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Along with some coverage of Ishiba Shigeru’s start as Japan’s prime minister, attention this fall has centered on the BRICS summit—which Russia hosted in Kazan—and on China and India as two states vital to Russia’s geopolitical and economic plans. Indeed, it is their place in BRICS of greatest interest, as is China’s role in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Neither country is criticized; both are assumed to be amenable to multipolarity conducive to Russia wielding a great deal of leverage. Specifically, infrastructure has become the new focus for how Russia to turn BRICS to its lasting advantage.
In RSMD on November 8, Rustam Khaidarzoda and Marina Dmitrieva discussed Sino-Tajik ties within the context of the SCO. With China chairing in 2025, they expect that the image of the SCO as a force for a new type of international relations will be boosted. Having served to solve rival Sino-Tajik border claims in the 1990s, the SCO in 2000 became a structure for regional multilateral cooperation, and now it is a pillar for forging a new international order. Yet, the authors express concern about the amorphous nature of the expanded organization with a weak secretariat, no binding decisions, and no discipline in principle, even as they commend the expansion (to India and Pakistan in 2017, to Iran in 2022, and to Belarus in 2024) and the Shanghai Spirit of respect for sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrations as well as no interference in a state’s internal affairs. It is credited with bringing a new type of foreign relations to Eurasia. Yet, missed opportunities are noted for what is supposed to be a showcase for the effectiveness of non-Western approaches to international order: security in Afghanistan and tensions between India and Pakistan. Stress is put on the role of the SCO in improving Sino-Tajik relations and the development of Tajikistan, leading to $3.34 billion in investment ($1.2 billion direct) from 2007 to 2023. Dismissing warnings that the SCO serves as an instrument for strengthening the influence of China in Eurasia and that China is proceeding through the BRI bilaterally, the piece insists that the SCO raises China’s status in the international system and in 2025 we can expect China to boost the image of this group.
Oksana Shmakova for MEIMO wrote on Chinese soft power after the 19th Party Congress. While attention to soft power at the 19th and 20th Party Congresses focused on culture, this concept covers the international economic and security sphere, too, as long as coercion is not present. China’s shift from passivity in global governance, as on Ukraine and Iran-Saudi-Arabian relations, is an expression of diplomatic soft power, in line with Xi Jinping’s call as far back as 2012 for diplomacy, his proposal of a community of common destiny, the BRI, and other initiatives adding to discourse power (huayuquan) and cultural power (wenhua shili). Hu Jintao introduced talk of soft power, BRI economic appeals contrast with US economic sanctions (hard power), and Chinese political rhetoric embodies soft power. Disagreeing with Denisov and Zuenko, who argue that China’s use of discourse can be akin to hard power, associated with the pursuit of dominance in the international system while pressuring other countries on values, Shmakova sees no coercion there. She notes that 200 million people outside China have studied Chinese and praises without any details the 2009 agreement with Russia to establish cultural centers. She also disagrees with Denisov and Zuenko that the liquidation of Confucian Institutes in the United States represents a failure of Chinese soft power in light of their great success elsewhere. Despite US anti-China rhetoric during the pandemic, opinion surveys in various states show China gaining soft power from its response. China’s position on the Russia-Ukraine conflict—neutral but for peace and anti-sanctions—also adds to soft power, readers are told. Of all factors raised, China’s economic ties seem to loom largest here for boosting its soft power.
