 2021–2024. The first was India’s view of the Indo-Pacific strategy and the Quad, which led to a key debate: Was India pursuing a strategy of strategic autonomy and “multi-alignment” or was it aligning with the United States? A second theme was understanding the causes and consequences of heightened border disputes. The third theme, sometimes connecting analysis of India’s Indo-Pacific strategy with events on the border, was India’s maritime strategy in the Indian Ocean. Finally, analysts evaluated the implications for core Chinese interests, including the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the South China Sea, as well as for China’s relations with Southeast Asian countries and its self-proclaimed leadership of the Global South.

Chinese analysis of India during the early 2020s took place against the backdrop of two important contextual factors: the significant institutionalization of Quad relations and the intensely damaging impact of the 2020 Galwan Valley dispute. By mid-2024, signs of a potential shift in China–India relations were emerging. Narendra Modi’s April statement prioritizing the resolution of the border conflict and normalization of bilateral relations and the two meetings between the countries’ top diplomats in July suggested the two countries might finally escape the morass. Meanwhile, Modi’s July trip to Russia and his very public embrace of  Vladimir Putin indicated that India was trying to create some distance with the United States—whether this went beyond Subrahmanyam Jaishankar’s 2020 formula of “engage America, manage China, cultivate Europe, reassure Russia, bring Japan into play” remained to be seen.¹ At a minimum, the gesture indicated Indian commitment to multi-alignment; by emphasizing differences between India and the United States on a crucial global issue it highlighted gaps between the strategic visions of the two countries, potentially creating space for a stronger India–China relationship. Yet, these developments did not necessarily herald a breakthrough in India–China relations. Previous potential breakthroughs in relations have stumbled when confronted with China’s strategic myopia.

This article first reviews the state of bilateral relations between 2021–2024 and then examines how strategic thinking toward India evolved over this time frame, drawing on Chinese writings. At times it appeared that China was seeking dialogue to reduce tensions. Nevertheless, the overall situation failed to improve, as China objected to India’s growing involvement in the Quad and to its maritime strategy. Beijing failed to seize opportunities to signal its intent to improve relations.

China-India Relations

China–India relations tumbled to a nadir in 2021–2024. During these years, two major factors provided the context for the bilateral relationship. At the regional level, the key factor was the institutionalization of the Quad (India, Japan, the United States, and Australia), characterized by the regularization of meetings among the four countries’ leaders and the expanded scope of issues they considered. Chinese analysts saw the institutionalization of the Quad as a manifestation of a US shift toward minilateralism—as opposed to more traditional multilateralism—which was also evident in the 2021 creation of AUKUS among Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States and continued intelligence sharing among the Five Eyes (the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Canada).²

While the revival of the Quad began under the Trump administration, US minilateralism took on a different meaning in the context of the Biden administration, which embedded it in a broader strategy of creating partnerships of like-minded democracies. This emphasis on minilateralism was itself driven by China–US competition in the Indo-Pacific.³ To the surprise of many Chinese analysts, who had expected a Biden administration to ease tensions in China–US relations, it continued the Trump administration’s emphasis on an Indo-Pacific strategy and its positioning of China as the United States’ key competitor. This competition was the backdrop for individual countries’ Indo-Pacific strategies, which complicated China’s strategic picture. India’s closer ties with the United States, Japan, and Australia and the importance of the Indo-Pacific as a region formed the key geopolitical backdrop for China–India relations.

At the more local level, the China–India border dispute, brought to the forefront by the violence in the Galwan Valley in 2020, set the tone for a very challenging relationship. Despite regular border talks, border tensions continued throughout this period. Indian analysts and officials expressed suspicions about what they saw as Chinese efforts to keep tensions going, pointing to geopolitics (as China and India jockeyed for regional influence), alleging a Chinese effort to knock down Indian ambitions, accusing China of trying to keep the Indian military tied up on a land border so India could not focus on expanding its maritime power, and highlighting Chinese concerns over Tibet.⁴ Chinese analysts blamed India for the border unrest and for allowing border issues to poison the overall bilateral relationship.

