China’s Relations with Asia’s Southern Tier, 2013–2016

The emergence of a new, more assertive Chinese foreign policy under President Xi Jinping had enormous implications for China’s relations with Asia’s Southern Tier—India, Australia, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Shortly after taking power in November 2012, Xi urged his country to achieve the “China Dream” of “the great revival of the Chinese nation.”¹ No longer content to “keep a low profile” and eager to translate China’s massive economic growth into trans-regional political influence, Xi’s ambitious foreign policy increased the significance of China’s relations with Asia’s Southern Tier.²

Three themes were particularly prominent in Chinese assessments of China’s relations with India, Australia, and ASEAN, though they carried different weight in each case. The first was each party’s bilateral relations with the United States, as Chinese warily assessed whether each party was engaged in “balancing” or “hedging” behavior against China. Both Australia and ASEAN had traditionally relied on the United States to ensure their security, but growing economic ties were bringing them closer to China. Meanwhile India, despite its long tradition of non-alignment, was nevertheless building a closer strategic relationship with the United States. Chinese analysts remained alert to the possibility that these parties might coordinate with the United States to check Chinese regional ambitions.

The second main theme was the South China Sea disputes, which dominated Chinese assessments of China’s relations with ASEAN, particularly as the Hague Tribunal reached its conclusion in 2016. Australia’s South China Sea policy was also a significant topic of discussion, with Chinese observers rejecting Australia’s involvement as “external interference” by an extra-regional party. China’s insistence on its “historical rights” in the South China Sea were a source of repeated tension in its bilateral relations, despite its efforts to confine these disputes to direct negotiations with claimant countries.

The third theme was China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), rolled out in the fall of 2013. The BRI was a major theme in Chinese assessments of Sino–Indian relations, as China struggled to persuade India to support the initiative. Given the location of China’s 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, the BRI was also crucial to China’s policy toward ASEAN, as China pursued infrastructure deals to build railroads and ports with various ASEAN member states and sought to link the BRI with ASEAN’s development agenda. Surprisingly, however, the BRI was a relatively understated theme in Chinese analysis of Sino–ASEAN relations during the mid-2010s, likely due to the overwhelming dominance of the South China Sea disputes.

The sections that follow evaluate the evolution of China’s bilateral relations with India, Australia, and ASEAN from 2013–2016, and the key themes underlying Chinese analysis of this era.

Sino-Indian Relations, 2013–2016

As Xi Jinping established his new foreign policy direction in 2013, China seemed eager to portray Sino–Indian relations as standing on stable ground, despite historical tensions. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, of the Congress Party, had been in office since 2004. The two countries had established a strategic partnership in 2005. In December 2010, they had agreed to launch a strategic economic dialogue, which met first in September 2011 and again in November 2012, amid a general trend of expanding trade relations (albeit one that featured a significant Indian trade deficit). The April 2013 “tent dispute,” in which approximately 50 Chinese soldiers set up camp in Indian-claimed territory in the Ladakh region of Kashmir and pronounced it to be part of China, threatened to unsettle relations, but Indian and Chinese leaders remained committed to seeking a cooperative relationship. In May, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang made India the first stop on his first overseas trip as premier, stating, “My visit to India is meant to tell the world that mutual political confidence between China and India is growing, that our practical cooperation is expanding, and that our common interests far outweigh our disagreements.”³ The two countries commemorated the occasion by signing agreements on matters including trade, agriculture, and environmental protection. In October, Singh returned the visit, and the two countries signed nine agreements, covering border defense cooperation, as well as transportation, education, and energy.⁴

Chinese observers pointed to several seeming commonalities between China and India to support their view that the two countries’ interests could be made compatible. Both China and India were ancient Asian civilizations with long, proud traditions. Both had been wronged by Western imperialists, who bore responsibility for the ongoing border disputes. As emerging economies and the world’s two most populous countries, the future of global economic growth rested with them. And as rising non-Western powers, they could work together to create a multipolar world order and reform a system that had been dominated by the United States and the West.⁵

Writing in mid-2013, Lan Jianxue was full of optimism about the future of the bilateral relationship. He argued that bilateral relations were “normalizing” as the two countries strengthened their cooperation. Lan saw the world as big enough for both countries; they would not compete against each other for influence. Instead, he believed that they were aligned in the international arena, and that India had become “a strategic partner that China can rely on” as they worked toward shared goals in economics, energy security, and climate change. In contrast to other Chinese analysts, Lan was even unperturbed about India’s deepening relationship with the United States and the West; he argued that this would reduce the sense of threat that India felt from China and make it more confident in pursuing cooperative relations with China. While Lan recognized the ongoing challenges posed by border disputes, he commended the two countries for establishing the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India–China Border Affairs in January 2012 and for what he saw as the effective management of the April 2013 Ladakh dispute. Lan was so optimistic that he ventured a prediction that Sino–Indian relations might even shift from “high politics” to “low politics” in the future, as issues like the border, Tibet, and security were increasingly supplanted by questions of economics and trade. Although Lan recognized that India would hold elections in 2014 and that the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) could come to power, he did not anticipate that the “fundamentals” of the bilateral relationship would change significantly.⁶

In fact, Sino–Indian relations headed in a significantly different direction in 2014 for two important reasons. The first was the introduction of China’s new Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), announced by Xi Jinping during visits to Kazakhstan (the Silk Road Economic Belt) in September 2013 and to Indonesia (the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road) in October 2013. The effort to strengthen China’s maritime connections to the Middle East and Europe amplified China’s interests in the Indian Ocean, drawing India’s concern. The second was the election of Prime Minister Narendra Modi of the BJP in May 2014, which took India in a more nationalist direction.

Modi’s administration adopted two policies that were seen by Chinese observers as having significant implications for the implementation of the BRI. The Indian Ministry of Culture’s Project Mausam, launched at the 38th session of the UNESCO World Heritage Committee in June 2014, was ostensibly designed to rebuild India’s cultural ties to other countries along the Indian Ocean.⁷ Despite Project Mausam’s cultural focus, however, this initiative drew the attention of Chinese observers because it focused on many of the same countries with which China was seeking closer ties to implement the “road” portion of the BRI.⁸ Then, at the November 2014 India–ASEAN Summit, Modi announced India’s “Act East” policy. The “Act East” policy upgraded India’s “Look East” policy, established in 1991, by refocusing India’s attention on its relations with Southeast Asia and East Asia. Consequently, just as China was pushing westward into the Indian Ocean, India began to push eastward toward the Asia-Pacific.

