Country Report: China (June 2025)

One important theme in Chinese publications of 2024 and early 2025 is the triangular ties among China, the US, and Russia in the context of a rapidly transforming international order. Chinese assessments examine how bilateral ties with Russia have changed since 2022, stressing a shift toward collective security architecture in Eurasia, while expressing caution over Russia’s quest for diplomatic and economic diversification—even suggesting that its further turn to China may be unlikely to last more than a decade. While insisting that the thesis of “dependency on China” is a Western invention, they give credence to unspecified Russian nervousness.

Whereas over the years others have lost focus on the China–US–Russia strategic triangle, Chinese sources insist it has remained the cornerstone of the global security architecture. In the 1950s, China benefited from using the Soviet Union against the United States, and after the Soviet side turned expansionist, it seized the opportunity to capitalize on the US need for support in its superpower rivalry. Maximum maneuvering in the 1980s and 1990s allowed China to overcome its relative lack of comprehensive national power to alter the triangle. Yet, Russia needed to be cajoled as it gradually, over more than three decades, swung closer to China’s long-term agenda. The stages of Russia’s growing alignment with China are well documented in Chinese sources, but more is sought—such as forecasts of what lies ahead. In looking forward, Chinese analysts are cognizant of Russian resistance, fueled by an exaggerated sense of autonomy and lingering attachment to the West, and of the continued need to cater to Russian sensibilities as the main security force in Eurasia and a great power pole.

In explaining various possibilities for the grand strategic triangle, Chinese give voice to doubts about the durability of close Sino-Russian relations, despite largely assuming a close bond in the near term rooted in geopolitics versus the US and even in ideology. Divergent thinking on regional issues is foremost: whether joining the BRI and EEU, dealing with South and Southeast Asia, or coordinating on the Arctic. As the power gap widens, China expects Russia to support China’s positions, while Russia demands autonomous great power respect. Meanwhile, the territorial issue is cited, hinting it is not closed for China as it is for Russia.

Liu Fenghua wrote in Eluosi Xuekan, 2024, No. 5 (translated in Rossiiskoe Kitaevedenie, 2025, No. 1), that the Russia–Ukraine war had caused Russia to turn to China—relying on it for foreign trade, energy exports, and finances, to the point that the yuan is now the main reserve currency and means of international settlement. Diplomats also have turned to China in building a new world order, battling hegemonism, seeking international management of the Russia–Ukraine conflict, and managing security in the Eurasian region. Russia had to turn to China in a difficult situation, but this does not mean it has joined China’s side. Simultaneously, it has sought to localize its economy and diversify its foreign ties. Despite its leaning on China, relations remain, on the whole, equal and based on mutual trust and friendship, and both must reject the Western “thesis of Russian dependence on China.”

Liu explains that the Russian–Ukrainian conflict grew out of the international situation that Russia faced, and led to the turn to China—an objective process that requires effort to manage, which Liu hopes will be done well. The conflict completely changed Russia’s external environment and its understanding of East and West after the Cold War. Since the majority of countries in the East distance themselves from the conflict and the sanctions against Russia, Russia is realizing its “Turn to the East.” The West provided aid in the struggle with the Russian army in an attempt to impose a “strategic defeat” on Russia, leading to a total confrontation. The US forged an anti-Russian alliance of 54 countries assisting Ukraine, with the goal of intensifying military containment. The main reason for the conflict, according to Liu, is the exacerbation of the contradiction between Russia and the US/West over security in Europe after the Cold War, as the latter expanded its sphere of influence and Russia defended its security interests.

Controversial in Liu’s analysis are: treating Russia as defensively responding to the international situation or NATO expansion thrust upon it; assuming that spheres of influence trump sovereignty; and portraying the West as seeking to impose a strategic defeat on Russia and further contain it, rather than help Ukraine repel an invasion. Liu treats Russia’s proposals over decades on security in Europe as reasonable, and its military operation in Ukraine as a last resort, while viewing the West’s response as an attempt, once and for all, to solve the “Russian problem” that has long bothered Europe.

After the onset of the conflict in 2022, Russia had to abandon its longstanding multi-directional foreign policy in the face of a world divided in two: the anti-Russian West, now deemed the main threat to Russia’s security, and the neutral East. Opposed to the West, Russia seeks the establishment of a multipolar international system, while leaning on the East. Overlooked in this analysis is Russia’s rationale for the war beyond NATO expansion; the lack of clarity on other “poles” besides China in the East; how resisting Russia in Ukraine is actually “anti-Russian”; and how “neutral” adequately describes China or North Korea.