In the context of these two factors—the institutionalization of the Quad and China–India border tensions—Chinese analysts of China–India relations emphasized four key themes. They carefully assessed India’s view of the Indo-Pacific and the Quad, debating whether India was maintaining a position of strategic autonomy and “multi-alignment” or whether it had chosen to side with the United States against China. They asked why the long-simmering border dispute had so negatively impacted the bilateral relationship. They evaluated India’s maritime strategy, connecting it both to India’s regional ambitions and to the border dispute itself. Finally, they explored the implications of India’s strategic approach, both for core interests like the Belt and Road Initiative and the South China Sea, and for China’s broader interests in Southeast Asia and the Global South. The following sections first examine the institutionalization of the Quad and the trajectory of border tensions during this period before considering each of these themes in more detail.

The Quad, 2021–2024

The gradual institutionalization of the Quad, which began with the reemergence of the mechanism in 2017, was cemented in the early 2020s as the four countries upgraded their meetings to the leadership level. On March 12, 2021, still amid the Covid-19 pandemic, Joe Biden hosted the first Quad leaders summit in a virtual meeting with his counterparts, Japanese Prime Minister Suga Yoshihide, Indian President Narendra Modi, and Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison. The leaders’ joint statement, “The Spirit of the Quad,” affirmed the four countries’ commitment to an Indo-Pacific “that is free, open, inclusive, healthy, anchored by democratic values, and unconstrained by coercion” and affirmed their support for ASEAN centrality. They agreed to launch working groups on vaccines, climate, and critical and emerging technology.⁵ On September 24, 2021, Biden hosted an in-person Quad leaders summit in Washington. In a joint statement, the leaders reaffirmed their dedication to each other and “a free and open Indo-Pacific, which is also inclusive and resilient,” celebrated the successes of their working groups, and expanded the scope of their cooperation to encompass infrastructure, cyber space, space, and educational exchanges for STEM students. Of particular interest to Chinese audiences, the four countries reiterated their commitment to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and maritime rules-based order, including in the East and South China Seas.”⁶

On March 3, 2022, the four countries met again for a virtual Quad leaders meeting, with Japan now represented by Prime Minister Kishida Fumio and the conflict in Ukraine added to their agenda.⁷ Two months later, on May 24, Biden, Modi, Kishida, and Australia’s newly elected prime minister, Anthony Albanese, met in Tokyo, stressing their commitment to “uphold the international rules-based order where countries are free from all forms of military, economic, and political coercion.” Emphasizing their desire to achieve “tangible results” to benefit the region, they recommitted to their wide-ranging list of collaborative efforts and added maritime domain awareness and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.⁸

Although the Quad leaders planned to meet for a fifth summit in Australia in May 2023, the meeting was rescheduled at the last minute due to Biden’s inability to attend. Instead, Albanese hosted a meeting of the four leaders on the sidelines of the G7 summit in Hiroshima on May 20, 2023. While the joint statement did not directly name China, many of its components seemed clearly written with China in mind. While highlighting “the Quad’s positive, practical agenda,” the Quad Leaders’ Joint Statement proclaimed, “We seek a region where no country dominates and no country is dominated”—a statement that, without naming China, registered both concerns about potential Chinese dominance of the region and, perhaps for some, opposition to US dominance as well. The statement reiterated support for international law “in addressing challenges to the maritime rules-based order, including those in the East and South China Seas” (the source of those challenges—China—left unspoken), and registered “serious concern at the militarization of disputed features, the dangerous use of coastguard and maritime militia vessels, and efforts to disrupt other countries’ offshore resource exploitation activities.” Building on a prior emphasis on building transparent and sustainable debt practices for countries developing their infrastructure, the 2023 statement went farther by stating, “We aim to ensure the investments we support are fit for purpose, demand driven and responsive to countries’ needs, and do not impose unsustainable debt burdens.”⁹ A sixth meeting, originally planned for January 2024 in India, was delayed, likely until after the November 2024 US presidential election.¹⁰

