Country Report: South Korea (August 2024)

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Over two months in July and August, South Korea faced major unpredictable international political challenges. US presidential election prospects, changing rapidly, have become unsettled by the attempted assassination of former president Donald Trump, the dismal performance of President Joe Biden at his debate with Trump, Vice President Kamala Harris’s rapid consolidation of support, and Harris’s surge over an entire month, leaving Trump flummoxed over how to react but still in a tight race. In response to this, South Korea’s media analyzed how the results of the election could affect security issues on the Korean Peninsula. This report presents through tables evolving expectations of the impact of the election. President Yoon Suk-yeol attended the NATO Summit, an important diplomatic event in July, emphasizing that the international community must jointly respond to the complex challenges to universal values and the rules-based international order. Left in dispute at home was how far Yoon would go to align with NATO’s growing consensus on resisting China’s aggressive moves.
North Korea’s trash balloons, continuing since the end of May, landed in the President’s Office for the first time on July 24, and South Korean media expressed deep concern about them. Other matters covered over this period are tensions with Japan over the Sado gold mine and the first anniversary of the Camp David trilateral summit, impacting US as well as Japan ties.

In the background were the further polarization of the world over the Ukraine war (including new US sanctions on companies in China and elsewhere enabling Russian arms production), the lingering impact of the Putin visit to North Korea (worsening South Korean relations with Russia), and the deepening tensions over parts of the South China Sea between China and the Philippines and over Taiwan between China and the United States (leaving uncertain Yoon’s Indo-Pacific coordination with President Biden, not just his Indo-Pacific economic framework). Clearly, this summer was not a quiet interlude for Korean media, but a time of further division.

2024 US presidential election and South Korea’s perspective

South Korea is one of numerous countries closely watching the US presidential election in a tumultuous period: the first TV debate on June 27 left Biden looking enfeebled as Trump lied repeatedly with little pushback. “South Korea,” “Samsung Electronics,” and “Kim Jong-un” appeared as topics in the war of words,1 as Biden cited South Korea as an example of the principle that strengthening alliances makes the United States stronger and Trump mentioned Kim as someone who neither respected nor feared Biden, implying that his “love letters” with Kim Jong-un resulted in respect conducive to diplomacy and peace. Biden proceeded to note Samsung’s investments as a marker of his successful economic policy. In this way, one Korea symbolized the merits of Biden’s approach, and the other the legacy of Trump’s illusions. South Korean media outlets evaluated that topics related to South Korea became a topic of argument between the two candidates.2 South Korea’s news outlets reported that the candidates spent most of the discussion exchanging harsh words of personal aggression rather than discussing policies. Mentioning that in the two candidates’ 2020 debate, Trump interrupted Biden and made abusive remarks, while Biden, as a seasoned politician, logically pointed out Trump’s misrule, Chosun Ilbo editorialized that the two looked completely different in this debate.3 While Trump was relaxed and confident, Biden, who faced controversy over his advanced age, stuttered and was easily perturbed. Dong-A Ilbo said that the presidential debate became a negative slander filled with personal attacks and fake information, and in particular, Biden was criticized for stuttering several times and having a weak expression and voice. Although 131 days remain until the election, Dong-A Ilbo warned of an increased possibility of a negative battle instead of policy competition.4 Biden’s age is becoming a serious issue, and Joongang Ilbo said that the debate has complicated the South Korean government’s diplomatic calculations with the United States.5

According to Joongang Ilbo, since the start of the Yoon administration, synchronization with the Biden administration has been increasing using the ROK-US alliance and ROK-US-Japan cooperation as links, so voices are growing that the fallout should be checked in advance if Biden is defeated. It was also indicated that the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group (EDSCG), and Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), which can be seen as Biden brands, are likely to undergo adjustments. Joongang Ilbo stated that South Korea’s foreign affairs and security ministries are currently analyzing the election campaigns by forming a “Team Biden” and “Team Trump.”6 Thus, it shows how closely South Korea is paying attention to the US presidential election.