Noting that Russia increased political trust in China after the conflict with Ukraine in 2014, Liu calls China’s response to the Russia–Ukraine conflict “wise” and befitting a responsible great power—seeking to manage the situation while demonstrating friendship to its strategic partner and giving new force to the relationship. He insists that China is neutral, objective, and just in its position, which is valued in Russia and respects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries as well as the UN Charter, while also respecting Russia’s security interests and calling for balanced, enduring European security through dialogue. Its proposals largely won Russia’s support, as both sides share an understanding of the basic causes and essence of the conflict. This gobbledygook disguises the nature of the conflict and the meaning of sovereignty.

Most important, readers are told, is that China—even under heavy pressure from Western countries and at economic loss—opposes sanctions on Russia. In turn, Russian trade has shifted toward China, rising 29% in 2022 and 26% in 2023 to $240 billion, playing an important role in stabilizing Russia’s economy. Chinese exports climbed 47%, while Russian exports rose 13%. Liu praises the continued improvement in the trade structure, though he details the dominance of Chinese industrial and consumer goods in exchange for Russian natural resources and foodstuffs. Despite evidence of an unwelcome dependency and a concentration within the East on China, Liu argues that this does not pose a problem for Russia but only further strengthens the strategic partnership—insisting that official circles in Russia see nothing wrong with such close economic ties, and that officials intend to further tighten economic and financial relations. Yet, he warns, Russian experts are concerned—seeing an imbalance between Russia’s high dependence on China and Russia’s small share in China’s overall foreign trade, and warning of a risk that could lead to strategic dependence. Some liberal Russian experts even repeat the Western warning of a “China threat” as Russia becomes a “junior partner of China,” though with little resonance given prevailing anti-Western views.

“Turn to the East” is official policy, while a turn to China is not—although it is the natural result, says Liu. Russia has no better alternative than China and the yuan. Previously, Russia sought to “integrate into Europe” and to preserve an independent, balanced foreign policy. Only after the beginning of the Russo-Ukrainian confrontation, Liu says, did Russia reject “integration into Europe” and begin to oppose US neo-colonialism, while strengthening an all-around strategic partnership with China. In this perspective, China is a passive responder to Russia—as another victim of “dual containment.” Russia has chosen radical methods in the fight against hegemonism, unlike China’s peaceful ones, but the two support each other in defending their interests and upholding basic norms of international relations—e.g., non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. To the extent the Russia–Ukraine conflict escalates, China’s influence on Russia grows. Russia insists on the neutrality and demilitarization of Ukraine in a struggle it frames as decisive for the survival or collapse of the Russian nation—and which will only grow more intense. Russia will need an intermediary, and a neutral but friendly China is best suited to that role. China, in turn, can help swing the “Global South.”

Although Russia, Ukraine, and the West rest high hopes on China as an intermediary in this conflict—and the latter two are pressuring it—the time for a diplomatic resolution has not yet arrived, mainly because the US and certain Western countries do not allow Ukraine to join in talks with Russia, and the gap between the two remains huge. Russia has always opposed the interference of major foreign powers in Eurasian security, but this conflict forced it to turn to China. It has also weakened Russia’s position on the continent. To attract Eurasian states to its side in the conflict and prevent them from drawing closer to the West, Russia shifted its position toward China and began actively inviting it to join in resolving Eurasian security issues—most clearly reflected in the invitation to join Russia in establishing a regional security system, which Putin extended in February 2024, leading to April talks and a May summit declaration. This has become a major pillar of Russian foreign policy, explicitly excluding countries outside the region, including the US Also new is the need to strengthen the role of the SCO in ensuring stability and security in Eurasia—a fundamental task amid rising geopolitical tensions. These shifts have altered Sino-Russian ties.