As Quad relations strengthened, India’s relations with the various Quad members continued to develop as well. In 2021, Australia, India, and Japan launched the Supply Chain Resilience Initiative in response to supply chain disruptions and concerns about overdependence on China laid bare by the Covid-19 pandemic. India held 2+2 dialogues with the United States (in 2022 and 2023), Japan (2022), and, for the first time, with Australia (in 2021, followed by a second 2+2 in 2023). In September 2022, Modi traveled to Japan for Abe Shinzo’s funeral (joining Albanese and US Vice President Kamala Harris). In May 2023, Modi turned the cancelled Quad summit in Australia into an opportunity for an official visit hosted by Albanese. In June 2023, India and the United States announced a Roadmap for U.S.–India Defense Industrial Cooperation ahead of Modi’s state visit to Washington, DC; later that year, the two countries signed a five-year master ship repair agreement.¹¹ Taken together, these developments suggested the development of India’s ties with each of the members of the Quad as well as its more active participation in the Quad mechanism itself.

Border Relations

The 2020 Galwan Valley incident brought ongoing border disputes between China and India to the forefront of their relationship. With border relations tense, Chinese and Indian officials continued to meet. The September 2020 meeting between Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi and Indian external affairs minister Subrahmanyam  Jaishankar in Moscow formed a key starting point for border discussions, which continued between them in phone calls in the first half of 2021 and in person in July and September 2021.¹² These high-level talks were accompanied by multiple rounds of talks between senior military officers and regular meetings of the nearly decade-old Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on Border Affairs (which met three times, in a virtual format owing to the pandemic, during 2021).¹³ Although there was some improvement—in February 2021, the PLA dismantled recently occupied areas in exchange for the Indian withdrawal from the Kailash Heights—the situation remained tense and the PLA buildup in the region continued.¹⁴ On March 25, 2022, Jaishankar and Wang met in New Delhi, with Jaishankar insisting that China pull back its troops at the border as a precondition for normalizing relations.¹⁵ Meanwhile, Wang urged India not to allow the border issue to define the two countries’ bilateral relationship and, emphasizing the similarities between China and India as populous emerging economies and ancient civilizations, argued that China and India should work together to promote a multipolar world, regional stability, and their shared development.¹⁶ Despite two more virtual meetings of the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on Border Affairs in 2022, in December hundreds of Chinese troops, apparently armed with crude weapons like clubs and stun guns, attempted to breach the border in Arunachal Pradesh.¹⁷

These developments were accompanied by efforts by both China and India to change the demographic realities on the ground. In 2022, India announced a new Vibrant Villages Programme, which allocated nearly $600 million to develop infrastructure in 2,967 existing villages along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), ranging from the Union Territory of Ladakh, Himachal Pradesh, and Uttarakhand in the northwest to Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh in the northeast. By investing in roads, telecom services, schools, and medical facilities, the Modi administration hoped to discourage out-migration and gain the support of local residents.¹⁸ Observers viewed Modi’s efforts as a belated response to the Chinese development of hundreds of new xiaokang villages in Tibet along the LAC.¹⁹ These Indian efforts to encourage settlement by improving infrastructure complemented road and bridge projects along the border, including in Kashmir, which strengthened India’s ability to move and resupply troops.²⁰

As the work of the Working Mechanism continued (with meetings finally returning to an in-person format in May 2023), Modi and Xi Jinping met on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in South Africa in August 2023 and agreed to deescalate border tensions.²¹ Yet just a few days later, China irked India by releasing an official map that depicted Aksai Chin (claimed by India, but administered by China) and Arunachal Pradesh (claimed by China, but administered by India as a state) as Chinese territory.²² Shortly thereafter, Xi surprised observers by declining to attend the G20 meeting in New Delhi for unspecified reasons. In March 2024, China objected to Modi’s visit to Arunachal Pradesh and—for the fourth time since 2017—announced Chinese names for places in Arunachal Pradesh.²³