Nevertheless, as Modi came to power, Chinese observers’ perceptions of Sino–Indian relations remained largely positive. Zhao Gancheng argued that despite the history of Sino–Indian border conflicts, there was a great deal of room for cooperation between the two countries because they held similar structural positions in the world order. Although Zhao rejected the notion that India was a “great power” on the scale of China, he recognized both countries as important emerging powers that faced similar challenges from the West and held similar interests in “modifying” the rules of the existing world order in ways that better advanced their interests. Zhao argued that although the two countries were “not natural partners” and “may even be natural competitors,” their shared interests could undergird cooperation, perhaps through the BRICS formation. Writing in the first half of 2014, before Modi’s new policy direction became apparent, Zhao’s discussion of bilateral conflicts was limited to border issues, with no discussion of the two countries’ competing interests in South Asia or the Indian Ocean.⁹

Writing that same spring, Wang Xiaowen and Li Baojun were also generally positive in their assessment of the prospects for Sino–Indian cooperation but drew more attention to the challenges in the relationship than other observers. They blamed India for acting “aggressively” during the April 2013 Ladakh incident and charged that India was pursuing a more robust military posture in the Indian Ocean to “check and balance” China’s influence. Although the question of India’s naval presence in the Indian Ocean came last among a list of bilateral challenges, which also included border disputes, the contentious status of Tibet, and Indian protectionism arising from its trade deficit with China, it pointed to competition for influence in the Indian Ocean as an increasingly important obstacle to stronger bilateral relations. Wang and Li took a predominantly geopolitical lens to understand the sources of these tensions, while also recognizing the impact of domestic politics and public opinion in India. They argued that India’s quest to become a great power caused it to unreasonably perceive China’s actions as potential threats and asserted that India saw US interest in stronger bilateral relations as an opportunity to use US power to push back against China. Nevertheless, Wang and Li expected the Sino–Indian relationship to remain stable because of the two countries’ many shared interests, India’s longstanding non-alignment policy (which would limit its cooperation with the United States), and the trend toward more frequent high-level exchanges and cooperation in multilateral organizations.¹⁰

This optimism seemed to be supported by high-level efforts. In September 2014, Modi greeted Xi’s official visit with a new slogan of “Inch towards Miles,” explaining, “INCH that is ‘India–China’; towards MILES—‘millennium of exceptional synergy.’”¹¹ The two countries signed agreements on economics and trade, developed a five-year economic and trade cooperation plan that covered pharmaceuticals, agriculture, and information technology (IT), and agreed to launch a cultural exchange program.¹²

In 2015, as China’s implementation of the BRI advanced and India’s resistance became apparent, the attention of Chinese observers turned to how to build India’s support for the initiative. In March 2015, the Chinese government released “Visions and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road,” which elaborated on China’s “belt” and “road” routes. Three aspects of the expanding project directly impacted India: the southernmost route of the Silk Road Economic Belt, which transited from China through Southeast Asia and South Asia to the Indian Ocean; the portion of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road that flowed from China’s coast through the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean to Europe, and the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) Economic Corridor, which the Chinese government officially described as “closely related to the Belt and Road Initiative,” but which many Chinese observers included as part of their BRI analysis.¹³

With India not yet having made any official statement regarding the BRI, some Chinese observers were optimistic that India could be persuaded to accept the Chinese policy because of the two countries’ compatible interests. Liu Zuming and Feng Huaxin highlighted the two countries’ shared interests in rapid economic development, stable bilateral and regional relations, and the creation of a new world order that better reflected the priorities of emerging powers. They believed these common interests would make India receptive to the BRI, and advocated stronger policy communication, expanded trade and financial integration, a focus on connectivity projects like the BCIM Economic Corridor, and expanded cultural exchanges.¹⁴

Other Chinese observers agreed on the necessity of gaining India’s support (or at least, acquiescence) to the BRI, but anticipated more significant challenges. Xie Jing predicted that China and India would compete for the influence and support of ASEAN, which Xie saw as a key geographical area for the BRI, but which was also a key focus of Modi’s “Act East” policy. Xie viewed the “Act East” policy as an attempt by India to “compete with China in Southeast Asia” through stronger economic, political, and security cooperation. Consequently, Xie argued, it was important to find a way to make China’s BRI and India’s “Act East” policy compatible so that India would not prevent China from implementing the BRI—though Xie was short on concrete ideas for how to achieve this.¹⁵

Meanwhile, with US–India relations growing closer (as exemplified by Modi’s visit to the United States in September 2014 and Obama’s visit to India in January 2015), Chinese observers grew more concerned about the possibility that the United States and India might coordinate against China. This was particularly striking in the work of Lan Jianxue, who two years earlier had imagined that India and China could take on the Western-dominated international system together. Now, Lan argued that power politics and nationalism had played a growing role in India’s “increasingly aggressive” foreign policy since 2004—a development that was accelerated, but not initiated, by Modi’s election. As India pursued its “great power dream,” it was intent on creating a “sphere of influence” in the Indian Ocean and South Asia and on moving eastward into the Asia-Pacific. Although India remained tied to its long history of non-alignment, it now saw itself as a “global balancer” or “swing state” that could influence global affairs by picking a side. While Lan believed that India was still hedging between China and the United States, he thought it was doing so mostly because it was not yet convinced that the United States would remain committed to India.¹⁶

Nevertheless, the pattern of high-level visits between India and China continued. In May 2015, Modi visited China, earning praise from Chinese observers for beginning his trip in Xi’an, a city on the ancient Silk Road trade route and the place where Xi began his career.¹⁷ A joint statement released on the occasion of Modi’s visit expressed the two countries’ view that “the simultaneous re-emergence of China and India as two major powers in the region and the world offers a momentous opportunity for realization of the Asian Century” and expressed their commitment to political and strategic dialogue, a developmental partnership, cultural and people-to-people exchanges, transborder cooperation, and coordination to promote the interests of developing countries in multilateral organizations.¹⁸ Li Keqiang reaffirmed the contents of the May statement during a meeting with Modi, while in Kuala Lumpur for the 27th ASEAN Summit in November, and reiterated the complementarities between the two countries’ development strategies.¹⁹

As Xi and Modi further implemented their respective strategies, 2016 brought a surge of articles on Sino–Indian relations by Chinese observers. Their analysis was dominated by the BRI. Chinese experts agreed that India was an important country for the implementation of the BRI, most obviously because of its crucial geographical location. They also noted India’s significance as a large country—in terms of its land area, its population, and its economy—and as a rising world power.²⁰ Yet although Chinese analysts agreed that India’s acceptance of the BRI would be important for the initiative’s success, they disagreed on whether India could be persuaded. Optimists pointed to the two countries’ many shared interests and argued that the implementation of the BRI was in India’s interests. ²¹ Those who took a more measured tone agreed that the BRI could serve both countries’ interests, but warned of challenges that could impede its implementation.²² The most pessimistic perspective argued that China’s BRI and India’s Project Mausam were fundamentally incompatible and that it would be impossible to coordinate these strategies.²³

As in analysis from previous years, many Chinese observers highlighted the two countries’ shared identities as ancient Asian civilizations, rising powers, and populous and developing countries, and pointed to their common interests in regional and global security, a stable global economy, and a new multipolar world order.²⁴ They repeatedly reiterated that China did not see India as a “competitor” or “threat.”²⁵ Xi’s 2014 articulation of a three-level bilateral partnership—as close “development partners,” as regional “cooperative partners,” and as “global partners for strategic coordination”—underlay much of the more positive analysis.²⁶ Rong Ying, for example, argued that the two countries were “natural partners” and insisted that the two countries could successfully link their development strategies.²⁷