The attempted July 13 assassination of Trump at a campaign rally saw him stand up after being grazed by a bullet in the ear again and reassert his momentum against a weakened Biden, whose supporters doubted his viability as a candidate.7 Joongng Ilbo reported a widening gap of Trump’s 52% and Biden’s 47%.8 Biden announced his intention to stop his reelection campaign on July 219  and to support Harris.10 This prompted Korean media to assess the consequences for US foreign policy, beginning with the Korean Peninsula, as in Figure 1.

Harris, expected to inherit Biden’s policy on the Korean Peninsula, is very different from Trump. As uncertainty about the election was growing, domestic media called on the government to thoroughly prepare for the impact of this election on the peninsula.

Regarding the Republican National Convention held from July 15 to 18, the conservative Dong-A Ilbo editorialized that Trump, who had been rallying his base with the language of conflict, was showing a different side from before. It is unclear whether Trump, after escaping assassination, is changing his political philosophy or whether it is a tactical change to broaden support, however, Dong-A Ilbo said that he had sensed the need to console the public. By noting that he did not acknowledge the defeat in the 2020 presidential election and even incited it, the conservative Dong-A Ilbo emphasized that attention should be paid to “his unity speech” and the follow-up measures.11

Against this backdrop, the conservative Joongang Ilbo commented that Biden’s resignation increased uncertainty in the presidential election and increased risks to ally South Korea’s diplomacy with the United States. It editorialized that the resignation of Biden obliged Yoon, who was close to him, to drastically revise South Korea’s plans for responding to the US elections. It noted that since Trump has shown hints of acknowledging North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons, this is not something that South Korea should take lightly,12 and it urged South Korea to look favorably on the election of Harris and seek a new Plan B, for the “Biden Government 2.0.”

Trump, who was officially nominated as the presidential candidate on the last day of the Republican National Convention held in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, said in his acceptance speech that he would get along well with Kim Jong-un if he is re-elected.13 In an editorial, the centrist newspaper Hankook Ilbo evaluated Trump’s remarks as clearly stating the direction of diplomacy toward North Korea. In addition, it said that from the perspective of the South Korean government, which has focused on putting pressure on North Korea through strengthening the alliance, including ROK-US-Japan’s trilateral cooperation, policy confusion appears inevitable in the event of a change of government in the United States.14 The centrist Seoul Shinmun also highlighted that the US presidential election was in chaos and urged the government to maximize its diplomatic capabilities to prepare for it.15 Additionally, it emphasized that although the trade and economic policies that led to the strengthened ROK-US alliance and massive investment in the US under the Biden administration will be largely approved by the new Democratic Party candidate, there is no guarantee that they will remain in place. Moreover, it said that if Trump is elected, these policies will be changed drastically.

The progressive Kyunghyang Shinmun criticized the United States for sacrificing its allies by strengthening bloc diplomacy, including competition with China, which is not fundamentally different from the Trump administration. It expressed disappointment at the lack of interest in issues on the Korean Peninsula, such as neglecting North Korea’s increase in nuclear weapons capabilities. Also, it reported that the Yoon administration was completely consistent with the Biden administration’s foreign policy and greatly restricted diplomatic autonomy by deepening dependence on the United States. Looking at the future election process, it added, South Korea must consider practical diplomatic measures that maximize national interests.16 The progressive Hankyoreh quoted Trump saying that he would change all policies pursued by the Biden administration and emphasized that the Yoon administration can fundamentally revise all the policies that the Biden administration has pursued over the past two years.17 In the worst case, South Korea could deal with a US president who tolerated North Korea’s nuclear weapons.

On August 22, the last day of the Democratic National Convention, Harris announced in her presidential candidacy acceptance speech that she would fight for the middle class and women’s right to abortion, helping her to gather support for the Democratic Party.18 However, the progressive Hankyoreh editorial stated that the most important thing at the Democratic National Convention was the new US administration’s policy toward the Korean Peninsula. Whichever side wins, what unfolds before is an arduous “thorny road.”19 If Harris wins, there is a high possibility that it will be “strategic patience” 3.0, where she says she will talk with North Korea to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula but does nothing.20 The progressive Hankyoreh expressed concern that the North Korean nuclear issue would be neglected for four more years. Even if Trump is elected, he may make concessions to tolerate North Korea’s nuclear weapons.21 Since it will be difficult for us no matter who wins, Hankyoreh emphasized that South Korea needs to make independent efforts to dialogue with North Korea, China, and Russia, breaking away from the current approach of only increasing pressure on North Korea. It highlighted that if another four years were wasted, it would be really difficult to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue.

