Chinese and Russian Designs for the Latticework of Eurasia

Chinese and Russian Designs for the Latticework of Eurasia
Gilbert Rozman

What do BRICS (named after early members Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and the Greater Eurasian Partnership (GEP) have in common? They are all groups designed by China, Russia, or the two together to reconstruct the architecture of Asia (or even the world) to displace the US-led international order. Whether they target a collection of neighboring countries or a huge swath of the “Global South,” they aspire to a unified, non-western community with economic, strategic, and identity agreement on transformation of the existing order of Asia. Their success depends on whether China and Russia work together or are at odds with each other’s aspirations. So far, substantial differences have yet to be overcome.

Whereas most coverage of the “lattice-work” of alliances and partnerships in Asia has fixated on US initiatives, a parallel process has proceeded under Chinese or Russian leadership or them together. The Third Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation took place on October 17-18, 2023, in Beijing. The 24th SCO summit met in Astana on July 3-4, 2024. The 16th BRICS summit convened in Kazan on October 22-24, 2024. Evaluating the outcome of these meetings is a starting point for understanding the prospects of initiatives to reconstruct the regional order. This article assesses what the two sought from these summits against the backdrop of how a common desire for regional restructuring has fared in handling their clashing agendas.

Building a New International Order

International order building is the core of the stated concepts of Russian-Chinese multilateral cooperation, to which all other concepts are ultimately subordinate, but the two are not on the same page. As one Chinese expert wrote, “There are major differences between the positions of China and Russia on economic globalization. China has a very positive attitude towards economic globalization and shows a high degree of activism… economic globalization is viewed critically and negatively in Russian official and academic circles… Breaking the current world order is Russia’s choice and way out…Chinese academia is more cautious, preferring gradualism and improvement to make it more just and fairer. Destroying an old order does not necessarily lead to the birth of a new order, especially not to the birth of a benign one. It may also result in political ruins and bring about chaos and disorder… Russia puts forward the idea of civilization as the path to building a multipolar world and international order, and advocates replacing the dominance of Western civilization with the interaction of civilizations. It is a revolutionary way to move into the future by breaking with the past.” China’s “community of human destiny,” at its core, is the “peaceful coexistence, friendship and cooperation of countries with different political systems, religions, civilizations and values,” according to this frank Chinese viewpoint.¹ 

Xi Jinping at the BRICS summit reaffirmed economic globalization and appealed for solidarity within the “Global South” but avoidance of a new Cold War. His was not a call for overturning the world order, at least not now. He appealed for seeking common ground without expanding hostilities or fanning the flames. Economic themes were foremost in his approach, but unlike Russia’s call for a separate, exclusive order, it was about boosting a competitive alternative.² For Putin BRICS loomed as the salvation for a country excluded from the US-led order to build anew. Political and infrastructure themes showcased a more far-reaching agenda for regionalism.

Russian aspirations for BRICS surpass Chinese thinking. BRICS is tasked with nothing short of uniting the world around a continental network, ending the reign of the West, and bypassing it ahead. Ideally, its core great powers of India, China, and Russia would join in leading the way to this new order, but tensions between India and China limit their cooperation, as Russia plays the key role in initiating unification, capitalizing on a vision and geography bridging East and West. It explains that the task at hand is an extension of anti-imperialism and de-colonization, since “neo-colonialism” remains the West’s approach beyond the Cold War era. The Kazan summit is seen as an important milestone for a new model of cooperation, when Russia exerted leadership.³ This Russian perspective frames BRICS as a more transformative force for forging a new order.

The debate over BRICS in Russia and China splits into (1) calls for an accelerated anti-Western agenda with unmistaken ideological thrust; and (2) warnings of the need to eschew ideology to broaden the appeal. On one side are Russians who insist that Russia and China are on the same page and prepared to take radical action; on the other are skeptics wary that coordination on the BRICS between Moscow and Beijing so far is not sufficient and many BRIC members insist on working within the existing global and regional order. Some Russians acknowledge this as well.