Several aspects of the bilateral relationship seemed to support the view that greater cooperation was possible. Chief among them was the two countries’ economic complementarity, with China serving as the “world’s factory” and India as the “world’s office.” This suggested that China could export goods to India, while India could export services to China. Moreover, Chinese observers suggested that China would be a good source for the investment capital necessary to fund Modi’s grand development plans.²⁸ Other factors seemed to point in favor of greater cooperation as well. Chinese analysts highlighted the frequency of high-level exchanges, the effective management of border disputes, and military interconnections and exchanges that built mutual trust.²⁹

Yet, despite these positive factors, Chinese observers noted a variety of challenges that might hinder a closer bilateral relationship and negatively impact Chinese efforts to implement the BRI. Many of these potential challenges were geopolitical. India had a “great power dream,” which might bring its interests into conflict with those of China, particularly in Asia.³⁰ Zhang Li argued that China needed to “normalize” its strategic position in the Indian Ocean to ensure the security of its sea lanes of communication, upon which it depended for trade and energy imports. Yet, India looked upon such Chinese actions with concern, viewing them as a threat to its own energy and maritime security, and as a dangerous intervention in its own “backyard.” ³¹ Chinese analysts repeatedly described Indian concerns that China was attempting to construct a “string of pearls”—a term that originated in the United States to describe perceived Chinese efforts to build a network of civilian ports and naval bases that would allow China to project maritime power into the Indian Ocean.³² Feng Chuanlu traced Indian concerns with maritime security in part to its experiences of colonialization, when India had been invaded from the sea. As a result, noted Indian strategist K. M. Panikkar had argued that sea power was crucial to India’s security—a perspective that continued to influence Indian policy. Feng argued that India was pursuing a version of the “Monroe Doctrine” in South Asia and the Indian Ocean, under which it sought to resist foreign intervention, maintain its historical influence over smaller countries in the region, and expand its military capabilities.³³

The challenges were not limited to these geopolitical concerns. China and India had a long history of disputes regarding their border and Tibet, which generated mutual distrust.³⁴ Qiu Meirong wrote critically about recent Indian military deployments to Arunachal Pradesh and support for Tibetan claims against China.³⁵ Others argued that India’s persistent trade deficit with China gave rise to economic nationalism.³⁶ Several analysts highlighted the complexities of the “imbalanced power structure” in South Asia, highlighting how India felt threatened by close relations between China and Pakistan and the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor.³⁷ These factors all suggested that it would be difficult to convince India to accept the BRI.

A second major theme in Chinese writings on India in 2016 was India’s cooperation with the United States, Japan, and Australia. This analysis mainly focused on India’s bilateral relations with each of these countries, and most researchers did not seem to foresee the revitalization of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue that took shape the following year. Chinese observers highlighted the compatibilities between the Obama administration’s “pivot to Asia” and Modi’s “Act East” strategy and noted increased US–Indian cooperation on maritime security.³⁸ They also referenced Modi’s interest in upgrading India’s relationship with Japan, often in connection with their discussion of US–India relations.³⁹ Others highlighted the rapid development of India–Australia security relations in the twenty-first century. Interestingly, while Ding Cong and Sun Haoliang recognized the role that China’s rise played in motivating closer Indian–Australian relations, they focused more heavily on other motivations, such as anti-terrorism efforts, securing trade routes, and protecting the stability of the Indian Ocean.⁴⁰ While some of this analysis assessed the implications of various bilateral relationships for China’s implementation of the BRI, it was often far broader in scope and focused on the bigger geopolitical regional picture.

Many Chinese observers raised concerns that India was attempting to “balance” against China, both because of its own interests in minimizing Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean and because the United States wanted India’s help to advance its own interests in balancing against China.⁴¹ Yang Siling argued that major powers like the United States and Japan were using India as a “strategic pawn” in their geopolitical competition with China.⁴² Yet, these concerns were tempered by confidence in India’s long tradition of non-alignment. This tradition, Chinese analysts believed, would prevent India from formally allying with other countries like the United States or India.⁴³ Instead, India was more likely to hedge between China and the United States.⁴⁴

Although most authors in 2016 focused on China’s bilateral relationships with India, Japan, and the United States, Ding and Sun presciently observed that closer India–Australia relations created a model for regional security cooperation that excluded China and might make the resumption of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue more likely.⁴⁵ Others anticipated the coming importance of the Indo-Pacific concept. Feng Chuanlu, who offered the most pessimistic perspective on Sino–Indian relations, noted the increasing use of the “Indo-Pacific” concept in Indian (as well as Australian and US) analysis since 2010. Feng argued that although the precise meaning of this term was unclear, it was evident that it had “geopolitical connotations” and was directed against China. Feng saw Modi’s “Act East” policy as embodying India’s embrace of the “Indo-Pacific” strategic concept.⁴⁶ Meanwhile, Rong Ying, though much more optimistic about the prospects for Sino–Indian cooperation, argued that the United States’ emphasis on the “Indo-Pacific” concept in its strategic discussions with India was one reason for worsening Indian perceptions of China.⁴⁷ Despite these occasional references, however, the “Indo-Pacific” was not yet a term that was often used by Chinese analysts writing on India.

Key Takeaways

Implicit in Chinese narratives on Sino–Indian relations were the two most obvious questions: First, should China treat India as a great power, recognizing the rise of nationalism under Modi and accommodating India’s quest for a sphere of influence—as Xi accommodated Russia’s quest and made plans for expanding China’s own sphere? Second, how could China modify the BRI and other plans to win India’s acceptance as a partner? The first four years of Xi Jinping’s leadership proved to be a critical time for setting the long-term agenda in Sino–Indian relations. Candor about dealing with a similar “rising giant” on the world and regional stage fell short. Chinese strategists engaged in intensive debates about India, but they failed to grasp India’s potential as a rival or China’s capacity to alter India’s trajectory. Although they recognized the danger of losing India, key issues were omitted from discussion.

While China set a new course for regionalism with BRI, Chinese analysts said little about the importance of attracting India. Their discussions centered on whether India would fit into China’s plans, not whether a plan could satisfy India. Clearly, Sinocentrism left little room in Asia’s Southern Tier for a rising power of India’s stature. If prospects for relations with India remained unsettled entering 2017, the die was cast by the way Chinese conceptualized India and the future of bilateral relations.