Nevertheless, in a rare media interview in April 2024, Modi stressed the importance of peaceful China–India relations and emphasized the need to “urgently address” the border issue so that the bilateral relationship could be normalized.²⁴ On July 4, Jaishankar and Wang met in Kazakhstan on the sidelines of the SCO and agreed to more intensive border talks.²⁵ Later that month, they met again in Laos on the sidelines of an ASEAN meeting and agreed “to work with purpose and urgency to achieve complete disengagement” along their disputed border.²⁶ Taken together, these measures indicated that both countries were prioritizing the resolution of the border issue and suggested that both countries were interested in resuming friendlier relations after several years of tension.

Chinese Strategic Thinking on India’s Indo-Pacific Strategy and the Quad

Given the institutionalization of the Quad and the focus on the Indo-Pacific during 2021–2024, Chinese analysts devoted considerable attention to evaluating India’s perceptions of both. Reflecting earlier thought, some still identified India as the “weakest link” in the Quad. Huang Jie, Zheng Yingyu, and Huang Lili pointed to Indian ambivalence: participation in the Quad allowed India to strengthen its military capabilities and gain regional and international influence but was limited by India’s desire for “strategic autonomy” and opposition to targeting China. Consequently, they argued, India resisted efforts to upgrade Quad talks to the ministerial level and had emphasized bilateral relations with Quad members over participation in the Quad mechanism.²⁷ However, most Chinese analysts recognized India’s newfound enthusiasm for the Quad and focus on the Indo-Pacific, reinforced by Modi’s opening remarks at the May 24, 2022 Quad Leaders’ Summit, in which he remarked that the Quad had “assumed an important place on the world stage,” argued that the Quad was promoting “a constructive agenda for the Indo-Pacific region” and deemed it a “‘Force for Good.’”²⁸  This enthusiasm was evident in India’s closer relations with both the United States and Japan. ²⁹

A key question for Chinese observers was whether India was balancing between China and the United States (a policy of “multi-alignment” through which India built strategic relations with multiple great powers, reflecting Indian strategic autonomy) or aligning with the United States against China.³⁰ This debate reflected a debate within India itself. Li Liang argued that historically, India emphasized strategic autonomy and non-alignment when the situation allowed but was willing to pursue closer relations with either the Soviet Union/Russia or the United States when crises occurred. More recently, Li contended, some Indian writers had encouraged India to pursue closer ties with the United States to advance India’s national interests, even though this closer partnership undermines India’s traditional pursuit of strategic autonomy and non-alignment. Other Indian analysts had argued that India’s strategic autonomy is strengthened when it pursues relationships with multiple great powers, particularly when it can leverage its relationship with certain great powers against others.³¹

Paralleling this Indian debate, Chinese analysts were divided over whether India was pursuing multi-alignment or “leaning to one side.” Chinese observers who argued that India was pursuing a policy of strategic autonomy and multi-alignment highlighted several motivations for India’s acceptance of the US Indo-Pacific strategy and support for the Quad. One motivator was India’s “great power dream.” In this view, India was happy to acquiesce to the Indo-Pacific strategy because it viewed cooperation with the United States to achieve its great power ambitions. Consequently, India had increased its dialogues and cooperation with the members of the Quad.³² Another motivator was India’s perception of a “China threat.” India saw cooperation with the United States and the Quad as a helpful response to a perceived Chinese threat to India’s regional dominance and global influence.³³ Analysts argued that India had accepted the US Indo-Pacific strategy and embraced the Quad to fend off pressure from China’s BRI and maintain India’s maritime position in the Indian Ocean.³⁴ Ultimately, support for the US Indo-Pacific strategy and stronger relations with the Quad advanced Indian efforts to gain influence in a multipolar world.³⁵