Citing a joint report of Russian and Chinese experts timed to coincide with the 75th anniversary of establishing diplomatic relations, Natalia Portyakova praised the pragmatism, eschewing any ideology, that unites Russia and China in cooperating across Eurasia, especially in Central Asia.
She affirmed that cooperation in Eurasia permits the two to build a fairer international order able to appeal to the “world majority” in the “Global South,” but she explained, “the current international political environment has remained ‘favorable within limits to the tasks Russia and China have set for themselves,’ while the two countries’ common approaches to such fundamental concepts as democracy, non-interference in internal affairs, inclusive security, and a multipolar world order have allowed them to maintain a high level of political coordination.”⁴

The report notes: “the Western narrative creates the illusion of a threat of conflict in the South and East China Seas, the US continues its policy of forming a de facto ‘Asian NATO,’ attracting Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea to cooperate with the alliance, and in every possible way developing quasi-alliances like the Quad and AUKUS, which have a poorly veiled anti-China orientation… One of the main conclusions against this background is the following: in order to prevent the Central Asian region, which is an integral element of the Russian concept of the Greater Eurasian Partnership and China’s Belt and Road Initiative and is the core of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, from becoming a zone of competition, Moscow and China should jointly develop cooperation with the region… Lack of coordination, in turn, could lead to Central Asia becoming a zone of competition between the great powers and other international players, preventing the achievement of unified and indivisible security in the region.” “We should not forget about the joint role of Moscow and Beijing in the further development of the SCO and BRICS as international institutions of a new type, the authors continue. In 2024, both structures have significantly increased their political weight: the BRICS format has turned from a ‘five’ to a ‘ten,’ while the SCO has also increased its membership to ten countries in 2024. This was partly a testament to the fairness of developing countries’ hopes that Russia and China can play a constructive role in organizing multilateral cooperation on the principles of non-alignment and mutual benefit… Russia and China are the drivers of BRICS, without which the association would simply not take place. It is from our two countries that most of the substantive initiatives in BRICS come. In addition, Russia plays a leading role as a political balancer between major powers that have serious contradictions between themselves: China and India, Iran and Saudi Arabia…In the economic sphere, China plays a similar role.”⁵

The authors warned that so far, the approaches of Russia and China to working with developing countries have not been properly or well-coordinated. “While sharing the view that the current international order is unfair and imperfect, Moscow and Beijing differ in their understanding of how to solve these problems.” “If Russia seeks to establish a new multipolar world order, where the role of the West will be insignificant, then in the Chinese picture of the world competition should be complementary. At the same time, not all countries of the world majority are ready to oppose themselves to the West and exclude deepening cooperation with it. Against this background, the authors’ only logical conclusion is that Moscow and Beijing need to continue coordinated development of relations with both Central Asian countries and global majority states not on the basis of ideology, but, above all, on the basis of mutual benefit and pragmatics.” “Moscow and Beijing should prevent a situation in which non-Western mechanisms of multilateral cooperation are labeled as ‘Russia-China bloc’ or ‘anti-Western camp’…and promote similar principles in their interaction with the world’s majority countries.”⁶

Russians are prone to see the struggle for Ukraine and its impact as a turning point in world history, even more significant than the transformation at the end of the 1980s and start of the 1990s.⁷ After all, just as the collapse of colonialism in the 1940s-50s only led to what they call “neocolonialism,” the end of the socialist bloc only brought further domination by the United States and the collective West. What is different at present is the emergence of a new world order not centered on the West–a change as dramatic as anything since the early 20th century. This time, however, the result will not be two blocs but the consolidation of an alternative to the old order, which the BRICS is primed to unite. Russia leads in this change, having launched its “Turn to the East” as a strong driver for diplomatic, economic, security, and cultural change.

Chinese are more reluctant to accept global polarization or a new cold war. Without referring directly to Sinocentrism, they prioritize the BRI, leaving the SCO as secondary and treating multipolarity as more global. If some acquiescence to Russia’s GEP is registered in meetings of Chinese and Russian leaders, this is rarely mentioned in China’s publications. The continental thrust of Russian rhetoric shortchanges China’s aspirations as a maritime power.⁸ Russians are quicker to put politics and “indivisible security” in the lead in any new architecture, substituting Putin’s notion of the GEP as the geographical construct being realized. Chinese are more careful about their expectations for what is coming, accepting more continuity with the existing order.

For BRICS to assume its rightful place in forging the new international order, Russians argue, it: (1) must be institutionalized as it keeps expanding, gaining the status of an international organization rather than just an arena for communications; and (2) requires infrastructure, centering on the Eurasian heartland, to solidify ties among members. If since 2018, BRICS has advanced substantially, e.g., in pursuing de-dollarization for payments, it is still not focused on forging political or military unity but rather on destroying the system centered on the West exploitative of the “Global South” as had been the case since the era of colonialism. It has established itself as the alternative to the Western-led world, rejecting its ideology while also adding members to the point it now exceeds the G7 in GDP and is pulling further ahead. Despite China’s economic superiority, it understands that no one state will dominate this organization. In contrast to the US-led order dismissive of state sovereignty and intrusive, this order is fair to all.⁹ Such rhetoric underscores the radical changes Russians see under way.