Sino-Australian Relations, 2013–2016

On the heels of Australia’s October 2012 “Australia in the Asian Century” White Paper, Sino–Australian policy from 2013–2016 reflected Australia’s interest in strengthening relations with China—and countries in the Asia-Pacific more broadly—while also maintaining its longstanding relationship with the United States. In April 2013, Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard visited China. After Gillard met with Chinese Premier Li Keqiang, the two countries announced the formation of a “strategic partnership” and the establishment of annual meetings between their prime ministers, the China–Australia Diplomatic and Strategic Dialogue (first held that December), and the China–Australia Strategic Economic Dialogue (first held in June 2014).⁴⁸ In May, Australia issued a Defence White Paper, which, in the view of one Chinese observer, took a “more positive view of China” than the previous 2009 Defence White Paper. The 2013 Defence White Paper argued that China’s economic growth contributed positively to regional development and explained its military modernization as a “natural and legitimate outcome of its economic growth,” clearly stating that Australia did not view China as an “adversary.”⁴⁹

In Australia’s September 2013 elections, the Liberal–National Coalition defeated the incumbent Australian Labor Party, and Tony Abbott became prime minister. Abbott’s diplomacy with China got off to a quick start, with a phone call with Xi shortly after Abbott took office and a meeting with Xi on the sidelines of the 2013 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Bali the next month. Later that fall, Abbott and Li Keqiang met at the eighth East Asian Summit in Brunei. One Chinese analyst anticipated that Abbott would adopt a “pragmatic and prudent policy toward China” that recognized China’s key role in Australia’s “Asia-first policy” without damaging Australia’s traditionally close relationship with the United States.⁵⁰ In November, Australia’s decision to summon the Chinese ambassador over China’s establishment of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea brought Chinese condemnation.⁵¹ However, these tensions did not derail the positive development of Sino–Australian relations.

In 2014, Abbott met with Xi in Beijing in April, and returned to Beijing in November for the APEC summit. Xi then flew to Brisbane for the G20 summit, followed by a state visit to Australia, during which he gave a speech to the Australian Parliament, entitled, “Pursuing Chinese and Australian Development Dreams Hand in Hand and Achieving Regional Prosperity and Stability Shoulder to Shoulder.”⁵² During Xi’s visit, the two countries announced the upgrading of their relationship to a “comprehensive strategic partnership” and the completion of negotiations on the China–Australia Free Trade Agreement (ChAFTA). The two countries also committed to strengthening exchanges between students and between provincial and state leaders.⁵³

Australia and China continued to pursue closer economic relations in 2015. In March, Australia expressed its interest in joining the China-led Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB), officially becoming a member that December.⁵⁴ In June, China and Australia officially signed ChAFTA, which also went into effect that December.  The free trade agreement set the two countries on a pathway toward eliminating tariffs on 100 percent of Chinese exports to Australia and 98 per cent of Australian exports to China, Australia’s largest export market.⁵⁵ The two countries also exchanged naval visits in October, when a Chinese naval hospital ship visited Australia and two Australian frigates visited China. Australia’s decision to conduct a “freedom of navigation” air patrol over the South China Sea in November–December 2015 drew predictable Chinese criticism. Nevertheless, Chinese observers pointed to the annual strategic defense exchange that December as a sign of the two countries’ institutionalized and deepening military relationship, which was reinforced by joint Chinese–Australian military exercises held in early January 2016.⁵⁶

In February 2016, Australia released a new Defence White Paper. The Australian government stated that “Australia welcomes China’s continued economic growth and the opportunities this is bringing for Australia and other countries in the Indo-Pacific” and reiterated Australia’s support for the comprehensive strategic partnership. The White Paper further stated that Australia “will seek to deepen and broaden our important defence relationship with China while recognizing that our strategic interests may differ in relation to some regional and global security issues”—a reference to differences between China and Australia over the East China Sea and South China Sea.⁵⁷ Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull, who had taken office in September 2015, made his first visit to China as prime minister in April 2016, where he met with Li Keqiang and Xi Jinping. Although the official agenda focused on trade, tourism, and research exchanges, rising Sino–US tensions in the South China Sea loomed over the visit.⁵⁸

In July, Australia’s Liberal–National Coalition narrowly won the general election, keeping Turnbull in power. Writing late that year, Han Feng predicted that Turnbull’s policy toward China would remain stable and focused on closer economic cooperation, but that tensions in the South China Sea would complicate Australia’s efforts to balance its relationships with China and the United States.⁵⁹ Turnbull made a second trip to China in September 2016 for the G20 meeting in Hangzhou, where he again met with Xi. This time, a key focus of the visit was China’s dissatisfaction with the recent Australian decision to block the purchase of Australia’s largest energy grid by State Grid Corp of China and Hong Kong’s Cheung Kong Infrastructure Holdings, citing “security concerns.”⁶⁰

Chinese analysts were quite consistent in their assessments of Sino–Australian relations between 2013–2016. Much of their analysis was grounded in the theoretical concept of “middle powers”—countries that lack the global influence of great powers, but which have significant regional influence (or even dominance). Yu Lei and Shamsul Khan argue that middle powers are “status quo” states: they are committed to the continuation of the existing hierarchical global system and seek to maintain their “middle power” status. To achieve these goals, middle powers often ally with superpowers—as Australia has long done with the United States. The US–Australian alliance, institutionalized in the 1951 ANZUS Treaty, ensures Australia’s security. ⁶¹

For many years, Australia’s economic interests were aligned with its security interests: its largest trading partner was either the United States or Japan, a close US ally.⁶² Australia’s economic and security interests became “decoupled,” however, with China’s economic rise; China became Australia’s largest trading partner in 2007. Consequently, Chinese observers argued, Australia has tried to “hedge” by balancing its security relationship with the United States against its economic relationship with China. So long as Sino–US relations are stable, this balancing is possible. However, Chinese analysts foresaw that a difficult Sino–US relationship might put Australia in a bind, forcing it to choose sides between China and the United States.⁶³

In the mid-2010s, Australia remained committed to the US–Australia alliance as the “cornerstone” of its national security policy. In part this was practical: as a sparsely populated but geographically vast “lonely continental island,” Australia lacks the resources to independently defend itself. Others argued that it reflected Australian wariness of China’s strategic intentions, despite the two countries’ closer economic ties. Australia hoped that the United States could balance China’s growing regional influence, and therefore supported the Obama administration’s “Asia-Pacific rebalance.”⁶⁴ A 2015 Lowy Institute poll found that 80% of Australians viewed the US–Australia alliance as “‘very’ or ‘fairly important’ for Australia’s national security.”⁶⁵ Australia’s military relations with the United States during this period reflected the central role of the alliance. In May 2013, the Australia–US Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty, which facilitated exchanges of military technology and made it easier for the United States to export weapons technology to Australia, entered into force. In August 2014, the two countries signed the US–Australia Force Posture Agreement, which allows the United States to station Marines in Darwin and US Air Force personnel in northern Australia.⁶⁶ The 2016 Defence White Paper affirmed that the United States “will continue to be Australia’s most important strategic partner” and asserted that “the global strategic and economic weight of the United States will be essential to the continued stability of the rules-based global order on which Australia relies for our security and prosperity.”⁶⁷ In the view of one Chinese analyst, Australia’s support for the Obama administration’s “pivot to Asia” and its willingness to take on more significant military responsibilities both advanced Australian interests and demonstrated Australia’s “loyalty” to the alliance.⁶⁸

At the same time, however, Australia eagerly pursued closer economic ties with China. This reflected both the importance of trade for Australia as an island country and the specific importance of China as its largest trading partner. China’s total trade volume with Australia grew rapidly during the early 2010s, increasing 44.8 percent between 2010 and 2014.⁶⁹ In 2015, Australia and China’s bilateral trade in goods totaled $107.21 billion, with goods exported to China accounting for nearly a third of Australia’s total exports and goods imported from China accounting for nearly a quarter of Australia’s total imports. China and Australia’s bilateral trade volume was 20% more than Australia’s bilateral trade volume with the United States and Japan (its second and third largest trading partners) combined.⁷⁰ Australia’s pursuit of more extensive economic relations with China was also motivated by Australia’s need to diversify its economy and reduce the outsized role of its mineral and energy exports in the wake of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis.⁷¹ These government policies were well supported by public opinion: a 2015 Lowy Poll found that 77% of Australians viewed China as “‘more of an economic partner to Australia’ than a ‘military threat.’”⁷²