In Kommersant, Nataliia Portiakova wrote on November 11 about Taiwan’s efforts to ingratiate itself with Trump, proving it is not stingy about its own defense. It is not the only Asian ally to take steps to please Trump with weapons purchases, as the Philippines agreed to buy mid-range rockets. Taiwan’s plans to invest in its own defense amount to about $15 billion, including for 60 F-35s, as its representatives met secretly in Washington. Last time around Trump called for no less than 2% of GDP on military needs. This time it is already up to 3%. Japan and South Korea are acting not only out of fear of an unpredictable US leader, but as a natural response to the powerful modernization of neighboring China’s army and North Korea’s missile and nuclear threat. If Biden declared that the US would defend Taiwan, before his remarks were withdrawn, Trump in January decisively refused to commit America to the island’s defense. Now, Taiwan’s decision to boost its own defense will be to the benefit of US companies. In the previous Trump term, Washington approved exports totaling $21 billion for Taiwan, with $7 billion more under Biden, but the Democratic administration focused more on cheaper, mobile arms, suitable for an attack by a more populous force, not the traditional, expensive weapons systems. China naturally condemned the arrival of Typhon in the Philippines and called declared plans “provocative” and “destabilizing.” It repeatedly has opposed any arms sales to Taiwan and military cooperation with it, warning of action that may draw Taiwan into a war.
In Vestnikh mezhdunarodnykh organizatsii, No. 3, A.I. Zakharov analyzed India’s foreign policy, noting that it positions itself between West and East and as the voice of the “Global South.” It carefully balances, using all centers of power and global organizations in order to become one of the greatest powers and to raise its status while preserving its decision-making autonomy. In a world without bipolarity or blocs, as international institutions remain paralyzed and crises are a constant, as divisions widen between the North and South and the East and West, India seeks to become a permanent of the Security Council and to use both BRICS and the Quad to reform international institutions. Its principle of multi-membership derives from strong sensitivity over historic theft and exclusion from key international processes, from which it is still suspicious of Western norms and global dominance. Modi practices “all-alignment,” partner to all, abstaining from anti-China declarations at the Quad and anti-West ones at BRICS and the SCO. He supports multipolarity and informal minilateral groups, while firmly opposing any spheres of influence.
In RSMD on October 7, Vladimir Nelidov wrote about Ishida Shigeru finally becoming the prime minister of Japan on October 1 after four prior attempts. Interest in him has been fueled by his promise to try to create an “Asian NATO” and to significantly boost Tokyo’s role in the alliance with the United States. For Russia, the most important question is whether there will be a fundamental transformation in Japan’s military policy, along with how serious one should take the intention to establish an “Asian NATO.” Japan’s prime minister lacks a lot of authority, e.g., compared to the US president, society strives for consensus, rarely giving rise to strong leaders, and the LDP is a conglomerate of factions, minimizing ideological differences. Ishiba is hardly capable of radically changing things, despite being somewhat of a non-conformist, enters a system of frequent turnover at the top, and faces low support for the LDP even if it is expected to retain power in the October 27 Lower House elections. The call for an “Asian NATO” is a repeat of a new leader tossing out easily forgotten slogans, such as Kishida’s “new capitalism” and Abe’s “Abenomics.” India quickly expressed its unwillingness to accept this idea, and Washington did not accept it too New foreign minister Iwaya Takeshi called it an “idea for the future,” while Defense Minister Nakatani Gen noted that there are no instructions to work for this goal. A bloc similar to that of NATO under Article 5 is unrealistic in the foreseeable future. Multisided cooperation among US “satellites” is already developing with Japan included, possibly in pillar 2 of AUKUS, with tightening military ties with South Korea in a trilateral format, and with new cooperation with NATO. Important, however, is the fact that even the Quad and AUKUS have elicited a sharp negative reaction in Beijing and Moscow. Consider how they would respond to an Asian analog of NATO, in light of the expansion of NATO to the east being one of the main causes of today’s tragedy in Eastern Europe. Japanese recall the US bombings and nuclear attacks in WWII, eager not to get entangled in a new war. In the 1950s, hundreds of thousands of Japanese protested the ratification of the security treat fearing nuclear war. Imagine how much worse the prospects are with today’s weapons. Ishiba’s idea would not strengthen the security of Japan. A conflict on the Korean Peninsula or the Taiwan Strait could follow. Time will tell if Japanese recognize that the risks are too great of being drawn by Washington into military blocs the article concludes.