Sergey Lavrov, a specialist covering the Eurasian horizons of BRICS, argued that its expansion from January 1, 2024 transformed its quality, adding to its political weight and potential. He noted that Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in June spoke of a process of fundamental change in Eurasian logistics, through a network of corridors. If success from 2020 was meager, seriously hampered by the sanctions and politically motivated limits imposed by the United States and the collective West, the article saw change accelerating due to the BRICS expansion, reaching across the Eurasian microregion, adding to the three weighty initial group members three others in Asia and nearby Egypt in a new geoeconomics situation. Iran’s location shortens the routes to the Persian Gulf and Middle East and expands the group of states unwelcome by the West, easing the way to a network of land-transport routes better defended from hostile foreign influence. Formation of Eurasian corridors can become a strategic, long-term direction of joint BRICS activities, meeting the interests of almost all members and leading to further expansion of the group. This does not contradict but complements the vast Chinese BRI, while to the greatest degree serving the needs of Russia. After all, Russia’s position is “as a distinct state-civilization, an extensive Eurasian and Euro-Pacific power.”¹⁰ Russia has entered a long-term confrontation with the collective West, and the need to bypass sanctions will only grow, necessitating fundamental change in transport logistics, as proposed in this audacious agenda.

What routes will serve Russia’s needs? The Northern Sea Route along with the railroad polygon of the Baikal-Amur line and Trans-Siberian line will not only serve transit between East Asia and Europe but the ambitious development of the productive forces of Siberia and the Russian Far East, stimulating deeper and multi-sided (not only natural resources) integration of Russia into the Eurasian exchanges. No less important should be north-south routes reaching to the Middle East, South Asia (India), and Southeast Asia. Three members of BRICS—Russia, Iran, and India—will satisfy their concrete economic interests, while Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt will find investments appealing. For north-south transport, along with the Caspian Sea a railroad is being built along the western shore of the Caspian through Azerbaijan and Iran, shortening the route from India and Southeast Asia to Europe. Delays have resulted from complex relations in the south Caucasus, but Putin’s agreement with Azerbaijan has activated the work,¹¹ raising hope.

Given Middle East divisions, an alternate route from Siberia should be sought. The Russia-Mongolia-China nexus would link industrial Northeast China with regions of Eastern Siberia. Currently under review in Russia, construction of the North-Siberian Railway, including the incomplete stretch from Nizhnevartovsk to Belyi Yar and a new branch from Sibirsk to Urumqi in Xinjiang, would not only strengthen the eastern polygon but support loading in polar ports through two outlets on the Northern Sea Route. These routes require vast capital investments, and such megaprojects cannot be based solely on geopolitical considerations but on no less weighty economic realities. The payback time would be shortened with cargo from China and other Asian countries and increased production in regions of Siberia in the new trans-Asiatic network. Another corridor could go from Krasnoyarsk krai through Tuva linking to Mongolia and China. In the planned route to Urumqi Russia would obtain another pathway to export coal, grain, fertilizer, etc. to China and on to Southeast Asia. Thus, Russia would build on the “middle silk road corridor” from western China to Central Asia and Iran and ports on the Arabian Sea and on to India and Southeast Asia. The Trans-Siberian Railroad would be supplemented to the north via the Northern Sea Route and to the south via China. Rich natural resources between the Ob and Yenisei rivers would be processed on these routes. China’s plans to turn Xinjiang into a major Eurasian logistical hub would lead it to use Russia in this way, while the financial potential of BRICS would forge a new architecture of transcontinental logistics consistent with Russia’s strategic interests and the rise of Eurasia. BRICS would be the locomotive, even if it would be premature to be confident that the states will agree, the author clearly recognizes.¹²

In a world without bipolarity or blocs, as international institutions remain paralyzed and crises are a constant, as divisions widen between the North and South and the East and West, India seeks to become a permanent of the Security Council and to use both BRICS and the Quad to reform international institutions. Its principle of multi-membership derives from prior deep sensitivity over historic theft and exclusion from key international processes, from which it is suspicious of Western norms and global dominance. Modi practices “all-alignment,” partner to all, abstaining from anti-China declarations at the Quad and anti-West ones at BRICS and the SCO. He also supports multipolarity and informal minilateral groups, while opposing spheres of influence.¹³ In casting doubt on hyperbolic narratives, some point to the limiting case of India.