Liu sees China and Russia as the two greatest powers of Eurasia, capable of initiating serious discussion on the region’s future security framework. The US, he argues, by forging closed military-political blocs and drawing NATO into the Indo-Pacific region, has made it imperative that the Russian initiative move forward: coordinating mutual understanding of Russia’s “special military operation” and supporting a resolution of the crisis as envisioned by Russia; preserving Russia’s leading role in Eurasian security and working with China to reduce US influence in the region; forging a just and balanced regional security architecture; and asserting Russia’s status as a global power. This initiative—building on the 2016 proposal for a Greater Eurasian Partnership—reflects Russia’s readiness to unite with China and use the SCO to manage the diplomacy of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict and construct a Eurasian security system. In the face of conflict with the West, the regional system will remain the priority for a substantial period, tightening Russia’s strategic partnership with China.

As a result of the confrontation with the West and the “Turn to the East,” Russia has turned toward China with limited space to maneuver or balance—even with India. It will continue to draw closer to China in an ongoing process, yet it will not be satisfied with this trajectory, since it still strives to be a world power and an autonomous pole. It remains open to improving ties with the US, Europe, and other Eastern countries, but the deepening of relations with China is expected to last 6–10 years—a window of strategic opportunity. Beijing, Liu suggests, should be sensitive to Russian anxieties, including its desire for localization and foreign policy diversification, taking lessons from Russia’s post–Cold War ties with the West, which failed to accommodate such concerns. Liu’s cautious optimism views Putin’s 2024 shift as a plus for China, but not yet a full breakthrough.

In Eluosi Yanjiu, No. 1, 2025, Feng Shaolei examines trilateral Sino-US-Russian relations as Trump returns to the presidency and focuses on achieving a Russo-Ukrainian ceasefire, renewing attention to the triangle—and even prompting talk of a repeat of the 1970s transformation. In 1996 with NATO expansion, in 1997–98 with the East Asian and Russian financial crises, and in 1999 with the Kosovo bombing campaign, China and Russia faced collective pressure, leading to the birth of their strategic partnership—what Feng calls the first wave of post–Cold War triangular change. If the 9/11 attacks briefly brought the three powers closer, then the 2003 Iraq War, a series of “color revolutions,” and the 2008 global financial crisis saw China and Russia respond with joint resistance on new platforms such as the G20—forming a second wave of triangular transformation. The third wave, Feng argues, came with the Syrian war following the Arab Spring, the 2014 Euro-American response to the Crimea crisis, and especially the US post-2017 designation of China and Russia as strategic competitors—driving Beijing and Moscow into even closer alignment. Following the 2022 outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine conflict, US–Russia confrontation deepened, and Sino-Russian relations took another leap forward. Now, another great transformation is underway.

China, Feng writes, welcomes Russia–Ukraine talks and any easing of the US–Russia confrontation. But improved US–Russia ties are unlikely to reverse or weaken Sino-Russian relations. Trump has stated that China’s help is needed in the complex ceasefire process, which has barely begun. But the idea of resolving long-term issues through a “join Russia, contain China” strategy will not succeed. Each US president in the 21st century has flirted with some version of this triangular adjustment—a recurring but ultimately futile hope, especially given what Feng calls Putin’s consistent and sincere friendship toward China. Moreover, the broader trajectory—of the rise of the East and the decline of the West—continues to shape the international order.

In Xiboliya Yanjiu, No. 2, 2025, Xu Chaojin evaluated the China-US-Russia triangle amid great changes unseen in 100 years—ecological, technological, and in the international situation—bringing simultaneous opportunities and risks. Xu recognizes this triangle as playing a critical role in the international order, as the center of gravity of the world economy shifts from west to east and the Global South gains influence, reflected in turbulent times. Xu praises the research of Chinese scholars studying this triangle. Even as the triangle has evolved significantly over half a century, it has endured.

In an account of the Grand Strategic Triangle (da sanjiao guanxi), Xu lists three key conditions: one side and another (or two others) have contradictory, core strategic aims; one side cannot defeat another or the other two by itself; and one pairing greatly influences the bilateral ties of the others. Chinese analysts see continuity between the Cold War and post-Cold War triangles, focusing on current changes greater than those over the past hundred years, while emphasizing shared interests across the triangle. One analyst noted that the Russia factor weighs more heavily in China’s stance toward the US than vice versa. Another argued that the China-Russia strategic connection is necessary given the US’s adherence to hegemonic policy. Fourth parties, such as the EU and India, are sometimes considered, but readers are told that the prospects for the strategic triangle remain too little examined—a gap Xu aims to remedy.