While Chinese observers argued that Australia’s balancing or hedging position was driven by its own interests, they also suggested that Australia’s complicated identity supported such a policy. Geographically, Australia is a Pacific country that borders southern Asia. This makes Asian countries like Japan and China natural trading partners for Australia and supports Australia’s “Asia-first” policy. Culturally, however, Australia sees itself as a Western country. These shared values form the basis for Australia’s close relationship with the United States.⁷³ Arguing that many Australians still distrust China as a “communist country,” Wei Zongyou contended that China’s rising influence over the regional order “heralds the end of the era of Anglo-Saxon civilization’s control of Asia’s seas.”⁷⁴ The implication was that this would be challenging for Australia, which had relied on a shared “Anglo-Saxon” heritage in depending first on the United Kingdom and then on the United States for its security.

A second theme in Chinese analysis of Australia between 2013–2016 was Australia’s policy toward the East China Sea and South China Sea. Chinese observers were sharply critical of Australia’s response to China’s declaration of an ADIZ in the East China Sea in November 2013, which encompassed the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and overlapped with previously declared Japanese, South Korean, and Taiwanese ADIZs.⁷⁵ Han Feng argued that the Australian government “overreacted” by summoning the Chinese ambassador, noting that it was the “only Western country” to do so.⁷⁶ Wei Zongyou criticized Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop’s “irresponsible remarks,” and praised Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s statement that Australia’s response had “damaged the mutual trust and affected the healthy development” of Sino–Australian relations.⁷⁷ Nevertheless, Wang Lianhe noted approvingly that Australia responded to Beijing’s criticism by reiterating its commitment to the Sino–Australian strategic partnership and its support for ChAFTA negotiations.⁷⁸

Australia’s policy toward the South China Sea drew significant attention, which was not surprising given the prominence of the South China Sea disputes in China’s foreign policy at the time. Feng Lei and Yu Changsen noted archly that although Australia was neither a claimant nor a direct neighbor to the South China Sea, it had aligned with the United States to intervene in the sovereignty disputes. Nevertheless, they recognized that Australia’s South China Sea policy was driven by its interest in maintaining secure channels for its global trade, two-thirds of which transited through the South China Sea. They were perhaps less sympathetic to what they viewed as Australia’s other motivations: its desire to support the US return to Asia, and its attempts to build stronger relations with ASEAN and strengthen Australia’s regional “middle power” status.⁷⁹ Chinese analysts criticized Australia’s support for the Philippines’ pursuit of arbitration under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and for its 2015 freedom of navigation patrols, though they noted that Australia had not yet participated in joint patrols with the United States.⁸⁰ While some observers, like Feng and Yu, disparaged what they saw as Australian efforts to cater to the US position, others, like Han Feng, argued that the Chinese and Australian positions were not necessarily opposed. Han argued that, as for China, Australia needed a stable regional environment to promote its economic development and that Australia did not “oppose China’s sovereignty claims,” but rather “demands a peaceful solution.”⁸¹ In many ways, Chinese views of Australia’s policy on the South China Sea were a microcosm of their broader perception of Australia’s hedging behavior, with Australia trying to balance its security interests in close relations with the United States against its economic interests in close ties with China.

A third theme in Chinese analysis of Australia’s foreign policy during this period was Australia’s bilateral relations with Japan and India, as well as trilateral configurations involving the United States. During an October 2013 meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Abbott called Japan “Australia’s best friend in Asia.”⁸² Australia’s longstanding economic ties with Japan further deepened with the signing of a bilateral free trade agreement (FTA) in July 2014 (which went into effect in January 2015). Chinese analysts observed that Japanese–Australian relations were rooted not only in trade and their mutual interest in regional economic development, but also in the two countries’ shared positions as unequal allies of the United States and their commitment to Western values.⁸³ Chinese observers also noted the two countries’ close security relationship, citing the 2007 Japan–Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation and the resulting 2+2 dialogues between the two countries’ foreign and defense ministers, as well as their joint military exercises. In 2014, the two countries announced that they were upgrading their relationship to a “special strategic partnership” and signed an agreement to promote the transfer of defense technologies. Liu Qing argued that this increased bilateral cooperation was motivated in part by a desire to build a new regional order in the Asia-Pacific in the context of China’s rise, but reasoned that mistrust and domestic political differences would prevent them from forming a military alliance. Another analyst noted the well-established Trilateral Strategic Dialogue among the United States, Japan, and Australia. Trilateral cooperation strengthened each country’s regional capabilities, and, as a result, their ability to check China’s maritime ambitions.⁸⁴

Australia’s deepening bilateral relationship with India also drew notice. Chinese analysts asserted that Australia had pursued closer ties with India since 2008, with a particular focus on ensuring maritime security in the Indian Ocean, and pointed to the two countries’ annual ministerial-level dialogues as evidence that the two countries were growing closer. Negotiations on a bilateral FTA were ongoing (although they were paused in 2016). Han Feng argued that Australia would continue to prioritize its relationship with India as a key part of its Asia-first policy, which had expanded beyond its original focus on East Asia. Stronger ties with India would also help Australia to diversify its economy and reduce its trade dependence on China.⁸⁵ Chinese analysts also noted the establishment of a trilateral dialogue between Australia, India, and Japan in June 2015.⁸⁶

Chinese discussions of Australia’s relations with Japan and India were rooted in their assessment of Australia’s embrace of the “Indo-Pacific” concept. Analysts noted the prominence of this term in the 2013 Defence White Paper, which called the Indo-Pacific “a logical extension” of the earlier Australian notion of a “wider Asia-Pacific region,” which “adjusts Australia’s priority strategic focus to the arc extending from India through Southeast Asia to Northeast Asia, including the sea lines of communication on which the region depends.”⁸⁷ Wang Lianhe argued that Australia’s desire to strengthen bilateral relations with Japan and pursue trilateral configurations with both the United States and India reflected its embrace of the Indo-Pacific concept.⁸⁸ Meanwhile, Han Feng argued that the Abbott administration’s addition of India as a key partner reflected its expanded “geopolitical concept,” meaning a recognition that Australian interests encompassed the Indian Ocean as well as the Asia-Pacific.⁸⁹ To this end, both the 2013 and the 2016 Defence White Papers described a “stable Indo-Pacific” as one of Australia’s key strategic interests.⁹⁰ Feng and Yu connected the Indo-Pacific concept to Australia’s South China Sea policy, arguing that Australia saw its intervention in the South China Sea disputes alongside the United States as a way to play an active role in the “Indo-Pacific system and Indo-Pacific order that the United States is trying to lead…rather than being marginalized by the newly constructed system.”⁹¹ The Indo-Pacific concept provided the glue that held together Australia’s bilateral policies toward Japan, India, and the United States, its pursuit of trilateral configurations, and its support for the Obama administration’s pivot to Asia.