In RSMD on October 9, Olga Dobrinskaya took another look at Ishiba’s plans, noting his image as a dissident or even a traitor in LDP circles, apart from leaving the party in 1993-97, seen as an ideological opponent of Abe and a voice calling publicly for Kishida to step down, Kishida won support for his political experience and reputation for avoiding the current financial scandal as well as his intention to clean out corruption in the LDP. Choosing him was a tactical move to avoid the LDP losing power. A significant part of his government service has been associated with the military sphere, and he can be expected to further build Japan’s military “muscles,” as will Iwaya as foreign minister and Onodera Itsunori as LDP policy chief. The article asks if an “Asian NATO” is ahead, as Ishiba repeats that “Ukraine today is Asia tomorrow.” It notes wide dissent, including in South Korea. As for his perspective on the Japan-US alliance, which Ishiba seeks to make more equal, to the level of the US-British alliance with joint control over US bases and Japanese forces training in Guam, Americans would have found it much easier to deal with Koizumi, who is close to Amb. Rahm Emanuel. On equality in the alliance, take note of Eldridge Colby, who seeks a place in the next administration if Trump wins, calling for US insistence that Japan raise military expenses to 3% of GDP. Do the Japanese people want to pay even more than the tax hike under discussion to get to 2% in order to realize a more equal military-political partnership with the US? Ishiba’s ideas for reforming national security give many reasons to call him a “hawk,” but compared to the heir of Abe’s legacy, Takaichi Sanae, he appears moderate.
Ishiba is not likely to provoke strong reactions in China and South Korea and is likely to improve ties to China, having spoken of the importance of a summit. He has spoken of regret about the colonization of Korea and has moderate views of the DPRK, casting doubt on the effectiveness of sanctions and suggesting opening offices in each other’s capital. Yet, for Russia, little positive can be expected. He had visited in 2003 and spent the whole night assembling a model of the cruiser “Admiral Kuznetsov” to give to Japan’s minister of defense, under whom he served. It is a big question mark if Ishiba will be able to pursue a more independent foreign policy as a whole and toward Russia in particular. Indeed, his tenure in office is unlikely to last very long.
Suggestive of the importance Russia attaches to BRICS is talk of cooperation through BRICS in the Arctic. In an article in Analysis and Forecasting, No. 3, an IMEMO journal, by A. Strel’nikova, M.G Mairov, and D.I. Popov, India’s role in the Arctic was essentially equated with China’s, while Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iran were brought into the picture as interested states that also would respect the exclusive interests and rights of Russia there, as set forth in Russia’s March 2023 white paper on its foreign policy. As Russia determines how to regulate passage in its exclusive economic zone, these states would accept the shared normative framework while investing in logistics and shipping. Despite the thrust of the article on multiple states, it only cited China’s past investment in infrastructure and investment in the Arctic of $90 billion, focused on natural gas as the Northern Sea Route draws it together with Russia as it envisions extending the BRI. Minimizing Chinese and Indian tensions with insistence that they have no contradictions in the Arctic, the article also pointed to the UAE and Iran cooperating on the North-South route. The absence of interest in the West is deemed an opening to be seized.
Strel’nikova, Mairov, and Popov linked the expansion of BRICS and cooperation logistics in the Arctic, noting as well the development of a north-south corridor of interest to the other BRICS members. Claiming that China and India, not being Arctic states, must respect Russia’s right to regulate passage in its exclusive economic zone and its interests, they lauded the merits of developing the Arctic for the export of coal and natural gas, while serving trade and security interests. If other routes may be lost for security reasons, this one to Europe would be secure. In accord with the new concept of Russian foreign policy of March 2023, China and India will be prioritized, but other partners are sought. Already China is proceeding despite the threat of secondary sanctions, diversifying its energy sources and since 2018 pursuing an agenda as a near Arctic state. China and India should seize this opportunity to work together as the West is left on the sidelines. China may be the first to join Russia, but multilateralism would be better.