The above summaries of Chinese and Russian overviews point to the grandiose visions coming from the Russian mainstream and somewhat more cautious thinking prevalent among Chinese. These differences played out in responses to the meetings over one year involving Xi and Putin.

The October 2023 BRI Summit

We start with the celebration of the 10th anniversary of the BRI in China, where Xi Jinping gave a keynote address focusing on connectivity. The essence of his appeal was to open boundaries by developing economic corridors, broadening transportation linkages, and forging a framework for crossing borders to achieve joint development. Xi warned that countries must not consider a rise in economic interdependence a risk (or consider decoupling and supply chain disruption) but integrate without reservations, as if that is the legacy of Silk Road commerce. He argued that the BRI had been a success through hard and soft infrastructure development, people-to-people exchanges, and ever-more countries (over 150) agreeing to join, ignoring challenges.¹⁴

The optics of the 2023 BRI summit cast doubt on Xi’s grandstanding. Whereas Russia has failed to recognize projects within its borders as part of the BRI, keeping its distance from integration with China’s economy despite a rapid rise in trade (up by more than half in two years), Putin enjoyed the place of honor, ahead of other heads of state as Xi’s closest partner. Moreover, his continued assault on Ukraine cast a shadow, as Xi expressed support for Russia safeguarding its “sovereignty and security.” Although the two designated vectors of the BRI—the belt transiting Central Asia and the maritime road through Southeast Asia—long held primacy, signs of putting Russia, at a time it was widely sanctioned as a pariah, in the forefront muddied the waters. The fact that top leaders of five ASEAN states and two Central Asian states did not attend and the number present fell from 37 at the second forum to 23 this time raised some eyebrows, too.¹⁵

A second problem was awareness that China is retrenching from the megaprojects and lavish spending linked to early BRI initiatives. While proclaiming “win-win” outcomes as the champion of continued globalization in opposition to the United States, China faced doubts about its use of informal sanctions for political ends and the “debt trap” imposed on some states. Casting a shadow too were signs of a sharp slowdown in China’s economy without a new reform agenda.

China’s use of economic ties to make other countries vulnerable without alternate suppliers or markets left many states wary of moving to the next stage Chinese desire. While at the peak of BRI optimism, it appeared that economic interconnections could result in both political and security leadership for China in Southeast and South Asia, the limits of building a regional community in this way had become more apparent. Having gained substantial leverage, China was finding it difficult to corral more than a few small countries into reliable supporters. As a solely China-led format, the BRI appears unlikely to expand beyond economic interdependence.

As Gaye Christofferson wrote, in February 2023 China had issued the GSI Concept Paper, suggesting that a security institution be formed combining BRICS cooperation, the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), the C5 + 1 (China + Central Asia) mechanism, etc.¹⁶ It would provide the political framework for the BRI in Central Asia that Xi had been seeking for a decade. In June 2023, the C5 + 1 summit, celebrating the BRI’s ten-year existence in Central Asia, gave Xi a platform to push for greater institutionalization. As usual, Chinese obscured any strategy for the BRI, as if it had developed from below through cumulative actions of firms and provinces, but Christofferson found a Sinocentric agenda behind it. Likewise, she discerned behind insistence that Beijing and Moscow serve as co-leaders of the Eurasian region an agenda of denial of agency to the Central Asian states and a call for a “common strategic periphery” replacing the old division of labor where security was Russia’s provenance. Use of the SCO (not yet able to be subordinated to the BRI) was meant to nudge Central Asia into China’s security sphere as well as its economic sphere with a Cultural Silk Road now also being pursued.¹⁷

The July SCO Summit

The July SCO summit refocused attention on Sino-Russian cooperation in a regional context. What had begun with a narrow Central Asian focus, primarily to resolve border disputes and maintain political stability without acrimony between Moscow and Beijing, had expanded into a far-reaching organization to include 29 members with uncertain aspirations mixing economics, security, and transformation of the international order. As Chinese and Russians argued, states are joining to counterbalance pressures from Washington that disregard their needs. Yet, there was recognition of a lack of “efficiency in deliberation and decision-making.” Secretary-General of the SCO Zhang Ming claimed that this would be addressed at the Astana summit, making it a milestone in the history of the SCO.¹⁸ Amidst the repeated expansions, the 2023 New Delhi SCO summit had affirmed that Central Asia remains the core area, but clarity about the continuation of the old division of labor, leaving security responsibilities to Russia, was not forthcoming. Even the “Shanghai Spirit” (non-alignment, no targeting of third parties, and openness) was facing doubts, given the prevailing image of anti-Americanism. Indeed, there was talk that the “initiative on World Unity for a Just Peace and Harmony” adopted in Astana was aimed at establishing the strategic autonomy of the SCO versus the G7 Leaders’ Communique in Italy a month earlier, contrasting SCO thinking to the new cold war mentality of the G7, but at the same time recognizing that divisions over security have been slowing the SCO’s transformation.