Yet these Chinese analysts were clear-eyed about the limits to India’s embrace of the United States and the Quad. They argued that India identified as a “great power” and would not sacrifice its long-standing tradition of strategic autonomy—historically manifested as non-alignment—for US interests.³⁶ They highlighted differences among the strategic interests of the four members of the Quad, emphasizing that India was interested in neither helping the United States maintain its hegemony nor Japan to establish a leading regional role as a “smart power.”³⁷ Rather, India sought a multipolar Asia that gives rise to a multipolar world order, meaning that it would not be willing to accept the dominance of any regional power.³⁸ They noted India’s persistent doubts about whether the United States was a reliable partner with objectives that fully aligned with those of India, arguing that India sees the Indian Ocean as its rightful sphere of influence, while the United States seeks to use India’s position in the Indian Ocean to advance US objectives of regional and global dominance, and pointing to a history of mistrust and policy frictions (most recently over India’s continued relationship with Russia in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine).³⁹ They pointed to India’s participation in both China-led organizations (like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)) and US-led organizations (like the Quad) as evidence that India is not fully in the US camp.⁴⁰ They argued that weaknesses in the Indian economy suggested that India might not have the comprehensive strength to enact its Indo-Pacific vision.⁴¹ These factors, Chinese analysts contended, would prevent the establishment of a formal NATO-like alliance, at least in the near to medium-term.⁴²

Other Chinese analysts, including several affiliated with the Institute of South Asia Studies at the Chinese Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), argued that India was leaning heavily toward the United States, or had even “picked sides” by choosing the United States (and its allies) over China.⁴³ Lou Chunhao and Wang Chong dismissed the view of India as the Quad’s weakest link and the perception that India would prioritize strategic autonomy as outdated ideas, pointing to Indian cooperation with the United States across security, economic, technology, and geopolitical domains.⁴⁴ A similar view argued that India strongly supported the US Indo-Pacific strategy—even if India and the United States differed in some of the particulars of its implementation and regarding the geography of the region—and “fully embraced the Quad.”⁴⁵ Those who believed India had picked a side argued that India had followed US decoupling from China and worked with Quad members to diversify its supply chains away from China.⁴⁶ They further argued that while India wanted a multipolar Asia, it was less concerned with US hegemony than with Chinese regional dominance.⁴⁷ Hu Shisheng and Wang Jun asserted that India would prefer a US-led order to “building a new one with China” because “the immediate and urgent challenge to its strategic autonomy stems less from the hegemony of the United States and more from the competition for regional order between China and India.”⁴⁸  Some even argued that the United States and India had formed a “quasi-alliance.”⁴⁹ Yet, even these analysts recognized limits to India’s embrace of the United States and the Quad. Some pointed to the history of complicated US–India relations during the Cold War, continuing US ties to Pakistan, structural economic differences between the two countries, and US concerns about India’s commitment to human rights and democracy under Modi as potential areas of tension.⁵⁰ Others thought that ultimately India’s pursuit of strategic autonomy would put a “ceiling” on its strategic relationship with the United States.⁵¹ Despite these various perspectives, a constant in Chinese analysis of India was the perception that India’s relations with the United States and other major regional powers would have an important impact on China’s strategic landscape.

Chinese Strategic Thinking on China–India Border Tensions

China–India bilateral relations in the early 2020s occurred in the shadow of the 2020 Galwan Valley incident, a context keenly on the minds of Chinese analysts. Lou and Wang lamented the disappearance of the longstanding framework for bilateral relations, in which border disputes were “decoupled” from the rest of the bilateral relationship, arguing that this framework had been replaced by a more competitive approach.⁵² Assessing the question of why the Galwan Valley dispute had such a deleterious impact on bilateral relations compared to other border incidents, they focused on the Indian demand for normalization of the border as a precondition for the normalization of the overall relationship, Modi’s hawkish, nationalistic insistence on “absolute security,” and a crisis management model that involved more use of force and coordination with the United States.⁵³ Others traced India’s approach to the border to its desire to monopolize the South Asian security order by maintaining a Himalayan barrier. They identified disputes over border defense infrastructure—the roads built near the LAC—as a major source of recent China–India tension.⁵⁴

Chinese observers widely blamed India for the rise in bilateral border tensions, failing to seriously evaluate any Chinese role. Hu Shisheng and Wang Jun attributed the rise in border confrontations under Modi to India’s “habitual crossing” of the LAC and blamed India’s road construction for the “continuous encroachment and penetration” of Chinese-controlled areas.⁵⁶ More broadly, Lou and Wang blamed India for failing to decouple border disputes from the overall relationship.⁵⁵ Left unexplored was how Chinese behavior contributed to border tensions.

