China’s Strategic Thinking toward the US Role in the Indo-Pacific

When the world looks back at the Biden administration and US-China relations during the four years between 2021 and 2025, they might come to the realization that this would be the last short period of relative stability before the two countries dove at full speed into frontal strategic competition. The “new Cold War,” a term raised during the Trump administration¹ and initially disputed by many,² could become the unstoppable destiny after all.

The assessment of Biden’s China strategy will be the subject of debate for many years to come. His administration has believed that it firmly and adeptly managed the relationship with America’s most consequential competitor while successfully avoiding armed conflicts including a possible world war.³ Biden’s people have believed in “a moderating approach to accommodate [China’s] rise,” a policy of “compete where we must, but cooperate where we can,” including on issues like climate change,” but his critics argue that this strategy has “demonstrably failed.”⁴

China had high hopes for the Biden administration to “reverse” the wrong direction they saw from the Trump administration,⁵ but it underestimated the bipartisan consensus in Washington on China as well as the inertia of the changed direction under the Trump team. That direction was anchored on a firm conviction that China is a hostile competitor, or at a minimum a strategic challenger to the United States, and that the engagement policy had failed. It took the Chinese two years to realize that to change this deeply embedded perception in US domestic politics was near impossible without a fundamental transformation in China’s foreign policy

China’s Pre-2021 Expectations and Illusions

The last six months of the Trump administration left Chinese with many painful memories of what a freefall in US-China relations looks like and how much damage it could inflict on China’s national interests. Especially after Trump’s late 2020 attempt to overthrow the election result⁶ and the fear of a “December Surprise” for Trump to start a war over Taiwan before he stepped down,⁷ Beijing could not wait to turn the page and restore some normalcy in bilateral relations.

By mid-December 2020, through unofficial communications, the Chinese demonstrated a sense of urgency for Biden and his team to provide some signals on the future of US China policy. By then, there had been ample speculation within China, ranging broadly from fatalistic pessimism to tactical optimism. And the Chinese had sent out many feelers, including on issues from carbon neutrality to North Korea, from vaccine cooperation to the global economic recovery to feel out the Biden policy. Using the words of a senior Chinese interlocutor in a Track-II virtual dialogue on December 15, 2020, “China is ready to work with [the] U.S. on deals, but there is not yet any reply from Biden. The ball is in Biden’s court. Maybe both sides need to enhance their actions, but Biden needs to take some initiatives.”⁸

The Chinese were growing increasingly impatient and wary of the argument that Biden had domestic constraints on his China policy, that he wanted to prioritize building up internal strength first, and that he may not have had a clear roadmap on China given the complexity of the issue. For the Chinese, domestic politics were “no excuse” to delay any needed adjustment on China policy, and Biden needed the “strategic resolve” to step up rather than being indecisive, sitting on the China policy review, and letting Beijing hang in the air. To this end, the Chinese interlocutors requested that the point persons of Xi and Biden meet as early as possible after January 20, 2021.

In private dialogues, the Chinese put as many concrete feelers on the table as possible to test the water for potential topics to entice cooperation, many focused on global governance, especially on economic and climate change issues. Specific proposals included global economic recovery, including a global QR system to facilitate global human mobility; COVID vaccines as global public goods; developing countries’ debt sustainability issues; and climate change. Compared to the earlier discussions in China about what could be done to revive cooperation with the United States, the issues at this stage were more forward-leaning and focused on the benefits of great power cooperation. At the same time, discussions about sore spots or China’s domestic issues, such as Xinjiang, Hong Kong, or Taiwan, had completely disappeared from the conversation.

The most “controversial” focus was bilateral trade relations. The American side complained that China had only fulfilled 55% of the $220 billion purchase of American products to which it was committed in the Phase One trade deal, while the Chinese responded with the “realistic difficulties” imposed by COVID in 2020 on its imports from the United States and demanded that the Biden administration drop all the additional tariffs on Chinese products levied by Trump.