Sergey Lavrov of the Institute of China and Contemporary Asia in Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn, No. 10, wrote about the Eurasian horizons of BRICS. He argued that the expansion of BRICS from January 1, 2024 transformed its quality, adding to its political weight and potential. Foreign Minister Lavrov in June described a process of fundamental change in Eurasian logistics, through a network of corridors. Success from 2020 was meager, seriously hampered by sanctions and politically motivated limits imposed by the United States and the collective West, but the situation can change substantially due to the BRICS expansion, reaching across the Eurasian microregion, adding to the three weighty initial group members three others in Asia and Egypt nearby in a new geoeconomics situation. Iran’s location shortens the routes to the Persian Gulf and Middle East and expands the group of states unwelcome by the West, easing the way to a network of land-transport routes better defended from hostile foreign influence. Formation of Eurasian corridors can become a strategic, long-term direction of joint BRICS activities, meeting the interests of almost all members and leading to even further expansion of the group. This does not contradict but complements the vast Chinese BRI, while to the greatest degree serving the needs of Russia. After all, Russia’s is “a distinct state-civilization, an extensive Eurasian and Euro-Pacific power,” which has entered a long-term confrontation with the collective West. The need to bypass sanctions will only grow, leading to change in foreign trade transport logistics.
What routes will serve Russia’s needs? The Northern Sea Route along with the railroad polygon of the Baikal-Amur line and Trans-Siberian line will not only serve transit between East Asia and Europe but the ambitious development of the productive forces of Siberia and the Russian Far East, stimulating deeper and multi-sided (not only natural resources) integration of Russia into the Eurasian exchanges. No less important should be north-south routes reaching to the Middle East, South Asia (India), and Southeast Asia. Three members of BRICS—Russia, Iran, and India– will satisfy their concrete economic interests, while Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt will find investments appealing. For north-south transport, along with the Caspian Sea route, a railroad is being built along the western shore of the Caspian through Azerbaijan and Iran, shortening the route from India and Southeast Asia to Europe. Delays have resulted from complex relations in the south Caucasus, but Putin’s agreement with Azerbaijan has activated this project. Given Middle East divisions, an alternate route from Siberia should be sought. The Russia-Mongolia-China nexus would link industrial Northeast China with regions of Eastern Siberia. Now under review in Russia, construction of the North-Siberian Railway, including the incomplete stretch from Nizhnevartovsk to Belyi Yar and a new branch from Sibirsk to Urumqi in Xinjiang, would not only strengthen the eastern polygon but support loading in polar ports through two outlets on the Northern Sea Route. These routes require vast capital investments. Such megaprojects cannot be based solely on geopolitical considerations but on no less weighty economic realities.
The payback time would be shortened with cargo from China and other Asian countries and increased production in regions of Siberia in the new trans-Asiatic network. Another corridor could go from Krasnoyarsk krai through Tuva linking to Mongolia and China. In the route to Urumqi Russia would obtain another pathway to export coal, grain, fertilizer, etc. to China and on to Southeast Asia. Thus, Russia would build on the “middle silk road corridor” from western China to Central Asia and Iran, and ports on the Arabian Sea and on to India and Southeast Asia. The Trans-Siberian Railroad would be supplemented to the north via the Northern Sea Route and to the south via China. Rich natural resources between the Ob and Yenisei rivers would be processed on these routes. China’s plans to turn Xinjiang into a major Eurasian logistical hub would lead it to use Russia in this way, while the financial potential of BRICS would forge a new architecture of transcontinental logistics consistent with Russia’s strategic interests and the rise of Eurasia. BRICS would be the locomotive, even if it is premature to be confident of agreement.
Russian aspirations for BRICS surpass Chinese thinking. It is tasked with nothing short of uniting the world around a continental network, ending the reign of the West and bypassing it ahead. Ideally, its core great powers of India, China, and Russia would join in leading the way to this new order, but tensions between India and China limit their cooperation, as Russia plays the lead role in initiating unification, capitalizing on its vision and geography bridging East and West. It recognizes that the task at hand is an extension of anti-imperialism and de-colonization, since neo-colonialism remained the West’s approach beyond the Cold War era. The Kazan summit is seen as an important milestone for a new model of cooperation, where Russia showed its hand, concluded Ramazan Abdulatipov in Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn’, No. 10.