The impact of increased border tensions was not limited to the bilateral relationship. Some analysts contended that concern about border disputes, elevated by the Galwan Valley incident, was a key factor that led India to abandon its ambiguous approach to the Quad in favor of clear, strong support.⁵⁷ For example, while India had previously resisted Australia’s requests to join the Malabar military exercise, India agreed to allow Australia to join following the eruption of violence in the Galwan Valley; analysts interpreted India’s military cooperation with the members of the Quad as an attempt to deter China.⁵⁸ Meanwhile, under Modi, India had turned to Japan as an important source of investment for infrastructure projects in India’s strategically sensitive northeast.⁵⁹ Others identified India’s border insecurity as a motivation for its military aid and development assistance to Vietnam. By supporting Vietnam’s position in the South China Sea, they argued, India believed it could use Vietnam to contain China.⁶⁰ Far from being limited to the bilateral relationship, Chinese analysts saw the China–India border relations as shaping India’s broader geopolitical strategy during the early 2020s.

Chinese Strategic Thinking on India’s Maritime Strategy

Chinese analysts continued to carefully assess India’s maritime strategy during the early 2020s, sometimes connecting it directly to China–India border tensions. Lei Dingkun and Feng Renjie asserted that since the 2020 border skirmishes, two camps had formed in India. The “radical” camp urges the Indian government to act aggressively against China in the Indian Ocean to increase India’s leverage over the territorial dispute. By contrast, the “rationalist” camp is wary of escalating the dispute and provoking Chinese retaliation and argues instead that India should adopt a denial strategy in the Indian Ocean to “check and balance” China’s advantages on land. Fundamentally, however, both positions advocate the “use of the sea to control the land,” which refers to Indian efforts to compensate for India’s military weaknesses relative to China on land by increasing India’s maritime capabilities, both through Indian investment in the navy and by developing stronger relationships with the United States and other partners. Lei and Feng argued that India has gradually implemented the strategy of “using the sea to control the land,” both in the Indian Ocean, where India has a geopolitical advantage, and through its cooperation with Southeast Asian countries and extra-regional powers.⁶¹ Placing the shift toward the sea in a more historical context, Shen Qinyu contended that, since the end of the Cold War, the strategic constraints imposed by India’s tensions with its land neighbors, Pakistan and China, have encouraged India to prioritize a maritime strategy that allows it to protect its sovereignty, pursue economic development through trade, and expand its blue-water naval capabilities.⁶²

Others identified additional motivations for India’s shift in focus from land to sea power. Many Chinese analysts recognized the catalytic role of the BRI, although they did not question the fundamental validity of this Chinese policy. Some argued that India perceives China’s 21st Century Maritime Silk Road as a strategic threat because Indian analysts believe China to be encircling India, creating a maritime “string of pearls,” and replacing India’s regional influence through infrastructure programs.⁶³ Others traced the motivations for India’s focus on sea power not only to the BRI, but also to the influence of the US Indo-Pacific Strategy and increasing Indian strength.⁶⁴ Another view highlighted India’s pursuit of its “great power dream”, its quest for economic development, and its concerns about energy security.⁶⁵