Interestingly, there was very little discussion of the Belt and Road Initiative in Chinese assessments of Australia between 2013–2016, although one analyst erroneously claimed that Australia had agreed to “actively participate” in the BRI in March 2015.⁹² An exception was an article by Zhang Ying, which argued that the South Pacific was a “natural extension of the ‘Maritime Silk Road.’” This made the countries in the South Pacific, including Australia, an important part of China’s “peripheral strategy.”⁹³ Although Xi proposed linking the BRI with Australia’s Northern Development Strategy, Australia remained hesitant.⁹⁴ The limited discussion of the BRI in Chinese analysis of Australia stands in marked contrast to its prominent role in Chinese assessments of India during this period.

Key Takeaways

Chinese observers recognized a good opportunity in Australia’s orientation during 2013–2016, but they leaned toward a zero-sum approach, weighing whether Australia was straying too far from China’s desired thinking rather than accommodating Australia’s alliance ties, closer relations with Japan and India, South China Sea concerns, and conceptualization of the Indo-Pacific. There was no sign of a Chinese strategy to build on the positive tendencies in bilateral relations over this period; instead, Chinese analysts persisted in taking China’s policies as a given.

As a close economic partner far from the caldron of sensitive issues in Northeast Asia, a middle power could have warranted strategic outreach cognizant of its priorities and concerns. Chinese writers were clear-eyed about some of Australia’s concerns without offering policy responses. Australia did not matter enough and China’s policies were not subject to enough debate to prepare for trouble.

Sino–ASEAN Relations, 2013–2016

China’s overtures to ASEAN in 2013 were marked by major efforts to strengthen relations and infrastructural connectivity, in line with Xi’s new foreign policy agenda. In a major speech to the Indonesian parliament in early October, Xi applied the new concept of a “community of common destiny” to Sino–ASEAN relations. Celebrating the tenth anniversary of China and ASEAN’s establishment of a strategic partnership, Xi expressed China’s desire to work with ASEAN member states to “ensure that China and ASEAN are good neighbors, good friends and good partners who would share prosperity and security and stick together through thick and thin.” Now recognized as the speech that both launched the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road–a key component of the BRI—and officially announced China’s intention to establish the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, Xi’s remarks also called for trust-building, “win-win cooperation,” security cooperation, increased exchanges, and a spirit of “openness and inclusiveness” that recognized the diversity of countries in the region.⁹⁵

Shortly thereafter, at the 16th ASEAN–China Summit in Brunei, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang laid out the “2+7” Framework, which urged China and ASEAN to seek stronger cooperation through strategic trust and mutually beneficial economic development in seven issue areas: a treaty on good-neighborliness, friendship, and cooperation; the upgrading of the China–ASEAN Free Trade Area (which had gone into effect in 2010); infrastructure connectivity (which reiterated the proposal for the AIIB), financial cooperation and risk prevention, maritime cooperation (including the construction of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road), increased security exchanges and cooperation, and expanded exchanges of various types.⁹⁶ The “2013 Joint Statement of the 16th ASEAN–China Summit on Commemoration of the 10th Anniversary of the ASEAN–China Strategic Partnership” affirmed China’s commitment to a “unified, prosperous and dynamic” ASEAN, to the strategic partnership, and to “resolving differences with relevant ASEAN countries through peaceful means and friendly consultations.” The Joint Statement laid out measures for political, security, economic, socio-cultural, and regional and international cooperation.⁹⁷

Despite these major policy initiatives, however, trouble was brewing in the South China Sea. On January 22, 2013, the Philippines filed a case seeking international arbitration under UNCLOS. The case challenged Chinese claims to “historic rights” within the so-called “nine-dash line,” which encompasses most of the South China Sea, including the contested Spratly Islands and the Scarborough Shoal. China soon announced that it would not participate in the Hague Tribunal, insisting that all disputes should be settled through bilateral negotiations and adopting an official policy of “do not accept, do not participate, do not acknowledge, do not implement” (bu jieshou, bu canyu, bu chengren, bu zhixing).⁹⁸ Meanwhile, consultations on the adoption of a Code of Conduct (COC) for the South China Sea between China and a newly unified ASEAN began in September, although Chinese observers held different perceptions of this process.⁹⁹ Writing in mid-2013, Nie Wenjuan argued that ASEAN efforts to develop a unified proposal for a Code of Conduct would require Chinese engagement, despite China’s reservations about the process.¹⁰⁰ By contrast, Lu Jianren asserted that the ongoing consultations on a Code of Conduct were an important measure to ensure smooth economic and political relations between China and ASEAN, suggesting that China should proactively support these efforts.¹⁰¹

China launched a “diamond decade” of China–ASEAN relations in 2014 with further initiatives to increase economic integration and cooperation. The two sides began negotiations on an upgraded China–ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), and China advanced its plans to fund major infrastructure projects through the BRI by establishing the $40 billion Silk Road Fund and continuing negotiations on the establishment of the AIIB. Marking the ASEAN–China Cultural Exchange Year, 11.4 million mainland Chinese visited ASEAN countries and 6.2 million ASEAN citizens visited China. At the 17th ASEAN–China Summit in Myanmar that November, Li Keqiang reaffirmed Chinese support for “practical cooperation” with ASEAN in the context of the 2+7 Framework.¹⁰² These actions were consistent with what Shi Yinhong termed a “strategic economy” policy toward Asia and the Western Pacific, launched in the fall of 2014.¹⁰³

Yet China’s disputes with ASEAN member states in the South China Sea continued to flare. In the view of one Chinese critic, China’s South China Sea policy took on a more militarized character and greater emphasis on an artificial island-building strategy beginning in 2014, after many years of restraint.¹⁰⁴ In May, a dispute between Vietnam and China in the Paracels quickly spiraled after a Chinese oil rig entered contested waters. A large standoff ensued with both China and Vietnam deploying additional vessels and many incidents of ramming. After large-scale anti-China protests erupted in Vietnam, Chinese boats ultimately towed the rig to a new location and then withdrew it from the area a month earlier than originally planned.¹⁰⁵

The Hague Tribunal continued to evaluate the Philippines’ claims. In its December 2014 “Position Paper” rejecting the jurisdiction of the Hague Tribunal, the PRC asserted, “Chinese activities in the South China Sea date back to over 2,000 years ago. China was the first country to discover, name, explore and exploit the resources of the South China Sea Islands and the first to continuously exercise sovereign powers over them.” The paper further argued that China had reclaimed these features from Japan after the Second World War and had “published an official map which displayed a dotted line in the South China Sea” (the so-called “nine-dash line”).¹⁰⁶ Nevertheless, China did not defend its historical claims before the Tribunal.