Two fundamental differences have been highlighted in recent Chinese writings. First, Chinese accuse Russians (called “extremely pro-West”) of emphasizing the need for “de-Sinicization” in Russia’s “Turn to the East,” treated as wariness of extending the BRI to Russia and eagerness to balance China with other states. Second, Chinese see Russia welcoming disorder and chaos, while “China has never had the strategic impulse to demolish the current order and start over with a new one,” thus, disagreeing on whether the world is in a state of order or disorder.¹⁹

Guan Guihai on July 9 offered a rather candid Chinese interpretation of the SCO. “China and Russia have been the twin engines of the SCO. The trouble with this structure is that there are various factors of instability in the model of the two countries sharing leadership, while the participation of India, which thinks highly of itself, has also had an impact on the dominant positions of China and Russia. Before expansion, in the relations between China, Russia and Central Asia — and even though Russia had greater influences on Central Asia — it was still possible for the SCO to preserve a relative balance there.”²⁰ Now, a dual-layer has materialized: China, Russia, and India in one, and these three added to Central Asia, Iran, and Pakistan in the other. Russia dominates the first triangle, enjoying better ties to the other two than they have with each other. Possible too is Russia-India and China-Pakistan checking each other, polarizing the SCO. Doubting India and wary of Russia’s intentions, Guan is uncertain that the joint Sino-Russian leadership will prevail and complains of foot-dragging on China’s economic proposals.

While adhering to “consultation-based unanimity” on major subjects, the SCO, Guan adds, needs to adopt the principle of simple majority for efficiency. “But the Russian side doesn’t agree,” e.g., blocking an SCO development bank. He regrets that “economic cooperation has lagged far behind security and political cooperation… The Russian mindset isn’t hard to understand: China has greater potential and say on economic subjects, so letting the SCO agenda tilt away from security toward economic fields would mean Russia ceding leadership to China.” Guan says that Russian obstruction in the SCO led China to propose the BRI and Russia was the one to insist on expansion to South Asia as Central Asian states feared marginalization. China’s expansion to “Central Asia-related Eurasia” was less confrontational with the West.²¹

The Astana SCO summit drew praise by Russians as a huge step toward the institutionalization of a new architecture for Eurasia, encompassing most of Asia with potential to reach Europe.²² Putin called the SCO and the BRICs too the “most authoritative, multi-national structures in the world,” promoting them as the centerpiece of a multipolar, global architecture.²³ Five themes distinguished Russian characterization of the SCO: (1) equal rights, expressed defensively in support of “world-power civilizations,” not in defense of the Central Asian ones or any other, apparently secondary states; (2) mutual trust, e.g., a call to defer to Russia by not contradicting its narratives and assertions of state interests; (3) civilizational diversity, a rejection of criticism of human rights or objections to deviations from democracy; (4) indivisible security, an attack on military blocs, but also an indirect appeal for spheres of influence, which provide security for Russia as well as China not to be undermined by insistence on one country’s security without consideration of another’s; and (5) Eurasia as a distinct entity in the process of integration, with insistence that there exists no ongoing process led by others that is more than sub-regionalism.

Each of the above themes warrants elaboration. Equal rights must be interpreted in the context of multipolarity, recognizing the poles (world-power civilizations) as enjoying special rights. Yet, there is no clarification of how to delineate clashing claims. Opposition to US thinking drives this claim, not delineating what is equal between other states. Mutual trust presumes if you trust a country, you do not criticize it. Moscow and Beijing join in a mutual, non-criticism pact, as a model. Civilizational diversity presumes autonomous state-civilizations. Indivisible security calls for acceptance of the broadly defined security interests of Russia and, by extension, China in opposition to any US claims of security interests in areas neighboring these states. Russian interpretations of the SCO leave no room for non-Eurasian states to be involved in the security of Eurasia. Citing the SCO as a configuration of the “heartland” of Eurasia in conditions of the 21st century, Russia recognizes an advancing integration project exclusive of every outsider.