In China’s strategic thinking, Biden’s primary focus would be domestic issues, including COVID and economic growth. The remark of the forthcoming National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan in June 2020⁹ was interpreted as such a signal: that the United States would focus on how to run faster instead of on how to slow China down. Similarly, forthcoming Secretary of State Antony Blinken emphasized that the prerequisite for US-China cooperation was to “engage China from a position of strength.”¹⁰ The domestic rejuvenation of American competitiveness meant that more attention and resources would be allocated to get the American house in order, rather than to confront or undermine China all over the world—-or, at least, that was the Chinese hope. China interpreted this as meaning strategic pressure on China would drop in both velocity and acuteness. 

The other interpretation the Chinese had reached from Biden’s domestic focus was that it created a “great opportunity” to cooperate on the issue of COVID, especially the production and dissemination of vaccines. Although Pfizer had developed an effective vaccine, Chinese interlocutors privately emphasized that China occupied a central place in the supply of raw materials for its mass production. The hope was that the Biden team might focus less on COVID’s origin or on demands for an investigation of China’s role. Such hopes would soon be dashed.

2021: The Anchorage Spirit—No Anchor, Only Rage

US-China relations during the first year of the Biden administration got off to a rocky start. In January, early signs of the administration’s tough attitude on China confirmed pessimistic suspicions about the prospects to the Chinese foreign policy community. First came Blinken’s testimony at his Senate confirmation hearing on January 19.¹¹ To Chinese great disappointment, he agreed with Trump’s “tougher approach to China,” just in a different style. Although the Chinese understood that toughness on China was a bipartisan consensus, they did not anticipate that Biden’s secretary of state nominee would so publicly agree with Trump on China policy.

Furthermore, the Chinese had hoped that the administration would demonstrate “more respect” and “more consideration” of China’s core national interests, especially Taiwan, Xinjiang, and Hong Kong. It was not completely beyond their expectations that Blinken would reiterate support for Taiwan and the democratic movement in Hong Kong. However, what shocked the Chinese more than anything else was Blinken’s agreement with Secretary of State Pompeo on the determination of China’s actions in Xinjiang as genocide.¹² The Biden campaign had used this term during the election,¹³ but the Chinese were hoping for a more lenient determination once Biden was in office. According to Chinese experts, by the end of inauguration day, Blinken had turned himself into “the biggest target of rebuke internally in China.”

Blinken was not the only one that the Chinese found disheartening. In fact, a “coordinated” campaign to target China was identified among other Biden nominees as well. Treasury Secretary nominee Janet Yellen vowed to “take on the challenge of China’s abusive, unfair, and illegal practices.”¹⁴ Director of National Intelligence nominee Avril Haines called China “an adversary” when it came to espionage.¹⁵ Similarly, Defense Secretary nominee Lloyd Austin affirmed the threat from China and vowed to develop capabilities that would allow the United States to “present, a credible deterrent… to China in the future.”¹⁶ Therefore, when the Chinese foreign policy community examined the indicators and signals on China from the Biden administration in the first several days, there was almost no good news.

Complicating the situation were China’s own awkward efforts to “shape” bilateral relations through sanctions on Trump officials.¹⁷ Beijing found it difficult to explain to Americans how the message was not intended as intimidation of the Biden team. The consensus in Beijing was that despite the negative early indicators, it was still too early to draw a conclusion about Biden’s China policy. As such, layered efforts were made to send signals to and test the temperature with the new administration. 

The most senior and meaningful test would come on March 18, the date that Sullivan, Blinken, Chinese Director of the Foreign Affairs Commission Yang Jiechi, and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi held the first senior strategic dialogue under the Biden administration in Anchorage.¹⁸ One week before the meeting, the foreign policy community in Beijing painted a rather rosy picture of the upcoming “senior-level strategic dialogue”¹⁹ and the anticipated “deal-making.”²⁰ Part of it was due to the surprise nature of the meeting announcement: only one week in advance. And the Chinese were inclined to believe that secret negotiations must have gone on for a while beforehand. Part of it was wishful thinking among Chinese analysts that the Biden team was practical and believed cooperation on terms acceptable to China was important, hence imminent.