Xu reviews the Cold War, when Soviet expansionism led China and the US to strategic cooperation, making 1972 to 1989 the most visible period of triangular dynamics after very different approaches in the 1950s and 1960s. Only in the mid-to-late 1980s, as the Soviet Union sought reform and a better international environment, did it seek to improve relations with China, while China needed a stable neighborhood for its reform and opening. Although China’s comprehensive national power was less, it leveraged the clash between the other two to boost its own power and influence, adopting a balancing approach and taking advantage of the adversarial relationship’s total nature. China could influence US policy toward itself.

As multipolarity and globalization advanced, the China-US-Russia triangle retained strategic significance but was losing its zero-sum character. Economic globalization made the bond indivisible even as protectionism and fragmentation increased. Shared interests became more apparent, creating win-win prospects. The US remains first in comprehensive national power—the only superpower—even as it has lost ground since the Cold War’s end. Russia’s GDP is now at the level of a middle power, but its resource wealth, military capabilities, and latent power remain significant. Although China’s military power (including strategic nuclear forces) trails the other two, its position in the triangle has clearly strengthened and its international influence has risen. Particularly in this wave of scientific and technological advancement, Russia has fallen behind, while the US and China have far exceeded it. The US remains the strongest of the three, with the most allies and the broadest influence. It has multiple structural contradictions with China and Russia, which have not chosen cooperation as their primary response to strategic pressure and US expansionism. Western Cold War thinking risks turning China and Russia into tools for a new cold war confrontation, destabilizing China’s peaceful development. However, cooperation remains possible, even as China and Russia pursue multilateralism to advance global governance reform. The US-Russia clash is mainly confined to Eastern Europe and the Middle East—not the Indo-Pacific or Africa.

Looking ahead, the China-US strategic rivalry is becoming more visible, the China-Russia strategic partnership is deepening continuously, and the Russia-US strategic opposition will be long-term. There remains room for more Sino-US cooperation in economics, science and technology, and regional security. This rivalry is not the same as the US-Soviet Cold War clash. US policy toward China shifted in 2017 with the trade war aimed at blocking China’s stable economic development, efforts to contain China through alliances, new military activity near China’s borders, and an anti-China information campaign. Although Biden has somewhat moderated the negative tone toward China, he largely continued Trump’s policies—interfering in internal affairs, disrupting supply chains, and fencing off scientific and technological cooperation.

Sino-Russian relations continue under the rubric of “One Belt, One Road,” with trust steadily strengthening, economic ties expanding, and exchanges advancing. These ties are seen as a model for great power relations. Over the next five years, China’s power and influence are expected to continue rising, US influence will likely recede, and the sanctions environment facing Russia will evolve—all factors contributing to greater balance within the strategic triangle in a stable direction. Leveraging frameworks such as the BRI, BRICS, and the SCO, China aims to broaden its influence. Meanwhile, Russia, facing various negative factors, will struggle to revive and develop its economy, unable to overcome its structural economic weaknesses. Nevertheless, its status as a great power will remain intact as it intensifies its “Turn to the East.” In this optimistic overview of the grand strategic triangle, China is portrayed as managing Sino-US relations without direct collision, maintaining very close Sino-Russian ties while building its own advantage, and benefiting from the troubled US-Russia relationship. Yet, the article somewhat blithely assumes that Russia will remain a great power despite its economic challenges and growing dependence on China. It leaves unspoken how the Sino-Russian relationship might evolve under increasingly unbalanced conditions.

In Waijiao Pinglun, No. 2, 2024, Li Ze examined Sino-US-Russian relations through the lens of strategic triangle theory. Li stresses that from Trump’s presidency onward, the US began to contain both China and Russia in response to their rising comprehensive national power. This fostered a new great power competition stage, reviving talk of a grand strategic triangle and prompting China and Russia to deepen their cooperation. In the short term, this triangle is described as a “marriage triangle,” but over the long run it could evolve into a “romantic triangle” with China as the pivot, a “romantic triangle” with Russia as the pivot, or a “unit-veto triangle.” Of these, the first scenario is most favorable for China.

During the 1990s, US analysts assumed a unipolar world where China and Russia could only submit to US dominance. As these expectations were frustrated, the US pursued policies aimed at containing China and Russia, including NATO expansion eastward, fomenting “color revolutions,” and implementing the “rebalance to Asia” and “Indo-Pacific strategy.” These policies spurred resistance and gradually brought the triangular strategic rivalry into the open. The US aimed to maintain better ties with each of the other two powers than they had with each other, a strategy it succeeded in during the 1970s. Trump, in 2017, expressed interest in improving US-Russian relations versus China, while maintaining strategic ties with China as Sino-Russian relations worsened—a “reverse Kissinger” approach. The idea of a grand strategic triangle has since been revived, though opinions on its significance vary within China. There is general agreement, however, that the triangle is back.