This dynamic continued in 2015, with China continuing to pursue closer economic ties with ASEAN, while tensions in the South China Sea simmered. At the 27th ASEAN Summit in November, ASEAN and China signed an agreement marking the upgrading of the ASEAN–China FTA and released a “Plan of Action to Implement the Joint Declaration on ASEAN–China Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity (2016–2020),” which promoted high-level visits; political cooperation at ASEAN-led fora; military exchanges; economic, social, and cultural cooperation; and greater connectivity and sub-regional development.¹⁰⁷ Meanwhile, Malaysia protested the deployment of a Chinese coast guard vessel to Luconia Shoals, Indonesia threatened to seek an international court ruling on China’s claims to portions of the Natuna Islands, and the Hague Tribunal continued its arbitration of the Philippines’ suit without Chinese participation.¹⁰⁸ An August 2015 US Department of Defense report estimated that China’s land reclamation efforts had already added nearly 3,000 acres to the Spratly Islands, including efforts to build up Mischief Reef (the site of a 1995 standoff with the Philippines) during the first half of 2015.¹⁰⁹

This bifurcated policy continued in 2016, as all parties awaited the decision of the Hague Tribunal. China continued to promote the BRI through economic development projects with ASEAN states, such as Thailand and Malaysia.¹¹⁰ In March, China, Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam held the first Lancong–Mekong Cooperation Leaders’ Meeting to spur sub-regional development. China and ASEAN expressed their support for linking ASEAN’s Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity (MPAC) 2025 with China’s BRI objectives at their July meeting.¹¹¹ At the East Asia Summit that immediately followed, China and ASEAN joined other parties in agreeing to promote “enhanced investment, financial and technical support” for infrastructure and connectivity projects in Southeast Asia.¹¹² The AIIB opened for business in January 2016 and approved a $216.5 million loan for slum development in Indonesia and $20 million in debt financing for a power plant in Myanmar.¹¹³ Meanwhile, China continued to seek more expansive free trade agreements through the ongoing Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) negotiations with ASEAN and other partners and worked to strengthen regional defenses against financial crises through the ASEAN+3 structure.¹¹⁴

But the biggest story of the year was China’s South China Sea policy as it awaited the Hague Tribunal’s decision. Chinese disputes with ASEAN member countries continued apace. In January, Vietnam protested that China’s Haiyang Shiyou oil rig had reentered disputed waters. Vietnam also objected to China’s decision to repeatedly land civilian planes at a new airstrip on Fiery Cross Reef (Yongshu) and reported at least 46 incidents of Chinese planes flying through Vietnam-monitored airspace in the first week-and-a-half of the year. Adding to the tensions, Vietnam complained that a Chinese boat had rammed a Vietnamese fishing boat.¹¹⁵ In March, Vietnam claimed that two Chinese ships had intercepted a fishing boat near the Spratly Islands.

During Chinese Defense Minister Chang Wanquan’s visit to Vietnam in late March, the two countries agreed to pursue stronger military ties and avoid conflict in the South China Sea.¹¹⁶ Nevertheless, in early April, Haiyang Shiyou returned to disputed waters, this time near the Gulf of Tonkin. Vietnam protested China’s construction of a lighthouse on Subi Reef (Truong Sa archipelago) and seized a Chinese fuel resupply ship.¹¹⁷ Meanwhile, Malaysia issued an official complaint in March over the presence of approximately 100 Chinese fishing boats near the Malaysian-administered Luconia Shoals.¹¹⁸ That same month, Indonesia and China engaged in the first of three skirmishes in disputed waters off the coast of Indonesia’s Natuna Islands; the Chinese Coast Guard freed a captured Chinese fishing boat by knocking it off the tow line, but Indonesia detained its crew.¹¹⁹ In May, the Indonesian navy engaged in a second skirmish with a Chinese fishing boat, resulting in shots fired and the detention of a second crew. After a third skirmish, in June, Indonesian President Joko Widodo visited the Natuna Islands on a naval warship.¹²⁰

China persistently worked to peel off ASEAN members by persuading them that maritime disputes should be handled through direct, bilateral negotiations rather than between China and ASEAN. At the ASEAN–China Special Foreign Ministers Meeting in mid-June 2016, China asked ASEAN to accept a 10-point statement on the South China Sea. In an embarrassing episode, Malaysia issued a joint ASEAN statement, which expressed concerns about the effects of recent developments on maritime peace and stability, but then retracted it a few hours later after Cambodia and Laos objected. Singapore’s foreign minister, who was to represent ASEAN, failed to appear at a planned joint press conference with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, and, in the absence of a unified ASEAN document, several countries issued their own statements.¹²¹ The failure to achieve consensus was a blow to ASEAN, for which unity is a foundational principle.

Shortly after the Hague Tribunal released its findings, which were highly favorable to the Philippines’ position, on July 12, ASEAN and China released a “Joint Statement on the Full and Effective Implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.” The statement did not mention the arbitration results or express concerns about recent tensions. Instead, it reaffirmed the parties’ commitment to the non-legally binding Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) and the adoption of a Code of Conduct, freedom of navigation and overflight, self-restraint, and the peaceful resolution of “territorial and jurisdictional disputes…through friendly consultations and negotiations by sovereign states directly concerned” in a manner consistent with UNCLOS and other “universally recognized principles of international law.”¹²² In the September “Joint Statement’ of the 19th ASEAN–China Summit, which marked the twenty-fifth anniversary of ASEAN–China dialogue relations, the parties announced their adoption of the “Joint Statement on the Application of the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) in the South China Sea” and “Guidelines for Hotline Communications among Senior Officials of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs”in the event of maritime emergencies.¹²³ In the “Chairman’s Statement,” they further expressed their commitment to agreeing on a COC outline in 2017.¹²⁴ In short, China sought to sidestep the unfavorable Hague ruling, a strategy initially helped along by new Filipino President Rodrigo Duterte’s surprising decision to set aside the Hague ruling and pursue bilateral talks.¹²⁵

In 2013–2014, Chinese assessments of relations with ASEAN focused on efforts to advance “strategic mutual trust” and “political mutual trust,” as analysts evaluated the first ten years of the China–ASEAN strategic partnership. (The concept of “strategic mutual trust” was so important that it became one of the “2” points of consensus in Li Keqiang’s 2+7 Framework, announced in October 2013). Observers lamented a lack of strategic mutual trust between China and ASEAN caused by ASEAN concerns about China’s growing power and Chinese concerns about ASEAN’s efforts to balance between China and the United States.¹²⁶ They argued that China and ASEAN needed to rebuild mutual trust through deeper economic cooperation (for example, by upgrading ACFTA and negotiating an RCEP deal), the establishment of a security cooperation mechanism, and negotiated resolutions to the South China Sea disputes.¹²⁷ They also encouraged more frequent non-governmental exchanges, particularly among youth.¹²⁸ Fundamentally, stronger strategic mutual trust between China and ASEAN required China to strengthen its bilateral strategic partnerships with the various ASEAN member states.¹²⁹ Chinese analysts argued that greater political and strategic mutual trust would ensure regional stability, which would in turn provide the necessary conditions for development in China and among the ASEAN states.¹³⁰