Events after the meeting announcement rapidly declined, however. The Quad summit,²¹ especially its announcement on quadrilateral cooperation on vaccine production and supply chain management, was bad news for China’s desired vaccine cooperation with the United States. The joint statement from the US-Japan 2+2²² was even more sobering, with Japan publicly adopting perhaps the most critical tone on China in recent years. Furthermore, the sanctions on 24 Chinese officials due to the crackdown in Hong Kong one day before the dialogue²³ showed the Chinese that the United States was not offering any olive branch at all. In addition, the State Department denied that there was a plan for the Alaska meeting to discuss a Xi-Biden virtual meeting during the climate change summit in April 2021. These events cooled Chinese expectations significantly. 

On March 18, the world witnessed a public spat during the first session of the Alaska meeting,²⁴ centered on the profound conflict between the American and Chinese positions. Moreover, the issue of “diplomatic protocol” played a significant role in exacerbating the situation. The two sides had agreed to two-minute initial remarks, which evidently was violated by all four speakers, but to vastly different degrees. During the press conference,  Blinken’s opening statement lasted for 2 minutes 27 seconds, Sullivan’s 2 minutes 17 seconds, Yang’s response was 19 minutes 40 seconds, and Wang’s was 4 minutes 9 seconds.²⁵ The Chinese government launched ferocious attacks over the issue of diplomatic protocol for the US “severely exceeding the time allocated for their opening remarks,”²⁶ neglecting the fact that the US speakers were both less than 30 seconds over time and that Yang’s speech was ten times longer than what it was supposed to be.

The other two accusations Beijing launched against the United States were focused on substance. The first, according to the Foreign Ministry, was “the unreasonable attacks and criticisms on Chinese domestic and foreign policy,” which were neither “hospitable” nor “in line with diplomatic protocol.”²⁷ The second accusation, based on Wang Yi’s remarks, attacked the US sanctions on Chinese officials related to Hong Kong “at the same time the Chinese delegation was leaving for Alaska,” which was “not a normal way to treat guests.”²⁸ The Chinese frustration was evidently not just about the United States exceeding the time limit for remarks.

The “Anchorage Spirit”—jokingly referred to as “no anchor, only rage” by Chinese experts—firmly set the tone for US-China relations in the following more than two years. On the trade front, the Chinese were surprised by the fact that the Biden administration not only kept the Trump era tariffs, but in fact piled on more sanctions on Chinese companies in 2021, including the FCC putting Huawei on its black list on March 12,²⁹ the Department of Commerce adding seven Chinese supercomputing centers to its SDN list,³⁰ the executive order on June 3 that expanded the Trump decision to prohibit US companies from investing in Chinese defense and surveillance companies,³¹ and the July 9 addition of 34 Chinese companies to the Specially Designated Nationals list by the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS).³²

If anything, the only comfort offered in 2021 was the gradual resumption of working- and senior-level communications and visits between the United States and China. China was still under severe COVID restrictions during that year. However, Premier Liu He was still able to meet with USTR Katherine Tai³³ and Yellen³⁴ virtually between the end of May and the beginning of June. And, perhaps most importantly, Xi and Biden had three separate direct communications with each other: via phone on February 10³⁴ and September 9,³⁶ and online on November 15.³⁷ Still, the virtual summit between the leaders did not stop the United States from putting more Chinese companies, especially high-tech companies, on its sanctions list before the end of the year.³⁸