The 2024 NATO Summit

Yoon attended the 70th anniversary NATO Summit in Washington DC, traveling to Hawaii first, where he visited the US Pacific National Cemetery and the Indo-Pacific Command, demonstrating alliance solidarity22 and emphasizing that illegal arms trade between North Korea and Russia would pose a threat to world peace as well as to the Korean Peninsula. It was interpreted as a warning about the robustness of the ROK-US alliance as the security crisis on the peninsula worsened amid military cooperation between Russia and North Korea.

In Washington Yoon said, “Russia-North Korea military cooperation is a decisive threat and serious challenge to the peace and security of the Korean Peninsula and Europe,” and “North Korea is a menace to the international community.”23 At the same time, he said “I hope that the Russian side will ultimately decide well which of North and South Korea is more important and necessary to it.”24 The leaders of the 32 NATO member states in the “Washington Summit Declaration” expressed concern about the recent deepening of relations between North Korea and Russia, and noted “China’s challenge to European and Atlantic Security,” while “welcoming the contributions of Asian and Pacific partners.”25 They also expressed gratitude for the contributions of the IP4 countries South Korea, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand.

The conservative Segye Ilbo editorialized that the North Korea-Russia arms deal is a clear violation of international law, denying a war of aggression and the UN Security Council resolution on sanctions against North Korea, adding that South Korea must keep in mind that although the close relationship between the two countries may be mutually beneficial, it will ultimately only deepen their isolation from the international community. Recently, a North Korean military delegation visited Russia, and Russian military aircraft flew back and forth to Pyongyang just before the NATO summit. The purpose is to maximize the anxiety of the people, showing the nature of high-level psychological warfare aimed at preventing the South Korean government from even thinking about providing actual weapons to Ukraine. In this situation, the ROK-US alliance needs to be strengthened and South Korea needs to deepen trilateral cooperation among the ROK, the US, and Japan, expanding cooperation with NATO.26

The centrist newspaper Seoul Shinmun said that although South Korea’s government has taken out the military weapons support card for Ukraine as a means of keeping ties in check, it is likely North Korea and Russia will further advance their military cooperation, therefore, South Korea needs to consider under what circumstances South Korea will provide military weapons support for Ukraine.27 In contrast, the progressive Hankyorehemphasized that Yoon should actively participate in NATO’s solidarity supporting Ukraine, but should avoid giving lethal weapons that could have disastrous consequences for South Korea’s security. If South Korea, a divided country, provides lethal weapons, Russia could retaliate in ways that would be difficult for us to bear. Therefore, it editorialized that NATO is responsible for lethal weapons and South Korea can focus on supporting humanitarian and non-lethal equipment.28 

North Korea’s Trash Balloon Landing on South Korea’s Presidential Office

On July 24, a North Korean trash balloon landed on South Korea’s presidential office for the first time. Since May 26, North Korea has been sending trash balloons as a protest against anti-North Korea leaflets sent by North Korean defector groups, which has led to property damage in the South, including the destruction of vehicle windows. According Han Ki-bum, this is a “gray zone strategy,” which refers to inflicting damage on an opponent with a small attack,29 contrasting to provocations through nuclear tests or ballistic missile launches. Still, trash balloons, which seem less serious than traditional methods, have a significant negative impact on the public’s psychology and military morale.30 There is a greater possibility of using a “gray zone strategy” aimed at riling South Korean society, such as drone launches, powerful GPS jamming radio waves, and balloons containing chemical, biological and radiological hazardous substances.31 In the 10th spray of balloons, the Presidential Office was hit for the first time.32


Ahead, there is a greater possibility of using a “gray zone strategy” aimed at riling South Korean society, such as drone launches, powerful GPS jamming radio waves, and balloons containing chemical, biological, and radiological hazardous substances.33 In the 10th spray of balloons, the Presidential Office was hit for the first time.34 The Presidential Office said that they recognize the gravity of the matter, adding “Regarding additional measures or response plans, it is a matter that needs to be reviewed more closely by the relevant agencies”35


South Korea’s news media outlets expressed deep concern about North Korea’s trash balloon landing on the Presidential Office. The conservative Segye Ilbo said that if explosives or biological weapons were contained in a balloon, something shocking could happen, so the government must be alert.36 Retaliation and punishment in response to provocations are important, but South Korea must not make the mistake of being caught off guard again. Additionally, every effort must be made to manage the crisis, finding a strategy to prevent it from escalating into a local conflict.