Chinese analysts argued that India’s maritime objectives in the early 2020s could be understood as encompassing three main goals: “military security, political diplomacy, and economic development.”⁶⁶ In terms of military security, India was focused on “controlling the Indian Ocean and influencing the Pacific Ocean” by investing in naval modernization, strengthening its control over strategic maritime chokepoints, and pursuing military cooperation with members of the Quad.⁶⁷ India’s political diplomacy focused on extending influence on the basis of its sea power in South Asia. To this end, India focused on achieving control of the Indian Ocean and creating an image of itself as a “friendly security provider” through maritime governance mechanisms and institutionalization, such as the Indian Ocean Naval Forum (in which India eventually grudgingly allowed China to have observer status) and the Indian Ocean Rim Regional Cooperation Alliance, by expanding its participation in ASEAN-led mechanisms, and by building relations with countries in Southeast Asia and with island nations in the Indian Ocean.⁶⁸ The economic development aspects of India’s maritime strategy focused on its control of trade routes in the Indian Ocean, which are essential to India’s own security and allow India to influence regional economic development and even, potentially, global supply chains.⁶⁹

Others characterized India’s maritime objectives in terms of its relations with China. Li Xinya and Shi Yinhong argued that India had adopted a three-part hedging strategy toward China. First, India supports the Quad and is strengthening its bilateral military and political relationships with the United States, Japan, and Australia to counter China. Second, India has attempted to limit China’s regional military presence by deploying India’s forces to key international waterways and strategic locations in the region. Li and Shi argue that India’s insistence on controlling these shipping lanes—either by protecting them or by blockading them—is an “implicit warning” targeted at China because China is uniquely dependent on these waterways. At the same time, India has strengthened its military deployments to two overseas territories, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Third, India has tried to persuade neighboring countries that have already adopted pro-China policies, such as the Maldives and Sri Lanka, to adopt neutral or pro-India positions instead by offering alternative political and economic aid packages.⁷⁰ Taken together, analysis of India’s maritime policy highlighted the increasing strategic competition between Chinese naval ambitions and India’s increasingly assertive position in the Indian Ocean and beyond.

Chinese Strategic Thinking on Implications for Chinese Interests

Finally, Chinese analysts explored the implications for Chinese interests, encompassing core interests like the BRI and the South China Sea, as well as China’s relationships with Southeast Asia and the broader Global South. Analysts were attentive to the impact of India’s increasingly assertive foreign policy on the BRI, a centerpiece of Chinese policy. On the one hand, they were highly critical and sometimes dismissive of India’s infrastructure aid. For example, they argued that Indian aid is overshadowed by the much larger development assistance provided by Japan, the United States, and China. India is the world’s fifth largest economy, but it is far less wealthy than these three countries and faces significant economic constraints, particularly considering its increased spending on domestic infrastructure and growing defense budget.⁷¹ Consequently, India has limited capacity to fund infrastructure projects.⁷² Wang Qiubin and Guo Zhengyang criticized India’s development aid strategy as instrumentalist, egotistical, and overly focused on strategic competition. Holding up China’s development aid approach as a model, they argue that India should instead cooperate with China and other donors to create win-win results.⁷³

Yet, Chinese analysts were plainly concerned that Indian efforts would challenge the success of the BRI. India’s indirect criticism of the BRI rankled: Chinese observers noted that while Indian leaders do not always name China in public, these leaders argue that infrastructure projects in the Global South should not become debt traps and should respect sovereignty and territorial integrity.⁷⁴ They asserted that India’s hedging response to the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road negatively impacted China’s economic and military security by disrupting China’s infrastructure deals with regional partners.⁷⁵ They cited with concern India’s developmental assistance to countries like Myanmar (which borders both China and India) and military aid to Vietnam (with which China has disputes in the South China Sea).⁷⁶ Moreover, even if India’s capacity was limited on its own, the Quad’s work on infrastructure indicated that India was part of a broader effort to compete with the BRI.⁷⁷