2022: Deterioration Followed by China’s Own Recalculation  

2022 was in many ways a perfect storm for China. Domestically, it suffered a nationwide COVID lockdown and the popular discontent from it,³⁹ held the 20th Party Congress in October⁴⁰ and saw Xi embark on a third term, ⁴¹ and suffered an economic slowdown⁴² Externally, China was framed by Putin as the accomplice in the Russian war in Ukraine and after that had to deal with the collective wrath from the United States and Europe.⁴³ It was also named “America’s most consequential geopolitical challenge” in Biden’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, released in February,⁴⁴ and its National Security Strategy in October.⁴⁵ The competitive tech policy of the Biden administration introduced more export control measures on Chinese high-tech firms.⁴⁶ And the tension over the Taiwan Strait due to Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s August visit to Taiwan⁴⁷ further marked the most unstable period of Biden’s relationship with China to date.

The Ukraine Crisis

Since February 2022, the Ukraine war has been a particular thorn in China’s relationship with the United States. Despite the diplomatic embarrassment of having been completed blindsided by Putin on the invasion,⁴⁸ Beijing adopted its famous “Pro-Russia” neutrality in the war, which caused considerable damage to China’s relationship with Europe.⁴⁹ China reiterated the principle of sovereignty and territorial integrity rhetorically,⁵⁰ while, in reality, China made its position clear that it would not oppose Russia, as its silence indicated complacency, acquiescence, and de facto recognition of the altered status quo as a fait accompli.

China’s diplomatic support of Russia was obvious in Foreign Ministry statements. In his phone call with Russian Foreign Ministry Sergey Lavrov on February 24, Wang Yi stated that China “understands Russia’s reasonable security concerns.”⁵¹ Although he also called for negotiations, the statement indicated that China saw Russian actions as justified, and therefore would not oppose them. The anti-US rhetoric in China was escalating rapidly as Beijing locked down its own people city after city. The inflammatory propaganda was particularly salient in the Foreign Ministry’s comments on the Ukraine crisis. Month after month, its spokesperson accused the United States of agitating tensions, supplying weapons to fuel the conflict,⁵² and unfairly holding China responsible for the crisis.⁵³ In commenting on US requests for China to use its influence to push Russia to compromise, China’s Foreign Ministry retorted that the United States was in “no position to lecture China on sovereignty and territorial integrity” as it was “currently trampling over China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity on Taiwan.”⁵⁴ There was a clear tendency to whitewash Russia’s responsibility for aggression and blame Ukraine and the United States for it instead.

The Pelosi Crisis, with a Silver Lining

By July 2022, the top priority of the Chinese bureaucracy was blocking Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. The news about the trip was first circulated in mid-April,⁵⁵ briefly faded because Pelosi tested positive for COVID,⁵⁶ and then resurfaced, as many Chinese interlocutors threatened a “Fourth Taiwan Strait crisis” if her visit were to happen. Throughout the month of July, the Chinese foreign policy apparatus was fully mobilized to deter the trip. The Chinese informed the United States explicitly that the trip would trigger a “Cuban Missile Crisis” between the United States and China.⁵⁷ A good amount of saber rattling came from China, including Xi’s statement that “those who play with fire will perish by it” on Thursday, July 28,⁵⁸ the Ministry of National Defense’s assertion that the “PLA will not sit aside and watch” on Wednesday,⁵⁹ and wolf warrior Zhao Lijian’s assurance that the “Chinese will keep our words” on Thursday, July 28.⁶⁰ Harsh rhetoric and verbal threats were unleashed, evidently to deter Pelosi’s visit, with a goal of “postponement” or, even better, “cancellation.” No stone was left unturned, from China’s “military advantage” in this region, to the Taiwan issue’s impact on the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party, to China’s “determination” to act this time around, to Xi’s “loss of face” if Pelosi still went after the Biden-Xi phone call. It was difficult to judge whether this was bluffing, but certainly the same things had been repeated before in similar attempts to extract US concessions on Taiwan.