The progressive Kyunghyang Shinmun editorialized that the problem was that the Presidential Office, the nation’s highest security facility, was breached,37 but, it pointed out, although spraying trash balloons is an unacceptable act, the spraying is a response to anti-North Korea leaflets sent by some North Korean defector groups. It quoted Minister of National Defense Shin Won-sik in an interview with Yomiuri Shimbun as mentioning the possibility of shooting or artillery fire in response to the shooting down of South Korea’s leaflets-dispersing balloons, pointing out that the inter-Korean tensions that began over anti-North Korea leaflets could escalate into physical conflict. The paper said that even if the government has no intention of immediately talking to North Korea, it must stop distributing anti-North Korean leaflets and break the vicious cycle.

Japan’s Sado gold mine

Despite Yoon Suk-yeol’s efforts to improve relations with Japan, Japan’s Sado mine, which omits explicit expression of “forced labor,” was designated a UNESCO cultural heritage site on July 27, prompting criticisms of the South Korean and Japanese governments from South Korea’s civic groups, provincial councils, and politicians. South Korea’s domestic media outlets unanimously expressed concern over Japan’s listing of Sado mine as a World Heritage Site and criticized the South Korean government for not rejecting the conditions promised by Japan. At a place where about 2,000 Koreans suffered forced labor during the Japanese colonial period,38 the Japanese government promised to take measures to reflect the dark history and the South Korean government agreed, resulting in its registration as a World Heritage Site. Japan’s representative to UNESCO, Ambassador Takehiro Kane, said in a public statement after the decision to register, “The Japanese government sincerely commemorates all workers at Sado Mine, especially Korean workers,” and “the harsh conditions that Korean workers faced their hardships”, and “To commemorate this, a new exhibit has already been installed at the Sado mine site.”39 However, his remarks did not mention “forced labor.” The opposition Democratic Party and civic groups criticized the government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which agreed to the listing. On July 31, Korea-Japan History Justice and Peace Action, a civic group, held a press conference in front of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs building in Seoul, saying “The Yoon Suk-yeol government sympathized with the Japanese government, which erased and denied the illegality of forced mobilization in the colony and even agreed to register the Sado mine as a UNESCO World Heritage Site.40

Against this backdrop, on August 18, South Korea, the United States, and Japan celebrated the first anniversary of the Camp David Summit and announced joint statements by the leaders of the three countries. The President’s Office offered congratulations on the anniversary and also stated that support for the Camp David Declaration remains firm regardless of the impending changes in leadership in the United States and Japan.

On August 6, in response to the National Assembly’s request to disclose the process and contents of diplomatic negotiations related to the listing of Sado mine as a World Heritage Site, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said, “During the process of discussing the contents of the exhibition, we requested that Japan’s records and exhibition text contain the word “forced,” but ultimately Japan did not accept it,” adding, “Please understand that it is difficult for one side to disclose the specific demands as they are matters related to diplomatic relations.”41
On August 7, Jeonbuk State Council, one of the provincial councils, condemned the UNESCO listing of Japan’s Sado mine.42 Council members from the Democratic Party, the Progressive Party, and the Justice Party criticized South Korea’s government regarding the UNESCO registration, saying “The government will pay the price for its cooperation in listing Sado mine as a World Heritage Site.” 