Chinese analysts were also concerned about the implications of Indian policy for Chinese interests in the South China Sea. Shen Qinyu asserted that India’s “Act East” policy is based on the theoretical concept of a “security circle,” in which India is the center and its strategic interests radiate out in concentric semicircles. Of particular importance to Chinese observers was India’s decision to include the South China Sea in its secondary interest area; Shen argued that Indian involvement is welcomed by ASEAN member states, but also increases the complexity of China’s disputes with various Southeast Asian states.⁷⁸ India had shifted from neutrality to active support for the Philippines’ position on its South China Sea dispute with China and the findings of the 2016 tribunal. Meanwhile, India’s military diplomacy raised concerns: for example, in May 2023 India and Indonesia conducted a joint military exercise in the South China Sea and in August 2023 India signed a memorandum of understanding with the Philippine Coast Guard on maritime cooperation. Indian control of the key sea lines of communication (SLOCs) in the South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca would pose a threat to China given China’s dependence on trade through these SLOCs. Shen asserted that intervention in the South China Sea provides India with “political capital”—with members of the Quad—that, in turn, supports its efforts to strengthen its maritime influence.⁷⁹ Others connected India’s interest in the South China Sea to its strategy of “using the sea to control the land” in its ongoing competition with China, contending that Indian policymakers recognize that India can best leverage its maritime advantages by encroaching upon China’s core interests, such as the South China Sea. From its starting point in the Indian Ocean, India has moved eastward by deepening its cooperation with ASEAN and participating in the Quad. This eastward movement brings India’s navy right up to China’s core interests, such as the South China Sea.⁸⁰

Beyond concerns about the implications of Indian policy for the BRI and the South China Sea, Chinese analysts were concerned about the implications for China’s relations with Southeast Asia and the Global South more broadly. Underlying much of this analysis was a clear sense that China and India were competing for influence in Southeast Asia.⁸¹  Shen asserted that Modi’s pursuit of a “free, open, prosperous, and inclusive Indo-Pacific” has spurred India to expand military cooperation with ASEAN and various ASEAN member states (for example, India’s May 2023 joint maritime military exercises with seven ASEAN member states). At the same time, India is working with ASEAN on issues such as maritime governance and connectivity, as well as to develop maritime resources and protect the environment.⁸² Others saw China’s development assistance to the four countries on the Indochinese peninsula—Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam—not just as a challenge to the success of the BRI, but as an Indian effort to increase its influence in the Global South and advance its quest to develop into a global power.⁸³ Meanwhile, ASEAN, while still attempting to balance among major powers and maintain autonomy, has strengthened its relations with India and “welcomed” its Act East overtures.⁸⁴

Other analysts saw the competition for influence as reaching beyond Southeast Asia. Zhang Jie contended that India seeks to limit China’s influence in the Global South by defining China as a “participant in great power competition” rather than as a member of the Global South. In doing so, it seeks to replace China as the leader of the Global South. Nevertheless, Zhang concluded that India’s Global South strategy will fail because most Global South countries will be unwilling to choose between China, the United States, and India.⁸⁵ All in all, this Chinese analysis reflected a struggle with how seriously to take the Indian threat to China’s regional and global influence.

Conclusion

Chinese analysis of India during the early 2020s took place against the backdrop of two important contextual factors: the significant institutionalization of Quad relations and the intensely damaging impact of the 2020 Galwan Valley dispute. Analysts debated whether India was pursuing a strategy of multi-alignment and strategic autonomy or siding with the United States against China, the causes and consequences of ongoing border tensions, the development of Indian maritime strategy, and the implications of Indian policy for core Chinese interests like the BRI and the South China Sea and for broader Chinese interests in regional and global influence. Differences of opinion were pronounced, hinting at uncertainty regarding China’s strategy, but debate was limited by Chinese analysts’ failure to question China’s decisions or recognize the legitimacy of India pursuing autonomous great power interests inconsistent with China’s.

With India in 2024 doubling down on its relationship with Russia, including Modi’s visit there in July, and Indo–US tensions over Modi’s human rights policies, China may have found more reason to appeal to the Indian leader. Driving a wedge between Washington and its partners in East Asia and Asia’s southern tier had become a more pressing concern. Given the way China’s leaders had interpreted border issues, the BRI, the Quad, and maritime security, however, talk of a breakthrough in China–India relations was exaggerated. China was not prepared to address the fundamental problems that had kept bilateral relations on edge since 2020 or to seriously question its approach to India.