Chinese analysts also considered the broad geopolitical implications of ASEAN efforts to balance between China and the United States in the context of the Obama administration’s “pivot to Asia,” in many ways mirroring Chinese assessments of Australian efforts to balance between the two powers. As was the case for Australia, they noted that ASEAN tended to rely on the United States for security, even as it developed increasingly close economic ties with China. Chen Yao, for example, argued that China’s willingness to offer economic benefits to ASEAN would be an important driver of China–ASEAN political mutual trust.¹³¹ Although ASEAN supported the US “Asia-Pacific rebalance,” Chinese observers detected limits to this support. Lu Jianren reasoned that ASEAN feared that US military expansionism in the region would threaten regional security, provoke China, and force ASEAN to choose sides between China and the United States.¹³² Chen Yao argued that although the “rebalance” might pose a challenge to China–ASEAN mutual trust in the short-term, the rise of China and decline of the United States suggested this challenge would not persist.¹³³

During 2013–2014, Chinese researchers often discussed the South China Sea disputes as a particular issue that could limit the broader effort to build strategic mutual trust. For example, Zhang Yunling listed the resolution of South China Sea disputes as an important component of a multifaceted effort to rebuild mutual trust.¹³⁴ Lu Jianren described China’s insistence on peaceful negotiations to resolve disputes and the implementation of the 2002 DOC as examples of how the successful management of the South China Sea issue could build political mutual trust, while also arguing that the unwillingness of “some claimants” (such as the Philippines) to abide by the 2002 Declaration damaged political mutual trust between China and ASEAN.¹³⁵ Ge Hongliang and Ju Hailong argued that the South China Sea disputes were an obstacle to political and strategic mutual trust, but, if China and ASEAN handled the issue well, could provide an opportunity for China to improve its relations with ASEAN member states.¹³⁶ This framing of the South China Sea issue as a component of the larger effort to promote strategic mutual trust found support in Li Keqiang’s own speech laying out the 2+7 Framework, which advocated for negotiations between China and specific claimant countries and promoted the implementation of the DOC and consultations on a COC in a section dedicated to describing the importance of “deeper strategic mutual trust and good-neighborly relations.”¹³⁷

By 2016, however, with the maritime and territorial disputes heating up and the Hague Tribunal proceeding, the South China Sea issue dominated Chinese analysis of its relations with ASEAN. In the period immediately preceding the Tribunal’s decision, Chinese discourse and policy focused on breaking ASEAN unity by persuading individual countries to support direct, bilateral negotiations and arguing that the South China Sea disputes should not be an ASEAN issue.¹³⁸ This approach was strategic (China recognized that it would likely lose the arbitration), and rested on a nuanced understanding of the particular national interests held by each ASEAN state in the South China Sea. According to Chen Xiangmiao and Ma Chao, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Singapore broadly supported US involvement in the South China Sea disputes, Malaysia and Indonesia were worried, and Cambodia was “indifferent.”¹³⁹ Chinese observers also maintained a firm objection to “external” intervention in the conflicts, particularly by the United States, which it viewed as having colluded with the Philippines to lay a “legal trap.”¹⁴⁰ Other Chinese analysts castigated Japan for “internationalizing” the South China Sea issue by raising it in multilateral settings and increasing the defense capabilities of ASEAN and individual claimant countries like the Philippines and Vietnam.¹⁴¹ With the Hague Tribunal’s decision supporting the Philippines’ claims, as anticipated, Chinese analysis turned to encouraging Duterte’s decision to sidestep the decision and seek warmer bilateral relations.¹⁴² In a piece published that fall, Shi Yinhong argued that the situation in the South China Sea needed to be resolved as quickly as possible. Most crucially, the continued tensions posed a fundamental challenge to China’s “strategic economy” approach by increasing countries’ distrust of China and, consequently, their skepticism of China’s economic proposals. Shi advocated for the adoption of a “dual track” policy to protect China’s rights and regional stability by preventing conflict with the United States, while improving relations with Southeast Asian states.¹⁴³

Surprisingly, the BRI was not a significant theme when it was first announced, and, though it eventually attracted more attention from analysts, remained a secondary theme to the South China Sea issue. Li Keqiang had initially described the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road as a way to “steadily advance maritime cooperation,” the fifth of the seven proposals in the 2+7 Framework.¹⁴⁴ Perhaps reflecting this understated framing, Chinese analysts often discussed the Maritime Silk Road as just one component of larger conversations about economic and strategic policy, when they discussed it at all. For example, Xu Bu and Yang Fan listed the mutual benefits of the BRI as one of many reasons for optimism about the future of ASEAN–China relations as the ASEAN–China dialogue celebrated its twenty-fifth anniversary in 2016.¹⁴⁵ Similarly, Zhang Xuekun and Ou Xuanxi stressed the importance of the promoting the BRI as one among many strategies for limiting Japanese intervention in the South China Sea disputes.¹⁴⁶ Others did, however, recognize the BRI as a major policy initiative in which ASEAN played a key role.¹⁴⁷

When they did discuss the BRI, Chinese analysts portrayed China as a benevolent elder that would generously share its superior expertise, technology, and management capabilities with less developed Southeast Asian states as they industrialized.¹⁴⁸ Convinced of the benefits of international infrastructure projects, many Chinese analysts were hard-pressed to understand why recipient countries would object to their largess. Officials portrayed BRI projects as a crucial way to create the “community of common destiny.”¹⁴⁹ Liu Jianwen, in considering why non-governmental organizations (NGOs) had successfully blocked BRI projects like the Myitsone dam and the Myanmar–China railroad, was dismissive of the possibility that local populations might be genuinely hurt by large-scale development projects.¹⁵⁰ While conceding that ASEAN members’ concerns about massive foreign-directed infrastructure projects within their borders were “natural,” Li Dongyi argued that ASEAN states were enthusiastic about the BRI once they were fully informed of the details.¹⁵¹ By contrast, Shi Yinhong took the concerns of ASEAN member states more seriously, arguing that the main obstacle for the BRI was other countries’ lack of enthusiasm. He cautioned that for the BRI to progress, it must serve other countries’ development interests, and that China could not simply decide what other states should want or need.¹⁵² While the limited discussion of the BRI in Chinese assessments of China–ASEAN relations in 2014–2016 is surprising, it likely reflects both the newness of the policy and the overwhelming dominance of the South China Sea dispute as the Hague Tribunal reached its conclusion.

Key Takeaways

The South China Sea cast a dark shadow on strategic thinking toward Southeast Asia. Given Chinese insistence that the various South China disputes were bilateral issues with individual states, ASEAN centrality stayed on the sidelines. In contrast, the BRI was just emerging as a concern, leaving more room for a degree of flexibility in China’s approach to the region. Never far from sight was the argument that ASEAN had to be turned away from the United States as China used its economic clout to impact strategic views.

Voices of accommodation on issues other than the South China Sea were well represented in 2013–2016, arguing that China had to be attentive to local thought. There was no mistaking the importance of Southeast Asia as a battlefront still attracted to the United States and Japan that required cajoling. The desire to get past the Hague decision shaped Chinese thinking. Yet, there was little let-up of the military pressure China exerted in support of its territorial claims. The South China Sea disputes remained prominent, with China’s island-building campaign and increasingly muscular military presence creating “facts on the ground” that overshadowed its legal defeat.