The conservative Maeil Kyungjae said that South Korea’s government must continuously monitor Japan to prevent it from removing, reducing, and distorting exhibits in the future.43 Additionally, it mentioned that South Korean-Japan relations should be developed in a future-oriented manner based on trust.44

The centrist newspaper Hankook Ilbo said, that even though the core demands were ignored, the government agreed to the registration, so it cannot avoid irresponsible criticism related to “low-profile diplomacy toward Japan.” It noted that the government’s explanations regarding the Sado mine had been back and forth, and it confirmed that the expression “forced labor” was not found anywhere in the exhibit at the local museum. The progressive Hankyoreh highlighted that this is because of the influence of the President’s Office, which placed more emphasis on “cooperation with Japan” than the “truth of history.” 45 Yoon has continued to say in interviews that he will no longer dwell on historical issues. So, the starting point of this issue is Yoon’s perception of history. Therefore, rather than hiding behind the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Yoon should directly explain himself in front of the people.46

The First Anniversary of the Camp David Summit

On August 18, the leaders of the Republic of Korea, the United States, and Japan announced a Joint Statement to mark the 1st anniversary of the Camp David Summit,47 celebrating, in particular, the launch of the first multi-domain exercise, Freedom Edge, the signing of the new ROK-US-Japan Security Cooperation Framework, and the response to North Korea’s cybercrime and other attempts to fund its weapons of mass destruction program through illicit means. It also directly congratulated the three countries’ working group on its focus. The principles established by the three countries at Camp David were celebrated as a roadmap for unprecedented cooperation.48 The President’s Office once again confirmed the three countries’ firm commitment to cooperate and that South Korea’s government will continue to faithfully implement follow-up measures to the Camp David Summit and strengthen cooperation between the three countries.49

The conservative Segye Ilbo evaluated the security cooperation among South Korea, the United States, and Japan as very encouraging, and emphasized that although leadership changes in both the United States and Japan are expected, the Yoon government should do its best to continue the security cooperation among the three countries.50 In particular, in a situation where it is impossible to predict who will win the US presidential election, there is a high possibility that the ROK-US alliance will be embroiled in turbulence if Trump succeeds in returning to power, and negotiations between the two countries on defense cost sharing for US forces in South Korea will be adversely affected.

The centrist newspaper Hankook Ilbo was also concerned about changes in leadership in the US and Japan, calling for institutionalizing measures to maintain the Camp David Agreement.51 The online report of the Institute for Unification said the most notable achievement was the revitalization and systematization of trilateral security cooperation among the three countries to deter North Korea’s nuclear threats.52 By sharing real-time warning information about North Korean missiles, it serves as a mechanism to deter North Korea’s threats. The report also states that the defense ministries of the three countries signed the ROK-US-Japan Agreement, which is the first document institutionalizing security cooperation such as regular trilateral military exercises. It mentioned the signing of the “Memorandum of Cooperation on the Trilateral Security Cooperation Framework Work,” which showed that the level of cooperation among the three countries has diversified.53



1. “90분 설전에 등장한 ‘한국·삼성·김정은,’” Joongang Ilbo, June 29, 2024, https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25259954  “시작부터 목 잠긴 81세 바이든···세 살 어린 트럼프 입가엔 미소가 번졌다,” Joongang Ilbo, June 29, 2024, https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25259955 

2. “[美대선 TV토론] 바이든·트럼프, 서로 비판하면서 北김정은 ‘소환’ (종합),” Yonhap,June 28, 2024, https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20240628099751071 ; “한국 삼성 김정은까지 등장···바이든· 트럼프 90분간 거센 공방 (종합)[美대선 1차토론],”Newsis, June 28, 2024, https://www.newsis.com/view/NISX20240628_0002791122 

3. “멍한 표정, 해야할 말 잊은 바이든···민주당 ‘충격·절망, 후보 바꾸자,’” Chosun Ilbo, June 29, 2024, https://www.chosun.com/international/us/2024/06/28/ZYIGXZHLHRAWBPDEPOKXB5AXQA/

4. “트럼프에 밀린 바이든…지지층서 ‘교체론,’” Dong-A Ilbo,June 29, 2024, https://www.donga.com/news/Inter/article/all/20240628/125679713/2

5. “더 복잡해진 시나리오···정부, 셈법 더 복잡해졌다,” Joongang Ilbo, July 1, 2024, https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25260126