The Chinese military response to the visit was unprecedented and came in a de facto partial military blockade of Taiwan.⁶¹ US officials called it an “overreaction,”⁶² but one could argue that the Chinese military actions could have been much worse, to include missile shoot-overs and warplane flyovers. China made a distinction between the United States and Taiwan in its reaction, stating that all its military activities were targeted at Taiwan rather than the United States.

Another distinction that the Chinese made in their reaction was between Pelosi herself and the Biden administration. In the statements by Wang Yi,⁶³ Vice Foreign Minister Xie Feng when he summoned US Ambassador Nicholas Burns,⁶⁴ and the foreign ministry spokesperson,⁶⁵ the Chinese specifically targeted Pelosi and her actions rather than the Biden administration. In each statement, Beijing called her out by name, pointed out her “transgressions,” and then circled back to criticize the “American side.” The Chinese recognized that the Biden administration did make serious efforts to persuade her against the trip. This is why the personal sanctions only targeted Pelosi and her family.

Some Chinese held a grudge that Biden did not call her directly and tell her to call off the trip, but more reassuring was that the US reaction to the Chinese military exercises was very “moderate.” The USS Reagan moved away from the area “several hundred kilometers” after Pelosi’s departure from Taiwan.⁶⁶ US forces monitored the Chinese military exercises, and US officials called it “provocative” and “a longstanding attempt to change the status quo,”⁶⁷ but there were no punitive efforts to confront China. The Chinese took notice of the Bloomberg report that the Biden administration was trying to put the brakes on the Taiwan Policy Act that would provide military assistance to Taiwan.⁶⁸ It did not mean a 180-degree shift in perceptions of the Biden administration’s China policy, but Chinese privately called it “a silver lining” from the Pelosi visit.

China Playing Nice(r)

A key factor in China’s restraint in the Pelosi visit was the fact that the 20th Party Congress was only two months away and China was not going to risk a war with the United States before Xi’s critical political event to secure his third term. But things did not improve for China at all after the congress. By the time it concluded, China had been living under self-imposed isolation for almost 3 years. Especially in 2022, China’s economy suffered tremendously from the rampant and repeated lockdowns to eliminate COVID cases. GDP growth for the first half of the year was at 2.5%, according to official data,⁶⁹ and was only at 3% for the whole year, the slowest in four and a half decades.⁷⁰ The economy had always been the most prominent component of China’s comprehensive national power as well as the foundation of its confidence in the “rise of the East and the decline of the West” and “the rise of China and the decline of the United States.” Now that China’s economy was running into a significant slowdown, it forced Beijing to refocus its priorities back to the domestic and economic fronts.

Beijing’s attempts to reimpose lockdowns after the easing of the restrictions imposed by the “20 Measures” exacerbated the situation. The easing led to massive infection of the Chinese population.⁷¹ Across the country, “COVID fatigue” prevailed, and people began to protest, not only against the COVID lockdown policies but also against the government in general.⁷² Beijing was faced with an unprecedented, pressing threat of social or even political instability.

Stabilization of external relations to prepare for the hard battle at home was seen as necessary. There was a strong aversion to distraction in China, and also to the potential vulnerability that China could become exploitable by “foreign hostile forces,” which started right after the Party Congress with Xi’s diplomatic charm offensive.⁷³ Beijing was prioritizing amicable ties with the international community, attaching great importance to Blinken’s visit to China  expected in January 2023.⁷⁴ It would be the first cabinet level visit from the Biden administration to China, seen as paving the way for positive interactions down the road in 2023.

One of the key considerations was the fact that the United States would be the host of the APEC Summit in 2023, which Xi would attend. Beijing was exploring the possibility of turning the trip into an official visit to the United States as well, which would require positive interaction between the two countries. Such a visit would be portrayed as the top Chinese leader’s major effort to reverse the negative direction of bilateral relations.