Andrei Bol’shakov and Evgenii Khramova in Mezhdunaronaya Zhizn’, No. 10, argued that the changes under way now are more substantial than those at the end of the 90s and start of the 90s, at last breaking the dominance of the United States and collective West. The collapse of colonialism only led to neocolonialism, and that of the socialist bloc did not end the dominance of the West. Russia’s “Turn to the East” is decisive, making it a leader in the diplomatic, economic, and cultural transformation under way. Creating new infrastructure will be transformative too. If Biden sought in consolidating the collective West to forge a lasting world order, China and Russia together in opposing US alliances and NATO could succeed in forging a political-military bloc. As BRICS in its new stage focuses on establishing an alternative to the Western world, it requires institutionalization, advancing beyond an arena for communications. Yet, it faces contradictions, notably between China and India, and divisive priorities fir transport logistics. The India-China-Russia triangle is the foundation of the new order, but it is not realizable for now. Still, China understands that despite its economic superiority it cannot dominate. So far, BRICS centers on the destruction of the world left from Western colonialism, not yet on political or military unity. It represents the Global South in opposition to the collective West.
On October 21 in Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Aleksandr Zhebin marked the 30th anniversary of the Agreed Framework between the US and DPRK, noting that the crisis had begun with the North’s withdrawal from the NPT in March 1993 after it faulted international society for inadequately responding to its refusal to allow access to two sites, which could shed light on the amount of plutonium accumulated. The US does not like to recall its “official guarantees,” including to move to full normalization of political and economic relations. From the start, it did not intend to abide by the agreement, expecting regime collapse soon, especially after Kim Il-song’s death on July 8, 1994. Pyongyang received neither a guarantee nor normalization of relations, while Republicans were quick to plan to avoid fulfilling US obligations and to blame the DPRK. They put more demands—a vast array—on the North, including massive inspections and threatened a naval blockade and preemptive strikes before George Bush raised the “axis of evil,” halting dialogue. The Six-Party Talks failed because the US demanded complete disarmament before it proposed anything concrete in exchange. To date it has not identified concrete diplomatic and economic steps it would take if the North agreed to verified liquidation of its nuclear program.
In Nezavisimaya Gazeta on September 18, an article described how Russia is reestablishing its presence in Indonesia despite pressure from countries in the West. It noted that direct flights to Bali from Moscow have begun, while a Russian consulate is opening there. A free trade zone with the EEU is close to agreement along with entry of Indonesia into BRICS. Relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated in 1965 with pro-American Suharto taking charge after mass killings of supporters of the communist party. Debt owed to the Soviet Union posed a problem, which could have been resolved with more exports but Indonesia refused. The USSR did everything to improve ties, but only in the 2000s did real prospects with Russia materialize. Russia began to sell weapons and intelligence was shared. In December 2021, Russia-ASEAN maritime exercises in northern Sumatra were held. Indonesia is very interested in attracting Russian companies for infrastructure, a nuclear reactor and petroleum processing are noted. Artificial intelligence ties and university ties are mentioned, too. Trade has risen to $4 billion. Of course, unprecedented pressure exists from the West to cut all economic and political ties with Russia, but Indonesia insists on an independent foreign policy, seen in the invitation to Putin to attend the November 2022 G20 there. There is reason to assume newly elected president Prabowo Subianto will continue this foreign policy course, as signaled in his July 31, 2024 visit to Moscow prior to taking office. Talk of an FTA is proof of a desire to be a reliable partner in the Asia-Pacific region.