6. Ibid.

7. “’우리는 강하다’ 피격 트럼프, 주먹 쥐고 ‘싸워라’ 외친 이유,” Joongang Ilbo, July 15, 2024, https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25263658

8. “트럼프 52%, 바이든 47%…총격사건·토론이 격차 벌렸다,” Joongang Ilbo, July 19, 2024, https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25264618#home

9. “바이든, 대선후보 전격 사퇴… ‘해리스 승계 전폭 지지,’” Hankyoreh, July 23, 2024, https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/international/america/1150048.html

10. Ibid.

11. “진심이든 전술적 변신이든… ‘증오’ 빼고 ‘통합’ 외친 트럼프,” Dong-A Ilbo, July 17, 2024, https://www.donga.com/news/Opinion/article/all/20240716/125966287/2

12. “‘바이든 사퇴’로 미 대선 격동··· 플랜 A·B·C 풀가동해야,“ Joongang Ilbo, July 23, 2024, https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25265338

13. “[美공화전대] 트럼프 ‘김정은과 잘 지냈다··· 핵 가진자와 잘 지내면 좋아,’” Yonhap, July 19, 2024, https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20240719078500071

14. “’김정은과 잘 지낼 것’…대북외교 격변 예고한 트럼프,” Hankook Ilbo, July 20, 2024, https://www.hankookilbo.com/News/Read/A2024071915010002488

15. “혼돈의 美대선…외교역량 최대치로 높여야,” Seoul Shinmun, July 22, 2024, https://www.seoul.co.kr/news/editOpinion/editorial/2024/07/23/20240723039004

16. “바이든 전격 후보 사퇴, 선거 105일 앞 변곡점 맞는 미 대선,“ Kyunghyang Shinmun, July 22, 2024, https://www.khan.co.kr/opinion/editorial/article/202407221815011

17. “‘바이든 사퇴’ 불확실성 더 커져, 최악 상황 대비해야,” Hankyoreh, July 22, 2024, https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/opinion/editorial/1150201.html

18. “해리스, 대선후보 수락…’중산층 강화가 목표,’” The Korea Economic Daily, August 23, 2024, https://www.hankyung.com/article/202408231721i

19. Ibid.

20. “미 대선 누가 돼도 한반도엔 ‘가시밭길’, 한국 역할 더 커져,” Hankyoreh, August 25, 2024, https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/opinion/editorial/1155239.html

21. “미 대선 누가 돼도 한반도엔 ‘가시밭길’, 한국 역할 더 커져,” Hankyoreh, August 25, 2024, https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/opinion/editorial/1155239.html

22. “尹, 29년 만에 美인태사 방문··· ‘북·러 불법 무기거래로 평화위협,’” Joongang Ilbo, July 10, 2024, https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25262453 

23. “Exclusive: South Korea’s Yoon to discuss Pyongyang’s ‘distinct threat’ to Europe at NATO,” Reuters, July 10, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/south-koreas-yoon-discuss-pyongyangs-distinct-threat-europe-nato-2024-07-08/

24. Ibid.

25. “‘북·러관계 심화 우려’ ‘우크라 60조 지원’ ···나토 ‘워싱턴 선언’ 발표,” Joongang Ilbo, July 11, 2024, https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25262803

26. “‘北·러 밀착, 국제적 고립만 심해질 것’ 보여준 나토 공동성명,” Segye Ilbo, July 11, 2024, https://segye.com/view/20240711516082

27. “尹, 나토 회의 참석…북러 밀착 공동대응 강화를,” Seoul Shinmun, July 11, 2024, https://www.seoul.co.kr/news/editOpinion/editorial/2024/07/10/20240710031003

28. “윤 대통령, 우크라 ‘살상 무기’ 지원엔 명확히 선 그어야,” Hankyoreh, July 10, 2024, https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/opinion/editorial/1148583.html

29. “2024년 상반기 북한의 대남 도발 평가 및 전망,”Asan Institute for Policy Studies, July 24, 2024, https://www.asaninst.org/contents/2024%eb%85%84-%ec%83%81%eb%b0%98%ea%b8%b0-%eb%b6%81%ed%95%9c%ec%9d%98-%eb%8c%80%eb%82%a8-%eb%8f%84%eb%b0%9c-%ed%8f%89%ea%b0%80-%eb%b0%8f-%ec%a0%84%eb%a7%9d/