2023: From Balloongate to San Francisco

2023 was more of a roller coaster ride than most had expected. The balloon incident, in which a high-altitude balloon from China transited US airspace without approval, was a black swan event that effectively delayed cabinet-level engagement for four months: Blinken canceled his trip to Beijing⁷⁵ and did not revive the plan until June.⁷⁶ His trip did, however, open the door to a

series of cabinet-level engagements in the summer, which eventually led to the San Francisco summit between Xi and Biden in November. One thing was clear: the desire for Xi to visit San Francisco was the theme for Beijing from the beginning of 2023. Therefore, despite the ups and downs, that desire ensured the eventual stabilization of bilateral relations by the end of the year. 

Balloongate

Even before Balloongate, the Chinese were having very mixed feelings about the signals Washington had been sending before Blinken’s visit, which the Chinese had hoped would be positive. The leaked memo from General Minihan about a war with China in 2025⁷⁷ was seen as US hawks attempting to drive up tensions around the Taiwan Strait again, despite Biden’s assessment in November 2022 that a Chinese attack on Taiwan was not imminent.⁷⁸ The US-Japan-Netherlands pact on semiconductor restrictions on China⁷⁹ delivered a heavy blow to China’s lingering fantasy that access to advanced chips could still somehow be partially maintained. Beijing also sensed enhanced US pressure on the Russia and Iran fronts. The US government announced sanctions on Chinese companies for providing satellite images to the Russian military in the Ukraine war in early 2023,⁸⁰ while China’s illicit crude oil imports from Iran had increased significantly, mostly through Malaysia.⁸¹ Both pointed to more pressure for China to “do more” to deliver on America’s key concerns

The Chinese sensed a coordinated effort to build up pressure and leverage vis-à-vis China before Blinken’s trip, speculating that the goal was to improve the US negotiating position and push China to make more concessions. While there had been complaints in policy circles, especially from hawkish corners including the PLA, about these efforts, the consensus remained that China needed to accommodate and keep a low profile because Xi’s priority in 2023 was improving relations. The announcement that Xi would meet with Blinken during his trip⁸² sent the message across the policy community, confirming the assessment that China would strive to “play nice.”

When it hit the news cycle that a Chinese spy balloon was identified flying over Montana,⁸³ the Chinese policy community—including well-positioned PLA contacts—was shocked and in disbelief. Beijing was as exasperated by the balloon itself as it was disappointed with the ensuing postponement of Blinken’s trip to Beijing. Given the optics of the spy balloon incident, the postponement was prudent and wise; even some in Beijing agreed on this.

The Chinese Roller Coaster

For about two weeks after the balloon incident, the Chinese policy community had hoped that this episode would be a temporary disturbance to a year of moderate improvement of relations with the United States. In their view, Blinken’s trip was only “postponed”⁸⁴ rather than canceled; and Xi’s November trip to the United States was still relatively far out, hence feasible. The postponement of Speaker of the House Kevin McCarthy’s trip to Taiwan⁸⁵ was further seen as good news that at least left some space for the relationship to recover after Balloongate.

Such hope was largely lost, however, after the Munich Security Conference. A series of events at and after the conference significantly dimmed, if not completely buried, the positive outlook for bilateral relations. Such events included:

The U.S. revelation in Munich on February 19 of China’s plan to provide “lethal aid” to Russia in the Ukraine war,⁸⁶ and the continuous, enhanced diplomatic pressure to deter China from providing such aid after that.⁸⁷

Senior “official” engagement between the United States and Taiwan, including Joseph Wu and Wellington Koo’s visit of the American Institute in Taiwan Washington headquarters in Arlington, Virginia on February 21 and their meetings with senior officials from the Biden Administration.⁸⁸

The FBI and Department of Energy declarations on the COVID’s origination from a Chinese lab.⁸⁹

The hearings of the new House of Representatives Select Committee on China, which with their bipartisan support offered no hope for improving bilateral ties.⁹⁰

More Chinese companies were included in the Department of Commerce BIS Entity List.⁹¹

These setbacks pushed China to be more realistic about bilateral relations. By April, they were no longer hanging onto the idea of a “basic framework of bilateral relations” as after the Bali Summit.⁹² China had dialed down its expectations. Senior officials made it clear privately that although Beijing in principle would welcome Blinken, the schedule, especially meetings with Xi and Wang Yi, was unlikely to work out soon. 