The SCO summit ended with the Astana Declaration, calling for a “new, democratic, and fair political and economic order.” Russians wrote rapturously about the breakthrough in progress. Chinese lauded the new international influence and legitimacy of the expanding organization. Both held out high hopes, but Russian hopes rested far more on this grouping. In covering this summit, Yomiuri Shimbun explained that Xi Jinping is wary of sanctions over dual-use trade with Russia and of alienating European states. Also, the visit of Putin to North Korea just two weeks earlier had raised apprehensions in China, which prefers stability on the peninsula. Meanwhile, the big economic issue for Russia—the “Power of Siberia 2” pipeline to pass across Mongolia–is at a stalemate, given China’s hesitation to become too dependent on energy from Russia and its call for prices close to those in the Russian domestic market. The SCO summit was seen as the first of three summits to solidify outreach to the “Global South,” with Russia to host the BRICS summit in October and China to host the SCO in 2025. The goal was perceived as drawing the “Global South” into an international framework clearly to be led by both China and Russia.²⁴

China expert Sergey Lavrov described the Astana SCO summit as a formula for the continental power of Eurasia. At the summit Putin called the SCO and BRICS the most authoritative, multi-national structures in the world, supporting a multipolar global architecture with equal rights and respect for civilizational diversity and selection of one’s own path and indivisible security. The SCO is praised for its wide scope across Eurasia, giving Russia a special place in development and security as an autonomous state-civilization, Eurasian, and Euro-Pacific power. It is grouped with China and India as world power-civilizations, distinct from influential regional players Pakistan, Iran, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan. Countries of the SCO, readers are told, comprise 65% of the continental space of Eurasia, including most of East Asia and South Asia, and practically all of the central part of Eurasia. This is the epoch of restoration of continental power, a platform for which is the SCO. Rather than recognizing China’s centrality, Lavrov emphasizes bringing into one space China, India, and Russia, balancing the interests of the greatest continental powers and centers of world power through the SCO, as a configuration of the contemporary “heartland” of Eurasia.²⁵

The “struggle for Eurasia” proceeds through the struggle for the Eurasian integration project through a continent-wide agenda, added Lavrov. Russia is a driver in the formation of the SCO, Putin’s 2015 initiative to build the “Greater Eurasian Partnership, and the destruction of the West’s stereotypes. The SCO unites various sub-regional integration formats, including ASEAN. In May 2024, Putin and Xi Jinping agreed that Russia’s thinking is fully consistent with the basic principles of the Chinese initiative in the sphere of global security, agreeing on the formula of “indivisible Eurasian security.” At the summit, Russia proposed the formation in Eurasia of a principally new system of security, affirming that Eurasian states want to provide order in the region without the interference of outside players. He adds, the development of the SCO has not proceeded without problems, unable to remain aloof from many international conflicts, as between India and China, India and Pakistan, and Tajikistan and Kirghizia. Serious shortcomings are visible in the absence of a reaction from the SCO or a mechanism to resolve such situations. Reorganization is needed—for instance, an SCO parliamentary assembly with controls and norm-setting rules. The article calls for an integration process for the “Greater Eurasian Partnership” as a platform for inter-regional coordination to advance Eurasian integration. This would be a new architecture with indivisible security in the forefront.²⁶ The old notion that the SCO is led by Russia and China is absent in this analysis, raising the institution to a higher pedestal, with three leading states.

Russia had yielded to China on some SCO economic matters, especially starting in 2014, and attention since the Russian 2022 assault on Ukraine has centered on how much more Russia will yield. By hosting in 2024, Putin pointed to the failure to isolate him, but his efforts were in vain to solidify opposition to the existing international order except in advocating for broader representation in international organizations. Support for his anti-Western narrative or for the idea that Russia could emerge as co-leader of the “Global South,” given China and India’s claims, was doubtful. If Russia needed India in the SCO to limit China’s growing asymmetrical sway, the inclusion also of Pakistan and rise in Sino-Indian tensions had left the SCO in limbo. At the 2023 New Delhi summit, Xi was not in attendance, and at the last minute the meeting was made virtual. In 2024, Modi did not attend, again stripping the summit of some significance. The best that could be done was to reaffirm Central Asia’s centrality and calm tensions over it.