In Polis, No. 3, A.P. Bocharova, A.V. Lukin, A.A. Perminova, O.V. Puzanova introduced the limits of a Moscow project on the study of the political culture of contemporary China, using social networks as their source while discussing methods suitable for closed societies, above all the USSR and China. They fault the theory of political culture for being extremely West-centric and based on an ideology of political superiority of the Western political model. Asking what to do with surveys of public opinion that are either absent or raise doubts about political pressure applied by authorities, the point to the early 1950s Harvard Project on the Soviet System and the follow-up at the beginning of the 1980s, both of which relied on deep interviews with emigres. Also mentioned are studies of Chinese political culture by Lucien Pye, Benjamin Schwartz, and Richard Solomon, pointing to deep-seated historical orientations, which were criticized by Joseph Levenson, who doubted such continuities and followed by an intermediate viewpoint from Liz Perry of neo-culturalism. Chinese authors as well as Xi Jinping proceeded to identify concepts from Chinese history to represent the historic civilization, but the basis for their choices was left unclear. Earlier Russian approaches centered on philosophical and political doctrines missed the degree to which they were accepted by the population. Answers to questionnaires often miss the dynamics of change in opinions and the motives behind the answers. Using Weibo could help to overcome some complexities, offering sufficient empirical material examined through to tone of natural language. These methods are to be applied to the study of aspects of political culture, maximally avoiding sensitive ideological problems, while looking at such issues as population, education, medicine, and social services, where debate is much less regulated that opinions on support for the leadership of the country as a whole.
Alexander and Vladimir Lukin wrote a joint article on Russian foreign policy after the Ukraine crisis in Mir Peremen, No. 3. They recognized that in its potential Russia will not easily remain in the first ranks of strong and influential countries over the coming decades. Its GDP is 11th, less than one-tenth of China’s and one-half of India’s. Its military budget is less than one-tenth of the US level or one-third of China’s, and roughly the same as India’s, falling behind in the newest weapons technology. Russia can continue as an influential power, but there is no guaranteed foundation to be one of the two or three leading powers or a separate independent, civilization. Dreams are unrealistic until there is a change in developmental tendencies, for which optimism is lacking even to exceed 1% annual growth per year to 2035.
How can it retain the status of a great power? North Korea is stable and has nuclear weapons, but South Korea is an influential force in the world due to the power of its growing economy, role in world trade, and level of development of human potential. Military strength alone does not suffice with a corresponding economy. Substantial groups in Russia continue to live as in Soviet times, from which feelings of shame and handicaps, making it easier to blame others with the potential to lead to social disintegration. A new political course and foreign policy are in order. Look at how France, Italy, Germany, and Japan changed course after WWII, preserving their status as a leading state, followed by South Korea and China. Now, India, Brazil, Malaysia, and Indonesia are taking that path, each rejecting a closed, isolated position in regard to technically advanced economies, as are the United States and its major allies. China switched without loss of sovereignty. It is easier now with the rise of non-Western states with technological strength.
Russia must concentrate on its economy, not on prestige projects or “soft power” with doubtful financing, as China did in its “reform and opening” and non-interference in foreign military conflicts. “Old Europe” should be the first targets, fearful of full subordination to US foreign policy and seeking a united Europe and an independent approach to China, as it emerges from an economic crisis. Rejecting its totalitarian legacy, Russia can win over young people and fears in Europe. In 2015 Evgenii Primakov, advocate of a troika with China and India and noted expert who built ties to the East, warned in what could be read as his last testament that Russia should normalize relations with the United States, while not ignoring the growing significance of China and other Asia-Pacific countries. Russian partners in the Commonwealth of Independent States fault it for turning the focus and resources elsewhere and have been looking elsewhere, and do not agree to unite on the basis of anti-Americanism and a battle with the West, where economic ties are appealing. The CSTO is in crisis. Leaders of the non-Western world are dissatisfied with the West’s domination of the world and preservation of neo-colonialist institutions, but they are not ready for confrontation with the West, allowing them to keep developing. Mostly, Russians are seen as European, but in Asia they are not seen as Asian. It would be of great significance to be in the winning position in a classical triangle of China-the US-Russia, a position China long enjoyed. Do not throw stones, but patiently and persistently gather them up, readers are told.
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