US interest in senior-level dialogues with China began to reappear by April and May. This time, Beijing was more hesitant. Chinese diplomats were confounded by Washington’s effort to reach out and engage China because they could not quite figure out what the United States could want that warranted such a level of outreach. For them, a crisis was not quite imminent between the United States and China at that time, so dialogue should not have been about conflict prevention or crisis management. The trips to Beijing by Blinken,⁹³ Yellen,⁹⁴ and Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo⁹⁵ from June to September, however, further reassured the Chinese of the US intent.

The Chinese foreign policy apparatus and policy community had become quite bipolar during the Biden administration, swinging between mania and depression; there either was “hope” or “no hope” for US-China relations, and such judgments were easily swayed by events. Despite frequent Chinese solemn declarations in 2023 that “we bear no illusion about the United States,”⁹⁶ officials and interlocutors were exhilarated at any positive signs. When all led to disappointment, the responsibility was usually placed on the top leaders to “save the world.” The psychological paradox of China’s hostility and its desire for improved ties with the United States is fascinating and is telling of the future trajectory of Beijing’s approach to the United States.

By the end of July 2023, the Chinese were finally reengaging again. The Foreign Ministry’s Director-General for North America Yang Tao had a relatively smooth trip to the United States,⁹⁷ and Beijing was “cautiously optimistic” about relations by that point. Yang’s trip was aimed at laying the foundation for Wang Yi to visit DC and negotiate the details of Xi’s trip to San Francisco in November.⁹⁸ Interestingly, even during this period, China refused to confirm Xi’s trip. China did not want to appear too eager and give Washington leverage. But, more importantly, after the embarrassment of Balloongate, China was afraid that there could be another unexpected turn of events. That demonstrated a change of focus: to identify potential risk factors, domestic and foreign, for the United States, that could derail the process of engagement again. Chinese diplomats were sent out to go after potential risks, including Willian Lai’s transits through the United States,⁹⁹ then-possible Taiwan presidential candidate Terry Gou’s visit to the United States,¹⁰⁰ the outbound CFIUS to be introduced before Raimondo’s trip to China,¹⁰¹ and potential China-related bills that were to be introduced on the Hill.¹⁰² To prevent the “black swans and gray rhinos”¹⁰³ had emerged as the top priority for Beijing, at least before Xi’s November trip.

San Francisco Summit

After year-long speculation and many months of negotiations, the Biden-Xi summit finally took place in San Francisco.¹⁰⁴ Instead of a sideline meeting at the APEC summit, the Chinese side emphasized that this was a standalone leadership summit. In fact, some Chinese insiders jokingly called the APEC summit a “side meeting” of the Biden-Xi summit. The Chinese policy community had had inflated expectations before the summit about possible deliverables. Some focused on the establishment of “basic principles” of US-China relations, which was a main talking point around the Bali Summit in 2022.¹⁰⁵ Some had hoped for bilateral consensus on areas of China’s key concerns, such as economic and trade policy, especially US export control measures and investment restrictions.

However, after the leaders’ summit, when people scrutinize the achievements in the government readouts, the list of tangible deliverables for China was surprisingly short. Both the cooperation on counternarcotics to tackle issues such as fentanyl in the United States and the resumption of military-to-military dialogue¹⁰⁶ had been Washington’s priorities, especially since the beginning of 2023.¹⁰⁷ But none of the Chinese priorities seemed to have made to the list, at least not in this round. On the issue of Taiwan and the issue of economic and trade policy, there were no breakthroughs.