The thinking of Kazakhstan also warrants attention. As host in 2024, it recognized that security and stability topped the agenda. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev called for respect for the “Shanghai Spirit,” including “consideration of each other’s interests.”²⁷ Rather than leadership of great powers, this outlook accentuates the import of other members, likely to be contrary to Chinese focus on great powers and more decision-making authority or Russia’s troika approach.

The October 2024 BRICS Summit

BRICS has much wider scope than the SCO, having added five members just since the assault by Russia into Ukraine in 2022. Putin treats it as club aligned with Russia in opposition to the West. It represents the rise of the non-Western world, as if it could become the voice of the “Global South.” In contrast to the distinct Chinese and Indian efforts to leadership over this amorphous entity, Russia asserts not only its membership but also its mediating leadership between the other two powers. The fact that Beijing and Delhi just before the Kazan summit reached an accommodation on patrolling their disputed border gave rise to Moscow’s image of mediator.

A Brookings assessment by Tanvi Madan found that BRICS has failed to rewrite the rules of international trade, establish a BRICS currency, or boost alternative payment systems to rival the dollar’s role. Yet, she recognized global restlessness and called for a response to address it. She explained, “BRICS remains an organization whose members are brought together by a negative, not an affirmative, agenda. Its members share a dislike of the current US-led world order, but beyond that, their political, economic, and strategic interests diverge so fundamentally that implementation of its ambitious agenda remains unlikely. The upcoming summit is likely to be long on political theater and short of substantive deliverables.”²⁸ One other analysis of BRICS found the whole weaker than the sum of its parts, given geopolitical and economic as well as political system divides. Multipolarity sounds desirable, but not Putin’s claim that BRICS is striving to “defeat the ‘classic colonialism’ of a US-led world order.”²⁹

In one interpretation, “The conference is intended to present a hefty showcase of economic might but also entice new countries into a coalition Russia hopes to build that would form a new world order not dominated by the West.” Quoting Yun Sun, the article said, “China is keen to cast this as a coalition of the Global South against the US-led West,” but “the bigger the coalition, the less effective its policy coordination and unity.”³⁰ It noted that the BRICS foreign ministers in September failed to agree on a joint statement, unable to draft a shared message.

Controversy over Saudi Arabia’s place in BRICS illustrated the uncertainty of membership. If Moscow insisted it was a full member, the Saudi side disagreed, saying it was an invitee. Its leader did not attend, and its foreign minister did not sign the Kazan Declaration. India, Brazil, and South Africa are democracies inclined to work through existing global institutions, while not siding with Putin’s disruptive agenda or even endorsing Xi’s polarizing aspirations. Some vague language on considering “legitimate and reasonable security concerns of all countries,” could be construed as supportive of Russia and China, but demands for a fairer international system did not reach beyond aims shared by most countries around the world. De-dollarization is not achieved by uncertain proclamations, when economic realities make it only a long-term hope. Talk of a “BRICS Bridge” payment system to rival the SWIFT system proved premature.³¹

“Russian propaganda painted the forthcoming summit as a culmination of resentment in the ‘world majority’ against the Western neo-colonial dominance, but expert examinations of the final declaration approved in Kazan cannot point to any signs of this imagined rebellion.” In the background, reports of North Korean troops joining Russia’s war in Ukraine cast a dark shadow.

Tensions between Moscow and Astana also marred the BRICS summit. Kazakhstan decided not to apply for membership, and just days before the summit, Russia banned imports of various agricultural products from there, leading to charges of a “trade war.” Earlier Tokayev warned that the EEU was increasingly divided by the deep integration of Russia and Belarus compared to more limited security and economic ties some Central Asian states had with Russia, a hint at the acrimony due to Kazakhstan’s partial compliance with Western sanctions on Russia.³²

The tone from China at the BRICS summit was more temperate than from Russia. Xi Jinping set forth apparent principles on the Ukraine war. “No expansion of the battlefields, no escalation of hostilities, and no fanning of flames to strive for swift de-escalation of the situation.” He asked to “jointly safeguard the international system with the United Nations at its core, support and strengthen the multilateral trading system with the WTO at its core, give full play to the role of the New Development Bank, and promote the reform of the international financial and monetary system.”³³ Pursuit of the “Global South,” with greater “certainty, stability, positive energy,”³⁴ underscored China’s priority, seemingly at odds with Russia’s approach to the area.