Some analysts argue that this triangle is not fully restored. They note that the US focus on containing China is less about Russia than about US allies in the Pacific and Europe, that China is not playing the “Russia card” more actively as Sino-US competition intensifies, or that Russia is no longer a top geopolitical player capable of shifting the Sino-US balance. This triangle lacks the global reach it had during the Cold War. Different labels are used to describe the strategic triangle—grand triangle, strategic triangle, triangular relations, three-sided relations—reflecting varied interpretations.

Some view it as a classic “marriage triangle,” characterized by two powers versus one due to strategic interests. This results in a quasi-alliance featuring shared military technology, joint drills, defense exchanges, high economic complementarity, mutual geopolitical support against the US and its “Indo-Pacific strategy,” and a shared quest for a multipolar international order opposed to “Western-style” democracy and human rights. Others argue that Sino-Russian ties remain insufficient for a true “marriage triangle,” despite closer coordination against the US, given differing geopolitical perspectives and domestic political factors. Issues persist in areas such as the Belt and Road Initiative, the Eurasian Economic Union, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Arctic, where regional attitudes diverge. Social exchanges remain relatively weak.

One perspective holds that the peak of Sino-Russian relations has passed, citing Russia’s reluctance to fully support China’s positions and its insistence on autonomous great power status and emotional independence. Developing a formal alliance will be difficult. Opinions vary widely, with some doubting the possibility of a stable “two versus one” alignment. Another view suggests that as the power gap between China and Russia grows, shared geopolitical and ideological opposition to the West will not suffice to maintain unity, especially as historical territorial competitions re-emerge and the US seeks to exploit them. Conversely, others argue the US is unlikely to succeed in this strategy due to the strength of Sino-Russian ties, internal US political obstacles, and the US’s sufficient power for dual containment without making major strategic compromises. Thus, a reversal of the current dynamics is highly unlikely.

For the medium and short term, the “marriage triangle” is considered secure. However, this does not imply that the grand strategic triangle is frozen. There remains room for dialogue in Sino-US and Russo-US relations. The Sino-Russian bond is strong enough to contain the US, while the US and its allies maintain sufficient comprehensive national power to believe they can continue containing the two. Consequently, the US is unlikely to rush changes, and China and Russia can maintain their advantageous position in the triangle, even if pursuing a more positive stance remains difficult. As power balances shift, the triangle itself may also evolve, potentially ending the “marriage” phase.

One possibility is that the Russia-Ukraine clash deepens, forcing Russia to deepen its ties to China and leading the US to possibly provoke a clash over the Korean nuclear issue, the Taiwan issue, or the South China Sea. This would lead China to greatly boost support for Russia’s strategic needs in a global cold war or even hot war. To avoid this, China and Russia should try to fragment US ties in NATO and the Pacific. A second prospect is for the US to turn Russia away from close China ties and make Russia the pivot of a “romantic triangle,” not breaking against China, but worsening China’s strategic position. To avoid this, as the Sino-Russian power gap widens, China should support Russia’s strategic interests and respect its great power standing. A third option is for the US to target China to split it from Russia, making China the pivot in a “romantic triangle.” If Russia adopts extreme measures toward Ukraine and the US and West find it difficult to sustain their support, the US could try to seek China’s influence, perhaps using the Korean nuclear issue, the Taiwan issue, or the South China Sea issue in a deal. This is not very likely, and China would benefit, but it could damage the post-Cold War long-term success it has had with Russia and end up facing US containment on its own. There is also a low possibility of a rupture in Sino-Russian relations, turning the triangle into a “unit-veto triangle.” This could result from a changing power balance, a domestic political shift, or a split over regional issues. The US would benefit, and this must be avoided. If the option of China becoming the pivot in the triangle may seem appealing and reflect Russia’s success in the Ukraine conflict and rethinking in a more desperate US, the article warns against this as a temptation, given how Russia might react. The “unit-veto” is most unwelcome. Overall, the article calls for reassuring Russia and not undermining its strategic interests and pride.