China did have two main achievements from the leaders’ summit. First, while Xi did not get anything on economy and trade, the summit, hence the stabilization of US-China relations, was still important for the Chinese economy. The Chinese no longer bore the illusion that the United States could or would “save” the Chinese economy, especially given export controls and investment restrictions. However, to have a relatively stable relationship was still important for Xi as he and his team prioritized challenges at home. China did not want to be in intense escalation of hostility while tackling the real estate bubble,¹⁰⁸ unemployment,¹⁰⁹ and sluggish exports.¹¹⁰ 

Second, as Xi had consolidated control over domestic politics at the 20th Party Congress, the next task was to stabilize the relationship with the United States and to demonstrate that he had the ability to manage the United States and all its challenges. Some even regarded the trip to San Francisco and the broad stabilization of relations with the United States as Xi’s primary tasks in 2023. Regardless of the result and deliverables from the summit, his trip was portrayed as “unique” and “strategically consequential” in the recent history of US-China relations.¹¹¹

2024: A Year Towards What?

After building a relatively high floor for the stabilization of bilateral relations, China delivered on several issues in 2024. The joint law enforcement on counternarcotics proceeded smoothly. China took measures to help disrupt the global supply chain fueling the opioid crisis in 2024.¹¹² The military-to-military dialogues resumed even faster and at a larger scale, including:

December 21, 2023, when Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General CQ Brown, Jr. held a teleconference with PLA Chief of the Joint Staff Department General Liu Zhenli.¹¹³

January 8–9, 2024, when China and the United States resumed the Defense Policy Coordination Talks (DPCT) in Washington, DC between Michael Chase, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense and Major General Song Yanchao, Deputy Director of the Central Military Commission Office for International Military Cooperation.¹¹⁴

April 3–4, 2024, when China and the United State resumed the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) working group meeting in Hawaii at the level of senior colonel.¹¹⁵  The next round is expected to take place in China in the fall of 2024 at one of the coastal cities where Chinese fleets are headquartered.

April 16, 2024, when there was a call between U.S. Secretary of Defense Austin and Chinese Defense Minister Dong Jun.¹¹⁶

June 1, 2024, when Austin and Dong Jun met in Singapore on the margins of the Shangri-La Dialogue.¹¹⁷

By the end of July, direct communication between the theater commands had not yet resumed. The improvement of Chinese behavior against the US military in the region was obvious; there had not been incidents of unprofessional, unsafe maneuvers by Chinese warships or warplanes like those witnessed in 2023. However, the tempo of Chinese actions against US allies and partners, such as the Philippines in the South China Sea,¹¹⁸ had not improved at all.

With the November election looming, no major leadership engagement was planned for 2024. And the Chinese have been watching the election closely as its result will determine the direction of the future of bilateral relations. The train left the station long ago on which candidate China prefers: Chinese experts have publicly proclaimed that whoever the winner is, both candidates are “poison” for China.¹¹⁹ In their view, Biden could have brought more stability to bilateral relations, but his competition strategy had been quite effective economically and diplomatically, leaving China’s high-tech industry and diplomatic offensive in limbo. By comparison, Trump’s position on US alliances and partnerships and the damage he could cause serves Beijing’s strategic agenda in the long run. Yet in the short term, Trump’s unpredictability and his use of maximum pressure would put China in extremely difficult corners, making him the less desirable option.  

For Chinese officials and elites who had to suffer through the free fall of US-China relations during the last year of the Trump administration, it is mind-boggling and emotionally traumatizing to imagine a second Trump administration and how China could work with it. However, since China is more on the passive receiving end of the result of the US presidential election, rather than in a position to actively shape the election’s result, which candidate China prefers is seen as a null question. After all, it is not China’s choice. China will have to deal with whoever wins the election in November for the next four years. bearing no illusions about the unfriendly and competitive future of bilateral relations, but under another Trump administration, the relationship would be more unpredictable, volatile, and prone to crisis. When Chinese looks back at the four years under Biden, they might realize that it was the last window of relative tranquility before the United States and China finally and formally embarked on a path of a new Cold War.