Alexander Gabuev said, “The beauty of BRICS is that it doesn’t put too many obligations on you.” …There are not that many strings attached, really, to being part of BRICS opportunities coming your way.”³⁵ “The 43-page Kazan document largely consists of rounded formulas intended to disguise underlining tensions among BRICS members rather than elaborating an emerging consensus…[but] the gradual emergence of an alternative to the US dollar will put the current global system with the greenback’s privileged position under increasing stress.”³⁶

Suggestive of the importance Russia attaches to BRICS and the cover it gives to claiming heavy dependence on China is really no more than multilateralism, is talk of cooperation in the Arctic. In one article,³⁷ India’s role in the Arctic was essentially equated with China’s, while Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iran were brought into the picture as interested states that also would respect the exclusive interests and rights of Russia there, as set forth in the March 2023 white paper on its foreign policy. As Russia regulated passage in its exclusive economic zone, they would accept the shared normative framework while investing in logistics and shipping. Despite the thrust of the article, it only cited China’s past investment in infrastructure and investment in the Arctic of $90 billion, focusing on natural gas as the Northern Sea Route draws it together with Russia and envisions extending the BRI. Minimizing Chinese and Indian tensions with the claim they have no contradictions in the Arctic, the piece pointed to UAE and Iran cooperating on the North-South route. Thus, the absence of partners in the West is an opening to be seized.

The 10-mile Tuman river separating Russia and Korea, long closed to Chinese ships re-emerged in December 2023 in a Sino-Russian communique agreeing to a constructive exchange of opinions along with North Korea, a theme repeated in bilateral meetings in May and August 2024. This suggests that Putin is reconsidering along with agreeing with Kim Jong-un on a bridge for cars. If Kim in 2014 had rejected China’s appeal for access to the Sea of Japan from its landlocked Jilin and Heilongjiang provinces, this time may be different with Putin now playing a leading role and Chinese pressing him on this. The article warns of ecological consequences, while claiming that a high level of trust between Russia and China would be essential in this strategically critical zone, i.e., agreement would signify that their friendship has no limits with no forbidden zones.³⁸

The Korean Peninsula and Northern Sea Route, arguably, test Sino-Russian relations more than Central Asia does. If treated as extensions of the BRI, Russia would be marginalized, but the fact that Russia urgently requires resources for infrastructure and investments to develop natural resources and build ships puts it at a disadvantage. Recent signs suggest that Russia is yielding to China in order to develop the Northern Sea Route and the Arctic.³⁹ If Russia created an alternative version of the Arctic Council among BRICS, China would be the obvious winner. 

Conclusion

Immersed in a hot war and intent on showing that isolation from the collective West is about to be compensated by a new Eurasian order forged largely by Moscow, Russians rest their hopes on BRICS more than the SCO or Sino-Russian relations. The mainstream puts high hopes on not only infrastructure integration, but also a political orientation in opposition to the collective West. In Russia, however, some join with Chinese in drawing a more cautionary note or pointing to India’s reluctance to embrace Moscow’s dreams. In one combined assessment at the end of October, the cautious side stayed in the forefront. In assessing the Kazan Declaration, Andrei Kortunov and Zhao Huasheng pointed to the well- balanced mix of development and security, identifying both of these tracks for reforming the international, multilateral system and forging a new system in its place. Yet they were careful to say that the new system is not to substitute for the existing one, to “smash the old world, or to unite versus the West.” Without a leader such as the United States, it cannot ever become a G7-type organization, despite giving representation to the countries of the “Global South,” which has hitherto been absent.⁴⁰ Chinese regard BRICS as important for changing the international order, but put more stock on economic appeals to states wary of unsettling the existing order and are less prone to grandiose designs for change.

The SCO is more narrowly conceived than BRICS but also serves Russia’s hopes for a troika of Russian, China, and India. As with BRICS, Moscow is impatient for more institutionalization, as if in this way, the troika will solidify. Beijing weighs bilateral ties more heavily, including its relations with Moscow, where asymmetrical ties have become more pronounced. A focus on economic globalization through the SCO and BRICS serves its interests well against rising protectionism. Moscow and Beijing agree on strengthening and expanding both the SCO and BRICS, even if they are not well aligned on the balance of economic and other instruments for achieving this goal.

The Sino-Russian latticework, centering on Eurasia, turns out to be a mismatch of discordant aspirations. An impatient Russia oversells the prospects and the Sino-Russian consensus, while a wary China sees value in the process but doubts Russia’s claims and agenda. There is no likelihood of coordination with other states, whose ties vary to Moscow or Beijing, to forge regionalism.