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. “북한, 10번째 오물풍선 300여개 부양···”, Joongang Ilbo, July 24, 2024, https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25265819

33. Ibid.

34. “북한, 10번째 오물풍선 300여개 부양···,” Joongang Ilbo, July 24, 2024, https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25265819

35. “대통령실, 北오물풍선 용산 낙하에 ‘실시간 감시, 명확히 측정,’” Joongang Ilbo, July 24, 2024, https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25265745

36. “北 오물풍선 대통령실 경내 낙하, 성동격서식 도발 경계할 때,” Segye Ilbo, July 24, 2024, https://segye.com/newsView/20240724516258

37. “대통령실 떨어진 오물풍선, ‘불씨 대북전단’ 안 막나 못 막나,” Kyunghyang Shinmun, July 24, 2024, https://www.khan.co.kr/opinion/editorial/article/202407241815011

38. “사도광산 세계유산 등재…日 ‘韓노동자 기리는 전시물 이미 설치,’” Joongang Ilbo, July 27, 2024, https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25266547

39. “사도광산 유네스코 세계유산 등재···’강제노동’ 문구 빠져 논란,” Seoul Kyungjae, July 28, 2024, https://www.sedaily.com/NewsView/2DBX0DQRPD

40. “시민단체 ‘강제동원 부정 사도광산 유네스코 등재, 굴종외교,’” Yonhap, July 31, 2024, https://m.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20240731105600004

41. “외교부 ‘사도광산’ 전시 ‘강제표기요구…日 수용안해,’” Seoul Shinmun, August 6, 2024, https://www.seoul.co.kr/news/politics/diplomacy/2024/08/06/20240806500194

42. “’성명서’ 전북특별자치도의회, 사도광산 유네스코 등재 관련 규탄,” Jeonbuk State Council, August 7, 2024, https://www.jbstatecouncil.jeonbuk.kr/jbassem/board/17/1/read/61696

43. “사도광산에 ‘징용역사’ 반영, 미래지향적 한일관계 계기돼야,” Maeil Kyungjae, July 28, 2024, https://www.mk.co.kr/news/editorial/11078869

44. Ibid.

45. “사도광산 ’강제노동’ 표현 거부 당하고 성과로 포장한 정부,” Hankook Ilbo, August 8, 2024, https://www.hankookilbo.com/News/Read/A2024080715250002097

46. Ibid.

47. “한미일 정상, ‘캠프 데이비드’ 1년 맞아 18일 공동성명 발표,” Hankyoreh, August 17, 2024, https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/politi Ibid.cs/politics_general/1154071.html

48. “캠프 데이비드 정상회의 1주년 한미일 정상 공동성명,” Office of the President, Republic of Korea, August 18, 2024, https://www.president.go.kr/newsroom/press/MxlYMaTe

49. “캠프 데이비드 정상회의 1주년 (8.18) 한미일 정상 공동성명 발표,” Office of the President, Republic of Korea, August 18, 2024, https://www.president.go.kr/newsroom/press/LMWjwZk4

50. “한·미·일 안보 협력 재다짐, 리더십 교체에도 기조 이어가야,” Segye Ilbo, August 18, 2024, https://www.segye.com/newsView/20240818511825

51. “도전받는 캠프데이비드 선언, 정권 바뀌어도 협력 지속돼야,” Hankook Ilbo, August 19, 2024, https://www.hankookilbo.com/News/Read/A2024081815370005075

52. “캠프 데이비드 선언 1주년 한·미·일 협력 평가 및 발전 방향,” Korean Institute for National Unification, August 19, 2024, https://www.kinu.or.kr/main/module/report/view.do?idx=125469&nav_code=mai1674786581

53. “한미일 국방장관회의 일본에서 최초 개최,” Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, July 29, 2024, https://www.mnd.go.kr/user/newsInUserRecord.action?siteId=mnd&page=3&newsId=I_669&newsSeq=I_82807&command=view&id=mnd_020500000000&findStartDate=&findEndDate=&findType=title&findWord=&findOrganSeq=

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